fltsimbuff

It's too bad they don't go into any detail. I saw an entire book about Phoenix missile program testing on Google Books at one point, but they didn't have an electronic copy...

Here are some resources describing the original mission of the Phoenix, so we can put that to rest. I've included links so you can take a look at the context: - "The Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapons Systems, 1997-1998" by Norman Friedman -- "...although conceived as an antibomber weapon, Phoenix can shoot down antiship missiles.." -- Lots of good information on guidance and on tests. Note none of the tests referred to maneuvering targets. -- Google Books Link: https://books.google.com/books?id=l-DzknmTgDUC&lpg=PA427&dq=aim-54&pg=PA427#v=onepage&q=aim-54&f=false - "Persian Gulf War Encyclopedia: A Political, Social, and Military History" edited by Spencer C Tucker -- "Developed by Highes Aircraft Company and Raytheon beginning in the late 1960s to meet the threat posed by Soviet long-range bombers carrying antiship missiles, the Phoenix entered service with the U.S. Navy in 1974." -- Google Books Link: https://books.google.com/books?id=-oaMBAAAQBAJ&lpg=PA6&dq=aim-54&pg=PA6#v=onepage&q=aim-54&f=false - "Iranian F-14 Tomcat Units in Combat" by Tom Cooper -- "... Hughes AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles, which were required by the US Navy to intercept the formations of Soviet bombers considered to pose the greatest threat to its fleet of aircraft carriers." -- Google Books Link: https://books.google.com/books?id=MCzk0cARvjAC&lpg=PA88&dq=aim-54&pg=PA8#v=onepage&q=aim-54&f=false - "F-15 Eagle Engaged: The World's Most Successful Jet Fighter" by Steve Davies, Doug Dildy -- "The AIM-54 Phoenix was specifically developed to be a very long range 'bomber destroyer' missile..." -- Other interesting notes about guidance issues against more maneuverable threats during mid-course guidance that I wasn't aware of. The author seems a bit biased against the Phoenix, so not sure we can trust that 100% though -- Google Books Link: https://books.google.com/books?id=wBRM5RRWZ3oC&lpg=PA88&ots=Owy_fM8905&dq=F-15%20Eagle%20Engaged%20phoenix&pg=PA88#v=onepage&q=F-15%20Eagle%20Engaged%20phoenix&f=false

See Below. For targets rapidly moving toward you, on which you have a good solid lock, there's plenty of reason to do so. I believe it was during the first Gulf War. 2 firing attempts were made that fell like bombs (the ones you are referring to) and a third actually launched properly (different engagement). On a somewhat related note, I read in a few places that Iran claimed they didn't use the "lofting" mode much, which probably means they fired it at shorter ranges (I've never heard of it being selectable, but as the minimum range was about 2nm it wouldn't be "lofting" at that distance). Again though, Iran claims a lot of things. You can invalidate as many information gathering methods as you want, but I'll take any one of those over the word of one dude on a forum. It's not like I am seeing a single reference and believing it zealously. I would expect you to also prefer whatever sources you've got over anything I say. Unless you can point me at some sources? Where do you get that it could not be used except in STT made at maximum ranges? Not only have I heard it was used at over 100nm against 6 targets at the same time from 1 ship during testing, but the way the AWG-9 works, that makes no sense. Remember the guidance of the AWG-9 when guiding Phoenix missiles was not like regular SARH missiles or radars. AWG-9 remembered tracks and used spotlighting, not a constant track. The mid-course guidance did not require constant illumination.

I am stuck on edge of envelope because that is what mattered for what this missile was designed to do. It was a direct response to the threat of large numbers of Soviet bombers closing on the fleet and attempting to get in range of their supersonic cruise missiles. The Eagle became Falcon, then became Phoenix. All 3 were designed to extend the standoff range against the bombers. The bombers would not turn and run until they fired their payloads, so they didn't need to deal with the targets escaping the envelope. The scenario these missiles were meant to counter was a large group of large aircraft approaching the fleet. This is also why the Tomcat needed to be able to patrol longer and further distances, and have a more powerful radar. The Soviet Union had a lot of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, so engaging these bombers as far away from the fleet as possible was critical, and given that all the bombers could do is continue to close into their launch range, firing at the edge of the envelope makes sense. The same applies for firing at cruise missiles. They may be far faster and smaller than the bombers, but they would be moving further into the envelope toward the launching platform (and the fleet behind them). The one Phoenix missile that was successfully fired at an Iraqi Mig (23 or 25) missed when the Mig turned tail and ran for it. Iran claims some successful intercepts, but not a lot is known about those (and Iran claims a lot of things). This is not to say that there weren't other considerations during design, but these were biased heavily towards an emphasis on hitting large numbers of bombers from range (early design versions had provisions for carrying a nuclear warhead in fact). I've not only read this numerous times, and seen it in numerous documentaries, but all the known threats of the period and the Navy's doctrine at the time support this. "Poor terminal maneuvering characteristics" was in the context of engagement at its max range, and in part due to the ballistic trajectory. Compared to an AIM-9 against a fast, small and highly maneuverable target, yes, the maneuvering characteristics can be considered poor even closer in.

My original comment on "poor terminal maneuverability" was regarding its use as it was intended at the edge of its engagement range. It was built to do a very specific job, as anyone familiar with Soviet vs Western military doctrine and capabilities at the time can tell you. Yes, I fully understand that missiles have much better chances of taking maneuvering targets when they are well within this envelope. You can engage a smaller target at ranges still outside what an AIM-7 can handle and have good performance against it. But whether you believe me or not on the original purpose of the missile (engaging large targets at the edge of its max engagement range) you simply cannot successfully engage a target that near the edge if it is capable of maneuvering out of the envelope. This could be an altitude envelope (remember lofting missiles trade altitude for range at the edge) or range (turn tail and afterburn!) or exceed the maneuverability of the missile near the edge of its envelope. You can sum up my point of view on this as follows (100+nm range is standing in for actual, as actual max range is still unknown): Was the Phoenix an awesome missile able to engage bombers at 100+nm? Yep! Was the Phoenix a fighter killer at 100+nm? No. Does that mean I think it was a failure? Absolutely not. It did what it was supposed to do. I really don't think we're ever going to agree on this. You say you've done math that can tell you what is still classified, that's great. I am not convinced. Maybe we'll see an well-modeled simulation someday that can accurately represent it. I concede that you can call it a "beam in the traditional sense" as long as you are looking at the phase shifting as a form of focusing of the energy like a lens does for light. The methods used are dissimilar though.

And here we go... The main purpose of the Phoenix being long-range intercept, maneuvering at the outer range envelope matters. It was "good enough" for aircraft that also can't maneuver very well and there was the real value against the target for which it was intended. Other missiles do indeed have trouble at the edge of their range envelope as well, and as a result it is a general rule you will close more distance before firing to get the aircraft into the "no-escape zone" depending on target type. But the Phoenix was a bomber interceptor, intended to be fired at edge of envelope at distant bombers. It, as with any missile at the edge of its envelope, would be far less useful against maneuverable targets at the same distance! My point was that it is a logical concept, not a "beam" in the traditional sense. Each individual T/R module is going to radiate like any other antenna, not in a specific constrained direction. The sum total forms an imaginary logical "beam." I am only pointing that out because it makes the whole conversation of what constitutes a "separate beam" a lot more complicated. See my edit to my post above. Plenty of examples, including from engineers and manufacturers. I agree on continuing to ask questions. My point is that when you get multiple answers in conflict, you have to weigh them. You may well have done a ton of research of far more credible sources than I have, but I can take your word for it or I can take the word of multiple engineers and AESA manufacturers. If and when I get additional information to the contrary I will re-evaluate. It's nothing against you, but one intelligent person vs numerous others saying something different is not so complicated.

I've read this many times over the years. Gaining any knowledge of history and how the cold war developed will tell you this. The Cold War was a series of actions and reactions. Defensive weapons are deployed against the current or predicted threat. Looking at the threats faced by our carrier groups makes this rather obvious, but don't take my word for it... http://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.2011-7027 "A long-range missile, the AIM-54 was intended to be used against slow, non-maneuvering enemy targets such as bombers and strike aircraft that were intent on attacking US carrier battle groups" Not only does it make perfect sense given the threats of the time, but I have seen similar things said many times over the years. In addition, nearly every document I have seen talking about the 'C' upgrade lists "improved effectiveness against cruise missiles and tactical aircraft" as a major feature. Tactical aircraft would be the smaller maneuvering targets and not the larger "strategic" bombers. The AIM-54A was designed for intercept of strategic bombers attacking the fleet with cruise missiles. A little historical context goes a long way to understanding the design. While the 'C' model may have added some increased effectiveness to the guidance of the missile for tactical aircraft, it was still a half-ton glider with proportionally tiny control surfaces when it reached the target. With an increase in mass, the forces used to maneuver must also be increased. This means larger control surfaces and lift area. The Phoenix had better lift surfaces than some missiles, but control surfaces were necessarily small. Gliding in a straight line and turning are very different things. The latter relies on control surfaces being larger to generate more differential force. That additional force comes at the expense of energy. I am not exactly sure why the command links keep coming up. I am still talking about SARH, not command-link. While they are not mutually exclusive, many SARH missiles did not have command link. In all my additional reading on the AIM-54C in locating the links above, I am even more certain the AIM-54 had no such link and used SARH. If it did, it's still classified information or no one has bothered to share it. These aren't really "beams" at all. That's more of a concept to describe the way the RF is being used and "focused" electronically. Sidelobes and EMI are a fact of life for radio transmitters. With the ability for each transmitter to operate on its own frequency that will help a bit with the interference. With all of the different things AESA is going to be used for (we hear about increased capabilities every day) the ability to have concurrent spatial "focusing" of multiple "beams" could very well be a useful feature, even with some power loss. I agree there's a lot of bad information out there. No offense intended, but I usually lean toward the consensus of available information and not information provided by one person of unknown credentials using unknown sources. I consider these capabilities as "possible, but unverified" as with most things that are mostly classified. Below are some specific articles, some straight from the AESA manufacturers that state multiple-simultaneous-beam forming capabilities. I suppose Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin could all be lying about functionality, but I somehow doubt it. -From a presentation by a Lockheed Martin Engineer: http://www.ofcm.gov/mpar-symposium/2009/presentations/workshop/W2_Al-Rashid%20Architecture.pdf -- "Digital beamforming affords multiple simultaneous beams.." -- Diagram on page 15 showing example of multiple simultaneous beams increasing scan speed. -Another article, and regarding one of Northrop Grumman's offerings: http://mwrf.com/analog-devices/radar-systems-ride-device-advances -- "Because system performance can be quickly redefined, the HAMMR system can readily adapt to new threats without additional hardware. Also, groups of modules can be dedicated to different targets, allowing them to be tracked simultaneously." (emphasis mine) -An article by Raytheon about their AESA radar tech: http://www.raytheon.com/news/technology_today/2014_i1/aesa.html -- "This will enable unprecedented performance and new capabilities for radar, communications and EW missions such as creating and processing multiple simultaneous beams, increased polarization diversity and improved dynamic range." (emphasis mine) -An article by another RF systems manufacturer about the tech: http://www.altera.com/technology/system-design/articles/2013/scanned-radar-signal-processing.html -- "This approach, aside from eliminating a lot of big moving parts, allows the radar to do things that are physically impossible with a conventional antenna, such as changing the beam direction instantaneously, having multiple antenna patterns for transmitting and receiving simultaneously, or even subdividing the array into multiple antenna arrays and performing multiple functions—say, searching for targets, tracking a target, and following terrain—simultaneously." (emphasis mine) - Another article about AESA systems in general: http://www.satellite-evolution.com/issues-2011/gmc-oct-2011/radar.pdf -- "AESA antennas comprise hundreds or even thousands of transmit/receive modules and each of these modules acts as an individual radar. It truly is a case of strength in numbers. The AESA is solid state – there are no moving parts, and this increases the overall reliability of the system as there are basically less things that can go wrong. An AESA radar can steer its beams electronically – nearly at the speed of light – and can re-direct them instantly from one target to another making them extremely versatile and agile. The modules can work together or in groups enabling them to perform multiple tasks at the same time." (emphasis mine)

You seem to be presuming those are the only things that factor. Energy going into a high G turn matters, and affects how long you can maintain that high G turn as well as how much speed or energy you have coming out of it. In the case of the missile, the additional weight matters because it will burn more energy in the same turn than a lighter missile. And the thrust at this point is 0, so that is energy/speed it cannot get back. A high mass missile with 0 thrust will run out of energy faster than an F-15 turning and burning. Without having access to actual data about the maneuvering of an AIM-54 at 100nm against a target in a 9G turn there's not much point in arguing about it. But I think we can both agree that an AIM-9 with its motor still burning or an AIM-54 at 40nm would fare far better against the same target? This is actually well-known. Look at the threats present at the time the Missileer project was started, and the role of "Fleet Interceptor" that was what became the F-14/Phoenix. Many many documents exist out there stating that the Fleet Interceptor role was to combat large numbers of bombers with their cruise missiles. This was the concern of the Navy at the time that the missile and the fighter were designed. The AWG-9 could track and fire on 6 targets at one time to meet the expected threat of a high threat density. Note in a retirement announcement from the NAVY itself they talk specifically of the targets the Phoenix was intended to combat, aircraft such as the Tu-22 and Tu-16. http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=15422 Lots of sources talking about AESA radars out there disagree with you and indicate multiple distinct beams can be and are formed with modern AESA radars. On missiles that use such a link. Again, I am talking about SARH missiles, which many of the early ones required a lock on for their own seekers before they left the rails. LOAL (Lock On After Launch) mode was a later advancement. Like I said. They call it "beam forming" but it is really electronic steering. It is very primitive but uses the same phase-shifting principles. Again, what you're saying doesn't jive with the available information. It is possible all available information is false and you're getting your information from an authoritative source, but I don't see anything so far that would convince me of that. AESA radars can and do form multiple logical "beams" for speedier coverage of scan area. It is possible that these are time-division scans rather than simultaneous as it doesn't usually specify, but some of the language implies concurrent. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/systems/an-apg-77.htm http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_electronically_scanned_array Okay that might have had a little too much hyperbole, but the point I was trying to make was that my explanation of Electronically Steered Arrays was an oversimplified one meant to get across the basic idea of electronic steering, and that there are many ways the inherent advantages can be used for things like SAR, communications, jam resistance, etc. I thought it was obvious I didn't mean that AESA would enable time travel or faster than light warp drives, but by moving most of the functionality into software there are many many things that can be done that you cannot with a standard radar.

Think of a Bus trying to make a tight turn around a corner vs a small rally car going the same speed. The same principles apply. If a target breaks hard during terminal guidance upon seeing the Phoenix's active radar on their RWR, the much faster missile has to make a much higher G turn to catch them. Chaff and other countermeasures also become more effective when you can maneuver. The Phoenix was never built to deal with this, as it was intended to knock out larger aircraft that could not pull high G turns. For this use they were able to build it big and heavy, which allowed the long range. It was a trade-off. The Phoenix was built with 1960s technology and the AMRAAM with late 1980-90s tech. Sidewinders were designed in the 1950s but have had continual technology refreshes. The Phoenix and the Sidewinder were designed to do very different things. One was a light missile intended for close-in engagements, and were very agile. The other was a very heavy missile intended to reach long distances but sacrificed agility to do it. My point is that the Phoenix wasn't some state-of-the-art ahead of its time weapons system. By the 1960s we could send missiles long distances easily, but it was a trade-off using 1960s technology. The AIM-120 uses much newer technology to allow it to engage targets at range and up close and to do so in a much lighter airframe. This is a result of technological progression. I am not even sure we are disagreeing on this point. Saying that the Phoenix would have no problem with highly agile targets at long distances just doesn't make any sense given the data and what it was designed to do. I wasn't talking about AESA, but Phased-Array mechanical radars. Even so that is not quite correct. Electronic steering is based on the principal that rather than having 1 ultra-powerful transmitter, you can have multiple transmitters of lower power, and "phase-shift" them so their waves overlap, effectively providing the power of a more powerful transmitter. However, if you don't need the power, you can have some transmitters not directly participating in the scan. This results in an effective loss of power at least part of the time, but doesn't slow it it down. AESA radars are not used in the same way as mechanically steered radars. For example, the APG-77 on the F-22 contains about 2,000 individual transmit/receive modules. All modules can be scanning, giving the system very good range, or you can have some transmitters tracking in other parts of the sky so that the overall scan power is limited, but proceeds with the same speed. These operate in parallel. With advanced AESA radars they can even scan multiple parts of the sky at the same time resulting in a near instantaneous and continuous full-arc scan. As these radars become faster and more powerful, the line between scanning and tracking blurs. With command-link guidance, sure. The discussion is about SARH. Remember that the missiles don't have antennas as large as a powerful AESA array and cannot take advantage of the same features for SARH mode. They need a more constant, higher amount of radiation illuminating the target. So even if the launching aircraft doesn't need to illuminate the target in the same way, a SARH missile still needs the track illuminated with enough power to pick up. Beam forming is not actually changing beam shape at all. It is electronic beam steering based on altering the RF phase. It is just called "beam forming" in Wifi routers. The idea behind phased arrays, "beam forming" and AESA all boil down to using multiple transmitters with phases that overlap at certain spatial locations. For example, if a signal is received at 2 antennas, the device can calculate the phase shift between the 2 signals and accordingly shift its transmit phase from the 2 transmitters such that when both signals reach the target, the effective power is increased from the amplitudes overlapping precisely. The phase shift necessary for the 2 separate signals to combine into a stronger single signal depends on the azimuth and range of the target. At other spatial locations the signal will be weaker overall as the phases of the 2 signals will be offset. This can be used for receipt of signals as well, where the receiving antennas shift the phase such that signals arriving from a single spatial location will overlap in the signals monitored by the 2 separate receivers. Now increase from 2 transmitter/receivers to the 2,000 in a modern AESA array and you've got one awesome phase-shifting array that can phase-shift to cover any point within a 120 degree arc without any mechanical antenna aiming at all. Now take 200 of those and phase-shift them to cover 1 spot in the sky continuously and you can track while the other 1800 keep scanning at the same speed but without the extra power from the 200 that are occupied. There are definitely other ways to use that array that probably make my explanation sound silly and oversimplified, but the base concept starts there with MANY possibilities only limited by the software.

It is physics. Objects with more mass have more inertia. Momentum can be helpful to get you to a target in a straight line, but inertia is bad when you need to make a high G turn. The high speed and loads of inertia from sheer mass and speed make it more difficult to maneuver. These are the same laws of physics that have a huge impact on dogfights and every other AAM or SAM. Big and heavy = sluggish turning unless you've got the thrust to maintain energy and some massive control surfaces. That is pretty much my point. It was great at what it was designed to do (well, in theory), but had major weaknesses. There were trade-offs made so that it could accomplish its core mission (quickly reaching long ranges) that made it not so good at other things (engaging smaller more agile targets at range). The AMRAAM isn't an improved Phoenix, but a missile built to be better all around. Spotlighting does not slow down the scan in Phased Array radars. They might decrease the total transmit power available for the scan, but it doesn't slow the scan down. The mechanical scan mechanism does not change speed of traversal. The "steering" is done by Phasing. Memory of the track is 1 part of TWS mode. The other half involves allocating additional energy to maintenance of those tracks. A simple track memory is not enough to guide a missile onto a target, but both methods are used together. AESA is Phased Array and then PESA taken to the next level. They implement many more transmitters and eliminate the need for mechanical steering altogether. Interestingly, a similar sort of "Phased Array" technology has now found its way into Wifi routers under the 802.11ac standard in a feature called "beam forming."

It wasn't only my assumptions. Nearly every document I've read about the AIM-54 has detailed the same limitation. Most Air-to-Air missiles don't weigh a half ton, which makes a big difference. Poor terminal performance at range against maneuvering targets is pretty much "common knowledge" when it comes to the Phoenix. Soviet "Cruise missiles" of that era were pretty much full fighter-size airframes that flew a mostly straight path to the target at low altitudes and required guidance from a controlling aircraft (imagine a Mig-17 hanging under the bomber's wing and you get the idea). The controlling aircraft would stay at high altitude a long range from the fleet spotting ships with radar and sending radio commands to the cruise missiles. The long range of the Phoenix was intended to take out the bombers before they got in range of their cruise missiles and/or take out the controlling aircraft. The C model had some improvements made to it for better tackling smaller targets but dealing with large #s of large bombers at range was what the Phoenix was originally designed for. If the Phoenix had the technology back in 1966 to take out cruise missiles at long range, modern AMRAAM development would have been redundant. It was designed to counter a very specific threat and used a number of clever tricks to accomplish that goal, although with some well known weaknesses. The AWG-9 Radar tracked in "spotlight mode" where it would shift from each of the 6 targets one at a time, not keeping a constant track on any one target. If the target were able to move a significant amount out of the "spotlight" between intervals the track would be lost. Most pre-AESA TWS radars work in a way similar to this, painting tracks with additional energy, but not a constant beam. Using phased arrays and remembering the track locations they can continue to be "spotlighted" on subsequent scans. As mechanical motion swept the radar cone away from the tracks the phase-change capability of the radar could continue to hit specific areas with an increased amount of energy.

When you can just cancel or delay a trip to take out a weapons depot so you can actually see what you're bombing, or avoid needless loss of life and aircraft then sure. Modern operations tend to be able to take less risk as the skies are pretty safe and things can more or less happen on the timetable of the one with air superiority. But that's not warfare in general. War involves risks and loss of life and loss of aircraft. See WWII for a good example of many many risks taken because they had to be. In a future (or theoretical) war where two similarly matched forces are contesting airspace and battlespace, there will be lots risks taken and lots of loss. I haven't noticed all that much turbulence myself, but it is fun to crank the wind speed at the ground up all the way as a headwind, and take off and "hover" over the airfield in an A-10C :)

I played around with this yesterday pulling engines to idle and diving at various angles. I was only able to do this from over 20,000 feet in about a 35-45 degree dive when I hit 450kts at about 8,000 feet. I shallowed my dive to about 10-15 degrees and they relit when I started moving the throttle forward. I don't know much about the mathematics and physics of a turbofan engine, but maybe bad things happen if the speed of the air moving into/around the engine exceed the air velocity exiting the exhaust? Going 450kts in a dive with engines at idle might also ram too much air into the engine for the amount of fuel. I was trying to test this via NASA's enginesim, but can't find the right parameters for a TF34.

Is the method used to confirm something you can share? I'd definitely like to learn more about its guidance system. My assertion of poor terminal maneuvering performance is based on the fact it is gliding by the time it reaches a distant target. For High-flying targets it doesn't have a ton of energy to work with by the time it gets there. It would be better for lower-flying targets, though ground clutter could be an issue there for its active sensor. It was primarily designed for an intercept role which would involve attacking lumbering bombers at that range before they could fire their jumbo cruise missiles, and "falling through" them. A more maneuverable aircraft, like say a Mig-25 or 31 probably would not have a lot of trouble escaping if they saw it coming. A 1,000lb missile trying to make high G turns with only inertia and gravity to rely on is going to be a pretty low PK. Don't get me wrong, I was sad to see the Phoenix retired (and the Tomcat too). We are only starting to finally recapture some of the range capability we had when it was in service (AMRAAM AIM-120D), but as far as missiles go, it had to be a bit of a pig at the longer ranges compared to other missiles. We are rather far afield of the topic at this point. I mentioned the Phoenix in the first place while proposing that there might be certain "data" present in the tracking illuminators that allow the missiles to know which target belongs to them, which might be useful by an RWR system. As the F-14 with the AIM-54 has the capability to launch on 6 different target simultaneously it would be a good example assuming it does any SARH tracking at all. I've seen plenty of other posts by you that lead me to believe you know what you're talking about, so I trust whatever you've been able to confirm, but I would still like to know where you get the info. A very interesting discussion either way.

I am not sure I would consider a Phoenix to be a "modern missile", and that's my point. I've seen no mention of an INS by any sources. At least one source I've read specifically says it does not have an INS. https://engineering.purdue.edu/~mjgrant/aiaa-guidance-navigation.pdf (chart at bottom) The AMRAAM on the other hand, is said to use a data link and an INS until its active radar kicks in (in some modes). I am not sure most people realize exactly how old the Phoenix was when it was retired. Comparing it to an AMRAAM is like comparing a B-52 to a B-2. The Phoenix used some very clever tricks to achieve its range and standoff capability, but it relied on very old tech and had a lot of shortcomings (one being poor terminal maneuvering characteristics). Ultimately they could have used a method unlike any weapon before it or since to handle the "mid-course updates" so all we can do is speculate... though it is fun to speculate sometimes :)

Unfortunately so little data made public (probably for good reason). The Phoenix was produced in 1966 (but didn't go into service until the F-14 was put in service), so it's less than a decade newer than the Sparrow. That is a good question on how it could see any returns, or receive anything from the controlling radar considering the altitude. I assume some energy would be scattered from the target, but probably not enough to detect it at range. I'd be really interested in any declassified data that might be available on how this guidance worked, considering it has been retired from service.

Do you happen to have any sources more specific than "SARH" for the mid-course updates? I have not been able to discern whether there is a data link, or it just "rode the beam." Semi-active radar homing has been used to refer to both the beam-riding variety and missiles receiving data via a guidance link, as that still relies on the aircraft's radar track. Using a guidance link usually requires that the launching aircraft track both the missile AND the target in order to provide accurate updates. As the AWG-9 could track 24, but only display 16 tracks at a time it is possible it could reserve some tracks for the missiles, but given the arc the Phoenix takes to 80,000-100,000 feet it seems it would be pretty "inconvenient" for the radar antenna to have to re-position to track the missile at that altitude. The Phoenix did have a certain autonomy, but used SARH to intercept the target prior to activating its terminal active guidance very close to the target.

Yes, the crazy thing with the Phoenix was its use of all the propellant in the first few seconds of flight, and then gliding down on top of the target at range. The terminal active guidance had a limited range. It only turned it on in about the last 10nm or so.

My understanding of missiles like the Sparrow and Phoenix were that they simply locked onto the reflected track from the fighter radar prior to launch and followed that reflection toward the target. I am fairly sure there was no data link. That could be different with newer missiles though.

I've always assumed that for SARH it would be similar to IR where the missile is detected via MWS. I've seen this simulated in that past (in things like the harpoon series) where extreme BVR missiles like the Phoenix would go undetected until they either turned on their terminal guidance or were seen visually or via IR. However, as GGTharos alluded to, there will likely be a change in signal for missile guidance. Even if the launching aircraft doesn't directly communicate with the missile after launch, consider that in the case of multiple launches against different targets, each active track will have to have some difference in signal so each missile knows which target belongs to it.

Very informative. You might add though, that if you do happen to end up with fuel imbalance between wing tanks, you can use the "TX Gate" switch to re-balance the fuel (set to on). That has helped in the past when I forgot to enable cross-feed after a single engine failure. I can't find it now, but read somewhere this basically opens a fuel transfer connection between the tanks.

I agree with Witchking on this one. ED has already added elements of RTS play to DCS world (particularly with CA), and with EDGE purportedly using less CPU for graphics it seems they might be able to allocate more cycles for improved AI. Using mission scripts is fine for those that play a lot of pre-made missions, but the randomly generated missions would benefit a lot from better AI. The best of both worlds to me would be implementing these behaviors (such as stationary units moving when under attack) as scripted actions or macros that could be placed on randomly generated units, or assigned manually when creating a mission in the editor. As much as I hate it when convoys don't hold still for my CBU-97s, it is kind of unrealistic that they will just sit there when an A-10 flies over.

Typical News Unfortunately nothing new here. News is all about a "good story" and sensationalism. Scandals have always generated more views, and few scandals can incense more people than poorly spent tax dollars. These days you pretty much have to subtract 100 points of hyperbole and add 50 of skepticism to anything you read on the major outlets.