Friedrich-4B

From: An account of a combat between a Tempest V of 486(NZ) Sqn and an overall RLM76 K-4 of 13./JG27, 22nd February 1945 ( a little irony in that the Wnr of the K-4 was 331486): From:

Not the only, by far. There was the weight and drag of the inter cooler system, enlarged radiators to cope with the heat generated and the weight and bulk of two stage superchargers to actually produce the pressure required to make any advantage of the higher anti-detonation rating of higher grade fuels. These systems in effect were responsible for the same thing as MW-50 - cooling the charge and the engine itself. Installing all this resulted in a weight creep from about 6600 lbs of the Mark V Spitfires to 7400 lbs on the Mark IX Spitfires. There was no weight increase needed to take advantage of the extra power available through using 100/150 grade fuel and +21 or +25 lbs boost compared with 100/130 grade and +18 lbs; nor were there any differences in the radiator & intercooler systems for either the Mk XIV or Mk IX.

Theoretically, but, according to the JaPo book on the K series the fuel consumption @ 1.98 ata using MW 50 went up to 650 litres per hour = 239 litres of fuel if MW 50 was used for 26 minutes, 217 litres for 20 - over half the 400 litres of fuel in the main fuel tank. How many pilots actually used 10 or 20 minutes worth of MW 50 in action? How many combat actions actually lasted 1 minute, let alone 10? The only times that such long periods of boost could have come in handy was during an extended, high speed chase, or evasion: it was nice to have, but would rarely, if ever, have been used to its full potential. The added tank and equipment with a full load of MW 50 weighed 93.18 kg (205 lbs) so, if MW 50 wasn't used for the full ten or twenty minutes during combat that's an extra load being carried for little gain. Was the MW dumped before landing? By way of comparison, the only weight gain for RAF fighters using 100/150 grade fuel plus extra boost was dependent on how heavy a gallon of 100/150 weighed cf 100/130.

Interestingly the top speed figures are about 20 mph slower than MA648 ("slightly above average") tested between November 1943 - Feb 1944, and 14 to 17 mph slower than early-mid production Spitfire IXs BS310 & BS543, retro-fitted with Merlin 66s: JL165 was a Mk VC converted to an early IX in March '43 and had a below average performance for any Mk IX, including the L.F Mk IX: the Soviet figures are more in line with JL165. http://www.spitfireperformance.com/ma648.html; a Rolls-Royce Bendix-Stromberg injection carburettor was subsequently adopted as standard on the Merlin 66, as was the lengthened intake with Vokes filter:

Some of the truly elegant fighters aren't on the voting list

A questionnaire which asks six pilots to compare their Spitfire Vbs against Fw 190s: general consensus was that the clipped wings improved lateral control and helped against Fw 190, although not sufficiently to beat it. Nothing new or sensational there, and how does it relate to 2 TAF Spitfire IXs? How useful is this as a "definitive" analysis? "No report can be made...concerning combat with enemy aircraft with clipped wing aircraft." How many pilots were questioned and how representative is this of Fighter Command as a whole? Report on the Spitfire XII which had a Griffon engine and a propeller that rotated in the opposite direction to that of the Merlin. Okay. One negative report, and a positive report: An extract from an RAE comment concerning a NACA report on a Spitfire VA: if the wings did indeed twist in flight, clipping the wings and enhancing torsional rigidity would enhance aileron efficiency, as noted in the AFDU report posted above. Otherwise, no reports specific to Mk IX with clipped wings; as it is 2 TAF didn't seem to have many clipped L.F Mk IXs so, again, interesting as these are in their own right none of these documents seem to be relevant to ED's Spitfire IX.

Pilot's Notes for Mk II? This doesn't have anything to do with the Mk IX - all Spitfires after the Mk II had hood jettisoning equipment fitted so the pilot didn't have to attempt to slide the hood open in an emergency. In a Post-War RAAF document describing reported defects on Mk VIIIs - rest of report not shown and nothing to do with 2 TAF Spitfire IXs. Extract of a report from 1941 - guess this is an attempt to convince the audience that the Spitfire was a delicate, fragile beast. According to Morgan and Shacklady it would seem that the Spitfire IXs could handle things better than Kurfurst likes to think. Not relevant to the Spitfire IX which, apart from early versions converted from Mk VCs, had larger elevator horn balances which helped solve the problem. And this applies to European based Mk IXs how? Yes and? No mention of drop tanks? Merlin 61 with carburettor rather than injection unit of Merlin 66? What Kurfurst conveniently left out: Plus there was this follow up document: Presumably Kurfurst is implying that the 1942 reports were not heeded and the surface finish of Spitfires remained poor for the rest of the war. So a whole lot of material relevant to Spitfire IIs, Vs and VIIIs, with very little relevant to 2 TAF Mk IXs. No idea of the relevance of any of these partial documents, interesting as they are, to Ed's pending Mk IX.

Excerpt from report dated March 1944 dive and recovery tests at Boscombe Down using BS310, a Spitfire IX first flown in August 1942 and used as a test aircraft, in various configurations for much of the rest of its life (Morgan and Shacklady page 329): http://www.airhistory.org.uk/spitfire/p031.html The excerpt gives no indication as to the condition of this old airframe, nor does it state whether the elevators with the enlarged balances were fitted. It would be interesting to see the full report. What will happen next is that there will be claims about how badly Spitfire's wings in 2 TAF wrinkled when dive bombing, thus proving how weak the Spitfire IX was: to save further trouble, here is Morgan and Shacklady's commentary from pages 317-318

For something completely different it would be interesting to have ED model a PR Mk XI - then players could experiment with flying PR missions or flying with no propeller :pilotfly:

Bombs and triple tube rockets: I don't think the 5" HVARs were used by European based P-47s; no doubt I'll be corrected on this. Info on 66" Hg WEP:

Wow, excellent find! :thumbup:

By early May 1944, that is, although there are those who would like to believe the rest of the GGS IIDs went into storage. :music_whistling: No real need for it because there were no Luftwaffe fighters anywhere near Britain in 1944, only the odd handful of night bombers, plus the V-1s. This thread is about how ED will configure the the Spitfire IX in 2 TAF service in 1944, so the subject of other theatres, or the Mk XIV using GGS has not been raised. That's still a heck of a lot more Spitfires equipped with GGS, and a far higher percentage of operational, frontline aircraft than was ever achieved by the Luftwaffe with the atypical EZ42 a year later.

The Tempest wasn't equipped with the GGS until post-war; it was standardised for the II and VI, so there were plenty of GGS for the Mk IX plus spares: just to be clear on this, in March 1944 485(NZ) Squadron was equipped and trained on the GGS: the following pre-D-Day note deals with 2 TAF's 126, 127 & 132 "Airfields": In a reorganisation that was promulgated on 12 May "Airfields" became "Wings" in early May there were already 10 Spitfire IX squadrons fitted with the GGS, noting that 83 Group Support Unit (GSU) was taking steps to ensure all future Spitfire IXs would be delivered with the GGS installed rather than the GM II: 126 Airfield 401 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX 411 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX 412 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX 127 Airfield 403 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX 416 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX 421 (RCAF) Squadron Spitfire IX 132 Airfield 66 Squadron Spitfire IX 331 (Norwegian) Squadron Spitfire IX 332 (Norwegian) Squadron Spitfire IX 485(NZ) Sqn was part of 84 Group's 135 Wing; if 83 Group was equipping Airfields, not individual squadrons, with GGS, its a safe bet that 84 Group was doing likewise: 135 Airfield 222 Squadron Spitfire IX 349 (Belgian) Squadron Spitfire IX 485 (RNZAF) Squadron Spitfire IX At least 12 squadrons already equipped with GGS by May = 240 Spitfire IXs, coinciding with the numbers of GGS produced in early 1944. February: 8 March: 110 April: 200 May: 250 30 Spitfire IX squadrons in 2 TAF, so over 1/3rd confirmed equipped with GGS by May. No doubt there are some who would like to believe that the rest of the Spitfires delivered to 2 TAF after May '44 were fitted with the old GM II, in spite of 83 Group's stipulation that all Spitfires delivered were to be equipped with GGS, and the remaining GGS units built were put into storage. :smilewink:

Fw 190D-9; take-off and landing that rugged wide-track undercarriage and better rudder authority: Combat, better all-round view, more dependable, longer range weapons, that roll rate...

For a post D-Day 2 TAF scenario the only choice is the L.F Mk. IX with the low-medium altitude rated Merlin 66:

Anyone for a P-61 and night fighting?

The F4U would be a tricky boid to handle on the ground, but I'd go for the F4U-1D Mind you, if some kind developer decided to model saaay the A6M5 and the USS Essex (CV-9) to take off and land on I'd want an F6F-5...:smilewink:

It has been proven beyond doubt that there was some C3 fuel on three Bavarian airfields used, however briefly, by the four Gruppen concerned, yet there didn't seem to be any supplies of Methanol, nor is there any evidence that Methanol was delivered, so we still have 109s able to use C3 and 1.8 ata. How many K-4s were left amongst the four Gruppen of JG 27 and JG 53 by the time they reached the "safety" of the Bavarian "home airfields" ? The only ones who have raised "screwdriver-access denial" are Kurfurst and Otto...:music_whistling: Such as those who cannot accept 60 primary source documents as evidence of something they don't want to believe, yet believe that a partial transcript of a document from a secondary source and several other often unrelated secondary sources are proof positive of something they are desperate to believe. :thumbup:

As has been already shown, the C3 fuel triangle doesn't mean a whole lot because Eastern front 109s, that were only using B4, also had C3 triangles. I. & III./JG 27 (and III./JG 4; 1,4,7 staffel NJG 11 and NAG 1) were the only 109 equipped units belonging to Luftflotte Reich; there was no guarantee that JG 27 was supplied with C3 in light of the 13 Fw 190 Gruppen and 22 Ju 88 Gruppen requiring C3. I. & III./JG 27 staged through one of the airfields around Prague, then stayed at one Bavarian airfield before packing it in: 18.3.45 - 29.3.45Gütersloh; Bf 109G/K: 9 days (OKL directive = 20/3/45) 29.3.45 - 8.4.45 Goslar; Bf 109G/K: 11 days 8.4.45 - 11.4.45 Halberstadt; Bf 109G/K: 4 days 11.4.45 - 4.45 Grossenhain; Bf 109G/K 4.45 - 20.4.45 Prague-Gbell; Bf 109G/K: 10 days between 2 airfields. 20.4.45 - 2.5.45 Bad Aibling; Bf 109G/K: 2.5.45 - 5.45 Salzburg 109G/Ks parked and abandoned: 5.45 - 8.5.45 Saalbach no aircraft according to John Weal's Jagdgeschwader 27 'Afrika' (page 120), I. & III. JG 27's last victories were on 19 and 21 April respectively (printing error in book says II./JG 27) while suffering seven more losses to the end of April. After parking their 109s at Salzburg the unit marched, on foot to Saalbach. III./JG 53 17.12.44 - 23.3.45 Kirrlach; Bf 109G/K : 4 days 23.3.45 - 26.3.45 Nellingen;Bf 109G/K : 4 days 26.3.45 - 7.4.45 Neuhausen ob Eck;Bf 109G/K : 13 days 7.4.45 - 13.4.45 Fürstenfeldbruck;Bf 109G/K : 7 days 13.4.45 - 1.5.45 Kreuzstrasse/Klein-Karolinenfeld;Bf 109G/K : 18 days 1.5.45 - 8.5.45 Prien am Chiemsee;Bf 109G/K : 8 days Between them they visited three bases in Bavaria between early April and early May: so, some C3 from mid-April but then there's no guarantee of methanol to make either MW 50 or MW 30; would have thought methanol would have been included in a list of fuel supplies.

(i) In all of the years that Kurfurst has claimed that 1.98 ata was used after 20 March 1945, has he found any other supporting evidence that, in the chaotic conditions prevailing for the Luftwaffe, both C3 and MW 50 or MW 30 was available at the airfields on which the four Gruppen were based? (ii) The OKL, GdJ-Grp. Qu-, Br. B. Nr. 1561/45 g. Kdos were not operational orders - they were OKL plans for how the Jagdwaffe would be equipped and organised in future. A transcript of a similar document, dated 4 February 1945, from Messerschmitt Bf 109 im Einsatz shows that various units were to reequip with the Bf 109K-6 (Sturm); no doubt the units concerned tried very hard to carry out these "operational orders":

Note the 2000 HP at 8000 m (sic). Depending on how soon after the event the memoirs were written and what source material was used in writing the memoirs there's no telling how accurate the specific details are. Its almost impossible to tell from the photos what the inscription on the engine casing says, so we'll just have to take the author's word on that - interestingly, these same authors in Messerschmitt Bf 109K show that the DC could be run at 1.8 ata without MW 50 So, a pilot's memoir and authors providing conflicting information. Where oh where could there be some solid documentation?

To be fair IV./JG 27 isn't one of the units slated to use 1.98 ata. The point about the near obliteration of some units is valid; another page from Messerschmitt Bf 109 im Einsatz by Zobel and Mathmann shows that by 26 April 1945 III. and IV./JG53 in Luftkommando West had twelve 109G/Ks between them: also notable is the fact that none of the remaining Luftwaffe Kommando West units are listed as being equipped solely with 109Ks, while JG 27 is not listed at all.

I have no doubt that some 109s used C3 fuel; what is at fault is the constant implication that C3 triangles somehow magically indicated that C3 plus MW50 and 1.98 ata was being used. Let's take a look at his article again http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclearances/605D_clearance198.html and see how Kurfurst's logic works: * Right below the transcript of a partial document from a secondary source showing that a mere four Gruppen of 109 units were supposed to start using 1.98 ata, Kurfurst goes on to claim: http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclearances/605D_clearance198.html Yet, as can be seen from the list of units on the eastern front, dated 19 March 1945, one day before Nr. 1561/45 g.Kdos, all of the rest of the 109 units listed in Nr. 1561/45 g.Kdos, were limited to B4 fuel. http://kurfurst.org/Operations/1945_Ausrustungderjagdverbanden_Lflotte6/Luftflotte6.html So on one page of his site Kurfurst made a rhetorical claim that is contradicted by a document posted on another page of his own site...

It shows conclusively that a C3 triangle was no indication of what fuel was being used, although Kurfurst tried to use these images to somehow prove that C3 and 1.98 ata MUST have been used by K-4s. So now we have a claim that G-10s and G-14/As used 1.98 ata although the one extract of a document from a secondary source doesn't mention that any G-10/G-14/AS units were cleared to use 1.98 ata. Nope, II./JG 52 is listed in OKL, GdJ-Grp. Qu-, Br. B. Nr. 1561/45 g.Kdos under II. / JG 52 Bf 109 G-14/U4 K-4 nachschubmäßig K-4 as deliveries permit but it is not listed as one of the four units that was supposed to switch to using 1.98 ata and neither was II./JG 51 which was on the Eastern Front. The image proves nothing. As already noted 109s on the Eastern also front had C3 triangles, thus the ground crews of those units were also out of their minds and painting them on for no reason, no reason at all...

Fair enough, although it is still an extract of a document cut and pasted from a secondary source. As for the rest of the "evidence" there is nothing whatsoever to show that K-4s ever used 1.98 ata after March 20 1945, no matter what Kurfurst likes to pretend. His own site http://kurfurst.org/Engine/Boostclearances/605D_clearance198.html on the K-4 and 1.98 ata has not been updated with anything new or different in nearly six years because there is nothing new to show, and what is shown is either inconclusive or self-contradictory: None of the reports on C3 in the section titled "Allied Crashed Enemy Aircraft Reports of Bf 109s fueled with C-3 fuel" is dated past 20 January 1945 - albeit there is an undated report on a G-10 - and there is no report on a Bf 109K-4 using C3, even though the Allies captured several K-4s from the units that were supposed to have used 1.98 ata. Two of the four photos of the 109s showing C3 triangles were a K-4 from 11./JG 77 (Fw Böttner, possibly taken November 1944) and a G-10 from 7./JG 52, formally of II./JG 51, all Eastern-front units that, according to http://kurfurst.org/Operations/1945_Ausrustungderjagdverbanden_Lflotte6/Luftflotte6.html, dated 19 March 1945, and the extract of OKL, GdJ-Grp. Qu-, Br. B. Nr. 1561/45 g.Kdos were not using C3 fuel! (Maybe the Italians were using C3, but no evidence has come to light.) In other words documents from Kurfurst's own site contradict Kurfurst's claims. So yeah, the fact is that all that is known about K-4s using 1.98 ata is that the "evidence" is inconclusive and weak at best. I agree with T/Glen, there's no reason not to have a very late war scenario where K-4s use 1.98 ata, but it should always be considered as a possible scenario not a factual.