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documentation about russian tactics, fac, in chechen war


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Posted

After digging on http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/, I fond some good documentation.

 

Here are some interesting links, thinking about future Combined Arms and other generic mission creation.

 

Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Organization Guide.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a304290.pdf

 

Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Operational Art Handbook.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a304379.pdf

 

Heavy Opposing Force (OPFOR) Tactical Handbook.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a304332.pdf

 

Light Opposing Force (OPFOR) Organization Guide.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a304690.pdf

 

Light Opposing Force (OPFOR) Operational Art Handbook.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a304333.pdf

 

Light Opposing Force (OPFOR) Tactics Handbook.

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a304380.pdf

104th Cobra

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Posted (edited)

Of course, tactics are ever evolving.

That docs are for the 80's childs like me. Cold War nostalgia and the omnipresent Fulda Gap scenario.

 

Here one:

 

Generals Balck and Von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a097704.pdf

 

Try also this link for a transcribed document.

http://wi.informatik.unibw-muenchen.de/_portal/_content/professorships/systemScience/armedForces/Balck_Mellenthin.pdf

Edited by Xpto

104th Cobra

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Posted
Balck and Von Mellenthin can not be relied upon.

 

Each commander can have a unique solution for a problem. But why do you say they can't be relied on?

 

I didn't read the text exhaustively, yet. So I don't have an opinion.

104th Cobra

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Posted
Each commander can have a unique solution for a problem. But why do you say they can't be relied on?

I've read their book, "Panzer battles". From cover to cover it came across as the bitter diary of a pair of Butthurt Nazi's who haven't yet accepted their defeat. Half of the account in the book Mellithin wasn't even involved in himself. lol It becomes clear because there is no great detail in it either.

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Posted
I've read their book, "Panzer battles". From cover to cover it came across as the bitter diary of a pair of Butthurt Nazi's who haven't yet accepted their defeat. Half of the account in the book Mellithin wasn't even involved in himself. lol

 

OK :)

 

I'm remembering of read that same idea of them, and about this text, from someone else, somewhere when I was searching for the Order of Battle in the eighties, on GDR and East Europe.

104th Cobra

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Posted
OK :)

 

I'm remembering of read that same idea of them, and about this text, from someone else, somewhere when I was searching for the Order of Battle in the eighties, on GDR and East Europe.

The problem is that when he advised (BTW I hope that NATO did not take it seriously) he did so very much from a very narrow point of view at a time when he could get away from it: far too general, and way too simplistic. Noone on Red side in 1981 was going to corroborate or challenge his stories and ideas. Nowadays with Red WW2 records are now open there's a long line of NAZI myths been busted and a lot of memoirs are sliding from the Military History section to the Military Fiction section. Or somewhere in between.

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Posted
I've read their book, "Panzer battles". From cover to cover it came across as the bitter diary of a pair of Butthurt Nazi's who haven't yet accepted their defeat. Half of the account in the book Mellithin wasn't even involved in himself. lol It becomes clear because there is no great detail in it either.

 

I had forgotten that I had already read some parts of the text about the Fulda Gap region. I was reading until page 11, when Balck and Von Mellethin demonstrated their arrogance.

It's true that German commanders like Guderian and von Bock where highly ingenious and aggressive, but I think they were still in the prussian/teutonic over-confidence of the first Barbarossa engagements against weak equipments and immature Russian tactics, after Stalin's purges and failure of taking defensive measures when knowing about the plans for the ofensive.

104th Cobra

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