Boagrius

I imagine that is what SACM and possibly even MSDM will be for. If you can shrink down that Rmin range to the point of negligibility then there's not much point in red team pushing to the merge/phonebooth anymore. EODAS has to be a big asset here - why risk chasing the tail of a jet that can kill you just as dead from its 6 o'clock as its 12?

@Weta43: Kia-ora bro! Was in your part of the world earlier in the year for the second time ever - lovely place. So I'm reaching to say that this just might have something to do with the fact that T50 is literally their first attempt at widely fielding a VLO front line combat aircraft? While the US has been sinking untold amounts of research and investment into the same field for decades, and has produced and combat tested multiple widely operational iterations/generations of them? I don't think I'm saying anything particularly controversial here whatsoever to be honest... Now listen mate, I can deal with you guys thrashing us in the Rugby all the time but I can't deal with strawman arguments. I quite clearly mentioned AESA fighter radars, not (P)ESA radars - big difference ;) Last time I checked the US actually got the tech off the ground first with the AIM95 "Agile" - they just didn't field it widely because it was too expensive (sound familiar? :P ooooh burrrn! haha just kidding). Seriously mate if you keep it up with these strawmen I'm going to have to mention Ireland... :P I would like to see your source for this though, it sounds like a fascinating bit of military history. At any rate I didn't say they couldn't keep up whatsoever, just that the US has the lead in implementing AESA and VLO tech and that this is likely to have important ramifications in the EW domain as well. I'd add that what Soviet technology could achieve against a Cold War era Western SAM system has little to do with what the Russians are likely to be able to achieve ~40+ years (and a lot of economic suffering) later across the board. I could equally point you (in the same time period) to what the Israelis achieved in the Bekaa Valley against Soviet analogues to the MIM-23, or the apparent immunity that AN/ALQ135 equipped F15's had to them in Desert Storm, but it wouldn't be all that relevant would it? The All Blacks got whooped by a bunch of LEPRECHAUNS!!! Dammit Weta, now look what you made me do! :p (Sorry Irish posters it was all for the banter)... don't hit me ;) I'm not selling Russian ingenuity short whatsoever - I am well aware of how potent it has been and can be, particularly when properly resourced. I’m just not getting sucked in by the APA/”Russia stronk” crowd either. That said, you're right in pointing out that much of the data on EW and VLO is classified and this confounds anyone's ability to draw meaningful conclusions in the public domain. For that reason I'd refer you to someone like former RAAF Air Marshall Geoff Brown - someone who is to my knowledge pretty highly respected both here and in NZ for both his professionalism and experience in these matters - he's had the classified briefings that you and I haven't: Anyhoo, I get the sense we may be hijacking the thread now, so I'll put a sock in it - no offence meant to anyone for the record, everything intended in good nature and/or in jest :thumbup:

No-one is saying maneuverability isn't or won't be important, just that it isn't a fight-winner the way it once was. Nowadays the air battle is almost certainly won or lost on the back of numerous other metrics and capabilities first. This is the message that has been coming out of the relevant parts of the operational community ad nauseum for quite a while now. For example: Sounds great, except in the real world an F35 with F22-like kinematics would in fact be an uber-F22, cost well over 100 million a piece and only be "fieldable" in comparatively tiny quantities (or not at all for smaller airforces). Remember quantity has a quality all of its own... Alternatively you are left with something 4.5 gen like the Typhoon which has all the super duper kinematic bells and whistles, but lacks the VLO signature and sensor sophistication to compete as effectively in the EM spectrum against VLO opponents... you can't have your cake and eat it too!

Can you elaborate?

You're reaching here. I doubt anyone really knows what the deciding factors were in the public domain - much of the relevant data is most certainly classified. At any rate it's also an apples and oranges comparison - the F35 also brings things to the air to air arena that neither the F22 nor YF23 do/did. The landscape of military aviation has also changed considerrably since their performance criteria were set and evaluated. The points I made (at your request) about the differences in important sensor, EW and sig management technology between the US, Russia and the PRC are actually extremely relevant to the F35's potential as a fighter aircraft going forward. Vastly moreso than BFM stats. You would do yourself a disservice by simply dismissing them because you "dunno".

Well, off the top of my head: - We know all of their 5th gen jets are also their very first meaningful forays into the production of VLO tactical aircraft. - We know that this shows when they are compared to those of the US. - We know that they're only just coming to grips with fighter based AESA sets when the US has been fielding them for years. - We know that the US lead in AESA technology also crosses over into EW/jamming capabilty (ref NGJ and GaN) - We know they're a long way from being able to present the pilot with sensor data in remotely as streamlined a way as the F35 does... - We know that EW and VLO work hand in hand - a VLO jet is orders of magnitude easier to conceal/protect via jamming than a 4th gen one. The smaller your RCS, the more effective your jamming is and the less RF energy you will require to achieve a given outcome. This is important because even emitting with a very modern jammer (say Khibiny for example) can give you away when faced with an EW suite like Barracuda (nevermind entire networked flights of them). The US lead in VLO technology actually has very serious ramifications for the EW domain as well. Probably because they can't compete on the VLO/sig management and sensor front so they're left with a more brute force approach. The US has been investing heavily in the VLO game for a LONG time and they're not sitting idle with it. Neither the Russians nor the Chinese can be reasonably expected to close that gap in their first serious attempts - corporate espionage or otherwise.

I get that, but the likelihood of your hypothetical actually coming to pass seems extremely remote given: a.) The lack of evidence provided b.) The tremendous lengths the US has gone to and is going to so as to prevent it from ever occurring.

Again, even a "failed attempt at BVR" does not necessitate a subsequent BFM or even WVR engagement. The F35 crews can crank away to attempt a Grinder type maneuver, go to EMCON and extend out/disengage entirely, call in support from nearby flights, close to WVR and gun down an opponent that has spent all its energy defeating slammers... the list goes on (and none of them involve the post merge). Nobody is actually saying maneuverability doesn't matter - just that getting bogged down by using it in a knife fight isn't smart anymore. To conflate the F35's BFM characteristics with its overall air to air combat capability is a fairly significant error to be frank with you. The only 5th gen competitors out there to the F35 are the T50, J31 and J20. All of them have plenty of hurdles to overcome themselves before they're likely to meet an F35 flight in the air and yet none of them exhibit the same level of signals management sophistication as the F35, with the same being true of their sensor and EW suites. To surmise that they instantly necessitate "Raptor intervention" purely by virtue of being 5th gen jets is a hell of a stretch. Ultimately we're talking about very unlikely contingencies here. It's like saying "what if enemy troops carry such good body armour that our 5.56 rounds can't kill them... we'll have to go hand to hand with our combat knives!". It's just not likely or true...

Sweep is spot on. There are a long list of things that would need to go very wrong before an adversary could render the AIM120D so impotent (nevermind whatever replaces it!). Unlike the simplified modelling shown for the B/C versions in DCS, the D model can be guided to a target via a variety of means (and sources of targeting data) that would all need to be systematically defeated first (unlikely). Even if the enemy turns up with "really good ECM" there are an abundance of BVR/pre merge techniques that could be employed by such a VLO aircraft before simply saying "welp, the slammers ain't workin folks - someone crank up the Kenny Loggins cuz it's dogfightin time!" :smilewink:

I suppose it is just as well that the F35 probably has the most sophisticated EW suite of any tactical fighter either current or planned... Look, you always have to "maneuver" the aircraft into a firing position to make a kill - BFM is just one way (and not a very good one anymore) to get there. The race between missiles and countermeasures is a constant one. If the US reached the point where enemy countermeasures had the upper hand to the point of rendering BVR weapons useless, then it is not a given that they'd simply fall back into BFM dogfighting of all things (!?). There are many ways to approach modern day WVR combat, and post merge BFM is just one of them. It's far more likely that they'd invest in (short term) tactical adjustments to leverage the F35s VLO and sensor advantages in tandem with the US' monstrous ISR capability/footprint to prevent neutral merges from occurring in the first place, and by investing in more capable AAMs/guidance packages in the medium term to reclaim the ability to reliably kill from a distance. At any rate, the above is a very vague and arbitrary hypothetical. There is very little real world data to suggest it will come to pass in the foreseeable future and there is a HUGE amount of investment occurring across the board in the US military to ensure it never does.

I don't think it is a "bet" so much as an observation based on operational experience, modelling and the data gathered from years of large scale exercises like Red Flag(!?). The data would need to have been off by a LONG way for the F35's BFM handling characteristics to become a particularly relevant determinant of its overall usefulness as an air to air combat asset going forward.

This is what it boils down to. US doctrine (quite rightly IMO) does not treat post merge WVR combat as a good way to obtain favourable kill ratios. HMD cued HOBS missiles simply make fighting in the "phonebooth" too much of a coin flip for any manned fighter you care to throw into the mix. Hence, they have moved away from "dogfighting" towards killing the enemy from BVR ranges or at least in the pre-merge - leveraging the technological lead they enjoy over the competition in VLO technology, sensors/ISR and networking. The F35, like any jet, must be judged on its own merits and it has plenty of them. I think it's fair to say that the F35's particular combination of VLO, sensors, networking capability, EW suite and aerodynamic performance is unprecedented. To relegate it to the strike role going forward seems bizarre and wasteful given what it is likely to bring to the air to air arena. Even in the "phonebooth" (which is only a small and diminishing part of the overall air to air combat domain), SACM is already in the pipeline to provide an internally storable WVR missile. With "insta-cueing" via EODAS, the F35 is pretty well placed to excel there too, albeit as a Plan B (or C/D/E/Z) contingency.

Indeed, and back when PGMs were either primitive or non-existent (ie. when the A10 was designed), you needed to get low for the sake of accuracy as well. Not so now. I'd add that it's all a moot point when your A10s have to use PGMs with targeting pods from above ~15000ft (just like an F35... but without the speed... or stealth... or sensors... or self protection suite... or networking capacity...) to stay alive against an opponent with remotely modern SHORAD systems anyway. Even then they can only do so AFTER the whole AO has been thoroughly cleansed by SEAD/DEAD strikes...

Not much of a "deficiency" in light of the bigger picture. Anyway, I already covered why I think gun-based CAS is, in all likelihood, losing its relevance going forward (particularly for the US with its monstrous PGM arsenal). It's true that UCAVs probably aren't a solution on their own, but when tethered via datalink to a local "mothership" aircraft (AH64E, F35, some other ISR node) or even the troops on the ground themselves, they might go a long way. When you then consider other emerging technologies like next gen guided artillery or loitering munitions you have a lot of capability overlap (with the A10) where there once was little to none. You also have to consider the USAF's over-arching CONOPS, and the fact that they are pursuing a distributed lethality model where just about any platform capable of moving mud is a potential CAS provider. I think you'll find this takes a lot of pressure (and need) away from ageing platforms like the Hog. Modern network enabled PGMs have changed the whole CAS ball-game in a big way... in many respects right under the Hog's feet.

Maybe, but the importance of a conventional deterrent is still paramount, especially as the U.S and China continue to butt heads in the Western Pacific - a theatre where a short legged CAS jet would be nigh on useless. Even then, I dare say that an F35 with its belly full of SDB's and its wing pylons loaded up with JAGM, Brimstone or APKWS would be a pretty potent CAS platform post ~2025 regardless. If you're in a COIN situation (Afghanistan, post war Iraq, Syria) where the bad guys can't really shoot back worth a damn, then your A29 and Reaper/Avenger types may well be much cheaper yet sufficient. That question ultimately falls to the USAF force planners and what cost/benefit analysis they get.

Actually there are quite a few advanced SAM systems out there that don't rely on radar and are highly mobile - just look at Strela M3, Sosna or even Pantsir. I'm not saying high altitude bombing is the only solution - medium altitude may suffice in many circumstances - but I really doubt that the A10 has what it takes to survive at low level against tomorrow's threats.

This is the problem - post ~2025 it probably can't "survive the attempt". At least, not in a sustainable way. "Surviving the attempt" by regularly taking significant amounts of battle damage requiring extensive repairs and/or airframe withdrawal is not a viable way to operate a CAS fleet. The A10's basic design is optimised to withstand vastly less capable weaponry (~23mm AAA, primitive SAMs) than will exist in the 2020s-30s. 57mm AA guns firing guided shells (ZAK57) or their own GAU-8 (LD-2000), SHORAD systems capable of reaching up to 40,000ft (Pantsir/Tor M2) and VSHORAD systems that are nigh on immune to flares and any other countermeasure the A10 can possibly carry (Sosna, Verba) are all very real emerging threats. In all likelihood they will render the A10's fundamental design increasingly (if not totally) obsolete before long. Hell, even the fire control systems on modern APC's and IFV's provide the capacity for defensive fire that could scarcely be dreamt of when the A10 was originally fielded. Granted, the A10 is not and never was a "Day 1" aircraft - but even after SEAD/DEAD have done their work, there is never going to be a guarantee that such mobile, concealable and replaceable SHORAD systems have been eradicated or even driven to the point of scarcity. This potentially makes your GAU-8 dead weight for much if not all of the conflict. Low and slow CAS is not a smart thing to do in this environment, and I dare say you would probably need a brand new DIRCM/DEW/MSDM/SAR Radar equipped platform to pull it off going forward. Even then there may well be better ways of doing things. Hand wringing over what platform can do gun based CAS the best misses the paradigm changes that have been occurring in the CAS domain for 30 odd years now, with gun based CAS being only a very small (and I would argue diminishing) part of the bigger picture. Every airframe has a shelf life, and if the USAF is focusing on the high end deterrence part of their capability set (and I think they are) then the A10 is rapidly approaching its own. Not bad for a jet initially conceived of in what? The 1960s!? I love the Hog as much as the next guy but I don't think I'm saying anything too controversial here.

At the end of the day the F35 is a totally different class of aircraft so you can't expect it to perform CAS in the same way as an A10. That said, you wouldn't want it to - as modern SHORAD systems proliferate and get ever more sophisticated (Sosna, Verba, Pantsir, ZAK-57/Derivatsiya-PVO, LD2000 etc) I can only see the A10's once vaunted brand of survivability continuing to decline into obsolescence. Gun runs of any kind go out the window completely once OPFOR have anything remotely modern to shoot back with, at which point you're back to plinking targets from 15000ft+ with the other fast(er) movers in a jet sub-optimally suited to that flight regime. Frankly, something like APKWS makes FAR more sense than the GAU-8 going forward, and it isn't even a platform specific weapon (unlike the GAU). Granted, the A10 has earned a tremendous reputation in the conflicts of the past (Iraq 2x, Afghanistan) and even present (Syria), but that doesn't mean this will continue into the future. When you consider the emerging threats that the USAF is trying to deter in Europe and the Western Pacific post ~2025, I can see why the Hog wouldn't be high on the priority list - love it though I do. I actually think the closing statement is extremely and excessively cynical tbh.

No I get that, and I apologise if my post was a bit obtuse (long day at work). All I am pointing out is that an aircraft's ability to "move about in the sky" is not a constant across all flight regimes. I would argue that the F35's ability to "move about in the sky" during BVR jousts, or when performing grinder/zoom and boom type manoeuvres (with HOBS/over the shoulder shots) in the WVR domain is probably more operationally representative in the A2A realm, while demanding very different things from the aircraft. It is certainly intuitive to use BFM as a proxy for an aircraft's overall aerodynamic ability, but I very much doubt it would tell the whole story in this case (and probably not a very operationally meaningful one). Just my 2c.

So do I - I'm Australian :smilewink:

I think you might be extrapolating too much off a single low speed pass here. Hell, even looks a little "nose high" compared to the F16 it's flying next to: Bottom line: we don't have the EM diagrams for the F35... they're classified :smilewink:

I'd question even the relevance of this for operationally meaningful insights into the F35's kinematic capabilities. BFM gunfight performance, I dare say, is not a particularly informative outcome in the current and emerging air warfare domain. With 360 degree spherical missile cueing via EODAS coupled with ever more capable HOBS missiles (AIM9X, AIM120D, SACM) I strongly suspect all this obsessing over BFM capabilities misses the VASTLY more important fact that the F35's "playbook" is probably going to call for dealing with WVR engagements in a totally different way to any aircraft that came before it. It's like evaluating the combat effectiveness of a modern infantryman based on their ability in hand to hand combat... :wallbash:

You might want a bit of bling bling too if you had an integrated double digit SAM threat to deal with... not so much the brrrt gun though :P

^ That was exactly my point? (ie. a Russian/Chinese IADS wouldn't roll over and die as easily as that). This could have serious implications for the A10 fleet - potentially forcing it to sit on the sidelines for much of the air campaign. Again, at least the F35 fleet could be credibly providing CAS from the day hostilities broke out until the day they finished.

Indeed. Granted there is always SEAD to consider, but there is absolutely no guarantee that even a localized Russian or Chinese IADS would suddenly collapse ala Desert Storm (thereby allowing the A10s to enter the fray on "Day 2"). Both of those powers would have a vastly superior ability to sustain attrition and "plug" nodes back into their IADS system in response to losses than the Iraqis ever did. The reality is that highly numerous and independent mobile GBAD systems like Pantsir, Sosna, Strela 10M4, Buk M3, Tor M2E and even Verba could still make the battlefield prohibitively dangerous to the A10 fleet for an untenably large portion of the air war. Hats off to any Hog driver who so much as contemplates getting low and close enough to employ the GAU-8 in that kind of threat environment (!). This is to say nothing of theatre level systems like S300/400/500 and HQ9/10/15/18 or the threat posed by enemy airpower... Better an F35 that can actually provide some CAS (among other important things eg. self escort) right from the outset of hostilities than an A10 that can provide none (and little else besides)? This may be particularly true in a time of ever tightening budgets, and I suspect this closely reflects the USAF's own rationale atm...