near_blind

How does Track Hold affect the implementation of the correlation logic? Reflecting back the radar is pretty resilient since the implementation of TWS-A in April when Tack Hold is off, but when it gets enabled the radar seems far less capable of correlating. The radar seems less prone to dropping the track since the November patch, but once its considered lost, it seems like it is totally gone, even if the radar creates a new track right on top of the old. I've described this to a former RIO who asked to remain anonymous, and their opinion was the radar should be capable of correlating in that situation.

Is this code live in the open beta? I have never seen the AWG-9 correlate a lost track back to a healthy state.

Without doing the long winded explanation again, yes. The AIM-54 needs a constant TWS track until it goes active.

I would like to add that my experience largely parallels that of Mbot. At medium altitude over water with a slightly lower contact with good closure, jester will not successfully transition from PD to P. As always I'm happy to provide evidence in whatever form you need.

Can do chief, Here are the tacviews from the tracks I posted today: M Miss M Multi Miss MH Miss Close Loft MH Multi Miss 2 MH Multi Miss MH Quatro Miss Here are another three from this weeks patch I didn't take the time to save the tracks for https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aHhO8_1OoUkUf_vNO77_niEQ8UpwLLL-/view?usp=sharing https://drive.google.com/file/d/1Mfxoky8VDnvhax8cA0y4ErnIRHovhuTV/view?usp=sharing https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xfthlvQdbstAG2QEToWQlsXBLv-46Anb/view?usp=sharing I appreciate everything the team has done with regards to Sparrows since release, you all have been responsive when issues were raised. I am also aware that right now the AIM-7s are going to be in flux for a while as ED is changing things with the missile API. I would just like to try and clarify that since the APN and classname issue was "fixed" in May, this issue has affected the HB AIM-7s and has never been remedied. You all have been extremely kind taking the time to refactor the Sparrows defined in the F-14s weapons.lua to match EDs changes, repeatedly, but even when the missile definitions were carbon copies the issue persisted in the HB AIM-7, not the ED one. In no way am I trying to make any accusations that you guys have done anything wrong, just that the steps to date have been ineffective and it seems to me (admittedly a layperson and an outside observer) that the issue dwells somewhere deeper than the lua layer of the simulation. Thanks again for taking the time to look at these threads, and happy holidays.

Just to add more evidence to the pile: The MH is doing the late stern conversion almost every shot at medium range. The M seems to be doing it more than it did, but is still fairly reliable. I haven't done any tests with the F. M Miss.trk M Multi Miss.trk MH Miss Close Loft.trk MH Multi Miss 2.trk MH Multi Miss.trk MH Quatro Miss.trk On a side note, @IronMike, are SP tracks alright or are MP tracks preferred for this sort of thing due to the desync?

Concurring with everything here. The M still seems to the most reliable, but seems to exhibiting the problematic behavior more than I've seen in the last two patches. The MH is still extremely prone to the issue. Haven't tried the F yet.

They're still the same values. .25 for the C, .3 for the As @IronMike I've noticed since the last patch there doesn't seem to be active indication for tracks that are both extrapolated and have an airborne phoenix assigned to them (numbers nor contact ever flash), and this is usually accompanied by the missile missing. I don't know if this is because the missile is activating and the target is out of the "basket" and the crew simply isn't receiving any indication, or if the missile simply isn't going active at all. If I had to speculate could this be because the active trigger and countdown are using the distance to the DCS object rather than the estimated target position? I have no evidence one way or another, that's simply a guess.

Oh, that's really simple. The contact with the square symbol on top is generated by your radar, and is where the contact actually is. The V is a datalink contact, and is provided by an AWACS or ship. They're different because your INS has drifted, and the position where your aircraft thinks it is, is not the position where it actually is. The relative position of the contact as provided by the datalink therefore, is also shifted due to the INS drift. INS drift is normal and unavoidable, the pains of existing before GPS made everything easy. The longer you fly, the greater the INS drift will be, it can also be worsened by heavy G. EDIT: to be clear, those two contacts are the same aircraft.

Is there an X over one of the targets? If so it sounds like a lost track. Basically the target maneuvered in such a way that it wasn't where the radar thought it would be. The radar will normally extrapolate (guess where the target will be based on the last heading / speed it knows about) the position of the target for 8 seconds (radar sweeps) before dropping it, but because you've fired a missile something called track hold is automatically engaged, which guesses the target location for two minutes to try and give the missile a chance to find it when it goes active. After the track is loss, the radar picks up the target again but generates a new track because it isn't smart enough to correlate the new contact with the old track. Depending on how divergent the estimated position is from the targets actual position, it's entirely possible this may result in the missile failing to find the target when it goes active.

Both. In June ED released their new AIM-120 API, and they both had extremely potent CM rejection values. In August the AIM-54A was changed to have a CM rejection value approximating the AIM-120B, the AIM-54C approximated the AIM-120C. About the same time, ED made a decision to reduce the AIM-120 CM rejection value because red players didn't like it, and it was felt to be unfair until the R-27 family can be given an APN work over. Last patch the AIM-54s were given reduced CM rejection values to be more inline with the rest of the missiles. For reference in before the reduction, the AIM-54A CCM_K0 was .06 (smaller number == better rejection). Right now it is .3. The AIM-54C was .05, it is now .25. The AIM-120C is currently .1, the AIM-120B is .2.

Oh no, you're serious. I thought we were all having a sensible chuckle. Is the 70s F-15 now considered a visual range dogfighter? Did someone yeetus deletus the AIM-7F and M from existence? Do I need to go get the picture of the QF-86 getting obliterated by the AIM-54A? Less humorously, as things like the Flanker and Fulcrum became more common, and especially the appearance of the AA-10C forced the Navy to re-evaluate their BVR missile doctrine. Beginning in the late 80s the AIM-54C was considered the preferred solution to the slotback / Alamo-C threat, even moreso once all the Badgers and Backfires disappeared.

Honestly, my experience is the opposite. I generally try to shoot high/fast around 50 miles. The AI likes to commit in the high thirties, will waste copious amounts chaff trying to decoy the missile during the fly out, and are limited in their ability to maneuver once it goes active. I'm seeing 50% against things like Fulcrums and Flankers, and even better against Floggers. Them reducing the occurrence of track yeet in the last patch only sweetens the deal. Meanwhile the AIM-7MH and to a lesser extent the -7M have some sort of APN issue when fired outside of ~15NM, and whiff shots they could and should have connected on. Its less of an issue with close shots, but letting Apex, Archer and Alamo carriers within 10 miles without some sort of weapon timing out on them is contrary to my general game plan.

In addition to the new missile API, the Phoenixes took a large nerf to their CM rejection capabilities last patch to bring them in line with ED nerfing the AMRAAMs to mollify the red players. Smol planes, lots of chaff, less resistant missiles, all in addition to any potential error introduced by the radar.

So take this with a grain of salt, I don't know if ED/HB implemented the full Rube Goldberg device that is a full up AIM-54 shot, but I'm going to assume it's been simplified a bit. For a medium/long range TWS shot, you visualize it having two stages. The first is the fly out. During this time the AIM-54 is not using its radar and is totally dependent on the AWG-9 for guidance cues. The AWG-9 gives the missile instructions to fly towards the position of the target track, and once the missile is an estimated 16 seconds Time Of Flight from the target, the AWG-9 commands the missile to go active I'm informed through the grapevine be people who know, that the missile is probably not affected directly by chaff during this phase: the missile is not "looking", and chaff doesn't really effect the AWG-9 in PD modes. However, since the missile is completely dependent on the AWG-9, if the AWG-9 loses the track, the missile has problems. In my experience the three most common reasons the AWG-9 loses a track are bandit maneuvers (the radar cannot track a target turning at ~> 6G), the target entering the notch (flying perpendicular to you, the AWG-9 is an old radar and has a pretty wide notch filter), and resolution cells (I.E. lots of targets flying close together, and the radar gets confused over which target is the actual track). In any case, if the radar misses a single hit, it begins extrapolating (guessing) the targets position based off the last known heading and speed. Depending on what the target has done after it broke the track, this estimate can be wildly inaccurate, creates problems. Once the missile receives its activation signal, it turns on it's own radar. At this point the missile (both the A and the C) *should* be immune to any sort of lock breaks by hard maneuvering, but it is now vulnerable to chaff, and is still capable of being notched (*grumble*), but is much harder to notch than the AWG-9. The effectiveness of Chaff is influenced by the positioning of the chaff relative to the missile (below is more effective because ground clutter), the aspect of the target releasing the chaff (closer to the notch, is more effective), and the ability of the missile seeker to reject the chaff (newer missiles are generally better). The AIM-54C has better CM rejection values than the AIM-54A and less likely to be fooled, but is hardly immune. Finally, every missile seeker has a finite field of view. Which means if the AWG-9 for whatever reason directs the phoenix to a position far enough away from the target, the missile won't actually see anything and continue flying straight. The only real way to eliminate the track extrapolation problem as it is now, is to either convince HB the AWG-9 can correlate over multiple frames, or FOIA the manual for the APG-71.

There is no track correlation. If the radar misses a hit the track is dead, it's just a matter of how long it is extrapolated.

Your first missile was decoyed by Chaff. Your second missile was most likely decoyed by Chaff. I'd need to see your TID to be sure, but your third and fourth missiles likely missed because the radar experienced track loss when they flew into the notch, and thus the missiles didn't receive a timely active signal. Things to keep in mind are the AI DCS will receive are cheating, and will begin chaffing if the missile is launched at < half range regardless of whether or not it's active. Chaff in DCS creates a dice roll when dropped to determine whether or not the missile is decoyed, and this dice is rolled for each chaff bundle the missile can see. Shooting into a concentrated blob like that means you are making 4x the miss dice rolls. Also AIM-54As are the most vulnerable to chaff. Also with the new missile API the missile is guided towards where the AWG-9 *thinks* the target is going to be, which may differ significantly from where the target actually is. If the contact flies perpendicular to you, or makes a >6G break turn, the radar will lose contact and begin guessing. In your situation, if the SU-25s you're shooting at start flying perpendicular to you, the radar begins extrapolating their position, and then they pitch back hot, it's a very real possibility the missile will fly past them before getting to command to begin searching.

Three of the radar modes you described aren't ACM modes. Jester (really any RIO), is going to seriously struggle to lock up a contact using the traditional radar modes close in. A maneuvering contact is going to be moving rapidly enough across the screens it's just not a practical ask. Likewise any PD mode is going to struggle against a violently maneuvering aircraft. You get four close modes in the Tomcat. Pilot Lockon Mode (PLM) - This is a boresight scan around the aircraft datum line with a range of five miles. This is activated by a dedicated button on the throttle. Pilot Automatic Lockon (PAL) - This is an eight bar, twenty degree scan with a variable lock range depending upon the RCS of the target. For something Flanker sized the range is ~15NM. Smaller jets lock closer, larger aircraft further. You activate this by depressing the Target Designation switch on the left wall of the cockpit. Vertical Scan Lock On High (VSL-High) - A simple vertical scan from +15 to +55 degrees (about where the canopy bow is to the radar gimbal) centered on the aircraft's center line. You can activate this by either asking jester, or moving the Target Designation switch up. Vertical Scan Lock On Low (VSL-Lo) - Same as high, only it scans from -15 to +15 degrees. You can also ask Jester for this, or activate it by moving the Target Designation switch down. http://www.heatblur.se/F-14Manual/general.html#an-awg-9-radar Unless I'm flying with a human RIO, and often times even then, I as the pilot will take control of the radar once we get WVR as it simplifies the whole affair.

At risk of piling on: My experience at 2.2 Gamma Seems to be considerably different than that of this photo taken from the back seat:

There currently appears to be an issue asking Jester to transition from PDSTT to PSTT via the BVR menu. When asking jester the first time, he will switch to PSTT as expected. During any subsequent PDSTT locks on the target or any different target, if asked to switch to PSTT Jester will respond affirmatively, but will not actually switch radar modes. This can be confirmed using rctrl + enter to verify the current radar mode. Track of Issue https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ZnxFqsmCHt1r09WwZcleCXHK6HDhiRwr/view?usp=sharing EDIT: Just as an afterthought, I don't know if it would effect things one way or another, but I have the option for Jester to automatically switch to PSTT at a certain range turned off.

I don't seem to recall making an argument other than providing an interesting source from the Soviet perspective to add context to your point. If we want to argue, yes, I tend to believe USN Officers flying USN aircraft off USN decks guided by USN AWACS supported by USN tankers and buddy tankers, trained as an organic unit under a single command structure backstopped by USN ships operating with a coherent data exchange architecture will have an easier time communicating than air force officers with less flight time attempting to coordinate with a separate and distrustful service without coherent tactics. Put another way: Clear friction points would be liaising with USAF or NATO partner Air Force tanker and control assets, and dissemination of national intelligence assets, that I will grant you. However the joint issues you're alluding to arose when the Navy, which had spent the previous three decades preparing for the fight we're discussing was forced to operate in an environment with stricture IFF procedures and close coordination with forces that, simply put, don't exist 1,000 miles from shore in the North Atlantic or Pacific. You don't have to concern yourself with accidentally Phoenixing an F-117 off the Kuriles or north of Iceland.

The INS in the F-14A and pre-upgrade B isn't accurate enough for this sort of thing. Any sort of accurate weapons delivery is going to require some sort of visual designation.

The "coordinated air/surface/subsurface wargasm" was soviet doctrine on paper, the reality was a little more nuanced than that. Political divisions existed between the surface fleet and the naval air forces, there were never enough nukes to completely outfit a regimental strike, and the technology and doctrine to tightly coordinate didn't exist stealthily and quickly. Fascinating article, I highly recommend https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss1/7/

I'm partially to blame for this. ED made changes to the APN guidance last year, but these apparently never manifested because of a naming conflict with copies of the Sparrow class HB uses on the F-14. This was discovered and fixed back in May, but there were some bugs with the APN causing the missiles to behave strangely during the last phase of their flight. ED fixed this sometime in August for the F/A-18 and F-15, however some strangeness remained with the F-14. I have been bugging HB over a specific issue with their AIM-7s making strange maneuvers when attempting to hit the target after being fired at long range.

Try F-14A-135-GR ?