Alps A320 Crash

[chaos]

Well, it is required for flights in the US, practice at RyanAir, now standard for a bunch of other airlines... I think they'll manage....

 

Of course they'll manage. That's not the issue. "Does this make sense?" is the question one should ask...

[shagrat]

Even an armed guard in the Cockpit, might not prevent the pilot from forcefully crashing a plane, but simply another human being near and watching you may prevent you from going through with a suicide.

Add the scenario where the co pilot get a stroke/heart attack/whatever and someone is available to call for the other pilot immediately, or at least help the guy say he choked on a potatoes chip?

 

I personally think it's a good idea, that doesn't require a lot of technology, just a little teamwork and common sense.

 

We will never know if it would have prevented the guy from doing what he did, but if there is a chance it can in the future it seems worth it to me...

 

I'll shameless quote myself...

 

I do think it does make sense.

[sobek]

Did they find the black box contents yet?

[chaos]

I'll shameless quote myself...

 

I do think it does make sense.

 

I think you're wrong so lets agree to disagree...

 

To significantly affect the way things are done onboard an airplane because of some idiot doing this sort of thing once in a 'billion flights' is not sensible...

[airdoc]

I think that the major issue is the door lock.

 

It is speculated that malaysian 370 was also pilot suicide and in 2013 there was another identical accident in africa. This makes 3 serious fatalities in two years. It's an outbreak.

 

These accidents are happening because it is now very easy to lock yourself in the cockpit alone. Wait until the copilot leaves, lock the door and that's it.

 

Most people who engage in serious attempts of suicide have a plan. Many research it before hand. Crazy as it may sound, there is a lot of rationale in this way of thinking. Once someone has made the choice of ending his life, he then has to find out how to do it. It's not easy, because most ways are either painful, disgraceful or have the potential of not working and leading to permanent disability.

 

With the door lock all these obstacles are overcome. It is easy to be alone in the cockpit and crash the aircraft. The plan is bulletproof.

 

I 'm certain that the piliot of germanwings had a plan sorted out. Note that he engaged the autopilot. This was probably because he wanted to witness the final minutes. He wouldn't have done it if he had to fight for it.

 

Two people always in the cockpit should be mandatory, but its not enough. Because there could still be many ways that one determined pilot find himself alone in the cockpit (i.e. lock during the transition, find an excuse for being let alone, etc). They should implement some rules that allow the door to be opened under specific circumstances.

 

This door lock thing is turning to lead to more loss of life than it is supposedly saving.

[chaos]

It's an outbreak.

 

With the door lock all these obstacles are overcome. It is easy to be alone in the cockpit and crash the aircraft. The plan is bulletproof. .

 

It really isn't an 'outbreak' and the lock has been in place since 2001. It really isn't difficult to crash a plane when you're in command... even with all the jumpseats taken.

 

Now we hear a Dutch politician wondering if the doorlock is still relevant. I don't know whether to laugh or cry...

[airdoc]

It really isn't an 'outbreak' and the lock has been in place since 2001. It really isn't difficult to crash a plane when you're in command... even with all the jumpseats taken.

 

Now we hear a Dutch politician wondering if the doorlock is still relevant. I don't know whether to laugh or cry...

 

If we had witnessed 3 major hijacking accidents in 2 years we would be hysterically talking about an imminent Armageddon and the rise of terrorism.

 

If there was a single malfunction in an aircraft that had lead to 3 crashes the company would have be so much defamed that it would have shutdown and the NTSB would be behind bars for not having taken appropriate measures.

 

Yet, we are witnessing 2 definite pilot suicides + 1 probable (the provisional report of 370 points to suicide) in two years, all of which were made possible by the existence of the door lock.

 

This qualifies as an outbreak and as a serious new threat to flight safety.

Facts speak for themselves. There is no moral justification for using a measure that protects lives on the one hand, but facilitates loss on the other one.

[SimFreak]

I think that the major issue is the door lock.

 

 

 

 

Errrr. I can cause structural failure of an aircraft in less than 30 seconds. Regardless if someone is sitting next to me. It might be "slightly" harder but given a will there is a way. Your locks will not do anything. Unless they are physically holding yoke down 100% of flight and can overpower me....which is impractical to impossible. Try stopping someone from doing Slit-S at full power from cruise altitude in a heavy.

[airdoc]

Errrr. I can cause structural failure of an aircraft in less than 30 seconds. Regardless if someone is sitting next to me. It might be "slightly" harder but given a will there is a way. Your locks will not do anything. Unless they are physically holding yoke down 100% of flight and can overpower me....which is impractical to impossible. Try stopping someone from doing Slit-S at full power from cruise altitude in a heavy.

 

You are not getting my point.

 

People who contemplate taking down their aircraft are not terrorists. 99% of the times they will not engange in the attempt if they know that they would have to fight / be resisted / fail and have to spend their life in jail.

 

This is why you observe so many accidents now, after the door is locked. You could argue that Germanwings pilot did not have to lock the door, he could just have engaged in the behavior you are describing right after takeoff, etc. But he didn't. And neither of the former cases did. They waited until they were left alone in the cockpit.

[SimFreak]

You are not getting my point.

 

People who contemplate taking down their aircraft are not terrorists. 99% of the times they will not engange in the attempt if they know that they would have to fight / be resisted / fail and have to spend their life in jail.

 

This is why you observe so many accidents now, after the door is locked. You could argue that Germanwings pilot did not have to lock the door, he could just have engaged in the behavior you are describing right after takeoff, etc. But he didn't. And neither of the former cases did. They waited until they were left alone in the cockpit.

 

I don't see your logic. Would you be happier if locks were removed and your local Jihad nut had access to it?

[alfredo_laredo]

First of all, if this was a suicide, this is not a normal case. There are thousands of planes flying right now with a lot of depressed and even suicidal pilots out there but none of them are trying to kill themselfs with 150 passanger on board.

 

I think the solution to this issue its better medical checkups, better company policies on psychology issues on their pilots.

 

Now as a real life pilot, I completly understand the issues of not wanting to express any phisical or psychological issues to your Aviation Medic or the company. You may loose your license, your work.

 

The nonsense of a pilot always being at his 110% during all flights its just wrong, thats why we have two persons crews, several software and hardware working for us etc.

 

Obviously if I had depression like in a suicidal way and I tell the company I work for.. Ill loose my job instantly, If I tell that in my medical I would be marked as not fit to fly.

 

But depression doesnt come out of nowhere, and if not checked and not attended can lead to this kind of accidents.

But pilots we are all afraid of comming up and saying "you know what? Ive been feeling sad"

 

And thats were the problem really starts.

 

In a perfect world you would come up and say it.. at the beginning of it and the company will understand it and the FAA will understand it and get help, and if you get better be able to keep your job.

 

In the end, the airline have spend thousands of dollars training a single pilot. why not also spend a little in detecting and resolving phisical and psychological conditions? and try to solve them before they decide to terminate them

 

But in a lot of countries the bar its much much lower, I once knew an arline pilot that lost its license because he lost half his index finger in an accident (non aviation related). the excuse was that he wasnt able to use the PTT!!!

 

Everyday pilots are working more hours and getting less pay.

[Yurgon]

I agree that the door lock is a problem.

 

On the other hand, how many airliner hijackings have taken place in the past decade? I think I recall one where the hijackers were overpowered by passengers somewhere in Asia a couple of years ago, but I couldn't find a reference to it with a quick web search. I found two other hijackings (one of which an attempted hijacking where a flight attendant was taken hostage).

 

I'd say the door lock seems to serve its purpose very well.

 

Getting rid of it would re-enable a forceful take-over of the cockpit by hijackers/terrorists. I don't see the golden way out of this dilemma, but as I said before I'd rather trust the pilots to not wanting to kill me than I would trust technical solutions to prevent them from doing so.

[airdoc]

I don't see your logic. Would you be happier if locks were removed and your local Jihad nut had access to it?

 

That's really not what I suggested. And you're not quite putting an argumentative point of view.

 

I could reply by saying "are you happier with having 150 people every year been murdered by a mental pilot or by a jihadist?"

 

Obviously any kind of solution should weigh loss of human life as the end point, regardless of where it is coming from and see that it is minimised.

[dagandolfo]

Having 2 persons in the cockpit at all times is another ridiculous rule to keep the flying public happy.

 

Had there been a second person in the cockpit on this occasion they could have let the pilot in and the psycho who locked the pilot out and murdered 150 innocent people probably wouldn't have been able to carry out this atrocity.

 

Doing something to keep 150 people alive isn't ridiculous.

[SimFreak]

<Ping Ping> Warning message pops up.

 

Warning: !Airplane control is locked out!

 

1 weight on P-seat detected an empty seat - Please sit down and enter password to regain aircraft control.

 

<Ping Ping>

[chaos]

.

 

Doing something to keep 150 people alive isn't ridiculous.

 

Doing something useful to keep 150 people alive isn't ridiculous

 

There... fixed it for you.

 

From my point of view this is all window dressing and will not accomplish anything besides creating hassle for the crew. I hasten to add that this new 'rule' created by the relevant authorities is a recommendation.

[159th_Falcon]

<Ping Ping> Warning message pops up.

 

Warning: !Airplane control is locked out!

 

1 weight on P-seat detected an empty seat - Please sit down and enter password to regain aircraft control.

 

<Ping Ping>

 

No thank's. Imagine a hickup in this system during an emergency decent......

Or on approach.

Or on take-off.

 

Or any other part of the flight, the pilot should never ever be locked out of control.

Certainly not by an automated system.

[vicx]

I have only a casual knowledge of passenger airliners and even I have read about problems that have emerged from Airbus automation.

 

A very cynical part of me feels that safety when viewed at the corporate level is less focused on life and more focused on liability. Airbus automation mean that airbus takes some liability which makes airlines happy. Airbus has all the lawyers, technical experts and insurance it needs to carry the burden of liability in the case of equipment and operational failures.

 

Now to be less cynical. Statistically automation has probably reduced by a large margin ALL accidents by reducing human error which has always been statistically significant.

 

Still it is a common way of thinking to be more disturbed by the rare accident that occurs from software and hardware failure than by more frequent accidents from human error. Why is that?

 

In the end we want someone to blame. Personally I think pilots should have control AND carry the blame. Statistics be damned, we are humans, not cogs in the machine.

[Azrayen]

I agree with airdoc, and a few others.

 

One cannot be 100% sure to stop a determined & insider suicide attempt. No matter how many safeties you implement (and each one of them has to be sensible & economical enough not to jeopardize the very existence of your business).

Acknowledged. Agreed. Granted.

 

That being said, this is not an excuse to refuse to discuss, assess (and implement, if found useful) new safety mesures.

 

Getting rid of the reinforced door (since 9/11) is a no-go, from a PR PoV only (notwithstanding all others aspects).

 

But :

• 2 people at all time in the cockpit is a good idea. Some companies didn't wait for the recent crash to make a SOP of this. Kudos to them.
  
  • it is not only or even mainly to manage possible "weak" suicidal attempts; it also work if for whatever reason one pilot is incapacited and/or cannot re-enter the cockpit; the second person can then help with whatever the now single pilot tasks him/her, e.g. communicating with the cabin, with the ground, monitoring this or that parameter... etc.

  [*]The fact that one person alone can lock himself/herself inside the cockpit is a bad idea. What to do about this?

  • dismiss over-complicated ideas (e.g. remote door opening from ATC commands: far to many points of potential failure in this)
    
  • keep it simple: replace the (current) single switch for door lock (that overrides emergency external code) by 2 different switches, placed in a way that one people cannot operate both at the same time + door lock must be validated by the two switches operated at the same time; this prevent a single person to lock himself in the cockpit, but retains the ability for a crew (2 pilots or a pilot + FA in case of loo-call) to deny entry to anyone if danger is present.

[shagrat]

Brilliant idea! Simple, and effective...

[159th_Falcon]

keep it simple: replace the (current) single switch for door lock (that overrides emergency external code) by 2 different switches, placed in a way that one people cannot operate both at the same time + door lock must be validated by the two switches operated at the same time; this prevent a single person to lock himself in the cockpit, but retains the ability for a crew (2 pilots or a pilot + FA in case of loo-call) to deny entry to anyone if danger is present.

 

 

 

That's seems like a really good idea actually, two switches in the cockpit instead of one.

 

Could even make it so that once they are in the door locked position they remain there unless moved by either pilot.

Removing the need of to relock the door after a given time as it is now. (apparently)

[Flagrum]

That's seems like a really good idea actually, two switches in the cockpit instead of one.

 

Could even make it so that once they are in the door locked position they remain there unless moved by either pilot.

Removing the need of to relock the door after a given time as it is now. (apparently)

That would defeat the purpose of this idea - one person could activate both switches then. :o)

 

But for the original idea ... don't know, I guess one can find drawbacks in every idea. Like: what if one pilot is unconscious and the other wants to lock the cockpit? Maybe because the terrorist who poisoned the food (which knocked out the other pilot) is still out there?

[159th_Falcon]

That would defeat the purpose of this idea - one person could activate both switches then. :o)

 

But for the original idea ... don't know, I guess one can find drawbacks in every idea. Like: what if one pilot is unconscious and the other wants to lock the cockpit? Maybe because the terrorist who poisoned the food (which knocked out the other pilot) is still out there?

 

No, you could not. Let me try to explain.

There are switches that work a bit similar to a relay.

They only stay in a certain position if a current is going trough a holding coil.

 

Now if the holding coil circuit of both switches is placed in series before going to ground you need to keep both switches in the given position for the holding circuit to start working.

Once it works though your free to let go and they will stay where they are.

 

I believe there are a couple of these kind of switches in the A-10C, on the LH console just besides the throttle, not sure what they do or what there called though.

 

***EDIT***

Like these;

http://sensing.honeywell.com/products/Basic-Switches/Toggle-Switches/ET/Ne/3025/N/3670

Edited March 29, 2015 by 159th_Falcon

[airdoc]

I agree with airdoc, and a few others.

 

One cannot be 100% sure to stop a determined & insider suicide attempt. No matter how many safeties you implement (and each one of them has to be sensible & economical enough not to jeopardize the very existence of your business).

Acknowledged. Agreed. Granted.

 

That being said, this is not an excuse to refuse to discuss, assess (and implement, if found useful) new safety mesures.

 

Getting rid of the reinforced door (since 9/11) is a no-go, from a PR PoV only (notwithstanding all others aspects).

 

But :

• 2 people at all time in the cockpit is a good idea. Some companies didn't wait for the recent crash to make a SOP of this. Kudos to them.
  
  • it is not only or even mainly to manage possible "weak" suicidal attempts; it also work if for whatever reason one pilot is incapacited and/or cannot re-enter the cockpit; the second person can then help with whatever the now single pilot tasks him/her, e.g. communicating with the cabin, with the ground, monitoring this or that parameter... etc.
    

   

  [*]The fact that one person alone can lock himself/herself inside the cockpit is a bad idea. What to do about this?

  • dismiss over-complicated ideas (e.g. remote door opening from ATC commands: far to many points of potential failure in this)
    
  • keep it simple: replace the (current) single switch for door lock (that overrides emergency external code) by 2 different switches, placed in a way that one people cannot operate both at the same time + door lock must be validated by the two switches operated at the same time; this prevent a single person to lock himself in the cockpit, but retains the ability for a crew (2 pilots or a pilot + FA in case of loo-call) to deny entry to anyone if danger is present.
    

   

 

 

Excellent idea, it combines the mandatory presence of two people in the cockpit with the potential of not being able to lock if only one is present (and this also serves as a motive for sticking to the 2-people-always-in-cockpit rule). Even in the case that terrorists would have seized one pilot after he exited, his replacement in the cockpit would still be able to account for the second person and lock the door (lock means overriding the opening code, the cockpit door is locked anyway during flight when it shuts).

Edited March 30, 2015 by airdoc

[chaos]

Excellent idea, it combines the mandatory presence of two people in the cockpit ...).

 

2 persons in the cockpit is NOT mandatory... it's a recommendation.

 

Besides... it is a bad idea. What if the other person is incapacitated? Now you created another problem by trying to solve the first one. Great!

Edited March 31, 2015 by chaos