OutOnTheOP

Bollocks, I do, and I think it's not half the machine it's made out to be. It has much the same strengths and weaknesses as the AC-130, and, as I'm sure you know, the reasonable scenarios for application of an AC-130 are somewhat limited.

Absolute rubbish, and a deliberate strawman. F-104 had no avionics or delivery systems for AG stores delivery. I believe the Germans equipped it for Mk80 series, but manual-release Mk80 versus SDBII is night and day. You might as well be comparing a crossbow to a minigun. Something tells me the F-35 will have a ridiculously long loiter time at cruise speeds. The fuel fraction is enormous, and it has zero stores drag. It doesn't have to dash around at full throttle all the time. Unlike the A-10, which falls out of the sky UNLESS kept damn near full throttle; particularly if carrying any kind of ordnance Until you consider that the A-10s will be shot down at a higher rate. And at that point, you're losing the cost of not only the aircraft, but the pilot (his training investment) and an AWFUL lot of sorties to attempt CSAR. Not true, the F-111 killed more armor, with less sorties, and that wasn't even the primary mission of the F-111 in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm. The A-10 did NOT survive in SAM areas; it took significant losses to quite low-performance SA-9/SA-13 and SA-7 in low-IADS-density areas over tactical positions. Against modern systems (or even higher-performance '60s era systems like SA6 or later-model SA2), it would be meat on the table. Also, it was not the USAF that suddenly realized the A-10 was a tits machine and decided to keep it: it was under pressure from Congress, who were themselves pressured by popular opinion. Just like now, it had nothing to do with actual capabilities, and had everything to do with Congress critters seeking public approval ratings.

The North and Baltic seas would also fit prominently into both WW2 and Cold War scenarios. Though I suppose seas aren't "oceanic"....

Funny, this is the exact argument I had about why we should have had FW-190A and Bf-109G models, and why I now contend that the P-51D should be retrofitted for higher octane/ boost pressures.... Unfortunately, it's kind of too late; that ship has sailed. Which is to say, that superplane has taken off. Once the Dora was in, it was a race to the top. The K4 has really sealed the deal. Expect to see rare, end of war birds for all nationalities, now... and maybe not so many common '44 models. Ironically, there DO seem to be start-of-war models on the way (F4F and P-40), but only for the poor Americans (who also get literally the WORST-spec P-51D ever produced). If I were into conspiracy theories... *edit: though, for the record, I also kind of oppose the F8F, for the exact same reasons. PARTICULARLY the cannon-armed version. If it were appropriate for Korea, maybe, but it's not. It's pretty much a "what-if" plane, in the same way the P-51H is. Sure, they're better performance, and sure, they were actually built in quantity, but they were designed to be the next generation aircraft in case the war dragged on... which it didn't

Specifically, the radar set had a programming glitch with the computer clock that timed radar pulses. Against VERY high speed targets (IE, re-entering ballistic missiles), it would miss by just a tiny margin of meters. Even then, it often fuzed and damaged the missile. The thing to remember is that even the OLD 1991-era PATRIOT got plenty of hits on SCUDs, the problem was that it was proximity fuzed, so it would break apart the SCUD (ruining what little accuracy it has), but the warhead would continue to fall and detonate on impact. The key here is that the SCUDs were aimed at cities (HUGE area targets) and used as terror weapons, so even though the PATRIOT might deflect the missile several miles from its intended impact point, it would still fall somewhere in the city. Against a MILITARY target (IE, a point target or relatively small, dispersed area target), deflecting the missile several miles would mean a clean miss. Of course, those are old, old PATRIOT. The PAC-3 is specifically tuned for ABM and uses hit-to-kill, which destroys the target warhead outright.

The manuals can also be found (at least on my computer, running Windows 7 pro 64) in the start menu under all programs > Eagle Dynamics> DCS World> Documentation. I just find it a bit easier than using windows explorer to find them. They're all .pdf files, which can be read by *most* smart phones, so it might be worth sending them to your smart phone to use as a reference without having to close or alt-tab out of DCS all the time. And, of course, most of the community is happy to help. Feel free to jump online, use Teamspeak, and get some live help online. Best to go to aerobatic or free flight servers for basic questions, though- it can be frustrating to have a new guy ground looping on takeoff or something on a combat server. No one will give you a hard time, really, but it's best to have the basics of flight down and some experience with engaging AI before jumping on combat servers.

I don't see huge issues with the aerodynamic model; it seems to have behaved relatively believably (it seems like the engine should have dragged the plane more down into the dirt, but considering the speed at which the maneuver completed, and that the blades would be stalling, it's believable to me). What I do have issue with is the damage model. That aircraft was going over 350 mph indicated, from what I could see. The wings going flat-on to the airflow should have torn them right off. I think the way wing overstress damage is calculated in DCS is based on lift loading or something (in this situation, there's technically no "lift", since the wing is stalled, so maybe the physics engine ignored it?), but the raw drag should have snapped them.

Honestly, I was half expecting him to overtake the broken wing, strike it with the other wing, and end up balanced out by breaking that one, too... at which point it'd fly straight, just... well, not slow =P

I'm pretty sure that was in jest, because if you need performance specs inflated on the order of 150% reality to win, you really need to practice your BFM :huh:

I'll bite; please explain exactly what the A-10 brought to the battlefield that would not have been provided just as effectively by another platform, either air or surface fired? *edit: also, [...]. I understand the spectrum of the battlefield just fine, thank you very much. In fact, I have explicitly referenced COIN operations and insurgent tactics (in particular, "hugging" friendly positions) that create the special circumstances in which the A-10 has some notable advantages. However, I cannot think of *any* situation in which I could not solve that problem with an AH-64, other fix-wing platform, mortar fires, artillery (either conventional or guided), or other systems with equal efficiency... and without relying on an aircraft that is suicide to operate in any kind of near-peer engagement. As I said many posts ago, there is a need for a COIN aircraft. There is *not* inherent need for the A-10 in particular. *edit 2: also, you are committing a TERRIBLE logical fallacy; you are predicating your argument on some alleged expertise on your part (or that of people you know), but not presenting anything to back up your position. It's called "appeal to authority", and happens when, instead of backing your argument with something measurable, you, essentially say "yeah, but this person is more expert than you, so what they think is the truth; even in the absence of evidence". ...and yes, I have done that a couple times here, myself... though I have tried to limit that to direct responses of people themselves making an appeal to authority fallacy claim against me, trying to argue that "yeah, well, you don't know anything".

Getting a bit caught up in semantics, aren't you? They both did the same role in ODS: BAI. As you pointed out, neither had much opportunity for CAS. But as I have shown, even B-52s at 40,000 feet have, in recent years, shown themselves quite capable of providing excellent anti-armor CAS on targets as close as a mile from friendlies. If you want to argue that the A-10 is better for use against dismounts "hugging" friendly positions, then yes, A-10 is inherently better. But a good turboprop COIN aircraft with lower rate of fire cannon would be equally good, or better. And at that point, you're hinging the entire valuation of the A-10 on a very specific role in a very specific circumstance; not really enough to make the aircraft worth retaining for just that specific purpose. Particularly when that situation is one in which 60mm mortar, AGLs, and artillery fires are every bit as useful as an A-10 (I've practiced "desperation close final protective fires with live 105mm M119 howitzer before; we brought the rounds in to about 30 meters from our position. They're a lot more consistent than people give credit; all rounds landed in a nice even row) Well, first, "the job" I was referring to was preventing enemy armour and other ground forces from being effective against friendly ground forces. I may have misremembered, and the post I was thinking I had earlier made was in the F-35 thread instead of this one, but, yes, my point largely hinged on the belief that BAI is inherently a more effective use of air power than CAS. Another source for our confusion may be that there's not much to distinguish between CAS and BAI, except that in CAS, the targets are in contact with friendlies and the aircraft is controlled by a FAC, and in BAI they... might be controlled by a FAC. Some CAS targets are farther from the FLOT than some BAI targets (for example, if an MLR battery is firing on friendly positions from 40km away and the ground commander asks for aircraft to hit the MLRs, that's technically a CAS mission... but if an aircraft spotted a tank column in the march just on the other side of a ridgeline, it's BAI. Now, realistically, BAI birds would never be allowed to engage anything that close, because the fire support coordination line is never that close to the FLOT. Point is, a lot of the same tactics, ordnance, and techniques are applicable to both. If you can kill a tank with a precision guided munition while the target is 200km from friendlys, you can do it when the target is 200m from friendlies... just so long as you can positively ID the target, and the PI risk estimates on the ordnance allows it. There's simply no reason the F-111 could NOT have conducted CAS sorties very effectively. Even for the "enemy infantry hugging friendly position" type CAS, the M61 is going to get the job done (funny enough, the magazine for the M61 in the F-111 in particular was ludicrously large... something like 2,400 rounds if I remember correctly). You don't *need* 30mm against troops. Yes, it's got a larger bursting charge, but you can't kill them MORE dead; the GAU-8 is overkill on soft targets. If enemy dismounts are SO close to friendlies that the slightly greater dispersion of the M61 is a concern, the GAU-8 would cause fratricide, too. You're talking almost hand grenade distance at that point.

I'm curious what they counted in the OCA strikes. Did that include attacks on GCI and EW radar? FARPS? Anything else? I don't recall A-10 ever being used to attack an actual airfield, but I'd love to hear if it happened. I would also like to know what they counted as CCC targets. Are we talking hardened, prepared corps and above CPs, or brigade-division field CPs that might be no more than a sandbag bunker a couple KM behind the MLR? The SCUD hunts can safely be considered BAI... but the A-10 wasn't a stellar success with them (though, to be fair, neither was any other platform) POL sites may have been CAS/ BAI as well. Are we talking permanent fuel farms, or field refueling sites/ fuel truck parks? That said, even without doubting the nature of any of the stats, it's still 87% CAS targets; I stand by what I said, that everything else is a tiny percentage.

Likewise. I may believe the A-10 is beyond it's prime, but that doesn't diminish the dedication and bravery of the crews that operate and service them. If anything, it makes it all the more impressive.

Where did I ever say "The F-111 did low-altitude CAS better than the A-10"? I said, *explicitly*, that the F-111 killed more tanks, that it was capable of dropping ordnance on targets in proximity of friendlies, and *implicitly* that it provided more valuable service to the overall success of the air campaign. I never said ANYTHING about the F-16 doing CAS better, or even about F-16 killing tanks in the BAI role. The ONLY time I mentioned F-16 was in saying that it took less losses per sortie than A-10, despite operating more deeply behind lines, confronted by higher-capability ADA systems. That was in direct reply to an outright wrong assertion made earlier that the "A-10 is more survivable against SAMS and AAA than the plastic F-35" Yes, sortie rate for the A-10 was only high after the IADS was disrupted. Considering that was the very first thing the coalition did, this should be no surprise. And the area in which the A-10 primarily operated (the border areas, in the middle of the desert and along the infamous "highway of death"), did not have significant high-performance ADA to start with. No SA-2, no SA-3, no SA-6. Just MANPADS and the occasional SA-9/13. The fact that A-10 was used for strikes on some EW/ GCI radar sites means the A-10 is capable of SEAD about as much as the fact that Apache conducted the first "SEAD" strike against EW radar sites. Think we should be using Apache for SEAD, too? I mean, it did it once in ODS, so that proves it's the right tool for the job, right? Perhaps YOU need to work on your reading comprehension.

I could say the same of you. I think it's the... second? I dunno, who can count that high? And I'm not ignoring your point, nor do I fail to understand it. Rather, I just think the point is, frankly, a bit dumb: you argue that since the A-10 didn't do CAS in DS, that we shouldn't judge it's usefulness from performance there, since it operated out of role. My counter is that since the A-10 has NEVER really done it's role (as you seem to define it), that is proof that the basic design philosophy of the A-10 is flawed. It has never, and likely will never, do CAS in a conventional environment against heavy tank and mechanized forces in the attack. Against any possible enemy that it MIGHT do that role (Russia or China), it would be slaughtered by the ADA. The role it had in Iraq and Afghanistan did not require most of it's capabilities, and certainly didn't require it to operate with the tactics and operating envelope for which it was primarily designed (NOE flight). The A-10 didn't do any better than F-111/F-15E/ F-35 style high-and-high PGM platforms in ODS. Or in OAF. Or, really, ever. You're basically saying you want to throw out all operational data because it doesn't agree with your preconceptions. That, frankly, is retarded. If it has never performed the mission it was designed for, the answer isn't "but it's great at it's designed mission!", it's "what use is a platform designed for a mission we never do?" That's beyond disingenous, that's a downright lie. The F-111 is credited with more tank kills in ODS, and you know it. Full stop. Now, you can argue the methods of counting (which you already did, and with which I disagree strongly), but the official counts put the F-111 ahead of the A-10 in tank kills. Yes, they were designed to do this in the assumption that the most capable short range SAM was the SA-9/ SA-13, and the most capable AAA was the ZSU-23/4. That is not a valid assumption anymore. And even if it were, the assumed loss rates among the A-10 were something like 30% per day in a high-intensity conflict. I would say they're vulnerable in pretty much ANY role they fill. Jammers and MAWS help, but they can only go so far. When it comes down to it, it's a late 1960s design, with early '50s aerodynamic performance. It does not have the kinematic performance to reduce the Pk of ADA systems to acceptable levels.

And I've been in the Army for 12; been actively engaged in combat for the better part of 9 months of that (I mean "in firefights", not "occupying a base in Iraq"), deployed three times. I think I know what we need in support of our operations. 9 times of 10, it ain't A-10. I would trade every A-10 in the world for a better stock of Excalibur, and a modern CLGP replacement for Copperhead. Two can play that game. *edit* oh, and seriously, if you're going to play the "but I have access to secret squirrel info that I'm not gonna share, because classified, but trust me, it proves my point" bit, that doesn't prove a damned thing. I have access to plenty of interesting stuff I can't share, either, but I'm not going to try to predicate my argument around assertions that I don't back with... well, *anything*. So far you've asserted that the A-10 does "way more than CAS", but failed to even delineate which other missions it does, and you've claimed that you've talked to pilots, but not even cited a sample of what they've said. I'm going to assume that the pilots thought they had the greatest airplane in the world, and that it was nigh perfect... but historically, every pilot has said that about pretty much every plane, even those that were clearly outclasses against their contemporary opponents. As a contrast, consider that the scouts in the Cavalry troop I went on my most combat-heavy deployment with were very firmly of the opinion that they could take on anything in the world with their M4s; to the point that it was like pulling teeth to get them to dedicate time training how to direct mortar and artillery fire (in fact, the CO at one point suggested that we pull the mortar turrets from my M1129s; luckily I won that fight, because those mortars did more damage to the enemy than any other weapon system we worked with, with the possible exception of Apache). Just because they strongly believed something about the capabilities of their weapon system, doesn't make it instantly true. I think your pride in your airframe is clouding your view of the topic

Yes, they, by inherent flaw in their operational tactics, as dictated by the capabilities of the A-10, allowed themselves to enter the lethal envelop of ADA systems. This is not a good thing. Again, the F-111 performed the same role against the same targets, with a high PGM delivery profile, and did not take losses. Mission done, less risk. Better all around. Explain why you come to that conclusion. Asserting "they would be useuless" is not proof of anything, it is an opinion. Why? Do LGBs suddenly no longer kill tanks if there are friendly troops in the same time zone? Can Maverick only be launched from NOE? I mean, it's not like the most devastating single anti-armor CAS strike in history was delivered by a B-52 or anything. ....oh, wait. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSxQXs9m9Wk Think that might have something to do with the fact that the F-111s brought back Pave Tack footage of bombs slamming into tanks, while the A-10s brought back pilots' assurances that "yep, I shot three tanks. I promise! I totally saw the hits, while I was dodging SA16s and AAA on egress!"? Which do you think a professional staff will weigh more on their BDA analysis? By all means, why not? I would bet good money that the expenditures were primarily in ordnance anyhow; of course an F-111 dropping twice the warload will cost more per sortie. Disingenuous. The SCUD hunt missions and SAM (more EW radar than SAM, by the by) missions were vanishingly small portions of the A-10 role in DS. Oh, and artillery positions are not "deep strike" by any stretch of the imagination; they were 10-20 km behind the FLOT, tops. Technically, still CAS, if the artillery was firing on friendly forces (read up on your 8 forms of contact. ADRP 3-90, indirect fire is contact.) I disagree that A-10 losses weren't high. They may have done a good job, but that's an opinion statement, not fact. The F-111s were retired, not because they were ineffective, but because there was no reason to keep them: the F-15E could fly the same mission profile, do it better, and provide air-to-air service in addition. The A-10, I believe, was kept largely for the same politically-motivated (look at senator me, I'm championing the A-10, I care about the troops!) reasons as are being argued in the chambers of congress now. Despite being the closest thing in history to the Fulda gap scenario for which the A-10 was explicitly designed? Yeah... how'd they do with that SCUD hunting, by the way? Ok, fine, let's consider OEF/ OIF then. Almost all the situations there could (and in fact have been) dealt with through JDAM or hellfire. Even A-10 flies a high profile in OEF/ OIF, so the "low and slow is needed for CAS" argument just doesn't jive there, either. A-10 in OEF/OIF don't even take off with more than 4-5 pieces of ordnance, so their supposedly massive warload hasn't been needed there. There is a need for a COIN aircraft with long loiter time, low operating cost, the ability to carry 2-4 JDAM/SDB and 2-4 hellfire or other light guided missile. Cannon in the 25-30mm range preferable, but extreme rate of fire unneccesary (the GAU-8 is a profligate waste of ammo against infantry targets). What the USAF needs is a good turboprop COIN plane, not the A-10. Incidentally, if you're curious about my bona fides, I was a fire support officer/ e-jtac in Baqubah, Iraq, 2006-2007. I know a thing or two about the application of CAS. For what it's worth, in COIN, I would much, MUCH rather have an Apache than a Warthog. I'd rather have an artillery battery with some Excalibur on hand than either airborne asset (seriously, the Paladin has loiter time like you would not BELIEVE :D). I hate to say it, but a lot of the situations where troops got their bacon saved by A-10s (or whatever other CAS asset) in Iraq and Afghanistan (especially Afghanistan), they only needed to have their bacon saved in the first place because they planned their operations poorly: if you're conducting operations outside the range fan of your artillery, and you're stupid enough not to bring a high-volume area effect weapon with you (both the Mk19 and the 60mm mortar are incredibly effective against both point and area targets), you're asking for trouble. Never count on rifles alone to win the day for you. Sadly, many units left their 60s at home, because, well, they're heavy, and no one wants to make all the soldiers on the patrol carry the two or three rounds of 60 they're supposed to carry.

Ah, so... what, *you're* an expert, then? Please, tell me, what roles can A-10 adequately fill, aside from CAS? I suppose it can do *extremely* shallow BAI. It will never do OCA, never do DCA, never do SEAD/DEAD (no, one or two cases where it was useful against a '50s-'60s system don't prove it can), it'll never do deep strike... (this all assumes a halfway competent IADS, of course... in a situation where there ISN'T a credible IADS, who cares? Any aircraft you can hang ordnance off can do the job then. You could deep strike with a B-17 :doh:) So, yes, CAS and Sandy. Or AFAC (which can be done by almost anything, though loiter time helps). That's pretty much it.

Give the man a cigar; he gets it. CAS is great, but if you have to do CAS, you've already screwed up somewhere. The close fight should be the Armys' fight, supported by organic artillery and close combat aviation (IE, Apaches). Fixed wing aircraft should be used to strike targets that rotary-wing and surface fires cannot reach. It should be a no-brainer that killing their vehicles *before* they reach the front is vastly superior to killing them while they're in a shootout with your troops. Put the effort into killing the logistical tail, and disrupting attacks before they even kick off. If you do as little as 10% damage to a unit, it's generally enough to force them to stop and reconsolidate, and that means they're not moving against your forces, and gives your forces the initiative. This is why the Air Force has always "looked down on" CAS: it's really not as useful a mission as BAI. ...COIN operations notwithstanding.

If you look at the dates the A-10 losses occurred, it's quite clear that they didn't really kick up operations until after the SEAD campaign was well on it's way. However, they still took more losses, with less sorties, than the F-16s. Full stop. If you want to argue that the airspace the A-10s operated in was somehow less deadly, with lower density of less lethal systems than the airspace around key control nodes like Baghdad, well... good luck coming up with a convincing argument there. As to the argument that "well, the F-111 were at higher altitude, so of course they took less losses", THANK YOU FOR PROVING MY POINT. They flew a higher altitude profile, did the mission as or more effectively, and took less losses. As far as inflating F-111 claims, I'm MUCH more likely to believe the claims coming out of aircraft that are making PGM drops with sensor pods (and can therefore see and RECORD the munition striking the target), over those of a single-seater dropping largely unguided ordnance that they never actually see impact because they're too busy with egress maneuvers. But if you're arguing that F-111 probably counted kills against tanks that were already killed... maybe. The same could be said of the A-10, and considering that the F-111 was killing tanks with munitions with much larger explosive payload, you would expect greater visual evidence of a kill from the F-111 sorties, and lower risk of needless re-attack. If you're seriously arguing that the airspace in which the A-10 operated in Desert Shield/ Desert Storm was more dangerous than that in which the F-111 operated... well, I'm just gonna have to call you a fool.

Want. Somewhat less than the A-26, but still, WANT.

That is patently untrue. If you look at Desert Storm data, you will find that more A-10 were shot down than any other aircraft (tied with Tornado, which was doing exceptionally hazardous OCA low-level airfield strikes). 6 total losses for the A-10. The next-highest loss rate was for the Harrier, with 4 losses (funny, another subsonic CAS aircraft? Who would have guessed!), then the F-16 with three losses (which was also operating further north, around Baghdad, in a much more dangerous threat environment). Two each of F-15E, F/A-18, and A-6E. ZERO shoot-downs for the F-111, which killed more tanks than the A-10, while flying less sorties, and oh by the way did it with the kind of high and fast precision ordnance CAS (really BAI) tactics that the F-35 would use. Then compare the raw losses to the actual sorties flown. F-111 flew over 5,000 sorties. F-16 flew 13,340 sorties. A-10 flew 8,000 sorties. So the F-111 had a loss rate of zero (or one per 2,500 sorties if you count pilot error/ controlled flight into terrain). F-16 had a loss rate of one per 4,446 sorties. The A-10 had a loss rate of one per 1,333 sorties; almost four times higher. Please do not make unfounded claims. Hyperbole much? Besides, who says it would NEED to go below the clouds? SAR penetrates clouds just fine, and is more than adequate to derive targeting data for PGM delivery onto point targets. If it's good enough for Apache Longbow to hit tanks (incidentally, they say the resolution is so good you can see individual strands on barbwire fencing), it's good enough for F-35 to hit tanks.

I have lots of opportunity to fire at 1100 feet. Personally, I think 1000-1200 foot shots are easier to set up than closer, by far. I suppose that depends on your flying style and tactics, though. Mathematical proof: assuming a (very optimistic!) 25-second 360 turn rate for a Dora at 300 mph, that makes the circumference of his turn about 3600 meters (25 seconds times 134 meters/ second). This makes the radius of his turn approximately 570 meters (radius=3600/2pi). This means that when he's out around the turn 30 or so degrees ahead of you, at a perfect deflection shot angle, he is, in fact, at 330 meters range. This is, of course, assuming a Dora CAN pull a turn in 25 seconds at that speed; I recall it only pulls 23-24 seconds at max rate, which is somewhat slower airspeed; rate drops significantly as speed increases due to g limits. So, yes, at speeds higher than those found in a stall-fight, you do have plenty of opportunity for shots at that range, given the size of the target's turning circle. 1100 feet is well inside their circle. Granted, you have to have the ability to rate your nose onto him. With combat flaps, not hard against the Dora. Not terribly hard even without flaps. Now, against an aircraft that can out-rate you, yes, you're going to have to get closer. I usually find I have to get to about 900 feet to get the nose onto a maneuvering Kurfurst. Sure,why not? Have the approved 250, 300, and 330 meter convergence settings. Just not the silly infinitely adjustable ones.

When his preference for adjustable convergence leads to developer attention being distracted from something more important like higher-grade fuel simulation, and when it allows people to fly with silly (and potentially game-breaking) settings, yes, that's forcing an opinion on others. I would point out that the same editing that allows adjustments of convergence, could be used to, for example, mimic schrage musik configurations. You don't think it'd be exploited? The difference in kinetic energy between 200 and 300 meters is somewhere in the realm of 8%. There is surplus energy all the way out to 500+ to penetrate anything in the aircraft but the engine block (by which I mean a through-and-through perforation). That's like worrying about 120mm APFSDS running out of energy to penetrate an APC: at any range you can actually *hit*, it won't matter. That's great that you think so, but the guys that actually programmed it in the first place disagree.

Perhaps you should take your own advice then, and stop trying to force your preferences on everyone else. The current harmonization is the USAAF approved harmonization for the K-14A. That is not "catering to personal preference". What you are asking for is catering to personal preference. I don't really care how good you are or aren't (or think you are or aren't, or I am or aren't); it remains that the current harmonization is the authorized pattern. Full stop. Maybe you just need to practice long-range shooting more, then. You've said yourself that you have always done it your way, and seem, from the content of this thread, to be ideologically opposed to trying any other way. Perhaps that's holding you back. As to "cutting the number of hits in half", or "the enemy having more time to react", I have found that is not at all the case. In fact, quite the opposite: it's easier to settle into a 15-20 degree deflection shot when a little further behind, and tiny jukes on the part of your target don't cause him to fly wildly around your canopy. The 15-20 degree deflection shot is, in my opinion, MUCH more lethal than the dead-astern chase that seems to be more prevalent in very close pursuit, because in the slight deflection shot, more visible area of the enemy planform is exposed. Larger area to hit. From 1000 feet, I find a half second to one second burst will almost always snap a wing off, because the visible target area and smoother tracking from that distance let me put most or all of my rounds into lethal areas (wing root/ cockpit; engine bay if he pulls harder or is a bit further out). I have no idea how much coding time it would take, but I guarantee it's not trivial, and would be better spent on, say, getting 44-1 fuel and the associated 72" of manifold pressure in the Mustang.