06.04.1999 - Mig-29 combat flight - Abdul Emeti

[okopanja]

06.04.1999 - Mig-29 combat flight - Abdul Emeti

Pilot: Major Abdul Emeti

Airplane type: L-18 (MIG-29 9.12b)

Airplane ID: 18109

Time: April 4th 1999, late evening hours (between 22:00 - 00:00)

Take off: Airbase Batajnica

Landing: Airbase Batajnica

Flight length: 17 minutes

Nobody refused - part 2 - Abdul Emeti - Mig-29 pilot interview

1st video segment at 01:48

32:46 Narrator: Major Abdul Emeti awaits in combat readiness (at Airbase Batajnica, near Belgrade). In late evening, the orders arrive for the MiG-29 to scramble.

32:55 Narrator: Emeti suspects that it is an important target, since the regiment command has decided for that day that none of our airplanes will be scrambled on that day.

33:04 Narrator: The runway remained in the dark on that evening. Despite this, Emiti decides to take off.

33:15 Abdul Emeti: I left the lights on short... At longer range I could not see anything, since mist did cause the reflections which prevented me from seeing.

33:26 Abdul Emeti: I set spot lights on short and released the back fasteners, so I could lean as forward as possible toward the front glass, which would allow me during the nose raise and take off to see take off line.

33:38 Abdul Emeti: While taking off, I was counting seconds... There was a possibility, you know, the aircraft was full of fuel and ammunition... Any departure from the runway would mean a catastrophe.

33:38 Remark: At this point aircraft with 6xR-60M loadout is shown.

33:53 Abdul Emeti: I had to keep to the middle line very precisely, as far as I could see. Around 1-2 line sections, and I had to hold it until the take off speed.

34:02 Abdul Emeti: Radar was on, and I found myself into something I could not imagine before.

34:10 Abdul Emeti: Radar display showed many targets. I knew that half of these targets must be false, and that those must be interferences.

34:18 Abdul Emeti: Jamming was present from our ground stations or from their AWACS or the dedicated ECM airplane.

34:26 Abdul Emeti: At that moment I saw a blast on my lower right side. I froze and thought: it's over.

34:33 Abdul Emeti: In my opinion, it was fired from the ground. Nothing happened and I continued to climb.

34:40 Abdul Emeti: I decided to climb to 1500 m and to set the speed the way it suited me, around 850 km/h.

34:47 Abdul Emeti: At that speed and altitude, I considered I had the best chances to get into the air combat.

34:55 Abdul Emeti: The GCI officer was bothering me more and more. He could not establish proper communication with me. His information was such that I felt obstructed.

35:05 Abdul Emeti: He started to obstruct me. I simply could not understand him and I even told him to scream as loud as possible, to simply give me the target.

35:11 Abdul Emeti: I was not expecting longer dispatches, but simply to give me the target. Short and clear: "Give me the target!"

35:11 Remark: In Serbian language the word “depeša” means short message, and was adopted from French “depeche”.

35:17 Abdul Emeti: Nothing was happening, while I passed the city of Pančevo, I noticed in the crowded target screen...

35:23 Abdul Emeti: ... btw, until that point I was constantly locking and unlocking the targets and maneuvering left and right.

35:28 Abdul Emeti: I noticed the target after the antenna sweep, I spotted the target that was coming toward me on the left side above me and going sideways.

35:37 Abdul Emeti: Based on speed and direction, it looked like the strongest reflection, I moved TDC and managed to track him.

35:37 Remark: Story interrupts here

2nd video segment at 41:54

41:54 Narrator: Pilot Abdul Emeti is flying over Pančevo, on take off he does not manage to establish connection with GCI officers, and during the free search he detects an enemy on radar.

42:09 Narrator: Emeti tracks one of the targets, just a bit longer and he could press a trigger to launch the missile. The enemy target is locked (HUD symbology shows radar lock, R-27R and ПР symbol meaning Launch Authorization, speed 775 km/h IAS, altitude 4150 m).

42:19 Abdul Emeti: It lasted around 2 seconds, maybe longer or shorter, ПР did not go on, otherwise I would launch, I was fully prepared. I needed 1-1.5 seconds.

42:32 Abdul Emeti: I foresaw the launch and was just waiting for it. Due to his closing speed I expected him to fit in within(launch parameters), but I had to see him.

42:38 Abdul Emeti: The missile itself, if it does not have the real lock and goes off the rail, it would just land somewhere.

42:45 Abdul Emeti: It's around 250 kg of explosives and that is really not a great idea.

42:49 Abdul Emeti: I had to keep the lock for at least 2.5-3 seconds, to lock the real target, the missile had to get real data from the computer, and the computer itself to give me the permission to launch.

42:58 Abdul Emeti: The computer did not give the launch authorization, the signal has not arrived yet.

43:03 Abdul Emeti: He dropped out of my lock, while I was still climbing steeply, I waited.

43:06 Abdul Emeti: At that moment I got locked (by an enemy aircraft), and performed Split-S, while remembering the direction where the lock came from.

43:16 Abdul Emeti: I accelerated the airplane to 1000 km/h, in order to approach the object I suspected to be my target.

43:24 Abdul Emeti: I crossed the Danube, toward the south.

43:28 Abdul Emeti: Then I heard the familiar voice... (Emeti rolls his eyes over...)

43:35 GCI Officer (reenactment): "Course 320... (statics...)"

43:38 Abdul Emeti (reenactment): "Repeat, I hear you as 0! Speak louder! (static noise...)"

43:43 Abdul Emeti (reenactment): "If I understood you correctly, course 320, climbing to 2000 m?"

43:48 Abdul Emeti: It meant they turned me in the completely opposite direction from where I was going.

43:53 Abdul Emeti: That was very weird. I thought this is not normal, I should turn my back from the target?!!

44:05 Abdul Emeti: I started to scan the space in the north, where the situation was totally different.

44:14 Abdul Emeti: There were not so many interferences, practically no target, occasional reflection which I quickly inspected, tracking, lock attempt... Nothing was there.

44:24 GCI Officer (reenactment): "Strai... (static noise...)"

44:26 Abdul Emeti (reenactment): "Repeat once more! I understood 'straight'"

44:28 GCI Officer (reenactment): "Strai... (static noise...) Landing...(static noise...)"

44:36 Abdul Emeti: Landing, but why?!! I did not yet expect to return for landing. To land at an airport where there was nothing prepared, no lights...

44:36 Remark: Story interrupts here

3rd video segment at 48:59

48:59 Abdul Emeti: The general feeling was that the pilots had to do anything at any cost.

49:07 Abdul Emeti: I can tell you about one detail after the landing...

49:10 Abdul Emeti: Commandant Pavlović was the one who was waiting for me and approached me immediately.

49:13 Abdul Emeti: He asked me to tell him all the details.

49:18 Abdul Emeti: I told him all the way it happened, I even told him about the "launch from the ground" (he emphasized this).

49:25 Abdul Emeti: I also told him that I was very close to the launch moment. He asked: "Why didn't you launch?!!! You could have done it!"

49:32 Abdul Emeti: I responded: "Pajo, listen, you know very well yourself that I am not allowed to launch without permission."

49:40 Abdul Emeti: Pavlović replied: "You know how it is... You have no idea what kind of pressure they put on me... If you just launched that missile, I would have carried you now with my own hands!"

49:40 Remark: Pavlović meant he would have celebrated the goal in a football match, due to the fact that he personally suffered huge pressure from higher command.

49:40 Remark: Story interrupts here

4th video segment at 51:08

51:08 Abdul Emeti: Given their numeric advantage, we could not do much. But we could interrupt their missions, to force them away, to prevent them from achieving goals...

51:30 Abdul Emeti: ...To force them to switch to reserve targets, to leave our airspace or part of airspace, or toward some of our PVO systems. Realistically this is how I saw my role.

51:30 Remark: Story interrupts here

5th video segment at 54:43

54:43 Abdul Emeti: We could not just stand and observe what they did to us, despite not being able to prevent them. That was our only chance to do something.

Reconstructed flight

The provided map is rough reconstruction based on interview and publicly known information.

Boro Zoraja flight on 06.04.2025 at 23:00

On the very same day Boro Zoraja had a combat flight at 23:00 from airbase Ponivke.

Distance between airbases Barajnica and Ponikve is ~120 km (~65 NM).

His flight is covered in a separate article.

Sources

1. Niko nije rekao neću (drugi deo) - Nobody refused - part 2 (see above), author Slađana Zarić, director Boban Simojlović, journalist Vesna Ilić, montage Marija Bogićević, link.

2. NATO Briefing on April 7th 1999, link.

3. NATO Briefing on April 7th 1999 - slides, link.

Credits

Ronin Gaijin, for review and English corrections

Edited Wednesday at 08:20 PM by okopanja

[Ronin_Gaijin]

43:03 Abdul Emeti: He dropped out of my lock, while I was still climbing steeply, I waited.

43:06 Abdul Emeti: At that moment I got locked (by an enemy aircraft), and performed Split-S, while remembering the direction where the lock came from.

 

Clear indication that SPO-15 can be used in the front hemisphere at the same time when the radar is on.
Thank you very much for all your work @okopanja  

[Pavlin_33]

1 hour ago, Ronin_Gaijin said:

43:03 Abdul Emeti: He dropped out of my lock, while I was still climbing steeply, I waited.

43:06 Abdul Emeti: At that moment I got locked (by an enemy aircraft), and performed Split-S, while remembering the direction where the lock came from.

 

Clear indication that SPO-15 can be used in the front hemisphere at the same time when the radar is on.
Thank you very much for all your work @okopanja  

Yes, at least two pilots teported being able to detect both locks and launches while either having radar in search or track mode.

[okopanja]

4 minutes ago, Pavlin_33 said:

Yes, at least two pilots teported being able to detect both locks and launches while either having radar in search or track mode.

desno pod 50

[Pavlin_33]

53 minutes ago, okopanja said:

desno pod 50

In this case there was no working radar between the two-ship flight, only one operational SPO.

[okopanja]

6 hours ago, Pavlin_33 said:

In this case there was no working radar between the two-ship flight, only one operational SPO.

Its a separate story, one that deserves more attention and effort. From what I know so far Peric had failed SPO/Radar, so Radosavljevic even as less experienced had to take over the lead. That depeche feom Radosavljević tells us about working SPO in PPS.

[Pavlin_33]

1 hour ago, okopanja said:

Its a separate story, one that deserves more attention and effort. From what I know so far Peric had failed SPO/Radar, so Radosavljevic even as less experienced had to take over the lead. That depeche feom Radosavljević tells us about working SPO in PPS.

Late Peric said to late Radosavljevic: "You come and engage" thinking that Radosavljevic had them on his radar scope when he said "right 50 degrees" a few moments earlier. Radisavljevic was in fact refering to his SPO device which was picking up the F-15's radar.