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And now the obvious question of how the Sukhois stack up against the "old F/A 18 , the recently proposed interim fighters such as the F/A 18E and the upcaming JSF aka F35? Against all three types the Su-30 derivatives, especially with later engine subtypes, will always have a significant kinematic advantage - there is no substitute for thrust in the kinematic performance game. There is another factor to consider here, which is the superlative 10 tonnes of internal drag free fuel the Sukhoi carries. When not operating at extended combat radii, the Sukhoi driver has more fuel to convert into energy, and that energy can nearly always be used to an advantage. With mutually competitive WVR missiles and Helmet mounted sight for close-in combat, all three types will live or die in a close in engagement with an advanced Su-30MK variant by pilot ability and good or bad luck. The Sukhoi combines high alpha manoeuvre capabilities with excellent thrust/weight performance, and is apt to have an energy advantage entering and prosecuting a close in fight. A JSF driver opting to engage a thrust vectoring late model Su-30MK in a knife fight may not survive to speak of the experience, unless the Sukhoi driver is unable to exploit his advantage properly. In close in air combat terms the JSF qualifies as 'double inferior' against the later model Sukhois, since the Sukhois have an advantage in both thrust/weight ratio and in wing loading (interested visitors refer R.L. Shaw's Fighter Combat), and with its canard and thrust vectoring capability will generally be able to gain a firing solution quicker. Because the JSF is designed within the kinematic performance class of the F/A-18 and F-16, it is right in the middle of the performance envelope of aircraft the Sukhoi was designed to kill. In Beyond Visual Range (BVR) combat, the Sukhoi will again have a kinematic advantage, which may be exploitable at the bounds of engagement radii, as the Sukhoi can gain separation in and out of the missile envelope of the F/A-18's and JSF faster - it has the extra thrust and combat fuel to play kinematic games both smaller fighters cannot. The BVR game is however dominated by sensor capabilities, both onboard and offboard the fighters, and long range missile capabilities. The F/A-18A HUG is wholly outclassed by an Su-30MK with an N011M phased array and R-77M ramjet missile. A late model F/A-18E with minimal external stores and the APG-79 AESA fares much better due to its radar signature reduction measures and better radar power-aperture performance, but with external stores its margin of survivability is eroded and it is likely to fall well within the engagement envelope of the Sukhoi and also come to grief (refer radar/missile plot). A post 2010 AESA equipped Sukhoi could almost certainly take on the F/A-18E with confidence as it will have much better power-aperture capability in the radar, enough to offset the radar signature reduction measures in the F/A-18E/F, with an advanced IRST to supplement radar data. What happens when the existing OLS-27/30/31 series IRST is replaced with a newer longwave Focal Plane Array device - such as a single chip QWIP device? The result will be a capability to engage opposing aircraft under clear sky conditions regardless of RCS reduction measures. While the supercruising F/A-22A can defeat such techniques by kinematics alone, fighters in the teen series performance envelope will have to contend with BVR shots using the R-27ET, R-77, R-77T and R-77M cued by the thermal imaging search and track set. Similar issues arise with the deployment of modern ESM receivers on the Su-30MK, analogous to a number of existing Western systems. The Su-30MK series can then launch long range BVR missiles such as the R-27ET, R-77T with infrared seekers, or the R-27EP and R-77P with passive radio-frequency anti-radiation seekers. If cued by such sensors or offboard sources, these weapons will permit the Su-30MK to engage the JSF or the F22 despite theyr good good forward sector radar and stealth performance. At the end the Russian and Chinese defence industries have absorbed most of the advanced technology in the globalised market. The most recent generation of radars, Surface to Air Missiles and Sukhoi SU 27/30 family fighter aircrafts they have developed can produce air defence systems which are completely impenetrable to all United States combat aircraft other than the F-22A Raptor and B-2A Spirit. The new stealthy Sukhoi PAK-FA directly challenges the F-22A Raptor. The result of this is that the United States will lose access to many theatres of operation on the global stage, as these new weapons proliferate, Sorry for the long but i hope interesting post!! (All the informations and articles above came from the Technical report APA-TR-2007-10101 of the Australia's indipendent defence agency AUSAIRPOWERfor full reproduction credits )

The flipside of the electronic combat game is no better. The F-14A/B/D included the AAS-42 Infrared Search and Track set which allowed a target to be tracked despite hostile jamming of the AWG-9/APG-71 radar. It is clear that the addition of the podded AAS-42 to the Super Hornet and "air to air" use of the JSF EOTS are intended for much the same purpose. While this may permit the continuing use of the AESA radar to datalink midcourse guidance commands to the AIM-120s, it does nothing to deny the Flanker its own BVR shot. The notion that the defensive jamming equipment and infrared decoys will be highly effective against late model Russian digital missile seekers can only be regarded to be optimistic. In electronic warfare terms neither side has a decisive advantage, but the Flanker does have a decisive advantage in aircraft and missile kinematics and in having up to six times the payload of BVR missiles to expend. The simple conclusion to be drawn is that operators of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF should make every effort to avoid Beyond Visual Range combat with late model Flankers, as the best case outcome is parity in exchange rates, and the worst case outcome a decisive exchange ratio advantage to the Flanker. Given the evident design choices the Russians have made, this is not an accident, but rather a consequence of well thought through operational analysis of capabilities and limitations of contemporary BVR weapon systems.The achievable kill probability of any missile depends on its kinematic performance, especially during the endgame phase of flight, against the intended target, and the performance of its seeker and fusing subsystems, especially in a countermeasures environment. Until the 1980s Soviet missile technology lagged the West in propellants, airframe designs, and guidance designs. That changed with the deployment of the R-27 and R-73 missiles during the 1980s, as these competed on a equal footing, or outperformed their Western equivalents. In kinematic terms, the WVR R-73 series, and the BVR R-27 and R-77 are highly competitive against their Western equivalents, and the long burn variants of the R-27 outperform all Western solid propellant competitors. The next evolutionary step for Vympel is the production of the air breathing ramjet RVV-AE-PD design, displayed since the 1990s at numerous trade shows. This missile spurred the development of the Meteor for the Eurofighter Typhoon. The attraction of ramjet BVR AAMs lies in their ability to sustain thrust and thus turning performance in the endgame phase of an engagement, where conventional soild rocket missiles are flying on inertia alone and rapidly lose speed when turning. It is worth noting that the high lethality of late generation WVR missiles like the Python 4/5 is in a large part due to the missile's ability to sustain ~100G class load factors during the endgame manoeuvre, precisely the regime in which most BVR missiles fail to kill their targets. Range extension options for the baseline R-77 include booster packs, discussed in Russian literature, or larger diameter rocket motors containing a larger propellant load, the latter proposed some years ago for R-77-ZRK surface to air derivative of this missile. In terms of kinematic performance, a key factor which is almost universally ignored by Western planners other than the F-22 and F-111 communities, is the impact of the launch aircraft's kinematics at the point of missile launch. A supersonic Su-35 sitting at Mach 1.5 and 45,000 ft will add of the order of 30 percent more range to an R-27 or R-77 missile. Low performance fighters like the F/A-18E/F and F-35 JSF simply do not have this option in the real world, and the reach of their missiles is wholly determined by the parameters of the propellant load inside the missile casing, and the ability of the midcourse guidance algorithms to extract every bit of range from that stored energy. The result of this is that an AIM-120C/D which might look better on paper compared to an equivalent R-77 subtype will be outranged decisively in actual combat. Russian seeker technology has advanced in strides since the early 1990s, largely as a result of the commodification of Gallium Arsenide monolithic chips and digital signal processing chips in the globalised world market. Agat, which manufactures the 9B-1101K semi-active radar seeker for the R-27EP/P, the 9B-1103K active seeker for the R-27EA/A, and the 9B-1348E seeker family for the R-77 missile family, publicly disclosed some years ago the use of the Texas Instruments TMS-320 series digital signal processing chip in a late model 'digital' variant of the 9B-1103K seeker. This chip is a mainstay of Western military radar design. The move away from analogue and hardwired digital seekers to software programmable digital seekers is an important milestone for the Russian industry, since it opens up many choices in signal processing and counter-countermeasures techniques hitherto only used by US, EU and Israeli manufacturers. In practical terms a later model digital variant of the 9B-1103K or 9B-1348E will be no less difficult to defeat by jamming than Western equivalent active seekers The monopulse slotted planar array antenna technology used in the 9B-1103K and 9B-1348E seekers compares closely to the antenna technology seen since the AIM-120A was deployed, and due to its dual plane monopulse design provides good resistance to a range of legacy jamming techniques. Russian concern about Western countermeasures is reflected in a propensity since the 1980s to use dual plane monopulse seeker designs, and even the baseline Agat 9B-1101K semi-active homing seeker in the R-27R/ER variants is a classical monopulse design, built for high jam resistance The infrared homing seeker technology used in Russian BVR missiles has also evolved considerably since the Cold War. Early R-27 Alamo variants used the legacy Geofizika 36T seeker. There are claims that more recent variants use the far more agile Arsenal Central Design Bureau Mayak/MK-80M seeker series, developed for the R-73M Adder WVR missile, and since then announced by Vympel as the seeker for the initial heatseeking variants of the R-77 Adder. The R-73 series WVR missiles have evolved, to the extent that the 'digital' K-74E variant is a highly competitive scanning two colour design, inherently resistant to many flares and with the counter-countermeasures flexibility inherent in software programmable guidance systems. Given the established pattern of migrating extant WVR missile seekers into BVR missiles, it is a safe prediction that late build heatseeking R-27ET/Ts and early build heatseeking R-77Ts are likely to use late build derivatives of the Arsenal MK-80M series, such as the MM2000 subtype.It is well known that Russian industry is working on a Focal Plane Array (FPA) seeker for their future WVR missiles, to compete against the ASRAAM, AIM-9X, Iris-T and Python 5 seekers, adding further infrared counter-countermeasures capabilities. The open question is whether the future Russian FPA seeker will match the midwave Indium Antimonide detector array technology in the Raytheon 256x256 device in the ASRAAM/AIM-9X, or whether the Russians will leapfrog a generation and opt for much more capable QWIP (Quantum Well Imaging Photodetector) technology pioneered by Germany's industry during the late 1990s. There is considerable Russian scientific literature available on QWIPs, which allow a single chip to concurrently image targets in two infrared colour bands, and permit tailored infrared colour sensitivity absent in bandgap detector technology such as the legacy InSb designs used in ASRAAM and AIM-9X seekers. With the exception of the now retired F-117A, and the remaining B-2A, infrared emissions are a major signature issue for low observable fighters. While the low observable technology used is generally good against the upper radar bands, it is less so against high performance lower band infrared sensors. A QWIP based missile seeker operating in the LWIR bands (8-12 micron and 15 micron) has the potential to be quite effective, if the midcourse guidance scheme can get the BVR missile close enough to acquire the target. Details of the Avtomatika 9B-1032 passive X-band RF anti-radiation seeker remain classified at this time, and even the antenna configuration has not been disclosed to date. This remains a unique capability in the R-27EP/P Alamo and R-77P Adder. What is clear is that the drive to digitise all Russian AAM seekers will be reflected also in anti-radiation seekers. It is known that the PLA has funded Russian development of new passive seeker technology for this application. Fusing technology in use includes radio-frequency proximity fuses and in more recent designs, active laser proximity fuses. From a Western strategic planning perspective the key development in Russian BVR missile seeker technology over the last decade has been the move away from legacy analogue techniques to digital software programmable techniques. This permits Russian designers enormous flexibility in embedding counter-countermeasures modes into these seekers, as well as enormous opportunities in smart signal processing to maximise detection range performance. Digital autopilot technology has been pivotal to optimising the kinematic capabilities of Western missiles and this technology is now available to Russian designers.

About the real life russian BVR philosophy in air combat..... The Russian paradigm of BVR combat has its origins in the Cold War period, when Soviet operational analysis indicated that the low kill probability of missile seekers and airframes, especially if degraded by countermeasures, would be a major impediment to success. By the 1970s the standard Soviet technique in a BVR missile launch was to salvo two rounds, a semi-active radar homing weapon and a heatseeking weapon. To this effect some Soviet fighters even included a weapons select mode which automatically sequenced the launch of two rounds for optimal separation. The mathematics of multiple round missile engagements are unambiguous - the size of a missile salvo launched is a stronger driver of success than the actual kill probability of the individual missiles. If the missiles are wholly identical by type, then the following curves may be optimistic, insofar as a factor degrading the kill probability of one missile is apt to have a similar effect on its siblings in a salvo. However, where the missiles differ by seeker type and guidance control laws, then the assumption of statistically independent missile shots is very much stronger. A question often asked is why are Sukhoi Flanker variants equipped to carry between eight and twelve BVR missiles? The answer is a simple one - so they can fire more than one three or four round BVR missile salvo during the opening phases of an engagement. In this fashion the aircraft being targeted has a difficult problem as it must jam, decoy and/or outmanoeuvre three or four tightly spaced inbound missiles. Even if we assume a mediocre per round kill probability of 30 percent, a four round salvo still exceeds a total kill probability of 75 percent. A critical question which must be asked when assessing the effectiveness of Russian BVR tactics is that of Western tactics and the effectiveness of the Aim 120 AMRAAM, the principal Western BVR fighter weapon. The AIM-120A AMRAAM was introduced at the end of the Cold War to provide a "fire and forget" active radar guided weapon with a midcourse inertial guidance system and datalink support provided by the radar on the launch aircraft, allowing multiple concurrent shots. The AIM-120A was followed by the incrementally improved B-model, and then by the "short span" AIM-120C-3 sized to fit the F-22A weapon bay. The AIM-120C-4 has better kinematic performance introducing a larger rocket motor and shorter control section, and a better warhead, while the AIM-120C-6 introduced a better fuse. The latest AIM-120D introduces a redesigned seeker built for better durability in high vibration carriage environments, a two way datalink, GPS to supplement inertial guidance, incrementally improved kinematics, and better seeker performance against high off-boresight targets. Most AIM-120 AMRAAM kills to date have involved 1980s export variants of the MiG-29 Fulcrum, with mediocre electronic warfare fit and often inoperative systems. These are not representative targets in the current Pacific Rim environment. The performance of the AIM-120A/B/C models in combat to date has not been spectacular. Test range trials have resulted in stated kill probabilities of 85 percent out of 214 launches for the AIM-120C variant. Combat statistics for all three variants are less stellar, amounting to, according to US sources, ten kills (including a friendly fire incident against a UH-60) of which six were genuine BVR shots, for the expenditure of just over a dozen AIM-120 rounds. The important parameter is that every single target was not equipped with a modern defensive electronic warfare package and therefore not representative of a state-of-the-art Flanker in a modern BVR engagement. Against such "soft" targets the AIM-120 has displayed a kill probability of less than 50 percent It is an open question whether the AIM-120D when challenged with a modern DRFM (Digital RF Memory) based monopulse trackbreaking jammer will be able to significantly exceed the 50 percent order of magnitude kill probability of prior combat launches, let alone replicate the 85 percent performance achieved in ideal test range conditions- Where does this leave Western air forces equipped with the AIM-120 when confronting Flankers armed with up to three times the number of BVR missiles? Illustrative examples are the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35 JSF, the latter armed in an air superiority configuration with two, the former with up to six AIM-120s Assuming the Flanker driver does not exploit his superior missile kinematic range and shoot first - an optimistic assumption - then the best case kill probability for the AIM-120 shooter firing two to four rounds is better than 90 percent. However, if we assume that hostile jamming and manoeuvre degrade the kill probability to around 50 percent - a reasonably optimistic statistical baseline here - then the total kill probability for a two round salvo is optimistically around 75 percent, and for a four round salvo over 90 percent. Arguably good odds for the four round salvo, only if the missile kill probability sits at 50 percent, but the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF will have expended all or most of its warload of AIM-120s and be unable to continue in BVR combat. In a "many versus many" engagement, the low speed of both types leaves them unable to disengage and will see both types subsequently killed by another Flanker. This best case "many versus many" engagement scenario sees the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF being traded one for one with Su-30MK/Su-35BM Flankers in BVR combat, which is the general assumption made for WVR combat between like opponents, and representative of many historical attrition air campaign statistics. To achieve this best case "many versus many" outcome of trading F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF one for one, we have stacked a series of assumptions against the Flanker - dumb Flanker pilots not exploiting a missile kinematic range advantage, dumb Flanker pilots not exploiting a firepower advantage, Russian BVR missile seekers no better than the AIM-120, and Russian DRFM monopulse jammers achieving a less than 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability A competent Flanker driver gets the first shot with three or four round salvo of long burn R-27 variants, with mixed seekers, leaving one or two remaining salvoes of BVR missiles on his rails, and the same Flanker driver will have modern DRFM monopulse jammers capable of causing likely much more than a 50 percent degradation of AIM-120 kill probability. With a thrust vectoring engine capability (TVC), the Flanker driver has the option of making himself into a very difficult endgame target for the AIM-120 regardless of the capability of his jamming equipment. Since all of the AIM-120s fired are identical in kinematic performance and seeker jam resistance, any measure applied by the Flanker driver which is effective against one AIM-120 round in the salvo is apt to produce the same effect against all AIM-120 rounds - a problem the Flanker driver does not have due to diversity in seeker types and missile kinematics. Currently classified capabilities such as the use of the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar as an X-band high power jammer against the Russian BARS or Irbis E radar are not a panacea, and may actually hasten the demise of the F/A-18E/F or F-35 JSF in a BVR shootout. This is for the simple reason that to jam the Russian radar, the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar must jam the frequencies being used by the Russian radar, and this then turns the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar into a wholly electronically predictable X-band high power beacon for an anti-radiation seeker equipped Russian BVR missile such as the R-27EP or R-77P. The act of jamming the Russian radar effectively surrenders the frequency hopping agility in the emissions of the APG-79 or APG-81 AESA radar, denying it the only defence it has against the anti-radiation missile. A smart Russian radar software designer will include a "seduction mode" to this effect, with narrowband emissions to make it very easy even for an early model 9B-1032 anti-radiation seeker.

There are only two squadrons of SU27 SM because from now all the SU27 (and SM too) will be replaced by the newest SU35. Sukhoi Company started implementing state contract on Su-35S multifunctional highly maneuverable fighter jets delivery to the Russian Defense Ministry. The contract was signed last August at the MAKS 2009 aerospace show on the delivery of 48 Sukhoi Su-35S before 2015 to the Defense Ministry. This is the largest purchase of modern fighter jets by the Russian Air Force in the past two decades. The Sukhoi’s Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Production Association (KnAAPO) in accordance with the approved schedule has already started production of component parts. Contracts were signed with sub-contractors for supply of necessary units, mechanisms and equipment. The assembly of the first serial planes is scheduled for 2010.Long-term contracts for the fighter aircraft delivery to the Russian Air Force and foreign customers allow Sukhoi Company to provide for a steady work load of its serial plants by combat aircraft production and make a shift from modernizing aircraft in the Russian Air Force inventory to production of new products. Delivery of new Su-35S fighter jets will strengthen the country’s defense potential and allow re-arming of combat aviation. The Su-35 is a substantially modernized highly maneuverable multifunctional 4++ generation aircraft employing technologies of the 5th generation. They make it superior to all other 4th generation fighter jets now under development worldwide such as F35, Typhoon and others.The Su-35, originally known as the Su-27M, is an improved derivative of the successful single-seat Su-27 Flanker designed as a 4+ generation multi-role fighter. Building upon Su-27 advanced aerodynamic design, the new aircraft features super-maneuverability, more powerful NPO Saturn 117S Thrust Vectoring Control (TVC) engines, new avionics, extended service life, and advanced air-to-air and air-to-surface precision strike capabilities. TVC engines provide no angle of attack limitation and enhanced maneuverability which outperforms all known fourth and fifth generation fighter aircraft. Under the Su-27M/Su-35 designation Sukhoi and KnAAPO have built 17 aircraft, 16 single-seat (five Su-27-based prototypes, two static-test airframes, six pre-production and three production aircraft) and one two-seat airframes. From its inception in the early 1990s, the Su-27M/Su-35 program has suffered the Russian Federation/Russian Air Force turmoil circumstances which delayed its development and changed the program's scope. The program scope was last updated in the mid-2000s with Sukhoi and KnAAPO projecting the first production Su-35 aircraft on active duty by 2009. One of the program's scope is to get a hardened airframe. The final Su-35 may incorporate more titanium alloys thus extending the aircraft's service life to 6,000 flight hours or 30 years. Overhauls are extended to every 1,500 flight hours or 10 years of operation. Another key feature of the Su-35 program is the X-band radar cross section reduction in the front hemisphere covering +/- 60 degrees. The aerodynamic layout is leveraged from the Su-27 which means no canard foreplanes despite what was seen on the prototypes unveiled in the 1990s. The flight performance will be enhanced thanks to the three-channel KSU-35 fly-by-wire system being developed by MNPK Avionika. The upper air brake has been discarded and its function is taken over by differentially deflected rudders and the landing gear has been strengthened. The internal volumes re-design has allowed a fuel capacity increase by more than 20 percent to 11,500 kg which can attain 14,300 kg adding two 1,800-l external fuel tanks. The production aircraft will feature X-band Irbis advanced phased array radar system capable of traking even a plane with very low rcs as the "stealth" F22, more powerful 117S engines, the latest Russian-made communication and radio-electronic equipment, glass cockpit with MFI-35 15-inch color multi-functional LCD displays, digital computers, HOTAS (Hands On Throttle and Stick) flight controls, wingtip-mounted ECM pods, drogue-and-hose air refueling system with a fuel transfer ratio of 1,100-liter/minute, OLS-35 Infrared Search and Track (IRST) System, and optional targeting pod as well as new avionics and weapons. Provided with 12 external hard-points the Su-35 would be able to carry an 8,000 kg payload. The weapon options during air engagements include: one internally-mounted GSh-301 30mm cannon; eight R-27ER1 and four R-27ET1 or R-27EP1 or twelve RVV-AE/R-77 medium range air-to-air missiles (AAMs) even in the new IR seeker head version R-77R; up to six R-73E close-range AAMs. In the air-to-surface role the Su-35 may carry: six Kh-29TE or Kh-29L missiles; six Kh-31A anti-ship and/or Kh-31P anti-radiation missiles; five advanced Kh-59MK long-range anti-ship missiles as well as five Kh-58UShE extended-range anti-radiation missiles; three Club-family long-range anti-ship missiles (3M-14AE/3M-54AE1); or a single Yakhont heavy long-range anti-ship missile. The guided bombs include: up to eight TV-guided KAB-500KR/OD; or KAB-500S-E (Russian JDAM counterpart) and/or KAB-500L; up to three KAB-1500KR or KAB-1500L. The aircraft may be equipped with rockets and alternate weapons under development. The first Su-35 aircraft performed its maiden flight summer 2007 and was displayed at the MAKS 2007 airshow in Moscow. The trials program started on February 20, 2008, and is expected to extend through early 2009. The Su-35 should be ready to enter active service with the Russian Air Force and foreign customers in 2010-2011 timeframe. According to Sukhoi, the Su-35 aircraft is intended for both Russian and export markets. It was reported by the Russian press that Venezuela may convert its existing order for 24 Su-30MK fighters into Su-35s thus becoming the first export customer. Yes it's time to change!

LCDR Scott Speicher was flying an F/A-18 Hornet fighter when he was shot down 100 miles west of Baghdad, on the night of January 17, 1991, the first night of Operation Desert Storm. His plane crashed in a remote, uninhabited wasteland known as Tulul ad Dulaym 33°14′35.81″N 42°21′18.14″E he was the first combat casualty for American forces in the war. The U.S. Navy maintained in a 1997 document that Speicher was downed by a surface-to-air missile.However, an unclassified summary of a 2001 CIA report suggests that Speicher's aircraft was shot down by a missile fired from an Iraqi aircraft, a MiG-25; flown by Lt. Zuhair Dawood, 84th squadron of the IQAF. Speicher was at 28,000 feet and travelling at 0.92 Mach (540 Knots) when the front of the aircraft suffered a catastrophic event. The impact from the R-40 missile threw the aircraft laterally off its flight path between fifty and sixty degrees with a resulting 6 g minimum load. A pilot on the same mission stated: "I'm telling you right now, don't believe what you're being told. It was that MiG that shot Spike down." The day after the shoot-down, Speicher was placed on MIA status. On May 22, 1991, after the end of the Gulf War, Speicher's status was changed to Killed in Action/Body Not Recovered (KIA/BNR). In July 1992, Speicher's widow Joanne married Navy Commander Buddy Harris, who was a friend and fellow naval aviator of Speicher's.Harris later became a strong advocate for searching for Speicher, often meeting with U.S. officials. In December 1993, a military official from Qatar discovered the wreckage of a plane in the desert, which was subsequently identified as Speicher's aircraft. The canopy was a good distance from the rest of the aircraft, suggesting Speicher had tried to eject.In April 1994, a U.S. satellite photographed apparent human-made symbols on the desert floor near the wreck's location, which might possibly be Speicher's E & E (Escape and Evade) sign, suggesting that Speicher might have survived the crash. A covert American operation to inspect the site was considered, but rejected by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili as too risky. In December 1995, working through the International Committee of the Red Cross, investigators from the Navy and Army's Central Identification Laboratory went to Iraq and conducted an excavation of the crash site. Bedouin nomads gave investigators a flight uniform that was likely Speicher's, with his name supposedly cut out of it, but the investigators concluded it had been planted there.Other evidence led investigators to further conclude Speicher had likely ejected, and was not in the plane at the time it crashed. In September 1996, the Secretary of the Navy in a new review reaffirmed the presumptive finding of death. Speicher was given a tomb at Arlington National Cemetery.[ In 1997, a Defense Department document leaked to The New York Times showed that the Pentagon had not been forthcoming with information previously requested by U.S. Senator Rod Grams. Senator Grams publicly accused the Pentagon of misleading him, and joined with Senator Robert C. Smith in calling for an investigation by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Speicher case was taken up by the National Alliance of Families, which had been quite active in the Vietnam War POW/MIA issue.Speculative theories were developed as to the circumstances of Speicher's shoot-down, and assuming he was still alive, why the U.S. military might not want to find him and why Iraq might not want to return him. n January 2001, the Secretary of the Navy changed Speicher's status to "missing in action." This was the first time the Defense Department had ever made such a change. In conjunction with the change in classification, Speicher was promoted to commander, in accordance with Navy practice for POWs held a long time. The 2001 CIA report stated that he may have survived by ejecting. Rumors from Iraq said that Speicher was captive, walked with a limp, and had facial scars. In July 2002, Speicher was further promoted to captain. Speicher's possible situation became a more high-profile issue in the build-up to war. In March 2002, the Washington Times ran five successive front-page articles about it, National Review Online ran a long piece on it, and on September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush mentioned Speicher in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly as part of his case for war against Iraq. Senator Bill Nelson of Florida also took a strong interest in the case.Speicher's status was changed again to "missing/captured" on October 11, 2002, one day after the United States Congress authorized the use of military force in Iraq. U.S. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England said, "While the information available to me now does not prove definitively that Capt. Speicher is alive and in Iraqi custody, I am personally convinced the Iraqis seized him sometime after his plane went down. Further, it is my firm belief that the government of Iraq knows what happened to Capt. Speicher." Upon the 2003 invasion of Iraq in March 2003, a major investigation on the ground began, that also further increased public attention to the matter.In April 2003, Speicher's possible initials were discovered in a cell at Hakmiyah prison in Baghdad. Investigators did not think it was significant because a similar carving of "MJN" was found directly above the "MSS" scrawl. Subsequent tests on hair found in the cell's drain did not match Speicher's DNA. Senator Nelson went to Iraq to visit the prison personally. Speicher's name was also found on a document in Iraq, dated January 2003, that had the names of prisoners being held in the country. Officials stated that the 90-page document offered no evidence of whether Speicher was alive and might have been written either to provide an accounting of former Iraqi POWs or to confuse the U.S. military. In any case, Speicher's whereabouts were yet to be discovered. Over time, as the U.S. occupation increasingly gained control over Anbar Province, it became apparent that Speicher was not a captive. On January 5, 2009, the U.S. Navy held a review board to consider officially closing the case. The review board recommended that the Pentagon continue investigating what happened to Speicher. The recommendation went to Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter who had the final decision. Speicher's family believed and was worried that would change the status of Captain Speicher to KIA and declared they would oppose such action. On March 10, 2009, the Secretary of the Navy declared that Captain Speicher's status was changed from "Missing/Captured" back to "Missing-in-Action. On August 2, 2009, the Navy reported that Speicher's remains were found in Iraq by United States Marines belonging to MNF-W's Task Force Military Police. His jawbone was used to identify him after study at the Charles C. Carson Center for Mortuary Affairs at Dover Air Force Base. According to local civilians, Speicher was buried by Bedouins after his plane was shot down. The evidence proved that Speicher did not survive the crash. Senator Nelson attributed the delayed finding to the culture of the locality: "These Bedouins roam around in the desert, they don't stay in one place, and it just took this time to find the specific site." Speicher's family expressed gratitude that the Defense Department had stayed with the case and that closure was now available About the reference: "Intelligence Community Assessment of the Lieutenant Commander Speicher Case". 27 March 2001. FOIA Electronic Reading Room. CIA. 10 September 2006 following you can take a look of it:

That's right! The US Navy F/A-18 piloted by Lt Cdr Scott Speicher was shot down on the first night of the war by a missile fired by a MiG-25. The kill was reportedly made with a R-40TD missile fired from a MiG-25PDS flown by Lt. Zuhair Dawood of the 84th squadron of the IrAF. Captain Speicher was apparently buried by nomadic Bedouin tribesmen close to where his jet was shot down in a remote area of Anbar province. In another incident, an Iraqi MiG-25PD, after eluding eight U.S. Air Force F-15s, fired three missiles at EF-111A Raven electronic warfare aircraft, forcing them to abort their mission and leave attacking aircraft without electronic jamming support. In yet another incident, two MiG-25s approached a pair of F-15s, fired missiles (which were evaded by the F-15s), and then outran the American fighters. Two more F-15s joined the pursuit, and a total of ten air-to-air missiles were fired at the MiG-25s, although none reached them. According to the same sources, at least one F-111 was also forced to abort its mission by a MiG-25 on the first 24 hours of hostilities, during an air raid over Tikrit. About the Allied Coalition The second (and last) air-air kill was recorded by a pilot named Jameel Sayhood on January nineteenth. Flying a Mig 29 he shot down a RAF Tornado GR1A. The RAF plane was piloted by Gary Lennox, and Adrian Weeks.ameel Sayhood was then shot down by the two pilots of McDonnell Douglas F-15C Eagle (F-15C, AF85-0122/EG, 58TFS / 33TFW, pilot Craig William Underhill; F-15C, AF85-0114/EG, 58TFS / 33TFW, pilot Cesar Antonio Rodriguez). American pilots announced shot down of two MiG-29B aircrafts, but Iraqi Air Force actually lost only one aircraft MiG-29, piloted by Jameel Sayhood .

Hi mates, I do not know if someone has already reported but this is a link http://warthognews.blogspot.com/ to a site (even if it is in fact a blog) that represents a true benchmark for any information regarding the 'A10 ... Happy reading! ( Hey The "Hog" has got the AN/AAQ-28 LITENING AT targeting pod!!)

Done, but the problem is still present.... In other posts i've read that the renderer.dll provided with the patch 1.02 could solve the problem but i don't know how to keep it.... :helpsmilie: EDIT: I discovered that the A10 Sim Mod interferes with Tom jet pack mod of which I installed only the F15E Strike Eagle removing it from the mission everything works perfectly including the A10 SimMod .... but don't ask me for the reason!!

hi mates after installing the A10 Sim Mod mod in my FC1.12 I noticed a very strange problem. The sim leaves regularly, I can see perfectly the plane in mission editor, I can correctly assign all the available skins and weapons but when I start the mission after loading everything in the very first few moments when you view the image the sim crashes and I always returns the same error: error DXRenderer.dll Now, if I start any other mission without the A10 everything works perfectly, the game crashes with only the A10 this even as it's present as flyable bird or simple fixed object. My rig is a Pentium 4 3.2 Ghz, 2 Gb ram DDR2 running Win XP Pro (yes i know it's time to change...!!) and my graphic card is an Nvidia GeForce 7600 GT 256MB, with drives nv4_disp (6.14.11.9621 - nVIDIA Detonator 96.21) and DirectX latest update ...... what is the problem? Could someone give me an idea and btw uploading the dxrenderer.dll ( present in the directory C: \ Program Files \ Ubisoft \ Eagle Dynamics \ Lock On) ... just to try even this solution ... :crash: Thanks everyone!

Maybe it will be a stupid question, but I am totally out of concepts of land development . Would it be possible to "merge" the map of FC1 and FC2 to obtain a single map with greater detail in the areas actually "discoveries" of the respective maps (eastern Georgia and north of turkey in FC1 and Crimea in FC2) obviously keeping the original bases formerly available in their respective versions as I know that they are hardcoded Would still be a considerable increase in realism, in areas now "free" would be, however, a land with mountains and valleys instead of a flat and desolate land.:pilotfly: The word to the experts! :notworthy:

Walmis' F-15C is "the mother of all 3D works".... and all the "fifteen's birds" Thanks Walmis!!

Please mates i want to spend two words for the great and very "gamed" work of Tomcatz ,even if it has some difference from the more correct USSR model, it remaining awesome and still on place in my sim!!! THANX TOMCATZ!!! i just can't get enough of this..... Btw if only you Tomcatz and USSR will find some kind of collaboration (USSR is full of work and a help could be precious!!) to give us a companion perfect F15E Strike Eagle to match the 15C...... :thumbup: Please mates the entire community will be eternally grateful to you!!! Think at this possibility .... Unity is strength!!!:drunk: Of course for the FC1,12 as well as stated from my screens above! :thumbup:

It's not weathered it's a "digital pattern camo" skin still available in the skins set provided with the F15 mod.