AKarhu

Finnish Hornets are (normally) rated to 7.5 g just like any other. "Paddle" is not used in air show routine as far as I am informed but it would work like in any Hornet, adding some 33 % to the CAS-scheduled limit g. I am not sure where the wing fold being an issue comes from, and perhaps it can be in case of gross overload (I doubt that though, based on how lift distribution over wings generally is). But in terms of regular in-service fatigue, the central fuselage "barrel" structure, into which the wings attach, has been the main source of issues, requiring some repair slash reinforcement earlier in their life than what was predicted by US service experience. The cause for this was speculated (at least in public) to be that of aircraft spending more time in maneuvering flight than in cruise due to very close proximity of the training areas to the airbases they primarily operate from.

As it turns out, even the slight asymmetries of the airframe itself having resulted from whatever history in crime the individual frame might have, can require enough of trimming to be mentioned in the log. The CAS in the F-18 is actually a relatively open-loop design in comparison to something like an Airbus, as more desirable handling characteristics in maneuvering flight could be achieved that way (particularly with control systems available at the time).

Just as a general observation, when it is told that something can... ...or similar, it is usually a good time to check if some text from a brochure is being mistaken to describe real, expected, and repeatable capabilities of the thing in question.

For what I have read of cold war era ground-controlled intercept scheme using data links, sometimes a bit wrong picture seems to get conveyed because of the ambiguity over the word 'control'. Sometimes the scheme is described as if the interceptors were flown ("controlled") directly by the ground control, as if they were drones of sorts. Whereas I read the word 'control' with meaning more similar to that in the context of air traffic control: now fly that way to intercept, to simplify. Obviously, it would not have been a huge technical leap from there to data link the vector directly to the aircraft's heading bug, so to say, and couple the autopilot to follow the vectors automatically, if so desired. Whether or not this would classify as fully automated, ground controlled intercept from pilot's perspective, I guess, anybody could argue one way or another, depending on one's point-of-view.

I'd take a practical guess that for most missions spent entirely over blue water, the accuracy of the inertial was mostly really just good enough. If you are supposed to keep station over the deep blue, being thereabouts within some miles would do just fine for practical purposes. And if navigating into somewhere, you'd just need to get close enough to be in range of navigation aids near the said somewhere and more or less where you'd expect to be, and then get a more accurate fix from thereon.

Remember as well that aircraft maneuvering limits are not in place primarily to protect against snapping wings or any other part of the aircraft if exceeded, but to protect the designed fatigue life of the aircraft. The ultimate loads that would immediately break primary structural components would very much exceed anything that would be reasonably thrown at the airframe in service, and some damage of lesser degree would certainly be sustained before reaching those loads (that 15 g mentioned sounds reasonable to me). Even without abnormal numbers of over-g events, any airframes of age that are from relatively high stress usage tend to accumulate assorted repairs in their structures, adding weight and inspections if nothing else. In case of the Hornet, the center fuselage 'barrel' area tends to be the primary area of concern, as far as I am informed. Recorded over-g events do result in an airframe inspection and may result in damage being detected if severe enough, however, they are unlikely to result in anything that was detectable by the pilot in any direct way after the incident, unless the limits were exceeded repeatedly over the time and aircraft not receiving proper attention accordingly. In the sim, where you effectively fly just a single sortie, this of course has a little meaning (aside a dynamic campaign, tracking statuses of the individual airframes, obviously! )

I believe a longer range launch with motor burned out and the missile coasting in would make a case point where the threat is unlikely to be detected by UV-based systems such as CMWS, as the sensors are effectively flame detectors, sensitive to missile's exhaust plume (or other suitable flames).

This is indeed done after the first engine shutdown but prior the second one is shut to check proper operation of the switching valves. You should not get any abnormal dings or X'es for the flight controls when hydraulics re-configure as the hydraulic pressure of the system supplied by the shut down engine drops. The pressure gauge in the cockpit shows the brake accumulator pressure. It will not drop during normal shutdown. It is not done to specifically bleed any pressure from the system, and is not 'required' for the stabs to droop after shutdown - they'll do that very much on their own!

Call me somewhat confused, but why should it?

It is mainly a nomenclature thing, but as some Boeings were mentioned, one can think that antiskid is the system and locked wheel protection is a function of it. Basically, on 737 the "skid control" function of the antiskid system monitors wheel's deceleration whereas "locked wheel protection" of the same system compares the wheel speeds in pairs (inboard and outboard wheels, that is) and releases the brake pressure from the slower wheel.

Interestingly, approximately 100 % of pilots first learn to fly in aircraft with no HUD. Many, or I'd say most, of pilots outside the military never fly any type that comes so equipped.

Yes, I do pretty much know what those look like - both from the air and when walking on.

I can't speak for South Atlantic, but something like that is quite common where (sea) ice is a thing in the north. As the ice grinds away any vegetation and such, what is left behind is a band of barrow rock faces and boulders. Obviously, it is more 'detailed' feature up close, but such a band is still a thing in reality on many coastlines. null

It has always been interesting to me that just about always when you read just about any comprehensive writings of significant flight operations, based on first hand sources in real shooting war, almost never one finds one without technical issues playing some sort of role. If not in eventual outcome, at least in how things ended up happening. The lack of this randomness of dynamic nature, precisely what Heatblur is apparently after, makes the simulated world all too clinical even if having a dynamic campaign with proper logistics. For a war not only consumes the supplies the logistics are providing, but also the providers and those who are provided with them as well.

Indeed, this system should be brilliant if we some day get the dynamic campaign. Overspeeding or over-g'ing the aircraft would have proper consequences in readiness rates, as the aircraft would have to be inspected in the best case and pulled out from the line for repairs in worse. And on the other hand, sustained high tempo air operations with limited downtime for maintenance could be modeled to result in lowering readiness rates, reduced reliability, and with aircraft having to be operated with faults open. Oh, just brilliant.