Russian military and Georgia war Lessons and Implications Study

[Invader ZIM]

Hey guys,

 

I came across this document in my studies of military equipment and tactics and thought some would find it an interesting read. This document goes into detail how the battles were fought, what equipment was used and how effective or ineffective both sides were with differing tactics and equipment.

 

It's a free document, you can get it here: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=1069

 

Just click on which format you want to download it in beside the photo of the blue covered book on that page.

 

Some interesting material posted below from the document, even more inside the book.

 

Russian forces, in contrast, generally used Soviet

tactics, moving in column formation, fighting from the

lead elements and continuing to press forward after

making contact. They generally made no attempt to

stop, establish support by fire positions, and maneuver

to the flanks of the Georgian units they encountered.

 

These tactics, employed as they were against

 

a Western-trained force, nearly had disastrous con

sequences

the Army Commander.33

 

 

Despite the high risk entailed by the use of Soviet

tactics in the war against Georgia, they did provide

a number of advantages to Russian units. The first of

these was speed. Declining to deploy upon contact,

using support by fire positions, and maneuvering to

the flank of enemy units allowed Russian forces—at

the cost of higher casualties—to continue to press their

advance southward through South Ossetia and into

Georgia proper. This kept up the pressure on Georgian

forces and certainly had an advantageous psychological

effect, since as noted earlier the Georgian military

did not believe Russia would fight for South Ossetia on

such a significant scale.

 

 

The second advantage to the

use of Soviet tactics lies in their simplicity. For units

in which vehicles are not equipped with navigation

systems, night vision systems, advanced radios, and

advanced fire control systems, the use of tight column

formations with the lead elements fighting and the rest

of the formation pushing through contact might be the

best way to maintain unit integrity and sustain the advance.

Finally, Russian maneuver tactics—especially

combined as they were with massive air and artillery

attacks against Georgian forces—seem to have had a

significant shock effect on Georgian forces, as testified

to by the significant number of Georgian vehicles left

abandoned on the battlefield.

 

 

Russian equipment deficiencies were not limited

to the maneuver forces. Russian military officers,

and both Russian and foreign analysts, have noted

the lack of counterbattery radars, lack of access to

satellite imagery for intelligence planning, lack of

electronic warfare capability, and a shortage of unmanned

aerial vehicles as well as the poor quality of

those available as factors that significantly degraded

the Russian effort. The lack of reliable UAVs and

satellite imagery is what apparently led the Russian

air force to send a Tu-22 bomber deep into Georgia

on a reconnaissance and targeting mission, where it

was shot down by Georgian air defenses.Within the

air force, two related deficiencies stand out. The first

is the fact that GLONASS, the Russian answer to the

U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), had not been

completed in time for the war. This, combined with

the fact that GPS data for Georgia were interrupted

during the war, made the use of GPS or GLONASS

guided precision munitions impossible. The second

problem was the overall lack of precision-guided munitions

(PGMs), meaning that even munitions with

other guidance systems (laser, for example) were not

available in sufficient numbers. These deficiencies led

to a significant degradation of the Russian air force’s

ability to identify and engage important targets, the

details of which will be discussed later.

 

 

It's a cold analyses of what was used in the war, how effective it was, deficiencies of both sides, and advantages of both sides. Critial thoughts on US activities and self assessment of the US's role in the conflict. I found it pretty interesting to help one understand how these two countries conducted operations only a few short years ago. Grab a cup of coffee and sit back and enjoy.

for the Russian effort when the command

group of the 58th Army, including the commander,

General Anatoly Khruliev, was almost completely

destroyed by Georgian forces. Of the 30 vehicles in

the command group, 25 were destroyed, killing a significant

number of officers and soldiers, and wounding

Edited February 28, 2013 by Invader ZIM

[RIPTIDE]

.... I've read a few analysis on this war. Seems many of them come with a heavy bias.

 

As for GLONASS, how come Glonass for cars was working since 2007, but that report says it was not "completed" ? BTW, you can make a Satellite system like GLONASS or GPS and say it wasn't completed... IIRC both systems started off this way, when they were partially finished, they always had a bit of the pacific out of reach where there was nothing of interest anyway.

[Invader ZIM]

An interesting question Riptide, I also knew the GLONASS system was started long before this war, but because it wasn't completed perhaps there were holes in coverage that wouldn't allow Russian forces to use it in the area of operations in this instance.

 

It also seems the U.S. was denying GPS service to the region, and there was a critical lack of guided munitions used by Russian forces. This report does give credit to each side if you read it. But also explains the advantages of the tactics used by both sides. It's a U.S. military paper that is for critical analysis of advantages and shortcomings of military forces, including the U.S. which is for learning how to address shortfalls in ones own force structure. You probably won't find this at your local bookstore lol.

[Invader ZIM]

This got me thinking more about the GLONASS and I found a Russian Times Dec. 22nd 2012 article that seems to imply the GLONASS system isn't very reliable even almost 5 years after the war. So it's possible that during the war the system was even less reliable for guiding PGM's.

 

http://rt.com/news/russia-glonass-corruption-failure-543/

 

Russian military's support of GLONASS on ice after corruption scandal, technical failures - report

 

Published time: December 22, 2012 07:24

RIA Novosti / Oleg Urusov

 

Tags

Military, Russia, Scandal, Space

 

The Russian Defense Ministry has reportedly refused to adopt GLONASS, the country’s rival to GPS, due to its technical shortcomings. One of the system’s 24 satellites has malfunctioned, and besides, GLONASS is still in its testing phase.

­The malfunctioning satellite will not be operational any time soon as it has already exhausted its power after 96 months in service, Nezavisimaya Gazeta reports. And due to a difference in orbit inclination, no existing reserve satellite can substitute it.

A backup satellite launched in December 2008 stopped working in September of this year, allegedly because of malfunctioning Taiwanese-made microchips. According to the report, Moscow was forced to order the microchips from Taiwan when the US, Japan and several other NATO countries refused to supply the GLONASS manufacturers with spare parts following Russia’s war with South Ossetia.

 

Though three GLONASS-M satellites are reportedly ready to be put into orbit, Russia’s 2013 budget has not allocated funds for additional launches. Formally, the navigation system is still in the development stage, which was planned to be completed by the end of 2012 with the Defense Ministry taking full control of the system. Due to systematic problems this has not happened, yet the federal program under which the project is funded has no provisions for any extension of the testing phase.

There are currently 31 GLONASS satellites in orbit, 23 of which are in operation. Others are either in reserve, or still being tested. If another satellite fails, it could delay the launch of the system by several more years.

Starting from January 1, 2013, all public transportation operators and the carriers of hazardous materials were ordered to equip their vehicles with GLONASS systems and report their locations to Rostransnadzor, Russia’s transport supervision agency. This requirement, however, is not legally binding unless the satellite system is formally put into operation.

GLONASS' development has been marred by corruption scandals in addition to its numerous technical failures.

In December 2010, three GLONASS-M satellites crashed into the Pacific Ocean. The approximate cost of the equipment was estimated at $80 million.

In November 2012, inspectors from Roscosmos, the Russian space agency, uncovered several significant violations in the use of budgetary funds allocated to GLONASS. The investigators said that 6.5 billion rubles (over $200 million) were embezzled from the budget. As a result of the scandal, Yury Urlichich was sacked from his post as GLONASS chief designer and then resigned as the head of the Russian Institute of Space Device Engineering.

The GLOSNASS case came amid a separate scandal in which Russian Defense Ministry head Anatoly Serdyukov was sacked for his involvement in large-scale corruption.

[FanBoy2006.01]

Thanks for the link.

[Maior]

An interesting question Riptide, I also knew the GLONASS system was started long before this war, but because it wasn't completed perhaps there were holes in coverage that wouldn't allow Russian forces to use it in the area of operations in this instance.

 

It also seems the U.S. was denying GPS service to the region, and there was a critical lack of guided munitions used by Russian forces. This report does give credit to each side if you read it. But also explains the advantages of the tactics used by both sides. It's a U.S. military paper that is for critical analysis of advantages and shortcomings of military forces, including the U.S. which is for learning how to address shortfalls in ones own force structure. You probably won't find this at your local bookstore lol.

 

Well, the system for cars, usually entails double GPS/GLONASS receivers to compensate for the lack of GLONASS coverage. Glonass was only once a complete constellation when the Americans helped Russians put their satellites in orbit fast enough. However, Russian atomic clocks were very sensitive and have a short life span. It was not uncommon for one of the watches to be a complete loss after the rigours of launch. When coverage is available, GLONASS is a nice complement to GPS and allows you to correct some ambiguities. Pretty small difference though and not really an alternative at the moment.

 

As for the article, it's pretty much in vogue with what I have read from other sources and it seems to be a bit too dismissive of Russian command from the excerpts you posted. Lack of precision ammo is one thing but the use of wave tactics is effective if you're willing to pay the price. It's very hard to resist an armoured spearhead and the speed of advance won them the war by completely seizing initiative. It's principle is basically the same as that used in WWII and it's not called massed columns, it's called Echelon formations and Deep operations. The idea is to have force in echelons and keep advancing them as you meet resistance. If the opponent has less troops than you do, either he withdraws immediately or he'll be locked in combat and, once the front is broken, he'll be outflanked at the same time. Plus Russian advantage in artillery has been around since Peter the Great. Stalin called artillery "The Red God of War!".

As one of your snippets says, the initial shelling was more than many could stand. I mean airstrikes come and go but an artillery bombardment can go on for hours and hours.

 

As for these operations Imagine German Blitzkrieg only instead of a small area push, it's push is with a whole front. Very impressive. The Germans certainly felt so. Army Group Center went bye bye with one of these.

 

It's funny, in a way this war shows signs of the deep changes in the Russian army conflicting with what is available to them. The Russian army restarted this year frequent mass exercises at brigade level iirc. This will increase their operational readiness and I don't doubt that in the next engagement, their equipment will be much better suited to their more up to date tactics.

[RIPTIDE]

This got me thinking more about the GLONASS and I found a Russian Times Dec. 22nd 2012 article that seems to imply the GLONASS system isn't very reliable even almost 5 years after the war. So it's possible that during the war the system was even less reliable for guiding PGM's.

 

http://rt.com/news/russia-glonass-corruption-failure-543/

Ah right... :thumbup:

[104th_Cobra]

As far as I know, the GLONASS constellation doesn't have the coverage of the GPS one. In 2008, it restricted to only generally cover the Russian territory.

 

As for the article, it's pretty much in vogue with what I have read from other sources and it seems to be a bit too dismissive of Russian command from the excerpts you posted. Lack of precision ammo is one thing but the use of wave tactics is effective if you're willing to pay the price. It's very hard to resist an armoured spearhead and the speed of advance won them the war by completely seizing initiative. It's principle is basically the same as that used in WWII and it's not called massed columns, it's called Echelon formations and Deep operations. The idea is to have force in echelons and keep advancing them as you meet resistance. If the opponent has less troops than you do, either he withdraws immediately or he'll be locked in combat and, once the front is broken, he'll be outflanked at the same time. Plus Russian advantage in artillery has been around since Peter the Great. Stalin called artillery "The Red God of War!".

 

One main difference between the Soviet and the "Occidental" use of reserves is that "reserves" (the Soviet better forces) were used in the advancing/winning zones with consequent exploration in deep, in contrast to use the reserves in the weaker points.

[EvilBivol-1]

GLONASS coverage: http://www.glonass-ianc.rsa.ru/en/

[Invader ZIM]

It's very hard to resist an armoured spearhead and the speed of advance won them the war by completely seizing initiative. It's principle is basically the same as that used in WWII and it's not called massed columns, it's called Echelon formations and Deep operations.

 

 

 

Exactly right Maior, and although the snippets I used may seem dismissive of the Russian Command, in other parts later in the article it explains that the Russian command had a handle on how to conduct an operation, but were hampered by problems with communications systems, among other problems. It mentions that the tactics of the armored spearhead are effective. I know it's a long read, but I found it thought provoking and interesting.

 

Thanks for that link EvilBivol-1 pretty neat to see the system displayed like that.

 

Back in 2008 during the war though, according to Wikipedia (Ugh, sorry) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GLONASS there were only:

 

In June 2008, the system consisted of 16 satellites, 12 of which were fully operational at the time.

 

And in order to get consistent coverage:

When the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1991, twelve functional GLONASS satellites in two planes were operational; enough to allow limited usage of the system (to cover the entire territory of the country, 18 satellites would have been necessary.)

 

So this would indicate problems with coverage back in 2008 if 18 satellites were needed for the region.

Edited March 1, 2013 by Invader ZIM

[EvilBivol-1]

Yes, even a few years ago GLONASS coverage was more limited. In any case, though, the problems of the Russian army in 2008 were hardly limited to satnav. Communication and coordination in general was very poor. On the other hand, as the analysts indicate, they had to move fast and get as far as they could to be in the best possible position for negotiations, which they knew would happen quickly under political pressure.

Edited March 1, 2013 by EvilBivol-1

[=KAG=RubiN]

Why did this topic?

[Maior]

Yes, even a few years ago GLONASS coverage was more limited. In any case, though, the problems of the Russian army in 2008 were hardly limited to satnav. Communication and coordination in general was very poor. On the other hand, as the analysts indicate, they had to move fast and get as far as they could to be in the best possible position for negotiations, which they knew would happen quickly under political pressure.

 

GLONASS coverage hasn't really changed much in the last couple of years. The Russian satellite model is at fault. It's cover has wide gaps due to incomplete orbital paths (4 orbital paths, six satellites each). You need 24 satellites to cover the whole world consistently. Russia only once managed to achieve that.

 

The problems of the Russian army had to do with a lot of factors including 90% of their equipment being new. And their army only recently is going professional.

So, you have new toys, no training how to use them effectively, and an army who didn't practice large formation operations more than once or twice a year. Again, I'm very curious as to what will follow. Russians were always very good at developing new doctrine. WWII battleplans for all nations were basically formulated by Mikhail Tukhachevsky (from Blitzkrieg to airborne troops). Let's wait and see.

[Invader ZIM]

Hi =KAG=RubiN I came across the article and found the U.S. Army war college information interesting regarding how the battlefield systems were used on both sides in an actual military operation. There weren't too many threads I could find addressing the specific issue so I figured others interested in such matters would find the reading material interesting.

 

I have no intentions on discussing politics, as I'm only interested in battlefield systems in operation. But the other guys here in this discussion have touched on some of the very points discussed in the article, indicating that some of it's points may be rather valid. I simply posted this up for information and simple discussion.

 

If anyone has any other reading that they could recommend on the war I'd like to read it, especially if there's a comparative document from the Russian side or Georgian side.

 

 

From the document:

 

Russian use of massive force and coordination with irregular

forces was particularly effective.31

Having trained the

North Caucasus volunteer forces, the Russian military

was aware of their strengths and weaknesses and

used them in roles that maximized the former and

minimized the latter. In summary, then, successful

preparation for war on the strategic level translated

into a significant advantage for Russian forces on the

operational level. Russia exploited this advantage by

committing a significantly greater number of forces to

the fight than Georgia was able to; by using its bettertrained

units in key roles; by adequate coordination

between units, including artillery; by relying on typical

Soviet doctrinal tenets of operational speed and

overwhelming concentrations of forces at key points;

and by making good use of irregular forces to complement

the efforts of its conventional forces. All in all, it

was an impressive 21st century engagement against a

smaller, weaker enemy, adequate for achievement of

Moscow’s geopolitical goals.

 

at the tactical level, in direct fire engagements

between Russian and Georgian units of relatively

equal size, Georgian forces seem to have inflicted more

damage than they suffered. In part, this was due to

superior Georgian equipment—many Georgian tanks

and infantry fighting vehicles were equipped with

reactive armor, night vision equipment, advanced radios,

and superior fire control systems installed under

contract by an Israeli defense firm, while most Russian

vehicles lacked these improvements. Georgian forces

also benefited from training administered by U.S. and

other Western countries designed to prepare them for

their deployments to Kosovo and Iraq. While generally

focused on stability operations or counterinsurgency,

this training taught skills relevant to conventional

engagements at the tactical level as well—skills such

as reacting to contact and using firepower to support

maneuver against the enemy.

 

Interestingly, the Russian and Georgian performances

in the war were in many ways mirror images

of each other. Russian strategy was well-thought-out

and properly resourced, giving Russia significant advantages

at the operational level of war and allowing

it to overcome shortcomings at the tactical level. The

Georgian military, by contrast, was reasonably welltrained

and well-equipped at the small-unit level and

fought well in tactical engagements, but the reactive

nature of Georgian strategic and operational planning

and the often haphazard way in which plans were

conceived and implemented undercut the tactical advantages

the Georgians enjoyed and undermined their

entire effort. Indeed, Georgian officers have characterized

their operation as spontaneously planned, with

no reserve designated, no fire support or engineer

plans written, and the main-effort commander select31

ed only hours before the war began. They have also

decried what they describe as significant intervention

by the civilian leadership of the country in the minutest

details of planning and executing the operation.

 

As implied above, the most significant failure in the

Russian air campaign was in the SEAD. The generally

accepted figure for Russian aircraft losses is 7-8, with

one of these having been a case of fratricide.60 At least

part of the blame for the poor SEAD effort must be

laid at the feet of the Russian intelligence community.

The Russian air force was unaware that Georgia had

purchased the BUK M1 (SA11) anti-aircraft missile

system from Ukraine prior to the outbreak of the war,

even though Georgia had publicly reported this purchase.

This system accounted for a significant portion

of the Russian aircraft losses during the war.

 

U.S. intelligence and military assistance shortcomings

are obvious. U.S. intelligence-gathering

and analysis regarding the Russian threat

to Georgia failed. The U.S. military assistance

to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the

last 15 years and focused on the development

of counterinsurgency capabilities instead of

conventional warfare, did not prevent the August

2008 debacle. No scenarios of a Russian

invasion were envisaged, wargamed, or seriously

exercised. No force structure to resist a

Russian invasion was built by the Georgian

authorities with U.S. support. U.S. intelligence

managers justified the failure by complaining

that the satellite capabilities were redeployed

for Iraq.126

 

Air power is not sufficient. Russia used air,

armor, the Black Sea Fleet, Special Forces, and

allied militias in the attack. Clausewitzian lessons

still apply to the August 2008 war: the use

of overwhelming force against the enemy’s

center of gravity by implementing a combined

air-land-sea operation may be 20th-century

style, but it does work

 

Surprise and speed of operations matter, as

they have for the 4,000 years of recorded history

of warfare. To be successful, wars must have

limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved

most of its goals between Friday and Monday,

while the world, including President Bush, was

watching the Olympics and parliaments were

on vacation.

 

Russia is prepared to take military casualties—

within reason—and inflict overwhelming military

and civilian casualties at a level unacceptable

to the enemy. Georgia lost some 100-200

soldiers and effectively capitulated. A tougher

enemy could well suffer a proportionally higher

rate of casualties and keep on fighting.

[Maior]

wow, nice snippets. :)

It all goes to prove that there's a lot of juice to be squeezed out of the document.

 

The conclusions they reach are very well balanced. All you hear about Georgian efforts fall in line with these conclusions. we all read about the brave Georgian units who inflicted more casualties against superior Russian forces. What most people fail to grasp is the resounding strategical successes Russia achieved. Most Russian attacks were design to keep Georgian is check and pin it's resources. Sure, they held out gallantly, however, the three tank corps (euphemism) that bypassed them in between were left free to roam on the Georgian countryside.

The Georgians were woefully unprepared to face a full assault by Russia and that showed since, as the document points out, Russian achieved most of their objectives in three days. The low casualties are also deceiving since Russia managed to make much more units of the Georgian army unable to contribute to the fight due to the front advancing hundreds of miles in a brief period of time.

Just look at the casualties, the Georgians had over a thousand wounded and quickly lost it's ability to fight. Pretty impressive. It just goes to prove that you cannot fight a war without supplies. Georgia lost a third of it's tank force... That's a blow.

 

You mentioned limits to air power, well, this is not Russian-Georgian war but, it just shows these limits very clearly:

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sberCNmEjoQ&list=PLD45D8B1080349E21

[Invader ZIM]

Thanks for that video link Maior, Kosovo is another major area of study that makes interesting reading, but it's sometimes hard to pick through and find the nuggets of info to help form a complete picture of the battlefields depending on what materials you read.

 

I like this U.S. Army report for a few reasons:

 

1. It's not afraid to mention where it's facts come from in the footnotes and not afraid to comment on the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of either sides tactics and equipent, allowing the reader to better form his or her own opinion of what happened on both sides.

 

2. It's cold hard details and also self criticism of how the U.S. and NATO made errors during this timeframe.

 

3. Writing from a U.S. Military point of view that is both professional and shows respect to both sides militaries and outlines lessons to be learned for U.S. strategy studies.

 

We sometimes all get hot headed in these forums when national pride comes into play, but it's interesting that on a professional level when documents like this are available you can see the respect given to a potential adversary.

[=KAG=RubiN]

Hi =KAG=RubiN I came across the article and found the U.S. Army war college information interesting regarding how the battlefield systems were used on both sides in an actual military operation. There weren't too many threads I could find addressing the specific issue so I figured others interested in such matters would find the reading material interesting.

 

I have no intentions on discussing politics, as I'm only interested in battlefield systems in operation. But the other guys here in this discussion have touched on some of the very points discussed in the article, indicating that some of it's points may be rather valid. I simply posted this up for information and simple discussion.

 

If anyone has any other reading that they could recommend on the war I'd like to read it, especially if there's a comparative document from the Russian side or Georgian side.

 

 

From the document:

Unfortunately on real events you and I will know soon as the document is too politicized.

[Maior]

Unfortunately on real events you and I will know soon as the document is too politicized.

 

politics is on the eye of the beholder. Usually, discussions revolving around facts tend to have little manipulation. Since 200 dead is 200 dead and there's no way around it. And that the Russians did achieve their main objectives in three days, there's also not much to be said about it. Politicized speech usually comes from people picking small details from a conflict and extrapolating them making them having a much bigger weight. Like an arms dealer trying to sell Georgia more advanced equipment since he can "show" that a certain unit with certain equipment achieved X and if they had more expensive and advanced optics and electronics, the end result would be different. While the result of any army in the same situation using the same tactics would suffer similar results no matter the equipment. Sure, they might destroy another plane and a couple extra tanks but, in the end, the result is the same.

Those are the political quagmires to avoid and sometimes turn an army which is already quite capable into something inoperable due to excess spending in resources instead of education. The Japanese learned this lesson better than anyone. If you look at the war of 1905 against Russia, the Japanese had less ships and less modern ones as well. Yet, they ended Russian interests in China decisively. Most of it was due to their hyper aggressive-doctrine meant to seize initiative vs larger armies (which their main opponents had).

[Invader ZIM]

Well said Maior, but the document in the opening pages actually mentions it's meant to generate discussion positive or negative on the topic, even the author gives his contact info and is interested in discussing the issue, so even though =KAG=RubiN feels the document is too political in nature doesn't mean his assessment is wrong or right, it's just his opinion based on how he's seeing it and he has a right to that opinion.

 

But Rubin, can you tell me more about why you think the document is too slanted in one direction over another? If it's more convenient you can answer in Cyrillic, I use google translate as I know it's probably inconvenient to translate all the time.

 

To me I feel it's balanced and it enticed me to look deeper into some of the details mentioned to confirm some of the material for it's plausibility. That doesn't mean my opinion is right or wrong either.

Edited March 1, 2013 by Invader ZIM

[maturin]

I only read the introduction, where the authors outlined the origins of the conflict. I'm fairly confident that I would get into a roaring argument with any Russian I engaged on this topic, so believe me when I say that the description of the political situation is biased pretty heavily.

 

That said, I really don't understand what effect that bias is going to have on a strategic and tactical analysis of the war. After all, would a biased American want to laud the performance of his allies and Western equipment, or inflate the abilities of the Russians in order to serve a political agenda focused on confrontation and increased military spending? After all, if everything is hunky doory with our military tech and clients, most of the military industrial complex is out of a job and there's no need for new projects and ramped up capabilities.

[Maior]

I only read the introduction, where the authors outlined the origins of the conflict. I'm fairly confident that I would get into a roaring argument with any Russian I engaged on this topic, so believe me when I say that the description of the political situation is biased pretty heavily.

 

That said, I really don't understand what effect that bias is going to have on a strategic and tactical analysis of the war. After all, would a biased American want to laud the performance of his allies and Western equipment, or inflate the abilities of the Russians in order to serve a political agenda focused on confrontation and increased military spending? After all, if everything is hunky doory with our military tech and clients, most of the military industrial complex is out of a job and there's no need for new projects and ramped up capabilities.

 

 

Ah, I read the introduction carefully and now I can understand your comments. Though I believe that the reasons for the war presented do not stray far from the truth, but it is presented in a rather strong fashion. You have to take into account that the focus of this study is Russia. In my opinion, from the data available, Georgia gave Russians the excuse they needed to invade. The way the invasion was led, it was not planned on the spot. It was probably planned for a long time.

 

I still don't think it's over-politicised. But again, this is my opinion :)

[RIPTIDE]

The way the invasion was led, it was not planned on the spot. It was probably planned for a long time.

It depends on what planning means. I don't see why this is ever an issue. I think every country in the world has blueprints on how to invade their neighbours, no matter the political situation.

 

I'd say they had an idea to finish this frozen conflict once and for all at some point, just that Mad Misha Saakashvilli wrong footed them on the exact timing. ;)

[Invader ZIM]

maturin does have a point, and I also can see how the wording is strong in some areas right at the beginning of the document, but looking at the authors themselves of this document helps one to get a perspective on that.

 

ARIEL COHEN is Senior Research Fellow in Russian

and Eurasian Studies and International Energy

Policy at the Katherine and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute

for International Policy at The Heritage Foundation.

He directs conferences on Eurasian security,

terrorism and energy, the rule of law, crime and corruption,

and a variety of other issues. He also directs

Heritage’s energy simulation exercises and war games

involving Russia (2007-11). Dr. Cohen conducts White

House briefings and regularly lectures for the U.S. Government,

including the Foreign Service Institute of the

U.S. Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the

Training and Doctrine and Special Forces Commands

of the U.S. armed services, Central Intelligence Agency,

and Defense Intelligence Agency. He frequently testifies

before committees of the U.S. Congress, including

the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees,

House Armed Services Committee, House Judiciary

Committee, and the Helsinki Commission. Dr. Cohen is

also a Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and

International Institute for Strategic Studies (London).

Dr. Cohen authored Russian Imperialism: Development

and Crisis (Praeger Publishers/Greenwood, 1996 and

1998); edited and co-authored Eurasia in Balance, (Ashgate,

United Kingdom, 2005); and authored Kazakhstan:

The Road to Independence: Energy Policy and the Birth of a

Nation (School of Advanced International Studies, Johns

Hopkins Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 2008).

 

ROBERT E. HAMILTON is a U.S. Army colonel

and Eurasian area specialist. His current assignment is

as a professor in the Department of National Security

and Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He has

served as a strategic war planner and country desk

officer at U.S. Central Command, as the Chief of Regional

Engagement for Combined Forces Command-

Afghanistan, and as the Chief of the Office of Defense

Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Georgia. Colonel

Hamilton was a U.S. Army War College fellow at

the Center for Strategic and International Studies in

Washington, DC, where he authored several articles

about the war between Russia and Georgia and the

security situation in the former Soviet Union. Colonel

Hamilton is currently completing Ph.D. course work

at the University of Virginia.

[=KAG=RubiN]

Well said Maior, but the document in the opening pages actually mentions it's meant to generate discussion positive or negative on the topic, even the author gives his contact info and is interested in discussing the issue, so even though =KAG=RubiN feels the document is too political in nature doesn't mean his assessment is wrong or right, it's just his opinion based on how he's seeing it and he has a right to that opinion.

 

But Rubin, can you tell me more about why you think the document is too slanted in one direction over another? If it's more convenient you can answer in Cyrillic, I use google translate as I know it's probably inconvenient to translate all the time.

 

To me I feel it's balanced and it enticed me to look deeper into some of the details mentioned to confirm some of the material for it's plausibility. That doesn't mean my opinion is right or wrong either.

 

Have any of those who made the document was in the Russian or Georgian headquarters? Where the data in the document? I think that neither I nor you know how many forces really are and what they have the technical ability. But based on questionable data can not draw conclusions, one can only version. But the document we see the output, and the strategic and try to guess the future. Although of course both Russian and American analysts have to justify its existence, it is difficult to guess what will happen tomorrow, but want to eat today. Well, the media added pepper. The result is poor, forms an opinion. Situation is beneficial to only a few people, all the other bad. Ordinary people do not know that they had been deceived and wanted to make money. A similar document to justify those who wage war. I did not read it to the end yet, there is something about the aid to Georgia from the U.S.? Google just lovely :)

[maturin]

Oh yeah, the Heritage Foundation. Wingnut dipshits.