[Audio from the Past Series]

Nicely done!

 

I always was riveted by this cockpit audio, over Baghdad in an F-16.

 

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=dc0_1240788325

 

The video above seems to correspond to the recollection at this site under Day3: http://www.lucky-devils.net/afm.html

 

As the package proceeded to the Iraqi border the weather become steadily worse until everyone was in the weather, unable to climb out into the clear. As planes got out of position, the package finally broke out into the clear just past the Iraqi border. At this time, a large calibre AAA gun began firing on the aircraft. The AAA consisted of extremely large airbursts that looked like big black rain clouds. The AAA, coupled with the confusion of sorting out the package formation, resulted in 25% of the package being sent home at that time. Meanwhile the package, now a 12-ship, pressed on to Baghdad.

 

As the flight approached the Baghdad IP, AAA began firing at tremendous rates. Most of the AAA was at 10-12,000ft (3,658m), but there were some very heavy, large calibre explosions up to 27,000ft (8,230m). Low altitude AAA became so thick it appeared to be an undercast. At this time, the 388th TFW F-16’s were hitting the Nuclear Research Centre outside of the city, and the Weasels had fired off all their HARMs in support of initial parts of the strike and warnings to the 614th F-16’s going further into downtown went unheard. The F-15’s also provided air cover and departed with the first part of the strike group. Again, a warning that went unheard. Without knowing it 614th TFS F-16’s were all pretty much alone in downtown Baghdad with no air cover and no electronic support assets.

 

A low overcast deck covered the northern portion of the city which extended south to the point where the AF Headquarters and the Republican Guard Headquarters were mostly obscured, and the package commander, Maj. John Nips Nichols, called a weather abort for those two targets. The southern portion of the city was clear, and the oil refinery was clearly visible to Crud and Stroke flights. As they approached the action point to roll in on the refinery, an SA-2 launch warning was received. The fighters turned to honour the threat missile launch warning, and some SAMs were seen in the air, but they were not an immediate threat. The remaining F-16’s each pinpoint bombed separate refectory towers on the site, and set the refinery ablaze. The destruction was so complete that the flames from the refinery were seen on Cable News Network (CNN) film for the next two weeks.

 

As the initial SA-2 launch warning faded however, Maj. ET Tullia, Stroke 3, received additional SA-2 and SA-3 acquisition warnings that went unheeded as he rolled in on the towers. The high angle diving delivery, combined with the on-board ECM pod delayed a full SAM missile system acquisition until he pulled off the target and turned south. As the missiles closed, ET's tape reveals the screams of the radar warning receiver into his headset of a missile launch. The missiles overshot and harmlessly detonated above his aircraft, and he turned back to the egress heading.

 

Multiple SAMs were launched at the package, some ballistic and unguided and some tracking with a full system lock-on. In spite of this, some members of the package refused to jettison their bombs until clear of the city to avoid possible damage to civilian non-combatants. One of the missiles guided toward Clap 4, piloted by Capt. Mike Cujo Roberts. A missile break warning sounded over the radio and Cujo saw the missile as it guided towards him. It passes behind his aircraft and detonates, and Cujo believes he is safe until his aircraft begins to pitch over and he loses control. As the jet approaches negative 1'g', Cujo ejected over downtown Baghdad. No one observed an ejection, nor saw a 'chute.

 

Meanwhile, ET became separated from the rest of the package because of his missile defensive break turns. As he defeats the missiles coming off the target, additional missiles are fired, this time, from either side of the rear quadrants of his aircraft. Training for SAM launches up to this point had been more or less book learning, recommending a pull to an orthogonal flight path 4 seconds prior to missile impact to overshoot the missile and create sufficient miss distance to negate the effects of the detonating warhead. Well, it works. The hard part though, is to see the missile early enough to make all the mental calculations.

 

The energy required to execute these missile break turns forced Maj. Tullia's jet to descend to 10,000ft (3,050ml, which put him in the heart of the AAA envelope. The only answer in this case was to select afterburner in order to increase airspeed and climb. However, being extremely low on fuel, and 700 nautical miles from home, afterburner must be used very judiciously. Before sufficient airspeed is increased, however, ET is faced with another multiple missile launch. In this case two separate SA-6 missile sites launch at his jet while he is climbing out of the AAA envelope. By continuing to unload his aircraft, ET watches the missiles as they close on his aircraft. The unloading and accelerating causes his aircraft to change its flight path, and a change in the missile flight path can be observed as well. As the timed break turns are accomplished, one missile flies so close that ET can hear the roar of the rocket as it passes where, just a fraction of a second earlier, the right wing was. Two missiles are launched towards him from the front of his aircraft and can be easily seen on his HUD film. Finally, as he reaches the outskirts of the city an optically guided missile of unknown type is fired. There is no radar warning of the launch, but the track of the missile can easily be observed to be guiding towards his aircraft. A defensive turn overshoots the missile, and Maj. Tullia proceeds on his way, now searching for the rest of his Flight.

 

Unknown to Maj Tullia, Tico was hit by an SA·3. He had an uncorrelated missile launch on his radar warning receiver (RWR), and as he turned, he visually acquired the missile guiding on his aircraft from below. He timed his missile break turn, the missile overshot his aircraft and detonated behind him. Unfortunately, the miss distance was not sufficient to guarantee the safety of his aircraft, and Tico observed large, peeled-back holes on the surface of the jet with fuel, oil, and hydraulic fluid forming a smoke trail behind him.

 

While Tico was egressing, all the warning lights in his cockpit had illuminated, and he had no indication of airspeed, heading, or altitude. Fortunately, Capt. Bruce Crutch Cox was nearby, and the two of them formed a Flight as they headed south. As the two were egressing, Crutch received some very unusual radar warning indications. About that time the AWACS called bandits airborne and heading south out of Baghdad. The bandits in this case were MiG-29 Fulcrum fighters. Crutch pitched back to look at the source of the threat warning with his radar and saw that he was flying line abreast with one of the MiGs. As he turned into the MiG and locked onto it with his radar, it turned and ran. Since Crutch didn't have the fuel to chase him, he turned his attention back to helping Tico.

 

Shortly after, Tico's jet quit flying. He was forced to eject over 150 miles (240km) into Iraq. As he ejected and was descending in his parachute, he extracted his emergency radio and talked to the Flight. A large number of enemy personnel on the ground were observing his descent and they were trying to shoot at him as he was descending. He asked for assistance, but the fuel situation prohibited anyone from orbiting. Once on the ground there was no chance of evading. Tico was captured by nomadic, Bedouin tribesmen of Iraq.

 

After talking to Tico on the radio, the Flight passed the information on his location to the orbiting AWACS in order to begin a Search-and-Rescue (SAR). The rest of the flight home was a quiet one as everyone thought of two friends left back in Iraq.

 

It was a long night. It was most people's first introduction to losing friends in combat. As the night wore on, the word finally arrived, there was no contact with Tico. The largest SAR effort to date had been under way. C-130’s and F-15E Strike Eagles orbited, circling over Tico's last known position, trying to raise him on the radio. Little did anyone know that Tico was sitting in the Bedouin chief's tent listening to the C-130 fly overhead, trying to devise a way to talk on the radio. No one would hear from Tico or Cujo again until they were seen on CNN three days later.

[The F-22 Thread]

On the surface your correct tflash, but the U.S. defense industry has a long history of working together on projects.

 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/an-apg-77.htm

 

Northrop Grumman's and Raytheon's AN/APG-77 for the Raptor (Northrop Grumman has the larger workshare) was originally designed as a pure air-to-air system.

 

A Northrop Grumman-led joint venture with Raytheon is developing the active-element electronically scanned array radar. Northrop Grumman is also responsible for the radar sensor design, software, and systems integration.

 

 

http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/apg79aesa/

 

In addition to the APG-79, Raytheon supplies the F/A-18E/F aircraft with several other systems.

 

Either way, the companies have their hands in it, along with other AESA systems together, some of the advancements are shared or updated later on on legacy products.

 

 

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/electronic-attack-role-next-upgrade-for-raptor-radar-212317/

 

the F-22's Northrop Grumman APG-77(V)1 radar is scheduled to get an electronic attack capability as part of the Increment 3.2 upgrade to be funded from fiscal year 2012. An "in-band" electronic attack capability for the Raytheon APG-79 AESA in US Navy Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets is to be funded from FY2008.

Raytheon says its AESA upgrade for the Boeing F-15 has already demonstrated in-band electronic attack capability in USAF flight tests, and the company has demonstrated the wideband ISR datalink using its own testbed aircraft. Raytheon is under contract to develop the radar common datalink (R-CDL) standard, providing 274Mb/s bandwidth and allowing the AESA to send and receive synthetic-aperture radar images.

 

Although the (V)3 is primarily an air-to-air radar, Raytheon says it is capable of being upgraded via software to provide in-band electronic attack and wideband ISR datalink capabilities.

 

My guess from the above is that Raytheon was able to get ahead on the AESA electronic attack capability on the software side and so these useful advances get rolled back to the APG-77 which they had a hand in with Northrop Grumman. As you can see in the above link, the upgrade for electronic attack is a software upgrade, not a hardware one. And below you can see another large defense company working with Northrop Grumman and improvements to the APG-77's and other AESA's upgrades.

 

 

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/elec-tricks-turning-aesa-radars-into-broadband-comlinks-01629/

 

Aviation Week & Space Technology reports that Northrop Grumman and L-3 Communications came up with an interesting finding while doing private research in this area: active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars external link can also be modified to send and receive large amounts of information at high data rates.

 

While the demonstration was done using the F/A-22’s ultra-advanced 1,500+ element AN/APG-77 radar, the engineers involved say the idea should work with any AESA radar (the F-15C/SG’s new APG-63v2/3, the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler‘s APG-79, the F-16 E/F Block 60’s new APG-80, or the F-35 JSF Lightning II’s APG-81). The system may even get increased bandwidth from bigger AESA radars like the MP-RTIP radars planned for the RQ-4 Global Hawk and some new AWACS (Airborne early Warning And Control Systems) and ELINT/SIGINT(Electronic/Signals Intelligence collection) planes. Unsurprisingly, US Air Combat Command is very interested.

 

For the testing, the F-22 Raptor’s AN/APG-77 radar was linked to an L-3 Communications modem. The modem is software-programmable, which means it can be adapted to send and receive using various protocols (“waveforms”). For the test, they used a modified CDL [Radar Common Data Link] waveform, and the entire array of elements in the radar. They then demonstrated the transfer of a 72 MB synthetic aperture radar image in 3.5 seconds at a data rate of 274 Mbps. That would have taken 48 minutes using Link 16, which is the standard data exchange system in US and allied equipment. In practice, that means the sensor data is downloaded and communicated only when the plane lands.

 

What if that sort of thing could happen in near-real time instead?

 

Aviation Week reports that the researchers eventually demonstrated lab transmission rates of 548 Mbps, and receive data rates of up to 1 Gbps.

[The F-22 Thread]

Well, we're dealing with public sources of info, but if you can find info that helps tie the jigsaw puzzle together and get an idea of what might be going on.

 

 

The F-18's AESA are made by the same company that makes the F-22's AESA, and F-35's AESA, Raytheon.

 

This article mentions the upgrades of the F-22 from F-35's:

 

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/usaf-fields-first-upgraded-f-22-raptors-369886/

 

The unit's flagship, tail number 4115, is the first aircraft to be equipped with the modifications, which add a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability, electronic attack, better geo-location capabilities to find enemy radars, and the ability to carry eight 113kg (250lb) GBU-39 small diameter bombs (SDB)

 

The Northrop Grumman APG-77 radar's SAR mode creates black and white photo-quality images of the Earth's surface, allowing pilots to pick their own targets, while the new electronic attack capability allows the F-22 to jam enemy radars using the sensor.

 

http://www.dailytech.com/F35+Stealth+Coatings+Applied+to+F22/article21321.htm

 

The F-22 and the F-35 are similar in that they are both fighter aircraft that are designed from the outset to have stealth characteristics to make them harder to see by enemy radar. With the F-35 being the newer aircraft, it has more advanced radar-absorbing coatings on the surface than the F-22. Lockheed has announced that it is now integrating some of the more advanced coatings the F-35 uses onto the F-22 fighters coming of the assembly line.

 

"Some of the [low observables] coatings system and gap-fillers that the F-35 had an advantage on, we have incorporated into the Raptor," said Jeff Babione, vice president and general manager of the F-22 program for Lockheed Martin.

 

Defense News reports that Babione claims that the new coatings don’t change the radar cross section of the F-22. The coatings according to Babione are simply to reduce maintenance costs. He said, "[The F-35 program] had some more robust materials that were more durable and we were able to pull those back on to the F-22. So our system is better, and the life-cycle cost of the F-22 is reduced."

 

However, some doubt that the new coatings won't improve the radar visibility of the F-22. Goure also noted, "I would be very surprised if this wasn't an improvement in stealth characteristics."

 

From this Air Force Article: https://secure.afa.org/joinafa/login.aspx?returnurl=http://www.airforcemag.com/magazinearchive/pages/2014/february%202014/0214raptor.aspx

 

Senior USAF leaders have said in recent months that in addition to the F-35, KC-46 tanker, and Long-Range Strike Bomber, a top spending priority under sequester is to continue to enhance the F-22 and make it, as Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Welsh III said, “all it can be.”

 

So, as you can see, info slips out there sometimes in articles, the other articles only serve to reinforce the idea that any Raytheon AESA radar has electronic attack capabilities, and I'm sure the F-22 probably gets first crack or updated software and equipment as it becomes available as mentioned from the other guys in this thread. I would not be surprised if the thing already has other upgrades we just don't hear about in public circles.

[The F-22 Thread]

http://www.businessinsider.com/david-cenciotti-us-f-22s-escorting-jordanian-planes-over-syria-2015-2

 

Last week the Pentagon provided some details about American support for the Jordanian air strikes in Syria that followed ISIS's killing of Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh.

 

According to the Air Force Times, US Central Command Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) tasked F-22 Raptors and the F-16CJs, along with an unspecified unmanned aircraft that provided intelligence gathering and surveillance, to escort the Jordanian aircraft launched against Islamic State positions.

 

The American stealth jets are now embedded in the “standard strike package,” which includes US and coalition aircraft committed to attack ISIS militants in Syria and Iraq, Pentagon spokesman Army Col. Steve Warren said.

 

 

 

Read more: http://theaviationist.com/2015/02/10/f-22-escorted-rjaf-jets/#ixzz3RNrdEiyp

 

Edit: beat me to it, good article Sith, mine was derived from your more detailed report.

 

Regarding AESA and jamming capabilities:

 

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/fa-18ef-to-use-aesa-as-jammer-208213/

 

Boeing's F/A-18E/F Block 2 Super Hornet is set to become the first fighter to use its active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar for electronic attack, with a planned software upgrade to allow its array of transmit/receive (T/R) modules to be used as a powerful directional jammer.

 

Under a "sensor integration" plan being drawn up, the Raytheon APG-79 AESA will be linked to the Raytheon ALR-67 radar warning receiver (RWR) via the fighter's fibre-optic network switch. The radar's ground mapping capability will then be used to pinpoint emitters detected by the RWR.

 

"This will allow us to begin single-ship geolocation of emitters," says Capt BD Gaddis, US Navy F/A-18 programme manager. The F/A-18E/F's BAE Systems ALQ-214 electronic countermeasures suite will also be integrated so the aircraft can jam emitters. "We will put the -214 jamming signal through the AESA T/R modules to put power on to the emitter," he says.

 

Although the capability has been widely discussed, it appears the Block 2 Super Hornet will be the first aircraft able to use its AESA for electronic attack. Rival radar manufacturer Northrop Grumman says its APG-77(V)1 and APG-81 AESAs for the Lockheed Martin F-22 and F-35, respectively, will have the capability, but it is not in currently funded plans.

 

Somewhere awhile back in the Su-35 vs F-22 thread, there was an article I posted that said the F-22 will get all available upgrades that trickle down from other advances in aviation technologies, so I wouldn't be surprised if it has the capability.

[SU-27 intercepts Orion Video]

The footage from 1:52 to 1:56 might have been shot with a non-IR camera, you know...

 

You're correct, it was. Specifically it was probably the CCTV Spotter scope on the gimball set to monochrome, the spotter has a very narrow field of view, but great magnification as you can see how close up the plane appears as the gimball operator switches between the other cameras in the mount, such as the Mid wave thermal and color CCTV modes.

[SU-27 intercepts Orion Video]

Need to tell the P-3 maintenance crew that the thermal camera on that plane has a bad pixel down and to the right of the crosshairs. It's not a dead pixel, because it's reacting to the various heat sources that pass over that pixel, but they are reacting out of spec from the rest of the non uniforimity calibrated Focal Planar Array.

 

A nearest neighbor algorithm will fix it though, or an additional offset correction map of the FPA.

[SU-27 intercepts Orion Video]

Doesn't look fake to me, few people who haven't seen stabilized high power thermal imaging systems in an aircraft would know where and when they would see thermal lens flare effects to fake it. It wouldn't take much of an increase in the Su-27's throttle to really spike the heat signature as seen from the FLIR camera on that plane.

 

Matches up nicely with the FLIR imager watching the Paris Airshow.

 

After some research I'm guessing the imaging system is an export downgraded version of the FLIR SAFIRE http://www.flir.com/uploadedFiles/CVS/Markets/Legacy/Documents/Sea%20Star%20SAFIRE%20II.pdf

 

Video demonstration of SAFIRE family matches image from P3:

 

[Stealth Capability debate]

Glad to assist, rep given as well to a few guys, good to see interest in learning and trying to better understand some of the complexity of air warfare.

[Stealth Capability debate]

Do have links to additional material?

 

Sorry, nothing I can find in the public realm to share at the moment, but an old Bill Sweetman article about the F-22 systems which helps understand how some of the systems might work, it's about 15 years old though so keep that in mind. If the other guys want to add info they can, my expertise is in thermal imaging and IR optics as well as image intensifiers, some of the guys here are real radar gurus so I defer to their expertise in that area and hope they correct me if I'm wrong about what I've posted.

 

 

As far as jamming AESA equipped aircraft, refer back to the Northern Edge 2009 exercises where the AN/APG-81 equipped aircraft faced off with multiple very advanced jamming systems and techniques.

 

http://www.deagel.com/news/APG-81-Radar-Validated-during-Northern-Edge-2009_n000006262.aspx

 

The radar was subjected to a scale of scenarios that far exceeded typical developmental or operational test program requirements," said Pete Bartos, a former U.S. Navy F/A-18 operational test director and currently Northrop Grumman program manager for fifth-generation fighter requirements, improvements and derivatives. "In the past, typical EP testing consisted of a few sorties versus a single or maybe two jammers at once. This test was unique in that it included flights versus multiple types of advanced jammers on several aircraft formations at once.[

 

EDIT: Found the article

Below is the article from the Journal of Electronic Defense; Author: Sweetman, Bill Not in it's entirety, and published June 1, 2000 making it 15 years out of date.

 

THE NEXT GENERATION

 

The fourth Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor, aircraft 4004. Is due to make its first flight from Marietta. GA, in late July. As the first F-22 to carry offensive avionics. Its task is to demonstrate that a stealthy aircraft can be a fighter. Under a deal struck with Congress last year, the F-22 has to prove this key technology by the end of this year if the next ten aircraft are to be authorized.

 

The F-22 represents a radical departure from the traditional approach to EW. Passive systems, once considered to be defensive in nature, are now critical to detecting, tracking and even attacking the target. The active radar, while still a primary sensor, is used sparingly for specific tasks. Active jamming in the traditional sense has disappeared. The F-22 approach is echoed to some extent in most of today's advanced fighter programs, including the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter typhoon and Saab JAS Gripen. It is also fundamental to the future of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF).

 

The F-22's EW philosophy is rooted in some of the earliest work on stealth. As the US Air Force (USAF) defined requirements and operational doctrine for the F-117 stealth strike aircraft and B-2 bomber, in 1980-81, A "Red Team" headed by Dr. Paul Kaminski was charged with looking for weaknesses and vulnerabilities in stealth technology. One of the Red Team's Most important conclusions was that a stealth aircraft could not survive by low radar cross-section (RCS) alone, but by stealth and tactics.

 

In the case of the F-117 the Red Team's recommendation resulted in the development of one of the first automated mission-planning systems, but this left the aircraft dependent on a pre-programmed flight plan. The B-2 was designed to feature a sophisticated defensive management system (DMS) which would allow the crew to respond to threat radars not anticipated by the mission plan. The initial DMS was abandoned in the late 1980s. Its successor is the APR-50, developed by IBM Federal Systems (later acquired by Loral and now part of Lockheed Martin).

The USAF's Advanced Tactical Fighter project, which led to the F-22, presented greater challenges. In the air-to-air regime, the primary threats are airborne and move rapidly, making identification, location and tracking more complex. The F-22's sustained speed also shortens engagement timelines by as much as 40 percent.

At the same time, the fighter's classic tool for situational awareness -- a powerful search radar -- can render its stealth characteristics moot. Low-probability-of-intercept (LPI) techniques are not very compatible with continuous searches over a large volume. The fighter's stealth is also of little use if it has to close to visual range in order to identify its targets. Passive search and track and non-cooperative target recognition (NCTR) are not luxuries for a stealthy air-superiority fighter.

The solution to this problem on the F-22 is sensor fusion. The principal sensors are the Northrop Grumman APG-77 radar and the Sanders ALR-94 passive receiver system. The fighter also has two datalink systems: one using the standard VHF/UHF radio frequencies and the other, the intraflight datalink (IFDL), a low-power LPI link which connects two or more F-22s at close range. The sensors are apertures connected to the fighter's Common Integrated Processor (CIP) banks in the forward fuselage.

 

 

The data from the APG-77, ALR-94 and the datalinks are correlated according to their azimuth, elevation and range. Data is combined into a track file, and the final target picture is obtained by choosing the read-out from the most accurate sensor. For example, the passive system may provide the best azimuth data, while the radar produces the most accurate range.

 

CIP software controls the APG-77 according to emission-control principles. The radar's signals are managed in intensity, duration and space to maintain the pilot's situational awareness while minimizing the chance that its signals will be intercepted. More distant targets get less radar attention; as they get closer to the F-22, they will be identified and prioritized; and when they are close enough to be engaged or avoided, they are continuously tracked.

 

Sensor fusion and emission control are closely linked. The more the datalinks and ALR-94 can be used to build and update the tactical picture, the less the system needs to use the radar. The IFDL provides another layer of protection against tracking, because any one F-22 in a flight can provide radar data to the others.

The APG-77 and ALR-94 are unique, high-performance sensors. The APG-77 has an active, electronically scanned array (AESA) comprising some 1,200 transmitter and receiver modules. One vital difference between an AESA and any other radar that has a single transmitter (including a passive electronically steered array) is that the AESA is capable of operating as several separate radars simultaneously. An AESA can change its beamform very readily, and its receiver segments can operate in a passive or receive-only mode. Unlike a mechanical antenna, too, its revisit rates are not constrained by the antenna drive, and it can concurrently revisit different points within its field of regard at different rates. The F-22 has space, weight and cooling provision for auxiliary side arrays on either side of the nose. If installed, these would provide radar coverage over almost 270[degrees]. The ALR-94, meanwhile, is the most effective passive system ever installed on a fighter. Tom Burbage, former head of the F-22 program at Lockheed Martin, has described it as "the most technically complex piece of equipment on the aircraft."

 

The F-22 has been described as an antenna farm. Indeed, it would resemble a signals-intelligence (SIGINT) platform were it not for the fact that the 30-plus antennas are all smoothly blended into the wings and fuselage. The ALR-94 provides 360[degrees] coverage in all bands, with both azimuth and elevation coverage in the forward sector.

 

A target which is using radar to search for the F-22 or other friendly aircraft can be detected, tracked and identified by the ALR-94 long before its radar can see anything, at ranges of 250 nm or more. As the range closes, but still above 100 nm, the APG-77 can be cued by the ALR-94 to search for other aircraft in the hostile flight. The system uses techniques such as cued tracking: since the track file, updated by the ALR-94, can tell the radar where to look, it can detect and track the target with a very narrow beam, measuring as little as 2[degrees] by 2[degrees] in azimuth and elevation. One engineer calls it "a laser beam, not a searchlight. We want to use our resources on the high-value targets. We don't track targets that are too far away to be a threat."

 

The system also automatically increases revisit rates according to the threat posed by the targets. Another technique is "closed-loop tracking," in which the radar constantly adjusts the power and number of pulses to retain a lock on its target while using the smallest possible amount of energy.

 

High-priority emitters -- such as fighter aircraft at close range -- can be tracked in real time by the ALR-94. In this mode, called narrowband interleaved search and track (NBILST), the radar is used only to provide precise range and velocity data to set up a missile attack. If a hostile aircraft is injudicious in its use of radar, the ALR-94 may provide nearly all the information necessary to launch an AIM-120 AMRAAM air-to-air missile (AAM) and guide it to impact, making it virtually an anti-radiation AAM.

 

Of course, there are some targets that do not emit signals. "We prefer it that way, because he's dumb," remarked one Boeing engineer. In this case, the F-22 can use its LPI features to track the target -- which is not a threat unless another radar is tracking the F-22 and datalinking information to the "quiet" aircraft -- and can, if necessary, identify it.

 

NCTR is a highly classified area. One of the few known techniques is jet-engine modulation, which involves analyzing the raw radar return for the characteristic beat produced by a combination of the radar-pulse frequency and the rotating blades of the engine. This technique is already used on operational radars (including the APG-70 in the F-15) but is vulnerable to countermeasures and dependent on target aspect.

 

Other NCTR techniques involve very precise range measurements. If the target's orientation is known, the distribution of the signature over very small range bins can yield a range profile which is characteristic of a certain aircraft type. It is possible that the F-22, which has a great deal of onboard processing power -- as well as a flexible, frequency-agile radar -- is designed to use an NCTR technique of this kind.

 

Unlike the Eurofighter Typhoon , the F-22 does not have an electro-optical (EO) system for target identification. F-22 program managers have said consistently that they believe that the F-22 pilot will be able to identify any target -- emitting or not -- beyond visual range (BVR). "We are confident that we can demonstrate to our leadership that we know what's out there, and that we will operate with rules of engagement that reflect that fact," USAF program manager Gen Mike Mushala remarked at a conference in 1997.

 

The ALR-94 drives the F-22's defensive displays. The system determines the bearing, range and type of the threat, and then computes the distance at which the enemy radar can detect the F-22. The pilot is the decision-maker and is provided with timely, graphic information to guide defensive maneuvers. On the main defense display, usually shown on the left-hand screen in the cockpit, threat surface-to-air missile (SAM) and airborne early warning (AEW) radars are surrounded by circles that show their computed effective range. On the right-hand attack display, fighter radars are shown as blue beams extending towards the F-22's position.

 

The F-22 has no dedicated jamming systems. However, the APG-77 array can be used to generate powerful jamming beams over a certain frequency range.

 

So, you can start to see the advantages of a radar that's hard to detect, and in the case of the F-35, coupled with pretty advanced IR detection capability to address the advantages and disadvantages of each technology to create a more complete picture of the battlefield. One other tidbit of info that was published in Air Force Magazine is that F-22's fly in groups with a spacing that is much further from each other than 4th gen aircraft, it was mentioned as "Geographic" spacing.

[Stealth Capability debate]

What I meant by fast maneuvering, is that if you have an aircraft closing at high speed, and say the IRST sees it a 50km ahead of you, your heading toward him, both at or over mach by this time, you don't have much room to work with that range closing fast.

 

And aircraft don't usually come in ones and twos, so in busy airspace PIRATE might have some trouble if it's focused on one or two contacts, but others are also out there.

 

Best official word on an F-22 detecting an object with 1m2 target size was in a Jane's 2004 publication, you won't find any details on the actual ranges though.

 

As yet unconfirmed sources suggest that APG-77 has a typical operating range of 193 km and is specified to achieve an 86 per cent probability of intercept against a 1 m² target at its maximum detection range using a single radar paint (Jane's Radar and Electronic Warfare Systems 2004c, ).

[Stealth Capability debate]

Well, your right that newer technology will extend the range, the Su-35's IRST is better than the legacy Su-27, but you can see it's not by too much and there's other factors that increase or decrease range performance, like good coding for the thermal sensor and quality of optics in front of the sensor.

 

Sniper is multi spectral, including a 3rd gen 3000 to 5000 nanometer thermal sensor with a rather large 512x640 focal planar array that gives the sensor a recognition range 2 to 3 times further than legacy pods like Lightning. Plus advanced image processing algorithms and extremely steady stabilization to help achieve that longer range.

 

It's really fascinating stuff to study, but like you said there are a lot of secrets, so the best you can hope for is to get some hints and put the info together to guess what might be possible when you search for info.

 

Trust me though, PIRATE isn't perfect, great to have in addition to a good radar to help out but there's no perfect solution.

 

https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/united-kingdom/defence/air-group/infra-red-search-track/pirate

 

 

Your article mentions the following for PIRATE:

 

Die Reichweite des Systems liegt zwischen 50 und 80 Kilometern, könnte aber bis zu 150 Kilometern betragen. Die Zielidentifizierung kann aus mehr als 40 Kilometern erfolgen. Allerdings beeinflusst die Wetterlage die Leistung der infrarotgestützten Zielsuche und Zielverfolgung erheblich.

 

 

Which in English translates to the following:

 

The range of the system is between 50 and 80 kilometers , but could be up to 150 kilometers. The target identification can be carried out more than 40 kilometers . However, the weather conditions will affect the performance of the infrared- based target search and tracking significantly .

 

So perhaps 40 to 50 km to ID the target as a plane then, on such a high end IRST system. It's great as an aide to the radar, but still too limited in range in real conditions against an air threat that's moving very fast.

[Stealth Capability debate]

Sniper is pretty good, same limitations apply trying to recognize an aircraft using a narrow fov sensor.

[Stealth Capability debate]

If your talking Western European and US IRST and thermal imaging sensor designs, then I agree, they can add an extra layer of information and other options to detect and fire on opposing aircraft at useful ranges. They are also more advanced and sensitive systems that can see targets much further away than Eastern designs. But none of them are magic bullets able to defeat all countermeasures.

 

Nobody talks about false signals though, from terrain, buildings, hot spots and metal reflecting in the 3000 to 14000 nanometer IR windows, stuff glinting into the sensor as you fly along at high speed, and the Su-35's IRST is the most advanced Eastern design that is actually fielded so I used it as an example showing how limited it was against a non IR stealthy and very large Su-30 target.

 

Other models which go into Mig-29's for example, like the OEPS-29 IRST are even less capable.

 

http://aerospace.boopidoo.com/philez/Su-15TM%20PICTURES%20&%20DOCS/Overscan%27s%20guide%20to%20Russian%20Military%20Avionics.htm

 

Fitted to the MiG-29A, KOLS is a combined IRST/LR device. All aspect device. Acquires targets independently, or with data input from the radar. Can detect a non-afterburning fighter head-on at a range of 12-18km. The collimated laser can provide ranging data from 200-6500m accurate to 3m. Scanning limits are ±30° azimuth, -15°/+30° elevation.

 

Operates in several scanning modes. In large FOV mode scanning is ±30° azimuth, +30°/15° elevation. In small FOV mode scanning limits are ±30° azimuth and ±15° elevation. Close combat mode scans +16° to -14° by 4°. Lock-on mode scans 6° x 4°. Target tracking rate is up to 30°/sec.

 

KOLS is able to reject flares only if the combined signature of the flares is less than the target.

 

Targets are displayed on the same display as the radar.

 

So here's some interesting info, the IRST on a Mig-29 has problems tracking a target if it uses flares. And at that, the combined IR signature of the multiple flares has to be LESS than the aircraft that's spoofing, that doesn't happen too often if you understand IR signatures. That's not good in a close in battle with aircraft popping flares WVR, and it's more confusing that false info is going to your radar display from the flares, since the system can't reject their signature as a false positive.

 

The Su-27's IRST, the OLS-27:

 

A combined IRST/LR device for the Su-27, similar to the MiG-29's KOLS but more sophisticated, using a cooled, broader waveband, sensor. Tracking rate is over 25deg/sec. 50km range in pursuit engagement, 15km head-on. The laser rangefinder operates between 300-3000m for air targets, 300-5000m for ground targets.

 

So looking up the hot tailpipe of an opposing aircraft engine, it can see it at 50km. Most likely if it's skylined against a nice flat cold sky in the thermal sensor.

 

As far as IR stealth, the F-22 and F-35's do employ it. Imagine the IRST sensor, however at 30km, an F-22 may only take up a few pixels across the sensor, and at that range the difference in it's heat signature from the sky may not be enough for it to be noticed by the IRST. Even more difficult is a plane coming from below the horizon, now it's IR signature is more easily hidden from terrain features, the ocean, etc instead of the much colder and more uniform sky if that happens to be perfectly clear.

 

On top of that, for example if it's possible to hide an M1 Abrams with IR paint, it's very conceivable that F-22's and F-35's can do some of the same. Look how hard it is for the thermal imager to see the hot engine of the tank even.

 

Maximum detection ranges are just that, detection, not recognition, or identification range, which is shorter than the Detection range. Detection is a pixel, what is it?? Recognition range is: It's a plane, but what kind? Friendly, enemy? Identification range: It's an F-22, and he's in my face!!

 

We use the The Johnson Criteria which assumes that the critical dimension for a human being is 0.75 meters. To get DRI, you need 1.5 pixels, 6 pixels and 12 pixels across 0.75 meters in the object pane.

That means:

Detection

 

1.5 pixels / 0.75m = 2 pixels per meter

Recognition

6 pixels / 0.75m = 8 pixels per meter

Identification

12 pixels / 0.75m = 16 pixels per meter

 

For a rather advanced 640x480 thermal sensor we have the following example to see a human target:

Sure, I can detect a man at 2.5km, but I won't know it's a man until he's 1.1km away. And I can't tell if it's a farmer or an enemy soldier until he's 600m away using the sensor above. Same applies to aircraft IR sensors.

 

And this applies to aircraft as well.

 

http://www.defensereview.com/intermat-anti-thermalir-camo-tech-for-infantry-and-special-operations-forces/

 

For reference, the M1 painted with the intermet is number 2, and it's only 250 meters away from the camera.

 

 

Another image, same range, 250 meters.

 

 

 

 

Thermal Images of Aircraft Carriers

Notice that there are two sets of apparent jet heat trails, these are called "ghosts". They are errors and result from lense reflection or instrument calibration error which introduce artifacts.

 

Video of the F-14's IRST, not the nice smooth real time high resolution image many like to think when discussing IRST's. And to get any real range, the sensors have to dramatically reduce their field of view, and their ability to search any large portion of the sky.

 

So, starting to see the problem with using IR seekers? It actually gets worse trying to pick out your target than the photos illustrated if it is high humidity, or if it has rained or is raining. Much more difficult. Now do it at ranges to avoid getting hit from an Amraam at over 35 km with a plane that's masking it's signature to allow it to get within no escape zones with it's AIM-120.

[Stealth Capability debate]

lol, it sure does seem to be heading more toward lasers, drones, and hackers as of late.

[Stealth Capability debate]

There's a lot more to even the type of radar used in planes like the F-22, F-35, Golden Eagles.

 

 

http://www.deagel.com/news/APG-81-Radar-Validated-during-Northern-Edge-2009_n000006262.aspx

 

Northrop Grumman Corporation (NYSE:NOC) has announced that it successfully demonstrated key electronic protection capabilities of the F-35 Lightning II's AN/APG-81 radar during the recent Northern Edge 2009 (NE09) joint military exercise.

The Northrop Grumman AN/APG-81 active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar was flown on board the company's BAC 1-11 test aircraft and was integrated into what is considered the United States' largest and most complex airborne electronic warfare (EW) exercise to date. Northrop Grumman demonstrated the electronic protection (EP) capabilities of the AN/APG-81, by successfully countering advanced electronic attacks (EA), which are intended to degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability.

 

"The radar was subjected to a scale of scenarios that far exceeded typical developmental or operational test program requirements," said Pete Bartos, a former U.S. Navy F/A-18 operational test director and currently Northrop Grumman program manager for fifth-generation fighter requirements, improvements and derivatives. "In the past, typical EP testing consisted of a few sorties versus a single or maybe two jammers at once. This test was unique in that it included flights versus multiple types of advanced jammers on several aircraft formations at once."

 

 

The effectiveness of a modern fighter radar is determined by a combination of its radiating power and Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) features that prevent the radar from tripping off alarm systems in a target. These typically include using a narrow beam that is hard to spot from off its boresight; only transmitting radar pulses when necessary; spreading the radar pulses over a wide band so there will only be a very small signal on any one band (Frequency Hopping); or varying transmission parameters such as pulse form, frequency, or PRF, jumping around in an unpredictable fashion, not staying in one place long enough to register.

 

The radiated power is largely dependent on the antenna aperture.

 

Increasing the radiated power will increase the range of the radar but unless it is accompanied by LPI it will also announce the presence of the radiating aircraft to sensors on an enemy fighter that still does not have you in its radar range.

 

In an AESA radar individual TR modules can be assigned the role of Radar Warning Receivers allowing a radiating aircraft to be picked up the target aircraft, instead of the other way around!

 

For example, the AN/APG-77 fitted on the F-22 Raptor has 2,000 TR modules. Operating purely as an RWR it can pick up enemy aircraft's radar from distances of up to 460 kilometers (250 nautical miles). The higher the energy radiated by the enemy aircraft radar, greater the APG-77's detection range. With all modules operating as radars, the APG-77 can acquire pick enemy targets up to 220 kilometers (125 nautical miles). Its use of LPI does not alert the enemy aircraft to its own presence.

 

Broadly speaking Russian radars tend to rely on radiated power for their effectiveness, leveraging the higher apertures of their radars facilitated by larger aircraft size and nose cross sectional area. American AESA radars blend radiating powere with LPI. Their higher software maturity levels facilitate use of the AESA for communication, gathering information electronic intelligence, locating electronic systems, classifying them, and warning the pilot of possible threats or high-priority targets.

 

When coupled with the electronic techniques generator in an aircraft, the radar can project jamming, false targets and other false information into enemy sensors. Ranges for electronic attack equal the AESA radar plus that of the enemy radar. That could allow electronic attack at ranges of 150 mi. or more. The ability to pick out small targets at a long distance also lets AESA-equipped aircraft find and attack cruise missiles, stealth aircraft and small UAVs.

 

 

From the book "Detecting and Classifying Low Probability of Intercept Radar"

 

As yet unconfirmed sources suggest that APG-77 has a typical operating

range of 193 km and is specified to achieve an 86 per cent probability of intercept against

a 1 m² target at its maximum detection range using a single radar paint (Jane's Radar and

Electronic Warfare Systems 2004c, ).

 

Essentialy, you would have to deal with a radar that is very difficult to detect, and can supposedly give you false signals or actively jam while it easily sees and classifies at ranges far in excess than even Western IR sensors.

 

 

 

And as far as IRST's go:

 

 

Even the Su-35 according to the brochure has trouble seeing the giant Su-30 coming straight at it until it's within 35 km. If that hot and large Su-30 happens to even be in the IRST's gimball frontal search arc. Your Amraam fodder head on at 35 km with something you can't see yet that's using LPI radar against you, or God forbid being painted by another LPI F-22 while the other units fire on you from multiple vectors.

[Research on Soviet MiG-21 losses during Soviet-Afghan War]

You can get a free account signing up here: http://www.acig.info/CMS/

 

It's the Air Combat Information Group, they have tons of research info for you to look into about aircraft losses and other subjects related to air combat.

 

Once you make an account, you can search the "Database" on the left side of the page to go to different regions for research. You can also contact the site owner, he's a publisher as well and very helpful in guiding you toward the info you want if your having trouble.

[9-11 Remebrance]

I was at the Community College of Allegheny County that morning. We had gotten into class when a few students had mentioned a plane hit the WTC. We thought it was a small piper or something, but about 10 minutes later the other Faculty ran into the rooms telling us to evacuate immediately, a plane was heading for our area. This plane turned out to be United Airlines Flight 93.

 

 

As I got outside with hundreds of others into the parking lot, I saw two F-16's. We don't normally see them, let alone with drop tanks, two AIM-120's and 2 Aim-9s, and they were afterburning.

 

I still didn't know what was going on as I got to my car and got onto the Interstate, I could see Pittsburgh International Airport once I got on Rt.22 from the College, but EVERYONE from all the local businesses were evacuating too.

 

I had the news radio on trying to figure out what was happening, it seemed like WW3 was starting, thousands of cars congesting the roadway, people running to their vehicles from all the businesses, you couldn't get anywhere.

 

What was normally a 20 minute commute took me 2 hours to get home. I finally had access to a TV and could see what had happened. There were F-16's doing combat air patrols over our area, we never see that kind of action in the air.

 

I'll never forget that day.

[Laser/IR beam width?]

Info about the illuminator is here:

 

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usmc/mcwp/3-23-1/apph.pdf

 

 

 

It's a gated IR illuminator for use with the narrow television that works with the Low Light Level TV sensor system.

 

Here's video that shows it from a closer position, skip to 4:20 in to see them using it.

 

[The F-35 Thread]

So... How many F-35's have been flying? Accumulating over 15,000 actual flying hours total?

 

http://news.usni.org/2014/06/24/eglin-f-35-operations-suspended-following-plane-fire

 

“Flights for the F-35A CTOL [conventional takeoff and landing] aircraft are temporarily suspended today,” said 1st Lt. Hope Cronin, a public relations officer for the 33rd Fighter Wing. “The F-35Bs and F-35Cs are on a weather pause at this time as Florida weather is rather disagreeable at the moment.”

 

The rest of the F-35A fleet is flying however according to Joint Program Office spokesman Joe DellaVedova. “Experts are working root cause,” he said.

 

The fact that the F-35A fleet is still flying suggests that a design flaw is not suspected as a cause of the fire.

 

This is the first incident this severe for the JSF during the life of the tri-service program.

 

There are currently 104 Joint Strike Fighters in the U.S. inventory — split between U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and U.S.

Marine Corps variants, according to information from Lockheed.

 

http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/24/us-lockheed-fighter-idUSKBN0EZ2J320140624

 

(Reuters) - The U.S. Air Force said it will resume flights of Lockheed Martin Corp's F-35 A-model fighter jets at a Florida air base on Wednesday, two days after one of the jets caught fire while preparing for takeoff.

 

"We intend to resume flights of the F-35As tomorrow," 1st Lieutenant Hope Cronin, a spokeswoman for the Air Force 33rd Fighter Wing, said on Tuesday. The unit trains Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy pilots to fly the new jets at Eglin Air Force Base.

 

The Air Force ordered a temporary halt in F-35A flights on Monday after a fire broke out in the rear of the plane, forcing the pilot to abort his takeoff.

 

Updated Reuters: http://www.nwfdailynews.com/military/top-story/f-35-flight-suspension-to-continue-1.337525

 

EGLIN AFB — Flights of the Air Force’s version of the F-35 fighter jet will remain suspended indefinitely here after one of the planes caught on fire on the runway on Monday.

 

“We found additional evidence and information in the initial safety investigation to decide to continue with the suspension of flights,” said Air Force Lt. Hope Cronin, a spokeswoman for the 33rd Fighter Wing at Eglin Air Force Base on Wednesday.

 

Initially, officials had said flights would resume Wednesday.

 

The fire began in the back of an Air Force F-35 during takeoff at the base on Monday. The pilot was able to safely shut down the engine and get out of the plane, and no injuries were reported.

 

The Air Force has 26 F-35s at Eglin.

 

The suspension will not affect flights of the Marines and Navy versions of the aircraft and is so far limited only to Eglin.

[What combat role could a mech play on a real battlefield?]

I started with mechwarrior gaming back in 1995, and it's funny that the same debate still rages 20 years later. :D

 

One thing is for sure, I certainly had a lot of fun online gaming with the Mechwarrior crowd, and back then we didn't realize it, but we were making memes even then. I think the big thing is that we simply had fun, no one was too worried about the armor thickness of a certain mech being able to deflect a ER-PPC, or an LBX-20 at 100 meters. It's just science fiction rock em sock em robot fun.

 

This one came about because someone complained that the mechs looked to "naked"

 

 

And this was pretty much the general rule of thumb after playing online and leaving the Microsoft "Zone" even back in the late 90's.

 

[Military and Aviation News Thread (NO DISCUSSION)]

LOL, it's always a mouthful, until you take the first letter of each part of the names.

 

CISDIOTAPCFLAS..... Ah..

 

Nevermind... It's still a mouthful. :lol:

[The AH-64 Apache Thread]

Thanks for that info raptor9, good to know it's a real usable system that helps out with operations.

[Best Silent Hunter?]

I'm with Scrim on this one.

 

Really had a lot of fun with the single download mod Trigger Maru Overhaul 2.5 with SH IV.

 

 

 

 

 

Definately lots of fun :D

[The AH-64 Apache Thread]

Regarding more fuel for the Apache.

 

I wonder if this was ever implemented:

 

http://www.meggitt.com/?OBH=108&ID=685&OP=Y

 

AH-64 APACHE

30mm 12-PAK magazine/Combo-PAK

 

One PAK, many configurations

Rounds from dual bay magazines are merged into a single chute serving the Apache’s M230 30mm cannon. Fully loaded, the AH-64 can carry1200 rounds—known colloquially as a 12-PAK. This gives considerable combat persistence in a battle zone.

 

After early service, the US Army found that 300-400 rounds were frequently sufficient for a typical sortie. This meant that the space taken up by the mostly-empty magazines was not being efficiently utilised. Meggitt therefore developed a hybrid magazine/fuel tank known as the Combo-PAK containing 250 rounds plus 100 US gallons of fuel, giving the helicopter additional range.

 

PDF of the system showing images of its layout, etc.

 

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a394834.pdf

 

Mentioned a 40 minutes of extra flight time without any external tanks.

 

 

And says it was available in 2002.

[IFV Sniping Jets]

At times I have had to factor in BMP's as virtual air defenses when designing missions and a threat environment

 

This.