DCS: AJS-37 Viggen Discussion

[mattebubben]

It was probably something that could had been done (Since the AJS 37 already had the same unused stations that the Boy 401 was attached to on the JA 37)

 

But it was probably considered that it was not needed and that such a modification would have been an Unnecessary expense.

 

And they would still have had to keep the Pod that the AJS 37 already used since it had other uses that a smaller chaff dispenser could not fulfill.

And giving up 1 pylon was not considered any significant problem.

 

Especially since it was usually only 1 aircraft in each flight that would carry the Chaff/flare pod.

[Farks]

Surely everyone who can read Swedish and has any interest in the Viggen has read the excellent doctrine analysis paper Med invasionen i sikte, but for the benefit of the linguistically impaired, a few tidbits from it may be of interest.

 

Farks summed the most important points of E1 up, but I'll start off with some background information to help you understand the context it was supposed to work in. The structure of the Swedish military and defense planning, as it developed in the 1950's, was highly decentralized - a feature that would remain intact until the end of the Cold War. The planners greatly feared a 1940 scenario where the mobilization either never got started or the central command was decapitated early on, and this was only increased by the possibility of nuclear strikes on important command centers. For this reason, the mobilization was designed to be impossible to stop once it had started (hence all the propaganda that said "every message that claims that the mobilization has been cancelled is false", and its later variant on the same tune that said "every message that claims that the resistance has ended is false"). All equipment storage was highly decentralized in order to prevent sabotage or surgical strikes on important locations.

 

With mobilization covered, the next step was to make lower levels of the chain of command so autonomous that they could handle themselves even if the top staffs got nuked, sabotaged or were otherwise unreachable. The country was divided into seven military districts (militärområden, milo), which were then subdivided into smaller pieces (försvarsområden, fo) that mostly corresponded to the counties of the civilian administration. A commander of a military district effectively had the command of all forces in his district, including fighter squadrons, which he could use at his own discretion. The Swedish army of the later cold war didn't have army divisions; the brigades were directly under military district commanders instead.

 

The exception to this structure was E1. E1 was not part of the regular chain of command - instead all six squadrons were under their own staff that answered only to the commander-in-chief and the joint headquarters. In other words, it was a strategic resource, not a tactical one. Under special circumstances a military district commander could be assigned a number of sorties from E1 per day to do something, but before the expected naval invasion, E1 could not be jeopardized on lesser tasks. In a decisive situation that could determine the course of the war like a naval invasion, however, E1 was to be used completely without regard for losses. Quoting directly from a formerly top secret 1963 doctrine document as cited in the paper mentioned:

 

(The underlining is from the original text.)

 

If I remember correctly, that document suggests that the secondary mission for E1 would be interdiction missions in northern Sweden, Finland and even Russia. But that would problary only happen if the naval threat was no longer considered realistic, if for example the WP had depleted their Baltic naval forces on attacking West-Germany and Denmark.

[renhanxue]

Yep. And those missions would not be flown much more carefully, to minimize losses. There was no sense in throwing aircraft and pilots away if the decisive moment wasn't there. But still, E1 in the 1960's and 70's was very much a strategic resource - it simply didn't do tactical strike missions like CAS. The army had no forward air controllers and E1 didn't train for that kind of missions. It was all about attacking important strategic targets like infrastructure (bridges, ports, airfields), command posts, logistics centers etc, and maybe bridgeheads if the opportunity was there and there was little to no AA .

 

By the time the AJS 37 rolled around in the 90's this extreme focus on anti-shipping work had been reduced a bit and it was at least conceivable to attack other targets, but things like the GBU-39 SDB and other precision ground attack weapons were not acquired until after 2000, the dismantling of the old invasion defense and the retirement of the Viggen system.

Edited August 7, 2016 by renhanxue

[Farks]

Speaking of E1: would it be far-fetched to assume that one of the reasons E1 was kept intact while the other three air groups were disbanded in 1966 had to do with nuclear weapons? They were still on the table when that happend, as far as I can tell.

[renhanxue]

I think that does sound a bit far-fetched. First, nuclear weapons were already well on the way to dying in 1966, especially as far as the air force was concerned, but you don't even need to use that for an explanation. E1 was a strategic resource before the reform and remained so afterwards - nothing changed in that regard. The purpose was always force concentration against a strategic target (like the invasion fleet). The rest of the air force simply didn't have that need for force concentration and it made more sense to decentralize.

 

Quoting the paper:

CFV och flygledningen blev visserligen en del av ÖB:s högkvarter i krig från 1961, men de fyra eskadrarna bibehölls intakta. Som visats i avsnitt 2.3 förordade flygvapnet endast tre nya militärområden i samband med den regionala ledningsreformen för att inte ytterligare splittra flygstridskrafterna. Det blev en kompromiss, innebärande sex nya militärområden men där i praktiken endast tre utövade luftoperativ ledning. Då dessa tre även ledde den luftoperativa verksamheten i var sitt annat militärområde blev den slutliga lösningen snarlik de gamla eskaderområdena E 2, E 3 och E 4. Flygvapnet behöll även E 1 med allt attackflyg direkt underställt ÖB i syfte att kunna kraftsamla i hela operationsområdet i tid och rum. De andra eskadrarnas motsvarande möjligheter hade för övrigt övergetts redan 1957 i och med att de tidigare flygbasområdena då uppgick i eskadrarna som därmed förvandlades till territoriella enheter, om än med möjligheter att förstärka varandra. En strävan efter, åtminstone relativt andra försvarsgrenar, centraliserad ledning framgår tydligt.

[Farks]

Yeah, I guess that makes sense.

 

On to something different then: any good estimates of what would a soviet invasion fleet heading towards Sweden would consist of in the late '80s or early '90s (considering it's the relevant time period for this module)? We've got this picture, but it's about the late '60s and I don't know how reliable the information in it is.

[BravoYankee4]

Yeah, I guess that makes sense.

 

On to something different then: any good estimates of what would a soviet invasion fleet heading towards Sweden would consist of in the late '80s or early '90s (considering it's the relevant time period for this module)? We've got this picture, but it's about the late '60s and I don't know how reliable the information in it is.

 

I'll try to dig out old slides from my fathers archives that might give us some details regarding this. I kept some presentations he had, but I haven't got the time to go through it all yet.

He served at K3, then Milostab V and later UNDS, so there are some gold to be found among all the papers, slides and films :)

[scaflight]

I'll try to dig out old slides from my fathers archives that might give us some details regarding this. I kept some presentations he had, but I haven't got the time to go through it all yet.

He served at K3, then Milostab V and later UNDS, so there are some gold to be found among all the papers, slides and films :)

 

I'd be very interested in more information! One of the elements mentioned in Med Invasionen i Sikte (p. 16) is the movement of Russian forces by way of helicopter, where est. 100 Mi-4 would fly at least twice a day. I can imagine that this force, partially shielded by Migs, could present us with a very nice mission for a invasion-type campaign.

[Silver_Dragon]

I'll try to dig out old slides from my fathers archives that might give us some details regarding this. I kept some presentations he had, but I haven't got the time to go through it all yet.

He served at K3, then Milostab V and later UNDS, so there are some gold to be found among all the papers, slides and films :)

 

 

Not bad update the "invasion" force from the pic with a 80s-90s period vessels (typical 86-87 WW3 scenery on NATO-PacVar central front). I go to check "Harpoon" wargame to fit the forces of Soviet Baltic Fleet and update the fleet.

[Fredo_69]

I think that pic would be quite relevant into the 1980-ies if you only delete the Sverdlov and replaces the Mirkas with Grisja/Parchim and the Kotlins with Krivaks.

[Silver_Dragon]

Review "High Tyde" Harpoon Suplement, on a 87 scenery.

 

The composition have small changes.

Soviet Baltic Fleet:

- Project 68bis Sverdlov Class Cruiser Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya. (decom 16.09)

- Project 1134 Berkut [Kresta I] Class Guided Missile Cruiser Admiral Zozulya (decom 5.07)

- Project 56EM [Kildin] Class Destroyer, 2 units.

- Project 61 [Kashin] Class Large Anti-Submarine Ships, 2 units.

- Project 956 Sarych [sovremenny] Class Destroyer, 1 Unit

- Project 1159 [Koni I] Class Guard Ship, 4 Units

- Project 12417 [Tarantul] Class missile ship, 6 Units

- Project 266M Akvamarin [Natya] Class Minesweeper, 4 Units

 

1x Sovremenny added as rear antisubmarine guard ship

 

Landing Force:

- Project 773 [Polnocny-C] Class Medium landing ships, 2 Units

- Project 771 [Polnocny-B] Class Medium landing ships, 3 Units

- Project 775 [Ropucha] Class Large landing ships, 5 Units

- Project 1171 Tapir [Alligator] Class, 2 Units

 

The Landing force has been reduce for better transport capability (2x Polnocny vs 1xRopucha)

 

Not add submarines or other escort forces

Edited August 9, 2016 by Silver_Dragon

[Farks]

The invasion fleet in that picture consists of 36 ships total. E1 during this period consisted of 12 squadrons, if I'm not mistaken. Even if you take into account potential losses before they'd even left the ground (sabotage, assasinations, commando raids, etc) and aircrafts lost to enemy air defence before they could get their missiles off, you still have more than enough of the force left to completely devestate that fleet. And after that they'd still have the navy and coastal artillery to get through.

 

The soviets would most certainly have had their work cut out for them if they had decided to cross the Baltic Sea.

[renhanxue]

Review "High Tyde" Harpoon Suplement, on a 87 scenery.

 

The composition have small changes.

Soviet Baltic Fleet:

- Project 68bis Sverdlov Class Cruiser Oktyabrskaya Revolutsiya. (decom 16.09)

- Project 1134 Berkut [Kresta I] Class Guided Missile Cruiser Admiral Zozulya (decom 5.07)

- Project 56EM [Kildin] Class Destroyer, 2 units.

- Project 61 [Kashin] Class Large Anti-Submarine Ships, 2 units.

- Project 956 Sarych [sovremenny] Class Destroyer, 1 Unit

- Project 1159 [Koni I] Class Guard Ship, 4 Units

- Project 12417 [Tarantul] Class missile ship, 6 Units

- Project 266M Akvamarin [Natya] Class Minesweeper, 4 Units

 

1x Sovremenny added as rear antisubmarine guard ship

 

Landing Force:

- Project 773 [Polnocny-C] Class Medium landing ships, 2 Units

- Project 771 [Polnocny-B] Class Medium landing ships, 3 Units

- Project 775 [Ropucha] Class Large landing ships, 5 Units

- Project 1171 Tapir [Alligator] Class, 2 Units

 

The Landing force has been reduce for better transport capability (2x Polnocny vs 1xRopucha)

 

Not add submarines or other escort forces

That looks really low, and furthermore you also have to consider the Polish and East German forces.

 

An excellent summary of Warsaw Pact forces available in the Baltic in the late 80's in Swedish is available here - it's too long to translate, but I'll sum up a few interesting tidbits:

 

Landing craft (lifts two reinforced naval infantry brigades, or equivalent)

 

Soviet Baltic fleet

2 ALLIGATOR - 1 naval infantry battalion (reduced)

7 POLNOCNY - 1 NI coy

9 ROPUCHA I/II - ½ NI bn

2 POMORNIK - 1 NI coy

14 AIST - 1 NI plt (reinforced)

2 PELIKAN - 1 NI plt (reinforced)

9 GUS - 1/2 NI plt (reinforced)

~30 smaller landing craft/boats, various types - ½ to 1 NI plt

 

Polish navy

23 POLNOCNY - 1 NI coy

~18 smaller boats/craft - 1 NI plt

 

East German navy

12 FROSCH - 2 NI coy

 

Civilian shipping

~20 Ro-Ro ships = 1 reduced motorized rifle division or equivalent (roughly 1-2 battalions per ship)

Other civilian/commercial shipping: 5-6 motorized rifle division or equivalent (roughly ½-2 battalions per ship)

 

 

Naval forces

Soviet Baltic fleet

 

Forward escorts:

 

Destroyers

1 SOVREMENNYY

1 KASHIN II

1 KILDIN MOD

 

Corvettes

10 TARANTUL I-III

10 NANUCHKA I & III

 

Missile boats

10 MATKA

20 OSA I & II

 

Torpedo boats

8 TURYA

 

Minesweepers

4 NATCHA

10 YURKA

20 SONYA

15 VANYA

 

 

 

Close-in escorts:

 

Cruisers (C&C, support)

1 KYNDA

 

Destroyers (AA, anti-submarine)

1 KASHIN I

3 KOTLIN SAM

 

Frigates (anti-submarine, AA)

8 KRIVAK I & II

9 MIRKA

 

Corvettes (anti-submarines)

6 GRISHA

12 PARCHIM II

7 PAUK

16 POTI

 

Minesweepers

20 YEVGENYA

 

 

 

Artillery support division:

 

Cruisers

1 SVERDLOV

 

Destroyers

2 SKORY

 

Frigates

2 RIGA

 

 

 

Polish navy

Forward escorts:

 

Destroyers

1 KASHIN II

 

Corvettes

4 TARANTUL

 

Missile boats

12 OSA I

 

Torpedo boats

11 PILICA

 

Minesweepers

6 T-43

25 KROGULEC

 

 

East German navy

Forward escorts

 

Corvettes

5 TARANTUL

 

Missile boats

12 OSA I

 

Torpedo boats

6 SHERSHEN

20 LIBELLE

 

 

Close-in escorts (anti-submarine):

 

Frigates

3 KONI

 

Corvettes

12 PARCHIM I

 

Minesweepers

21 KONDOR

Or, about 25-30 years earlier:

 

1961 total:

6 cruisers

2 missile destroyers

29 destroyers

8 frigates

86 submarines

80 sub hunters

170 torpedo boats/gun boats

60 larger minesweepers

80 smaller minesweepers

 

 

Of course, you can't exactly assume that all of these would be concentrated against Sweden...

Edited August 9, 2016 by renhanxue

[CoBlue]

The invasion fleet in that picture consists of 36 ships total. E1 during this period consisted of 12 squadrons, if I'm not mistaken. Even if you take into account potential losses before they'd even left the ground (sabotage, assasinations, commando raids, etc) and aircrafts lost to enemy air defence before they could get their missiles off, you still have more than enough of the force left to completely devestate that fleet. And after that they'd still have the navy and coastal artillery to get through.The soviets would most certainly have had their work cut out for them if they had decided to cross the Baltic Sea.

And 800 000 Swedes could be mobilized in 3 days to greet the remaining force of 5000 highly trained USSR marines.

No something is wrong with that picture, since Sweden counted on holding of an invasion for 3-4 days until defeated! No way USSR would do this kind of stupid suicide attack with only 5000 men.

[Farks]

And 800 000 Swedes could be mobilized in 3 days to greet the remaining force of 5000 highly trained USSR marines.

No something is wrong with that picture, since Sweden counted on holding of an invasion for 3-4 days until defeated! No way USSR would do this kind of stupid suicide attack with only 5000 men.

 

Those marines job would be to sieze a bridgehead so the main force (a few motorized regiments at least) could be shipped over safely, not face the entire swedish army on their own.

 

And 3-4 days doesn't sound realistic, even in a worst case scenario. I'm no expert on logistics and troop movement, but shipping over the necessary reinforcements to starting advancing inland from the bridgehead(s) would likely take a few days at a minimum. Looking at other seaborne invasions, it has typically taken the attacker weeks to start really pushing out of the bridgehead.

[Skjold]

AFAIK full mobilisation of cold war reserves and national guard of the Swedish Army was planned for 2-4 weeks. You would also have the army spread out all over the country. You'd probably look at a force in the tens of thousands to greet the Russian marines. Depending where they land, this may or may not include heavy equipment.

[BravoYankee4]

Don't forget about VDV. One of the main targets for the Swedish ranger battalions was to meet the airborne assaults. I have some figures somewhere about how many IL-76's that where available, the time to fly from Soviet to mid Sweden, how many troops that could be lifted per pass and so on.

 

As a AJ(S) Viggen pilot I wouldn't mind attacking an IL-76 or two ;)

[mattebubben]

And 800 000 Swedes could be mobilized in 3 days to greet the remaining force of 5000 highly trained USSR marines.

No something is wrong with that picture, since Sweden counted on holding of an invasion for 3-4 days until defeated! No way USSR would do this kind of stupid suicide attack with only 5000 men.

 

Sweden counted on holding for much more then 3-4 days during that time period.

(Weeks and Months not days)

 

3-4 days is a more modern estimate with the state our military has been in for the last few years.

 

Its not the estimate for the cold war when the Swedish armed forces was at its largest.

 

During the cold war Sweden would have been able to hold out for a much longer time (and perhaps even being able to repulse a possible naval invasion outright).

 

But in a modern scenario (today) Sweden would not have Hundreds of thousands of soldiers available to fight of a possible invasion.

 

Today we would most likely not have more then 50,000 or probably significantly less if the attack was a surprise.

(without a month or more to try to prepare the defenses)

 

Thats why todays scenario would be no more then 3-4 days since our military is alot smaller while and possible invasion would not be that much smaller then it would have been during the cold war.

(and our airforce is also smaller and less ready today then it was during the cold war as well as the coastal defenses being more or less completely gone).

 

But then again its pretty much the same with most of West European nations our Militaries almost vanished after the cold war.

Edited August 10, 2016 by mattebubben

[Silver_Dragon]

Normaly East German Forces and Polish Forces dont enter into doctrinal invasion vs Sweden. The main target for that naval forces has invade Denmark and control the Denmark straights to get a free passage vs Baltic / Polish / East German fleets and decimate the AFNORTH group of forces.

 

for example, typical naval invasion force on North Germany / Denmark by PacVar was a East German Motorized Schützenregiment + 7 Polish Naval Assault Division + 36 Soviet Guard Naval Infantry Brigade with support of the 6 Polish Airborne Brigade. A Speznad Battalion can raid Copenhagen to support of 7 Polish assault. 6 Polish can capture Borhorn Island.

 

Typical doctrinal plan maps

 

Document about cold war show Sweden fortress.

[ame]http://coldwarsites.net/wp-content/files_mf/travel_giude_www39.pdf[/ame]

 

Website about Scandinavian fortress

http://www.fortress-scandinavia.dk/

Edited August 10, 2016 by Silver_Dragon

[Farks]

Correct, but as those maps show occupying southern Sweden was a potential part of those plans.

[Volator]

Correct, but as those maps show occupying southern Sweden was a potential part of those plans.

 

I'm wondering why the Soviet Union / the Warsaw Pact would have been interested in attacking neutral Sweden in a major clash with NATO. Did they assume Sweden would give up neutrality and fight alongside NATO in a major conflict? Or were they afraid NATO might force Sweden to provide bases to interrupt Warsaw Pact fleet movements in the Baltic Sea? Or was it just a consideration of "Well, while we are at it, let's also conquer this little rest of free Europe"?

 

Surely the main thrust or main focus of a Warsaw Pact attack would always have been West Germany, BeNeLux and France/GB, and also Norway to win the contest for the North Sea/Atlantic/Arctic, so why deal with neutral Sweden and waste forces and resources if they (Sweden) remained quiet and possibly did not take sides?

 

Was it a - in my eyes totally understandable - common sense in Sweden to fight alongside NATO if the Soviets tried to take over NATO Europe?

[Farks]

I'm wondering why the Soviet Union / the Warsaw Pact would have been interested in attacking neutral Sweden in a major clash with NATO. Did they assume Sweden would give up neutrality and fight alongside NATO in a major conflict? Or were they afraid NATO might force Sweden to provide bases to interrupt Warsaw Pact fleet movements in the Baltic Sea? Or was it just a consideration of "Well, while we are at it, let's also conquer this little rest of free Europe"?

 

Surely the main thrust or main focus of a Warsaw Pact attack would always have been West Germany, BeNeLux and France/GB, and also Norway to win the contest for the North Sea/Atlantic/Arctic, so why deal with neutral Sweden and waste forces and resources if they (Sweden) remained quiet and possibly did not take sides?

 

Was it a - in my eyes totally understandable - common sense in Sweden to fight alongside NATO if the Soviets tried to take over NATO Europe?

 

The WP would have a few main reasons. One would be occupying southern Sweden (as seen above) as a part of securing the Öresund straits, another would be to open a second front towards Norway and the NATO forces in that region (either going through northern Finland and Sweden or cutting through central Sweden), and yet another would be to move forward their air defense. Denying NATO the use of swedish territory would problary be a reason as well, seeing how the soviets apperently didn't trust swedish neutrality.

 

 

There are people more knowledgeable about the WP's war plans and strategic thinking than me, but that's the gist of it as far as I know.

[renhanxue]

AFAIK full mobilisation of cold war reserves and national guard of the Swedish Army was planned for 2-4 weeks. You would also have the army spread out all over the country. You'd probably look at a force in the tens of thousands to greet the Russian marines. Depending where they land, this may or may not include heavy equipment.

Nah. Field army brigades had target mobilization times of 36-48 hours for most of the formation, with some of the more unwieldy parts (logistics and maintenance companies, field engineers and such things that needed to get a hold of a lot of civilian equipment like trucks, earth movers and the like) going up to 72 hours. Usually one battalion plus some support elements (AA, artillery) was earmarked for quick mobilization (within 24 hours). The formations that had longer mobilization times than 72 hours were mostly higher level (division or milo level) support and logistics ones - I think the longest mobilization time I've seen was 144 hours (6 days). Local defense formations that defended things like ports, airports, bridges and other infrastructure using the fixed fortifications in place had - on paper - 12 hour mobilization times, but since almost all of the personnel were locals, they usually mobilized within 6 hours or even faster on exercises. The national guard (hemvärnet) usually mobilized more or less instantly since they had their equipment at home.

 

For the air force, readiness was high even before the mobilization order was given. In the 60's, the lowest level above peacetime readiness, "lystring" meant that a quarter of the air force formations should be ready for takeoff within two hours, dispersion to wartime bases should be possible to start within 6 hours and the squadrons should be fully manned within 12 hours. The next step, "givakt" (probably familiar to you if you've read Operation Garbo) meant that most of the air force would disperse to wartime bases with a quarter of the aircraft at highest readiness (ready for takeoff within minutes) and the rest in one hour readiness. All of this was done without mobilization, using only the conscripts that were doing their service at the time. (See Med invasionen i sikte, p 32.)

 

It is, at least for me, difficult to grasp just how enormous the mobilization plans were. I've seen documents in the joint headquarters (försvarsstaben) archives that are just endless lists of mobilization bus routes for each county. In the event of mobilization, the civilian administration in each county (länsstyrelser) was responsible for stopping almost all regular bus traffic and rerouting it just in order to get the military personnel to where they were going. All of this was pre-planned with stops and timetables and everything. Similar plans existed for the national railroads.

 

See here for some more discussion about mobilization and readiness etc.

Edited August 10, 2016 by renhanxue

[El Hadji]

Speaking of doctrines, if we look at how the Soviets had started to organize "front group HQ's" in the late 1970's to lead and conduct operations within separated sectors - TVD's (Teatr Voennich Dejstvij or Theatre of Military Operations). Each HQ could carry out operations within their TVD's. Europe was divided into three TVD's: TVD South West, TVD West and TVD North West. What makes this doctrine interesting from a Swedish perspective is that Sweden is located in two of these TVD's (North West and West):

 

 

This meant that Sweden would be subject to attacks by units from two TVD's in the event of war. Eventhough the main assault would come against NATO countries, Sweden could not have avoided being dragged into a conflict in Europe based on this doctrine.

[QuiGon]

Speaking of doctrines, if we look at how the Soviets had started to organize "front group HQ's" in the late 1970's to lead and conduct operations within separated sectors - TVD's (Teatr Voennich Dejstvij or Theatre of Military Operations). Each HQ could carry out operations within their TVD's. Europe was divided into three TVD's: TVD South West, TVD West and TVD North West. What makes this doctrine interesting from a Swedish perspective is that Sweden is located in two of these TVD's (North West and West):

 

This meant that Sweden would be subject to attacks by units from two TVD's in the event of war. Eventhough the main assault would come against NATO countries, Sweden could not have avoided being dragged into a conflict in Europe based on this doctrine.

 

That's some odd logic. Just because Sweden is geographically located in two TVDs doesn't mean it would automatically be drawn into the war. That would then also apply to Austria and Switzerland.