Four Israeli F-15s Dodged Syrian Missile

[Kusch]

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/four-israeli-f-15s-dodged-syrian-missile-fire-to-attack-urgent-targets-a28cff11323d

 

On Dec. 7, the Israeli air force carried out a series of surgical air strikes inside Syria. Such strikes are not uncommon in Syria and Lebanon—the Israelis frequently attack convoys carrying weapons to Hezbollah militants in Lebanon and to and degrade Syrian regime forces in southwestern Syria.

 

But the Dec. 7 strike was fairly unique. For one, much of the air raid was captured on camera. And the video and photographic evidence reveals some very interesting Israeli tactics.

 

Two formation of Israeli fighter jets, each consisting of two F-15s, entered Syrian airspace at 1600 local time from the direction of Lebanon, heading from west to east toward Damascus at very high altitude and high speed.

The wide spacing between the Israeli jets—both within each two-ship formation and between the two separate pairs—is noteworthy. There’s a good probable cause for this arrangement.

 

Israeli fighters almost definitely were using electronic jamming to prevent Syrian air defense radars from tracking them at long distance. Russian-made air defense systems, including those in Syria’s possession, include specific means of countering sophisticated enemy jamming.

 

In the absence of passive radars and an integrated air defense network, Syrian systems could probably still track the azimuth and elevation of incoming jamming signals via their own receivers—albeit with a considerable error margin.

That data could cue Syrian missile batteries’ optical sensors and allow the operators to fire toward the intruders. The spacing between the Israeli F-15s made the error margins overlap and thus made the Syrians’ direction-finding even less accurate, buying valuable time for the planes to get close to their targets.

Even under heavy jamming, Syrian Buk-M2 missile batteries stationed at Mezzeh airport managed to fire two missiles toward the first formation. The Israelis responded with a simple move—they changed direction.

 

In long-distance shots, medium-range surface-to-air missiles predict a point of impact ahead of incoming aircraft and travel a ballistic trajectory to reach that point. In the last phase of flight, the missile would correct its trajectory using its seeker. A significant change in the target’s direction would mean that the missile would not find the aircraft in the predicted zone.

 

The first formation of F-15s drew the Syrian missiles toward themselves then turned toward north and released their weapons, striking a small airstrip called Al Sharai in Dimas region west of Damascus. The first formation then made a hard turn to the west and returned to Lebanese skies.

 

Not far behind, the second formation had already entered Syria.

The pair of F-15s approached Damascus head on—this time the Buk-M2 battery apparently waited for the intruders to change their direction or close in.

 

The Israeli F-15s released their standoff weapons and made a hard left turn toward the south. Two more Syrian missiles snaked into the sky—the contrails indicating SA-3s. These missiles weren’t aiming for Israeli jets but for the missiles they had fired.

 

One of the SA-3s hit its target. The wreckage of a Popeye guided missile fell to the ground. The Popeye is a stand-off missile with a warhead weighing 700 pounds. It uses combination of infrared imagery and inertial guidance to precisely attack targets up to 50 miles away from the launch point.

The surviving missiles from the second pair of F-15s struck vehicles and supplies on a ramp at Damascus’ international airport.

It’s interesting that the Israelis used Popeyes. The Israeli air force also possesses the more modern Spice guided weapons that use a combination of GPS and laser guidance.

[Yurgon]

I can't help it, I always have to go nitpicking on things like these. By which I don't mean to say anything about the events that took place, but about the details that are wrong, weird or interesting in the quoted article and that make me question the validity of the article as such.

 

This got me started:

 

Two formation of Israeli fighter jets, each consisting of two F-15s, entered Syrian airspace at 1600 local time from the direction of Lebanon, heading from west to east toward Damascus [...]

 

The Israeli F-15s released their standoff weapons and made a hard left turn toward the south.

 

Lebanon is to the west of Syria, and flying from Lebanon to Damascus would indeed put them on a west to east course. If they turn south, that would mean a right turn, not a left one.

Unless they decided to fly a 270 degree turn. This site gives a maximum sustained turn rate of 16 degrees/second for the F-15C (I guess it's less for an armed F-15D), which would mean a right hand turn towards south would take some 6 seconds whereas a 270 degree left hand turn would take some 17 seconds. If I flew within the range of a known SAM site, I sure wouldn't want to spend those 11 extra seconds right there.

 

In the absence of passive radars and an integrated air defense network, Syrian systems could probably still track the azimuth and elevation of incoming jamming signals via their own receivers—albeit with a considerable error margin.

 

The first time I heard about passive radar systems was just about a week ago. (Granted, that doesn't mean anything :)). According to Wikipedia, passive radar systems are still under development. Why note the absence of a passive radar system when even the most advanced countries don't officially use them yet?

 

The first formation of F-15s drew the Syrian missiles toward themselves then turned toward north and released their weapons, striking a small airstrip called Al Sharai in Dimas region west of Damascus.

 

I think I found it on Google maps:

 

(Screenshot from Google maps)

 

Neither Google maps nor OpenStreetMap found any place in Syria called "Al Sharai", but the above airstrip is located west of Damascus and seems to be in a region called "Dimas". There's nothing really noteworthy about it, except...

 

... for the compound right to the north of the road, there's a Google Plus review that reads:

 

 

One will probably find tons of remarks like this posted all over the middle east, but in connection with the Israeli airstrike, maybe this guy already knew something about it a year ago?

 

Israeli fighters carried out a daring mission in broad daylight.

 

Something just doesn't add up here. The article cites the Popeye missile's range as 50 km, Wikipedia even gives 78 km.

Edit: My mistake, the article gives the range as 50 miles, thx Aginor!/Edit

 

The farthest target, according to the article, was located at the Damascus International Airport, which is located to the east of the city. According to OpenStreetMap, it looks like this:

 

 

That means that at max range, the aircraft could have fired the Popeye missile without even setting foot on Syrian airspace.

 

I can only begin to imagine the outcry if Syria shot down Israeli aircraft over Lebanese airspace, so I guess the BUK operators had to be very sure their targets had indeed crossed the border before they shot at them.

 

On the other hand, even if the F-15s flew some 10 km into Syria to give their missiles a better chance to hit the target, they'd still be able to leave Syrian airspace in a matter of, say, 2 minutes? Not a lot of time for the Syrians to react.

 

I'm not saying the Israeli's were playing it safe or there was no risk involved. It's just that I probably wouldn't have chosen the term "daring", especially when the article begins by stating that "Such strikes are not uncommon in Syria and Lebanon".

 

The raid was a success for Israel, but it was also risky. An ambush by a lone missile site near the border or a few short-range missiles or guns could have turned the Israeli victory into a defeat.

 

The lone missile site would indeed seem dangerous, although I assume that Israel and the US keep a very close eye on Syria's air defenses and would have a very good idea of what to expect, and where.

 

The thing that caught my eye were the short-range missiles. Wikipedia confirms my gut feeling that short-range anti-air missiles are typically shoulder launched MANPADs. The article states the aircraft were "heading from west to east toward Damascus at very high altitude and high speed."

 

Even at 30,000 ft (surely not very high), MANPADs would have zero chance to hit an aircraft. And why even bring up guns? I guess we're talking Zu-23. They don't even reach up to medium altitudes.

 

It's always little details like the ones above that make me question the validity of the article as such. What's the source? See, there's not a single link in the article. Not one. It doesn't claim they got the information from "Israeli government officials" or "high ranking military personnel". Yet most points are presented as solid, undeniable facts. Are they? Or did the author get that wrong as well? Maybe the aircraft were Turkish F-16 instead? Or US F-15E? Who knows? I sure don't, and I guess that's my point: after reading the article, I still don't really know much more than before, it could all be wrong or made up. From a journalistic point of view, that article is a piece of crap IMHO.

 

@Kusch, thanks for sharing anyway (unless you're the one who originally wrote it :D).

Edited December 12, 2014 by Yurgon
Note regarding Popeye range

[Weta43]

But it doesn't matter if there are a few mistakes - Don't they make you feel proud ?

 

Our Glorious Steel Workers have surpassed their production targets for the fourth year running.

[Kusch]

 

 

 

The first time I heard about passive radar systems was just about a week ago. (Granted, that doesn't mean anything :)). According to Wikipedia, passive radar systems are still under development. Why note the absence of a passive radar system when even the most advanced countries don't officially use them yet?

 

@Kusch, thanks for sharing anyway (unless you're the one who originally wrote it ).

 

Sorry, only quote :D

 

Check this:

 

Ramona:

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramona_passive_sensor

 

17 Ramona systems and 14 upgraded Ramona-M systems were built. Of these, 14 Ramona and 10 upgraded systems were exported to the Soviet Union. Of these, the system with serial number 104 was deployed by the Soviet Union in North Korea. Other systems were exported to the German Democratic Republic and Syria.

 

ELINT Systems:

http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Warpac-Rus-PLA-ESM.html

 

Vera:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VERA_passive_sensor

 

Tamara:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tamara_passive_sensor

 

Kolchuga:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kolchuga_passive_sensor

 

85V6 Vega:

http://militaryforces.ru/weapon-7-99-679.html

 

Polish PaRaDe:

http://www.pw.edu.pl/engpw/News/Passive-Radar-Demonstrator-PaRaDe

Edited December 12, 2014 by Kusch

[pyromaniac4002]

On the other hand, even if the F-15s flew some 10 km into Syria to give their missiles a better chance to hit the target, they'd still be able to leave Syrian airspace in a matter of, say, 2 minutes? Not a lot of time for the Syrians to react.

 

They can establish a track on the aircraft long before it gets to the Syrian border. The IDF does the same thing. Even radio chatter is monitored to track aircraft before they get off the ground.

[Aginor]

The article says 50 miles (80km), not 50 km. So Wikipedia could actually pretty accurate for a change (or it is the source the author used for the range...).

 

EDIT: Also guns can be dangerous in high altitudes. Big guns can easily put a barrage at 40,000ft.

Edited December 12, 2014 by Aginor

[RIPTIDE]

The old Pechora knocked out 1 of the Popeyes?? I'm impressed....

[mig29movt]

I'd say that the lebanese air force is basically not existing...

Hmm :book: ah my memory didn't lie http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lebanese_Air_Force :smartass:

So basically everything coming roughly south-> Syria can be considered hostile to them (so is north, remember the shot down of a turkish AF RF-4E?)

The Israeli air strike during daytime seems a bit dangerous to me...

 

Off topic: Do you guys ever heard of this:

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Orchard

I heard about it in our radio news (on a side note, what else :doh:)

and it still stays in my mind, last week I heard that Deir az-Zor is still being ruled by goverment forces/ mercenaries

[vicx]

+1 Yurgon Great post. On this forum we should be interested in the details not in the silly stuff you can get on any average news site.

 

I have to agree with RIPTIDE and what seems the most note worthy element of the incident. A very old SAM knocking out a strike missile. How did they do that?

[Kusch]

In Polish Army during exercise SA-3 (S-125M) shoot even smaller air cell (SPO 0,07m2/0,3m2).

[Yurgon]

Check this:

 

Ramona:

 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ramona_passive_sensor

[...]

 

Fascinating, thanks! :thumbup:

 

They can establish a track on the aircraft long before it gets to the Syrian border. The IDF does the same thing. Even radio chatter is monitored to track aircraft before they get off the ground.

 

You're right of course. I just mean that they don't have a lot of time to shoot the aircraft while they're inside Syrian airspace, even if they've tracked them well in advance.

 

With the update on the Popeye's range (see below), it seems the aircraft wouldn't have needed to enter Syrian airspace at all.

 

The article says 50 miles (80km), not 50 km. So Wikipedia could actually pretty accurate for a change (or it is the source the author used for the range...).

 

EDIT: Also guns can be dangerous in high altitudes. Big guns can easily put a barrage at 40,000ft.

 

Thanks for the missile range, I did misread that. :music_whistling:

 

Does Syria employ such long range AAA? I thought these things weren't used since WWII basically.

 

If they do, that would make the daytime attack more daring indeed - if the aircraft entered Syrian airspace at all (or Syrian operators would dare shoot aircraft over another country).

 

The part about short range missiles posing a threat to the aircraft still seems way off to me.

 

+1 Yurgon Great post. On this forum we should be interested in the details not in the silly stuff you can get on any average news site.

 

Thx. :thumbup:

Edited December 13, 2014 by Yurgon
Typo

[Yurgon]

Check this:

 

Ramona: [...]

ELINT Systems: [...]

Vera: [...]

Tamara: [...]

Kolchuga: [...]

85V6 Vega: [...]

Polish PaRaDe: [...]

 

I've been reading up on the links you provided. Definitely very interesting stuff, but I think there are two very different types of technology we're talking about here. :smartass:

 

Most of the systems you mentioned are described as:

 

[$system] is an electronic support measures (ESM) system that uses measurements of time difference of arrival (TDOA) of pulses at three or four sites to accurately detect and track airborne emitters.

 

I realize that this technology has been around for a long time. Basically, it detects the location of an (airborne) object by analyzing its radio emissions.

 

What I refer to as "passive radar" is something different altogether: detecting the location of an object by its reflection of pre-existing radio emissions (radar waves, mobile radio waves etc.).

 

Wikipedia on the topic:

 

Passive radar systems (also referred to as passive coherent location and passive covert radar) encompass a class of radar systems that detect and track objects by processing reflections from non-cooperative sources of illumination in the environment, such as commercial broadcast and communications signals.

 

Your link about "Passive Radar Demonstrator PaRaDe" belongs to the latter category and it's called a "Demonstrator" in an article only a year old.

 

All the other links refer to the category of well known technology, and I've never heard this referred to as "Passive radar". It's called ELINT or ESM, but not "passive radar". Therefore, I think the point I made in my post remains valid: it's weird to state that Syria doesn't have passive radar technology when this type of technology is still under development - or the article's author has a rather peculiar choice of wording regarding ESM/ELINT.

 

TL;DR: I think my point about "passive radar" remains valid. :D

[Kusch]

All the other links refer to the category of well known technology, and I've never heard this referred to as "Passive radar". It's called ELINT or ESM, but not "passive radar". Therefore, I think the point I made in my post remains valid: it's weird to state that Syria doesn't have passive radar technology when this type of technology is still under development - or the article's author has a rather peculiar choice of wording regarding ESM/ELINT.

 

TL;DR: I think my point about "passive radar" remains valid. :D

 

Keyword: Triangulation ;)

 

Your link about "Passive Radar Demonstrator PaRaDe" belongs to the latter category and it's called a "Demonstrator" in an article only a year old.

 

http://dziennikzbrojny.pl/aktualnosci/news,1,5008,aktualnosci-z-polski,mspo-13-radar-pasywny-parade

 

Article in Polish, I use a translator:

 

Passive Radar Demonstrator (Passive Radar Demonstrator) has been developed by engineers at the University of Warsaw. Work on it was launched over 10 years ago, and the first copy was created in 2006. Development was directed toward the creation of a radar operating in real time, culminating in the verification of polygons during exercise Eagle (2011) and Anaconda (2012).

Passive radar does not emit electromagnetic radiation to obtain data by using natural radiation which is present around the object, which translates into labor secrecy. As transmitters (illuminators objects) are used for FM radio transmitters or TV DVB-T. Partly for this purpose can also be used for mobile telephone signals and even Wi-Fi networks. The continuous operation of such transmitters, their power, wide operating band allows you to create air situation picture. The intersection of the three pairs of measurements of transmitter-receiver point us in the space for the searched object.

 

Parade is found to detect the operating range of 750 km with the ability to track up to 400 objects. His most visible elements of a mast height of 12 meters from the antenna in an array of 3 meters. The accuracy of the measurements of the three pairs of transmitter-receiver is 100-1000 meters

[Aginor]

As for the radar guided big caliber AAA:

Those were used since the Second World War, that's correct.

They were also used in Vietnam, and in both Gulf Wars by Iraq. So I would assume they are still widely used.

Syria is known to have hundreds of KS-12 and KS-19, so it isn't exactly safe to fly around there, but it is very hard to hit a plane up there if it is jinking a bit, which I assume they do.