Exocoetidae

Assessment of the DCS F-16C: Current Readiness Based on extensive testing, community collaboration, and comparison to available documentation for the F-16CM Block 50. This summary identifies key systems and functionalities that remain incomplete or inaccurately modeled. It is not an exhaustive list, but it reflects the most significant issues currently limiting fidelity, usability, and consistency within the DCS ecosystem. Im not an expert and there could be some errors, i'd appreciate corrections. 1. Damage Model The existing damage model lacks comprehensive simulation. Only basic elements such as fuel leaks and wing loss are represented. Critical subsystems (hydraulic, electrical, control surface degradation, etc.) remain unmodeled, which undermines the “combat” aspect of the simulator. 2. Maintenance and Pilot Fault List (MFL/PFL) The fault indication system is largely absent. At present, the aircraft only displays a single “FLCS BIT FAIL” message. In the real F-16, this system provides essential diagnostic and operational feedback — for instance, “LK16 TIME REQD” when Link 16 time is not set. Its absence prevents accurate aircraft management and fault identification. 3. Navigation and Steerpoints Steerpoint functionality remains limited to basic types (regular, mark, and partial D/L steerpoints). Several categories such as pre-planned threats, SEAD steerpoints, and additional Link 16 steerpoints are missing. The CRUS TOS (Cruise Time on Station) logic and associated functions are also incomplete, affecting time-sensitive mission planning. 4. Digital Terrain System (DTS) The DTS and its subsystems (PGCAS, TRN, DBTC, OW/C, PR) are entirely absent. These systems are fundamental for terrain avoidance, navigation accuracy, and INS drift correction. Their omission significantly reduces low-altitude safety and precision targeting, deviating from real-world aircraft performance. 5. Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) Current ECM implementation is rudimentary. The ALQ-184 pod’s self-protection modes (MODE 1 and 2) are ineffective, unable to break radar locks or manage frequency bands accurately. The jamming coverage is also incorrect (modeled as 360° instead of directional cones). Chaff effectiveness is inconsistent across threat types, reducing survivability in realistic SEAD environments. 6. SEAD Systems The Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses capability is substantially underdeveloped. Missing features include: Proper AGM-88 HARM operational modes (TI, GS, DL). Complete HAD functions and HOTAS commands. Threat memory and SEAD steerpoint storage. Accurate RWR behavior and relative lethality display. These omissions collectively impair the aircraft’s core role as a SEAD platform. 7. AN/ALR-56M Radar Warning Receiver The current implementation does not reflect the real system’s performance. Threat prioritization, signal processing, and closure rate indications are absent. The result is reduced situational awareness and ineffective missile threat response. This system should be considered a critical component requiring urgent revision. 8. Air-to-Air Systems Several radar and missile functions are either incomplete or inaccurate: AIM-120 lacks target size settings and HPRF capability. ULS mode and COAST mode are missing. Radar notching behavior is exaggerated. TWS and HAFU symbology are unreliable. LINK 16 symbology occasionally disappears. These issues reduce combat effectiveness and tactical realism. 9. Air-to-Ground Systems Ground radar mapping and precision strike systems remain unstable. JDAM, JSOW, and GBU-24 programming is incomplete. GMT mode behavior is incorrect. Gain/contrast controls are oversimplified. Certain weapons (CBU-89/104, training munitions) are missing. These gaps limit the realism and tactical utility of air-to-ground operations. 10. Lighting Systems Cockpit and external lighting systems require revision. Covert/IR lighting is absent. Floodlights lack correct intensity and diffusion. NVG compatibility is inconsistent, with some panels excessively bright. Cockpit spotlights are non-functional, impacting night startup procedures. 11. Visual Assets and Textures Default exterior and cockpit textures are of low fidelity. Missing panel detail and poor material definition reduce visual realism. Community-made textures substantially exceed official quality, suggesting that asset revision would be beneficial. 12. Aerial Refueling KC-135 refueling lacks key physical interactions such as boom resistance and force feedback. Lighting behavior is unrealistic, and TACAN transmission operates incorrectly in T/R mode. The absence of boom operator logic (e.g., breakaway calls, fuel readouts) diminishes immersion and training value. 13. Documentation The official DCS F-16C manual is outdated and incomplete. Newly implemented features often lack documentation, forcing users to rely on unofficial sources. Each stable update should include synchronized manual revisions and changelogs for transparency and usability. 14. Missing or Inconsistent Features Across ED Modules Several systems available in other Eagle Dynamics modules are absent from the F-16C, despite being appropriate for its block and tape. These include: Expanded HSD data (present in A-10C and F/A-18C). AN/ARC-210 radio suite with HAVE QUICK capability. Proper IFF page with Mode 1–4 functionality. Link 16 mission channel selection. Such inconsistencies reduce interoperability and perceived parity across DCS platforms. 15. Quality and Product Readiness Recent statements suggesting that the module is “complete as intended” are concerning. While 100% fidelity is not expected, the current implementation does not meet the standard of completeness or functionality demonstrated by other Eagle Dynamics full-release products, such as the A-10C. Releasing the F-16C in its present form risks setting a lower benchmark for future modules and could erode community trust in the DCS platform’s quality standards. 16. Conclusion and Recommendation The DCS F-16C remains a promising module with substantial potential. However, significant systems and core functionalities are incomplete or inaccurately modeled. Proceeding to full release at this stage would be premature. A full release should represent a stable, feature-complete product that meets both the technical and operational expectations established by prior Eagle Dynamics releases. Delaying release until these critical systems are implemented and verified would preserve product integrity, customer confidence, and DCS’s reputation for simulation excellence.