Kurfürst

1st Lt. Tobak of the 101. Vadászezred recalled in his memoirs that the regiment received new aircraft, the G-10 or as they nicknamed it the Fat Messer, because of the enlarged engine hood. The power of the engine was 2000 HP at 8000 m (sic). Egy-két perc múlva már a régi barakkban, a nagy készültségi szobában voltunk. Az első megdermedt pillanatokat harsány örömrivalgás követte. Aztán félórás beszélgetés során sok mindent megtudtam. A lényeg: amolyan vihar előtti csend van. Új gépeket kapott az ezred, a G—10-esek beceneve „Kövér Messzer", mert nagyobb a kompresszoruk meg a motordekli, vagyis a motorháztető. A légcsavarlapátok is szélesebbek, nagyobb az oldalkormány is. A motor maximális teljesítménye 8000 méteren 2000 LE, de a fiúk szerint 6000-ig jobb lenne egy Fritz — az „F" jelű sorozatból — vagy a Győrben gyártott G—6-osok. He put his new plane, a G-10/U4, into good use in March 21, 1945 west of Veszprém (near Lake Balaton, Hungary), shooting down a Yakovlev fighter in hard turning fight at 6000 m. (Lt. Tobak gave full throttle and then throttled back not to overshoot the target, while he was completely blacking out in the turn - ie. a 5+ g turn - at a firing range of 30 meters using the MK 108 3 cm cannon. The Yakovlev was hit and disintegrated into three pieces. Olyan közel már a bevetési légtér, hogy a 6000 métert Veszprémtől nyugatra spirálozva vagyunk kénytelenek elérni. Állítólag pirkadattól nyüzsögnek a gépek a Balaton akarattyai sarka fölött. Nagyon jó a látás, nincs egyenletes felhőalap, csak itt-ott magas szintű felhősávok. Befutunk a bevetési légtérbe 7000 m magasságban, finoman nyomjuk, kb. 700 km/óra így a sebességünk. Kettes, hármas varióval vesztjük a magasságot és kinézzük a szemünket. Nem telik el 20 perc, egyszerre hárman ordítunk a rádióba: — "Drótkefe, vigyázz! Jobbra előttünk három órában gépek! — ez Holéczy Dani, de rögtön visítja valaki: — Jakok! — Három Jakot látok, majdnem szembejönnek velünk. Szembetámadást várok, de nem. A jobb szélső balra kitér és szintben marad, a másik kettő leborít. Ilyen is ritkán van! Találkozás azonos pozícióban és mi vagyunk létszámfölényben. — Dani, a jobb szélsőre megyek! — mondom, Dani annyit felel: — Jó! Teljes gáz! — A távolság a szintben kitérő Jak—9-es és köztem egyre csökken. Kissé nyomja. Távolság 200, rövid sorozatot lövök a 13 mm-esekkel, a távolság már csak 100 méter. Észreveszi a sorozatomat és rendkívül élesen jobb felhúzott fordulóba kezd. Jól látom a felségjelét és vörösre festett csőrét. Le kell kapnom egy pillanatra a gázt, hogy túl ne lőjek rajta, mert akkor szerepeink megcserélődnének, én lennék elöl, ő pedig hátul. Távolság már csak 50 méter. Pokolian szűkít, szinte eléri a saját farkát, távolság 30 méter, a revikör fekete, a próbasorozat a farka mögött szalad el. Csak géppuskázok egyelőre, de olyan szűken fordul, hogy alig látok a gyorsulástól. Egy pillanat alatt átfut az agyamon, hogy még rá kell húznom a gépem orrát, hogy teljesen eltakarjam, csak úgy találhatom el. Ha kések, meglóg, vagy — rosszabb esetben — ő lesz az üldöző. Ne mondja senki, hogy a Messzer 6000-en rosszul fordul! Teljesen elfeketedek, amikor meghúzom a botkormányt és nyomom a háromcentis ágyú gombját! A látásom visszatér, és látom, sőt érzem a robbanást előttem! Belefut a gépem — szerencsére csak az apró törmelékbe. Oldalt kinézve látom, hogy az az előbb még oly szép repülőgép három darabra válva, lángolva pörög lefelé . .." See also the picture below from Janda-Poruba: Messerschmitt Bf 109G-10/U4 Production & Operational Service. It appears JG 27 and 53 were not the only ones running at 1,98 ata :)

Its not a claim, its a fact. The images, crash reports and archive text prove that the use of C-3 fuel in late war Bf 109s was quite common. Its becoming a more and more interesting thesis over time. Do you have any evidence of (i) C-3 not being available to the 109 units concerned or that (ii) the 109 units concerned refused to carry out their operational orders to increase manifold pressure to 1.98ata? (iii) or evidence of combat use of +25 lbs boost on Mk IXs in 1945? (iv) or evidence of combat use of +21 lbs boost on Mk XIVs in 1945?

Finally, some convincing evidence at last that Spitfire pilots went to battle armed with Mike Williams charts! :megalol:

Lets compromise in 22 for you, friedrich and milosh, and seven for the rest of us. ;)

How is the extract on the Luftflotte 6 (Eastern front units) is supposed to contradict the fuel use of Lko. West units in Bavaria? Also note that II./JG 11 is operating at C-3 and 1,98ata on the Eastern front (II/JG 11 was stationed near Berlin). Oh yes, G-10 and K-4 had the same engine with the boost possibilities, while the G-14/AS bz that time could have the ASC engine with 1,98ata. Not only the K-4 operated at 1,98 ata, but G-10 and G-14/AS (ASC) as well... Anyway, we can't say there is no new "research" results! Here are two brand new ones: Fw 190F units operating in Hungary prevented Bf 109K units in Bavaria from operating on C-3 fuel and whatever units operating in Prussia/Poland prevented Bf 109K units in Bavaria from operating on C-3 fuel because 7./JG 52 was formally of II./JG 51 which was from the Eastern Front! In addition, the ground crews of 109K units in Bavaria were out of their mind and painted C-3 fuel triangles on their aircraft for no reason, no reason at all. HAHA! See?

Seven.

I agree... its a very late war ("über") planeset anyway.

Its worth reading the Luftwaffe's own assessment on the relative flying qualities of the two. http://kurfurst.org/Tactical_trials/109F4_Rechlin_vergleich_190A2/109F_Rvergleichsflg_190A2_de.html IMO the 109 was the more forgiving or "newbie friendly" plane in the air and the 190 the generally more forgiving during take off and landing. It still had some quirks though, being sensitive for sink speed and generally having higher landing speeds. Start- und Lande-Eigenschaften: Start FW 190 A 2 ist vermöge des höheren Gewichts um etwa 60 bis 70 m länger. Aus demselben Grunde ist die Lande-Geschwindigkeit um etwa 15 km/h höher. Jedoch ist es vermöge der robusten Bauweise des Fahrwerkes und der auch bei geringeren Geschwindigkeiten noch stabilen Fluglage (keine Neigung zum Abkippen) möglich, die FW 190 fast ebenso kurz zu landen, wie die Bf 109. Die Bremswirkung der Räder ist besser als bei der Bf 109. Etwas zu geringe oder zu hohe Fahrt bei Landen wirken sich in der Sinkgeschwindigkeit allerdings bedeutend stärker aus, als bei der Bf 109, sodass in einem Falle das Flugzeug sehr stark durchfällt, im anderen Falle die Landestrecke erheblich vergrössert wird. Neigung zum Ausbrechen besteht nicht. Besonderes hervorzuheben ist, dass bei Bauchlandungen kaum nennenswerte Beschädigungen entstehen, in keinem Fall aber ein Verziehen der Flächen oder des Rumpfes eintritt, was bei der Bf 109 fast regelmässig der Fall ist. Dadurch insbesondere kam es bei der Truppe zu hohen Flugzeugaus- fällen an der Bf 109. One of its greatest advantages was the robustness of the airframe if things went south during landing - belly landings were much less likely to result in a write off than in the case with the 109.

All valid points of course - the range of Spitfire when operating from bases in the UK was simply inadequate to operate over the continent for any meaningful time, especially when this would involve combat. Consumption of the Merlin 66 would be in the order of 196 imp./gallons per hour and the internal fuel capacity was just 85 gallons - or ca 16 gallons consumed in every 5 minutes at max. boost, or about one-fifth of the tank's capacity. With a range of just about 3-400 miles under high/low cruise conditions, the chances of returning to base would quickly approach to nil. Anyway, the point I was trying to make that the argument of +25 lbs Spits in 1944 is odd given that these in all likelihood were never used in actual combat and the two Squadrons involved in the trials were a small minority among the many Mark IX Squadrons at that time. +25 lbs for the Mark IX is really a spring 1945 scenario, same with the 109K at 1.98 ata. It is remarkable how close these developments run parallel in real life btw.

It has been done, some eight years ago. Like I said, Mike lost that argument long time ago. Really there is nothing to argue on the 1.98 ata matter anymore, as all the important details of its clearance and use are well researched, published and known. Nobody will seriously bother to stop and argue, or repeat these facts every time a few partisans (who could be really counted on one hand - Milo and his various nicks, "Friedrich" and his various nicks, Mike and Neil) start to speculate what could have been gone differently than it was. If he want to revise history on his site, that's his problem. You seem to have been concerned with him being referred as a 'clown' etc. - I believe you should really ponder on whether this controversial reputation Mike has built up over the years has anything to do with the way he handles historical evidence in those performance comparison articles. Have you ever considered the possibility of him just coming clean, after all these years and after several researchers having sent him documents and advised to correct his articles and correct them? Its his choice to have those articles in the way they are, and have the reputation that comes with it. There is no denying that he is doing some useful work at the same time. Pardon my satirical style and highlighting a few of the most comical takes on historical on that site - I was attempting to keep my criticism on the light side. Of course I could just say it more directly what is in them - selective presentation of facts. If you like that sort of approach on history, by all means, keep reading them.

.... which has been posted a week ago in this very thread. http://forums.eagle.ru/showpost.php?p=2099002&postcount=128

I wonder if that same strict sense of what constitutes evidence and what not also applies to Allied aircraft performance, because apparently it does not and some like to have double standards. For example, a single petrol browser with the number "100" on it supposed to prove that 1000+ fighters at the time were running on 100 octane fuel and being highly boosted; in contrast, a dozen reports of 100 octane fuel found in tanks and 100 octane stencils on aircraft does not even prove the aircraft is actually has 100 octane in its tanks, if we are to believe some of the usual suspects.:music_whistling: But lets apply the same strict of evidence to the late war boosts used by Spitfires, shall we? At the best what we've got is evidence for two Mark IX Squadrons (that's two dozen aircraft for you) experimenting with +25 lbs boost but without any evidence of ever employing it in combat in the spring-summer of 1944. (fun fact - hundreds of equivalent G-14s were used for combat operations at the same time). We also have evidence of plans (as you like to call it) from November 1944 to use it with several squadrons. If we allow for "secondary sources" a single Wing (126 Wing) was actually "experimenting" the prescribed fuel type a few months before the war, but no evidence of using it in conjunction with higher boost modifications. (At the same time in we have evidence of a German Wing "experimenting" with the higher boost modifications in February 1945.) Funny thing about these articles, this "secondary source" mentioning the engine failures and fuel supply problems is, for some obscure reason, omitted from the said article. ;) For Mark XIVs, we have evidence of +21 lbs boost some brief use against the V-1 campaign and at best that by late March 1945, a handful of XIVs in a storage depot were converted to said boost. Nothing on actual combat use though. Even at that point what if we allow for all the circumstantial evidence we have no "data" on the performance for the Mk XIV at +21 lbs boost - the "data" displayed is not from a primary source, not even a secondary source, but Mike William's own estimate. Apparently his own estimates are judged to be good enough to be used for a comparison , while the performance calculations prepared by Messerschmitt's engineers and noted to be "certainly reached with well built serial production aircraft are dismissed as "simplistic estimates". These latter obviously failed to meet the high quality standard which random speed and climb numbers pulled out from Mike's backside easily satisfied, on the other hand. Besides the fact that the numbers that are shown are not even for the K-4 variant, but the curves for the K-6 heavy fighter. Another honest mistake probably. There is no particular reason to beating that dead horse anyway. Mike lost that argument some eight years ago and in frustration of seeing the evidence he pulled off any and all 1.98 ata figures from his site. :megalol: The reason the articles even manage to generate some debate nowadays is not because of their "research" quality (IMO they hardly constitute more than a random collection of factoids randomly lumped together in who's plane is the "bestest" argument style). What generates interest and controversy is the pitifully biased representation, that has been always a trademark of that site and which has resulted in a lasting reputation for lack of credibility in the aviation community.

Would you give us a breakdown on all these Fw 190s in Bavaria which "relied on C-3" and "significantly outnumbered" the 109s" dear Jeff? Its a question of reading carefully the evidence. We know that on April 22 1945 Luftwaffenkommando West reported 284,000 liters of C-3 fuel stocks on airfields in Bavaria. Would you kindly re-read it? It says "on Airfields". Not "On depots". As has already been shown, RAF units had to scrounge for even small supplies of fuel, and even ammo just to keep going. Nothing to say that +25 lbs boost was used by the single Spitfire Mk. IX wing from late March 1945. Was it ever used in air to air combat, I wonder.

Good news indeed! Still its a long waiting time for me for a thoroughly modelled 109K October 2014... curiously enough exactly at the 70th anniversary of the service introduction of the real thing! :)

Thanks Otto for your scans. I think it settles the matter for good. FYI on C-3, on April 22 1945 Luftwaffenkommando West reported the following fuel stocks on airfields in Bavaria: B-4 = 350,000 liters C-3 = 284,000 liters J-2 = 1,897,000 liters Certainly C-3 was not any harder to come by than B-4. The amount of C-3 directly stocked at airfields (keep in mind that main storage was not at the airfields themselves, they were supplied periodically) was enough for ca. 700 Bf 109 sorties. I do not think the supply of C-3 was a problem, after all, it was a standard Luftwaffe fuel since the start of the war. The Germans even preferred to supply the pro-Mussolini Italians with mostly C-3 instead of B-4 (when either would do). Plus there is of course a wagonload of photos showing 109s with C-3 fuel. I believe though from operational documents that 109 units largely relied on B-4 in the Eastern Front. It had been even mentioned that using methanol was seldom necessary on that front. In any case, the matter has been cleared up yet again with overwhelming evidence more than sufficiently IMO.

This has been already addressed in the other thread. http://forums.eagle.ru/showthread.php?t=116391&page=6 Via Messermeister:

I do not think anyone in their right mind takes these articles by mr. williams too seriously. :music_whistling:

IMO while technically the higher/lower RPM is more correct translation for German terminology, but its also seems somewhat alien to English terminology - isn't coarse/fine propeller pitch (which is really just a different description of the same thing) a more commonly used term? PS/OFF: "ß" can be a pain reproduce, the ASCII code evades me... btw weren't the special German characters supposed to be "withdrawn from service" in grammar reform..?

Irrelevant, plus Jeff Webbs originally couldn't even figure out where Salzburg (a rather well known Austrian city... ) airfield is - instead, he plotted a unit movement for April 1945 that placed III/JG 27. in Salzburg, Germany hundreds of kilometers behind American lines. :megalol: Speculation. Note that Jeff Webbs has been implying beforehand that he had not seen any evidence of the 150 grade related engine problems - now he posts (and dismisses) the very source he did not seen... ;) Sure. Merlin 66 testing with 150 grade fuel, end of July, 1944. Backfire problems were experienced, possible solution was found, further trials are neccesary. Griffon 65 testing with 150 grade fuel,, August 1944. Sabre II testing with 150 grade, August 1944: 150 grade problems described with Packard Merlins of Mustangs, April 1945. Including plug fouling and cut of power during takeoff (the same phenomenon that plagued 126 Wing) http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/150grade/8thaf-techops-4april45.pdf No, "Mk XIV Squadrons" did not convert in "June/July" 1944. Even in August 1944 the report says that only 3 Mk XIV Squadrons are involved in the modifications, which are still in the stage of "mostly converted".. :music_whistling: http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/150grade/backfire-2.jpg They also reverted ASAP the diver threat ended: The manual you linked is a post war (12 November 1945) manual for the Griffon 64, which was never used in the Mk XIV Spitfire... nice try, Jeff. :music_whistling: This is from May 1944, for one of the two Squadrons that performed the operational trials. AFAIK, they did not see any combat. It is funny though that as of July 1944, despite being "fully capable" of using 150 grade fuel, they were still writing about possible fixes for backfires and further testing; a month later in August1944 they write about the withdrawal of these IX units with 150 from anti diver duties; and in September 1944, they write about that the further use of 150 grade is "undesirable" with ADGB. Which would be the transition process itself - modify the engines and supply them with the required fuel. What evidence do you have for the engine modifications being carried out and when did this happen, and for which units? This is not a contrast - that would be if you could show evidence for select Wings of the 2nd TAF that the transition was made. But you cannot give any evidence. As things stand, the only evidence is the source you dismiss for the 126 Canadian Wing - it says the transition was not done until "early February 1945" (you claim that this occured in "mid December 1944", without any evidence of course). This, on the other hand, is a bald faced lie. The order states that the all other G-10/G-14 units were to transition to the K-4 K-4 "nachschubmäßig", or "via supply/reinforcements" or "as deliveries permit". The way of conversion was that written-down aircraft were to be replaced by K-4s and thus there would be a drawn-out transition from the G series to K series. They were not throwing out perfectly good Gs and rush for the depot for a brand new K, nor withdrawing units from combats to convert. Any hard evidence to your bluff? .... and a particular feat of theirs (nope - yours) was when they moved hundreds of kilometers behind enemy lines. :megalol: Speculation. Apart from that, a technical nonsense - engines set to DC settings would only run on C-3. Curiously, it was not only the Germans who moved a lot, the fuel (and even ammunition) supply was critical for the only confirmed 150 grade operating Mark IX unit of 1945, the 126 Wing. From No 126 Wing RCAF (Aviation Elite Units), by Donald Nijboer, pp. 107-108: "Throughout the transition from B108 to B116 the wing continued to fly armed reconnaissance missions. Indeed, on 15 April Nos 401, 402, 411 and 412 Sqns began their day flying out of B108 in search of ground targets, after which most pilots recovered at B116. No 401 Sqn's WO Campbell (in PL278) actually force-landed at the new base at 1355 hrs after suffering flak damage - his fighter was declared a write-off. And while the wing was still flying its missions, the supply situation became critical due to its rapid move to the northeast. By 16 April the servicing echelons were stretched to the limit, with both petrol and ammunition being unavailable. An emergency airlift was organised which produced 20,000 rounds of 20 mm ammunition and some essential lubricants, but fuel remained a problem." and page 109: Ammunition shortages continued to plague the wing, despite the arrival of another 20,000 rounds by air, and petrol also remained in short supply. Urgent requests were sent and the result was the promise of 13 Dakotas! The plan was for these aircraft to deliver two shipments in one day, but in the end only nine aircraft made one delivery. Priority orders had the Dakotas assigned to casualty evacuation, leaving the wing to struggle on as best it could. The grass airfield at B116 was also beginning to disintegrate under the strain of both transport aircraft and fighters. The forward location of Wunstorf made it the prime destination for dignitaries and other people of importance visiting the frontline, and this resulted in a number of missions being cancelled on the 18th due to the almost non-stop arrival of transport aircraft. Two of the fighters that did manage to take off on that date failed to return to base. Fit Lt D R Drummond (in RN126) of No 402 Sqn force-landed near B116 after his aircraft was hit by flak and No 412 Sqn's Fit Lt R B Barker (in MK898) ran out of fuel and crash-landed in no man's land between Lubeck and Goldberg. He returned to base on foot. So, how many IXs and XIVs were grounded through lack of fuel, or had to revert to 130 grade and lower boost because of supply problems? This sounds like a crazy idea, but as these are your words and not mine... Well, until the 16 December 1944 this may been the plan. These are snippets about plans and some speculation on your part. Your theory is that from mid december the 2nd TAF would only use 150 grade. It just did not happen as planned because while the fuel requirement for the 2nd TAF was about 15 000 tons a month (ie. all aircraft converted and using), the reality was that the consumption in NW Europe only amounted to December - no consumption at all January 1945 2,054 February 1945 2,328 March 1945 7,132 April 1945 12,191 May 1945 4,383 IOW, the conversion only begun in around January for some units, and it took a lot of time to convert all units (obviously they would first consume existing stocks of 130 grade), until about March-April 1945. 126 Wing, for example, only in "early February". As of January 1945 these engines - which covers all of those types used in 2 TAF - were cleared to use 100/150 grade: Irrelevant. Higher grade fuel can be generally used. Higher boost can be used if the required modifications to engine are made (were they?) and required fuel is available (was it?) Duly noted.

Commander of 11./JG 53 (III. Gruppe), Lt. G. Landt, in the cocpit of his Bf 109K-4, Yellow 1, photographed at Kreuzstraße airfield, in April 1945. The 'C-3' notice instructing the ground crew for filling the aircraft with 'C-3' grade fuel is blurry but visible on the cocpit. Photograph via Janda-Poruba, Messerschmitt 109K, Camouflage and Markings. Me 109K Boost gauge for 1.98ata.

In short: You cannot give an honest answer whether you have seen evidence of the Mark IX problems when converted to 150 grade boost, even though the very information is in the Spitfire book which's pirated images you have saturated the other thread; it is also mentioned by the intel officer of the relavant Canadian Spitfire Wing, the information which you keep deleting from wikipedia. And you pretend, using one of your twelvth internet handles, that you you never seen the evidence to such... You also require evidence which you yourself cannot provide. Apart from that, there is written evidence of the relavant units on the subject of converting engines to 1.98ata, so it is really not my problem if you also want combat reports and whatnot for this really, really happning. By your standards, there is no evidence to that the the 2nd TAF ever used highly boosted Spitfire in combat. Now as for the activities of III./JG 27, you have no idea in that regard as well - even your source notes that, but you only provide snippets - apart from Arnolds seventh claim on the 24 March 1945, the unit kept flying until the end. The later known victories include three Austers on 4 April 1945, then 10 & 12 Staffeln were moving to Prague to protect 262s; several combats are known but not always the results, the last last known and confirmed victory (but the first for the pilot) was by Fw Jünkersfeld over a Spitfire on 24 April 1945, at 15:45. On the 26th air combat also took place, killing a Staffel commander, the last operational sortie was on the 28 April, just a week before the war ended. The rest of you ignorant hysteria doesn't even merit an answer. If you are under the illusion there were 1000+ 109s on the Western front in April 1945 then there is nothing I can do for you. The remaining 109 units in the West in the operational area of the 2nd TAF were those that were cleared and were converted to 1.98ata in March 1945. The rest moved to the east. The facts are on the table, and you cannot offer anything of substance. http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclearances/605D_clearance198.html

I wish it would be fiiiiiinallly... a 410. :thumbup:

Yup - though I believe the D-9 introduced the higher boost (MW50) model practically immediately after its introduction. Same for the 109s... the boost only gives a moderate performance gain under FTH. And quite frankly, neither the XIV or the K-4 needs that boost very much, so its hard to understand all the excitement about it. Its the IX that needs the boost it direly.. Indeed the regular combat at this time was between the USAAF and the LW at this time... the engagements and losses were on the most massive and bloodiest scale on both sides. The 2nd TAF units were much less of a concern to the LW than the heavies, so those fighter engagements were rather occasional and a bit of a sideshow IMO. Nevertheless, I find them more interesting. As opposed to the big, rather impersonal "material war" above the clouds, these rarer RAF - LW engagements at low - medium level was much more like the classic, small unit size engagaments of the Soviet-German front.

I am not sure what you are refferring at, but of course its possible to optimize propellers to either speed or climb; as far as the modelled 109K-4 (which shared the prop with the /AS and G-10 types), its quite clear from test data that it was optimized for high altitudes, at the expense of low altitude performance (both speed and climb). Later (projected) prop types would have yielded some improvements in high altitude speeds (727 kph with one type, 741 kph with another).

The Tempest and the Dora are very closely matched, and quite similar in performance profile, too. Personally, the Tempest is my favourite late war (Western) Allied fighter. :) I hope we see it one day in DCS! :)