Modelled AIM-54 effect on a typical DCS PvP server

[*Rage*]

The video shows an intercept. What scientific data are you getting out if it?

 

How does the 54 compare to a 120 in terms of dealing with its Inertia? The 54 is very heavy and very fast. Can it cope equally well as a 120 (or a 7M) against a intercept vector thats reversing or changing rapidly? While staying in seeker gimbal limits?

 

Edit: Don't get me wrong. The F14 was my first love as child and from a personal POV I would like the 54 to be fighter capable. I'm just intrigued by the reputation it has as an antibomber missile. I'm also surprised by the notion that the doctrine was that they're too precious to use against fighters. Surely the pilot and airframe were more valuable given the choice.

Edited February 18, 2017 by ///Rage

[BlackLion213]

I'm also surprised by the notion that the doctrine was that they're too precious to use against fighters. Surely the pilot and airframe were more valuable given the choice.

 

I am too, but this doctrine also wasn't an absolute. During the first Gulf of Sidra incident in 1981, the Tomcats of VF-41 and VF-84 were launching with a the classic 2x2x2 load-out, even though the Libyans did not possess anything that could viably attack the carrier (let alone carry out a Soviet style mass bomber raid). Same with Desert Storm, though tactics had already changed at that point.

 

This doctrinal emphasis was really in full swing during the late-70s and early-80s. Back then, the USN and USAF were training to counter their Vietnam nemesis - the MiG-21. The MiG-23 was just starting to present itself as an operational threat (even though it had been in service with the Soviets and some exports for several years). But the MiG-21, had no real BVR capability and classic ROE was still a factor. When attacking a MiG-21, a AIM-7 was already much better than the opponents weapon - was much gained by adding ARH and 3-4 x times the range? On paper it might not look like it even if pilots really appreciate the benefits.

 

AIM-54 production and cost do play a real role in creating these doctrines, even if aircrew and airframe are the priority. Total AIM-54 production was only about 5000 units (just over half or which were AIM-54Cs manufactured from the late-80s to 90s) and they were way more expensive than the AIM-7. This cost, along with the low production meant that carriers didn't deploy with large numbers. Plus, any expensive program needs justification and protecting billion dollar carriers could justify expensive programs. Plus, many decision makers (often politicians when it comes to actually authorizing a budget) don't see things the way that pilots or knowledgeable planners would. To a politician, they see that the AIM-7 has a quoted range of ~15-25 nm (depending on variant) while the AIM-54 can reach out to nearly 100 nm, but the opponent has a range of 3-5 nm (MiG-21) - they quickly ask why you need more range than 4 times your opponents? This sounds like another crazy military program feeding the military-industrial complex, etc.

 

However, the MiG-23 and later the MiG-29/Su-27 really changed perspectives. Now there was a credible forward quarter threat with BVR capability and the extra range/ARH/multi-shot really counted. In 1982, the USN started "Rising Fighter", a new program to create tactics to better counter the MiG-23. They used F-4S's carrying AIM-7s to simulate the MiG-23 and ran test scenarios against F-14As armed 4x4. Most encounters were 2v6 and the F-14s actually did quite well, but the success was all about SA and much better performance after the merge (per Bio Baranek). These tests plainly revealed that Tomcats could be easily lost before the merge from forward quarter shots and there weren't great counters with only the AIM-7. So in the mid-80s, it was recognized that Tomcats would need to carry the AIM-54 to maintain their edge.

 

Here is an excerpt/overview:

 

When I joined my first F-14 squadron in 1981 (VF-24), the A-model was still relatively new and some US Navy squadrons were still flying Phantoms. The potential threats that we most often trained for were the MiG-17 and MiG-21, which were not match of a threat beyond visual range (BVR), but could be a handful if you got engaged within visual range (WVR). Since we always expected to be outnumbered, and with the lessons from the air war over Vietnam still fresh, we spent a lot of our training fuel and time on ACM – air combat maneuvering, or dogfighting.

 

We would use the AWG9, which at the time was by far the most capable radar in a fighter, to paint the picture of what is out there and get us to the merge. Our weapon during the intercept was the AIM-7 Sparrow, which was much improved since its flawed debut in Vietnam and had become a reliable and versatile weapon. But in my experience we often wouldn’t kill-remove adversaries based on pre-merge shots because we wanted to maximize the number we faced in the within visual range engagement.

 

Most anyone who has ever had an interest in military aviation knows that F-14s carried AIM-54s, and that the Phoenix (affectionately known as a 1,000-pound wingman) was famous for its long range and large warhead, as well as active terminal guidance and the ability to have multiple Phoenixes in flight simultaneously. This gave us impressive capability, especially compared to other air-to-air missiles in the early 1980s. Yes, the AIM-54A had some employment limitations, but it repeatedly destroyed fighter-size targets in test shots. Let me digress to say how disappointed I am that the U.S. Navy has no real-world Phoenix kills.

 

Anyway, the penalties for this capability included weight and drag. We would carry the Phoenix on the belly (also known as the tunnel), and that required adapter rails that weighed 400 lbs each and added drag. Each missile itself weighed 1,000 lbs. But the reason we didn’t use them against fighters was policy: carriers planned to save AIM-54s for use against a raid by a Soviet bomber regiment. On my first tour we were never in a real-world counter-air situation so I don’t know for sure, but that’s how we trained: against enemy fighters it was AIM-7s, AIM-9s, and the gun.

 

Around the world there had been developments during the 1980s that affected our training and tactics. Among the most significant was the proliferation of forward-quarter capable MiGs and Sukhois. Against the MiG-21 and previous threats we were essentially immune from attack until the bandit was behind our 3-9 line. This may seem like ancient history, but it shows the advantage US fighters held until the early 1980s. Our response to the Flogger was gradual. I participated in a series of test flights to explore the Flogger threat in 1982, but those flights didn’t include tactics designed to counter threat missiles, so they were like the Gunfight at the OK Corral, and they proved the need for a whole new approach to the intercept. Some of that was taking place while I was at Topgun, and by the time I got back to the Fleet it was becoming well-established.

 

When we started to get serious about the threat, especially when the AA-10 Alamo arrived, we realized we had to employ AIM-54s against enemy fighters. So of course we began to train with them. I think the capability was in TACTS all along, we just never used it. Fortunately the Navy introduced the AIM-54C in 1987, when we really needed it. The Charlie corrected many shortcomings of the Alpha, in both outer air battle and closer-in tactical environments. With its long motor burn time, large warhead, and radar improvements, the AIM-54C was a tenacious missile. Again, it is too bad it doesn’t have a combat record.

 

However, by the time all these tactics are changing, the idea of the AIM-54 as an anti-bomber missile had been solidified in the minds of those following aviation. This is logical, it was the justification for the AIM-54 program from a political standpoint and the initial employment given the missiles low production numbers and nature of the A-A threat in the late-70s/early-80s. The progressive change in tactics didn't catch much attention, but this isn't the kind of stuff that gets published in regular aviations books, etc. Most of the interest around the AIM-54 was centered around its range and multi-shot capability, since that didn't change there wasn't much to talk about.

 

Beyond the need for battlegroup protection, the AIM-54 was also that critical stepping stone towards the definitive US missile: the AIM-120. Much was learned from an operational ARH/fire-forget missile and the AIM-54's guidance and architecture was funneled into the AMRAAM program. But without the CVBG threat, it's likely that the AIM-54 never would have been funded and development of future weapons would have been slowed. The USN had certain needs for the missile, but it was probably funded due to the bomber threat and the anti-fighter aspect did little to support the USN's case - even if it was eventually needed. But when people make decisions about money, it's based on that moment in time and it that moment of the late-70s the fighter threat didn't seem that bad.

 

-Nick

[lunaticfringe]

The video shows an intercept. What scientific data are you getting out if it?

 

I don't need to use the video.

 

How does the 54 compare to a 120 in terms of dealing with its Inertia? The 54 is very heavy and very fast.

 

It's also losing 33 to 45% of that weight over the course of its impulse, depending on variant, and is programmed to optimize its loss of inertia in accordance to target range, closure, and altitude at launch.

 

Can it cope equally well as a 120 (or a 7M) against a intercept vector thats reversing or changing rapidly? While staying in seeker gimbal limits?

 

See the attached pages from a USN paper I had to FOIA from 1977. Note, very closely, the statement with Figure 10- that includes the AIM-7E-2, AIM-7E-4, and AIM-7F. And that the AIM-7M didn't receive an aerodynamic update- only the course guidance optimization in software. What matters in the intercept is energy, and the gimbal limit differences, as observable by the aforementioned video (because I'm not with my external with further notes on the matter) are immaterial in the comparison.

 

(Also, on the matter of inertia optimization, note figure 8- most sources will tell you the AIM-54 lofts to 70k, when in fact it'll go almost 150% of that, without instruction, if it's guidance calculations require that to make the range.)

 

I'm just intrigued by the reputation it has as an antibomber missile. I'm also surprised by the notion that the doctrine was that they're too precious to use against fighters. Surely the pilot and airframe were more valuable given the choice.

 

The thousands on the carrier are more important than the fighter. Phoenix was the ace in the hole.

 

If presented with three battalions of Soviet Naval Aviation Tu-22s and their supporting spotter and EW packages, the priority are those: spotters, EW, and launchers. The only fighter type threat that Phoenix would be spent on in a 70's-mid 80's OAB situation would be a threat to the E-2s- MiG-25s/MiG-31s, if in fact those had been assigned to assist, which is debatable.

 

One of the most important aspects missing to most regarding the doctrinal choice to limit AIM-54 employment until near the fall of the Soviet Union with the operational availability to PVO and VVS of the MiG-29 and the Su-27, is the understanding of Outer Air Battle and the tactics employed to do so, based on the capabilities of what the Soviets were presenting as a threat.

 

If, for example, your threat bomber is launching a weapon with a 120 mile range, your keep-out range is 120 nm plus downrange flight for your DLI's best time to altitude, with some fudge for time to acquire and get AIM-54 rounds off- say, 160 miles total.

 

Swap that for a Kh-32, or even a Kh-22M, and now your dynamics change, because you're not even trying to kill the shooter- you're trying to kill the targeting group that will feed the coordinates; now you need to beat their signals detection and radar, because a nuclear cruise missile can kill within a radius the carrier can't get out of if they get lucky, meaning your keep-out is two or more times that original number- if they pass the CAPs, and potentially anyone on the chain in relief, the remaining DLI has got to have enough time to get down range, pick them up, and kill the interlopers before they can pin down the boat.

 

And now that 100+ nm range of the AIM-54 is the difference between success and failure, because if the strike spotters see the boat, everybody has to switch responsibilities on the fly in a EMCON/high-jamming environment, and that's a huge risk. Those CAP guys need to now be looking for cruise missiles instead of bombers. Those guys may already be Winchester and heading back, meaning somebody has to come up and take their position- and the situation may entail an inability for them to relay that information back.

 

Kill those searchers, though, and you force the strike group to close and attempt direct acquisition, buying the carrier group time to reload for spent Standard or Sea Sparrow, the boat time to vanish, and the air wing to rearm and restage the grid.

 

Does it seem strange? Maybe. Given you go on cruise with *maybe* a hundred Phoenix rounds, and you need viability to deal with easily fifty to sixty aircraft or cruise missiles in a strike (not accounting for SM capability from the escorts because you require certainty), with any one of those potential bombers or cruise missile targets meaning certain death to the group- every one of those AIM-54s is worth its weight in gold. Navy paid perhaps half a million per once the total bill was done, but every single round was an insurance policy for well over $6 billion, easy, when accounting for the full air wing and the training of every man and woman on the CV.

 

The other pertinent factor to be considered is that the USSR didn't have a fighter-carried stick with the range of the AIM-7F, let alone the Phoenix (barring the Foxbat with the R-33, which was already going to catch a -54 if it was in the airspace); nor, for that matter, did anybody else. Subsequently, you don't have to bother with the heavy rounds to kill Floggers, Fishbeds, etc.

 

Put R-27s out there, even with their worse intercept performance, and you're getting back into the unacceptable rate of exchange area, which then makes Phoenix the solution in hand. Present them with a strike package as escort, though, you'd likely see the old rules apply.

Edited February 18, 2017 by lunaticfringe

[Drag0nWIng]

just let nicole released the module, play it ingame, and put into practice...

that will save many time, instead of discuss this question on this thread.

nicole plzzzzzz

[lunaticfringe]

Protip: If you don't like the discussion, and have nothing to add to it, you are free to move along.

[Buzzles]

With respect, the OP is about the effect of the missile on DCS multiplayer. He's already come back on the last page saying it was that, and not about it's RL performance.

 

All the RL performance stuff (which has already been gone over) probably belongs in the actual LN dev update about the Aim-54, which is concerned with modelling it.

[OnlyforDCS]

With respect, the OP is about the effect of the missile on DCS multiplayer. He's already come back on the last page saying it was that, and not about it's RL performance.

 

All the RL performance stuff (which has already been gone over) probably belongs in the actual LN dev update about the Aim-54, which is concerned with modelling it.

 

With all due respect, there is very little that can be said about that because the missile has not yet been implemented in the sim. The only thing that we can base our assumptions and this discussion on (and please remember these are ALL assumptions) right now, is real data. This will change once the F14 is released. Until then, we can either stop the discussion right here, or use the RL data available.

Edited February 18, 2017 by OnlyforDCS

[Frostie]

:thumbup: Nice write up Fringe.

[Frostie]

With respect, the OP is about the effect of the missile on DCS multiplayer. He's already come back on the last page saying it was that, and not about it's RL performance.

 

All the RL performance stuff (which has already been gone over) probably belongs in the actual LN dev update about the Aim-54, which is concerned with modelling it.

 

You can't predict how it will behave in mp other than experience from the current ED model.

Trying to understand and how the real deal works goes someway to answering the OP, provided LN get a good representation.

 

There have been mods using the F-14 which have been incorperated into server missions and squad matches before now, the results of a which were nothing out of the ordinary.

[lunaticfringe]

"How is Ferrari's untested chassis and engine combination going to shake up F1 next season?"

 

"Hey, don't talk about raw displacement, rotating mass dimensions, boost, fuel consumption, the length of the wheelbase, braking power, or similar conceptual downfornce concepts in this conversation!"

 

With all due respect, how does anyone expect to discuss what a new variable will do to the multitude of server implementations, when there is such a wide difference in opinions on the capabilities of that variable, without attempting to define what that variable should, in fact, be capable of doing? What, is OP desiring we go through every possible permutation based on observed MP server and opinion of capability, or are we allowed to cut through the chaff and pare things down to a reasonable discussion? Because if not, the discussion is potentially a lot longer, with more heat, and absolutely no answers for you.

 

Seriously- the continual lack of willingness to talk facts to derive a conceptual answer around here is amusing.

[Buzzles]

The difference is the minutiae of the Aim-54's capabilities which this thread has moved to aren't actually relevent in relation to the OP.

 

Does it matter it can potentially hit a target maneuvering from close range? Yes, that's important.

Does it actually matter if it can do so at 5.5g rather 6g? No, because no turn fights involve an aircraft being at a fixed g 100% of the time, and a defending pilot will still be worrying about a missile launch against them.

 

Same goes for range. Does it matter if it's max for fighter sized targets is 100mn under ideal conditions rather than 80mn? No, as it'll still outrange any other aircraft currently in DCS, and if you're aware of the launch you'll have to go defensive anyway.

 

lunaticfringe's big post talks about doctrinal deployment of it. As interesting as it is, it's got no relevence to DCS's multiplayer environment.

[lunaticfringe]

The difference is the minutiae of the Aim-54's capabilities which this thread has moved to aren't actually relevent in relation to the OP.

 

When having to deal with the differences of opinion regarding the facts of performance of the type, the presentation of minutiae is the determinant of what opinions on the matter are correct.

 

Same goes for range. Does it matter if it's max for fighter sized targets is 100mn under ideal conditions rather than 80mn? No, as it'll still outrange any other aircraft currently in DCS, and if you're aware of the launch you'll have to go defensive anyway.

 

Range begets time. Time begets tactics and detection. Twenty nautical miles at 1000 knots closure is a minute and fifteen seconds difference. Given current effective ranges of missiles in DCS (20-30 nautical miles at best), adding in something able to swat a fighter at two to three times that range is a substantial factor in relation to what takes place on a server and why. That is time, that is tactics, and that is a major shift in what occurs.

 

It's not a major shift if LN doesn't play the weapon straight, but that's been the point of separating out the minutiae- to define the terms that will determine the impact.

 

lunaticfringe's big post talks about doctrinal deployment of it. As interesting as it is, it's got no relevence to DCS's multiplayer environment.

 

It has every bit of relevance to DCS' multiplayer environment, given the offerings of a map to use it, carrier operations over substantial blue water, and the nature of what the server owner chooses to do to present a threat to Blue Air, and restrictions placed on AIM-54 availability on the server.

 

All of these factors have been discussed, because they all go into the equation of what will happen in DCS multiplayer.

 

These things are both server and modeled system dependent. You can't ascertain these things in a vacuum.

[*Rage*]

I am too, but this doctrine also wasn't an absolute. During the first Gulf of Sidra incident in 1981, the Tomcats of VF-41 and VF-84 were launching with a the classic 2x2x2 load-out, even though the Libyans did not possess anything that could viably attack the carrier (let alone carry out a Soviet style mass bomber raid). Same with Desert Storm, though tactics had already changed at that point.

 

This doctrinal emphasis was really in full swing during the late-70s and early-80s. Back then, the USN and USAF were training to counter their Vietnam nemesis - the MiG-21. The MiG-23 was just starting to present itself as an operational threat (even though it had been in service with the Soviets and some exports for several years). But the MiG-21, had no real BVR capability and classic ROE was still a factor. When attacking a MiG-21, a AIM-7 was already much better than the opponents weapon - was much gained by adding ARH and 3-4 x times the range? On paper it might not look like it even if pilots really appreciate the benefits.

 

AIM-54 production and cost do play a real role in creating these doctrines, even if aircrew and airframe are the priority. Total AIM-54 production was only about 5000 units (just over half or which were AIM-54Cs manufactured from the late-80s to 90s) and they were way more expensive than the AIM-7. This cost, along with the low production meant that carriers didn't deploy with large numbers. Plus, any expensive program needs justification and protecting billion dollar carriers could justify expensive programs. Plus, many decision makers (often politicians when it comes to actually authorizing a budget) don't see things the way that pilots or knowledgeable planners would. To a politician, they see that the AIM-7 has a quoted range of ~15-25 nm (depending on variant) while the AIM-54 can reach out to nearly 100 nm, but the opponent has a range of 3-5 nm (MiG-21) - they quickly ask why you need more range than 4 times your opponents? This sounds like another crazy military program feeding the military-industrial complex, etc.

 

However, the MiG-23 and later the MiG-29/Su-27 really changed perspectives. Now there was a credible forward quarter threat with BVR capability and the extra range/ARH/multi-shot really counted. In 1982, the USN started "Rising Fighter", a new program to create tactics to better counter the MiG-23. They used F-4S's carrying AIM-7s to simulate the MiG-23 and ran test scenarios against F-14As armed 4x4. Most encounters were 2v6 and the F-14s actually did quite well, but the success was all about SA and much better performance after the merge (per Bio Baranek). These tests plainly revealed that Tomcats could be easily lost before the merge from forward quarter shots and there weren't great counters with only the AIM-7. So in the mid-80s, it was recognized that Tomcats would need to carry the AIM-54 to maintain their edge.

 

Here is an excerpt/overview:

 

 

 

However, by the time all these tactics are changing, the idea of the AIM-54 as an anti-bomber missile had been solidified in the minds of those following aviation. This is logical, it was the justification for the AIM-54 program from a political standpoint and the initial employment given the missiles low production numbers and nature of the A-A threat in the late-70s/early-80s. The progressive change in tactics didn't catch much attention, but this isn't the kind of stuff that gets published in regular aviations books, etc. Most of the interest around the AIM-54 was centered around its range and multi-shot capability, since that didn't change there wasn't much to talk about.

 

Beyond the need for battlegroup protection, the AIM-54 was also that critical stepping stone towards the definitive US missile: the AIM-120. Much was learned from an operational ARH/fire-forget missile and the AIM-54's guidance and architecture was funneled into the AMRAAM program. But without the CVBG threat, it's likely that the AIM-54 never would have been funded and development of future weapons would have been slowed. The USN had certain needs for the missile, but it was probably funded due to the bomber threat and the anti-fighter aspect did little to support the USN's case - even if it was eventually needed. But when people make decisions about money, it's based on that moment in time and it that moment of the late-70s the fighter threat didn't seem that bad.

 

-Nick

 

I don't need to use the video.

 

 

 

It's also losing 33 to 45% of that weight over the course of its impulse, depending on variant, and is programmed to optimize its loss of inertia in accordance to target range, closure, and altitude at launch.

 

 

 

See the attached pages from a USN paper I had to FOIA from 1977. Note, very closely, the statement with Figure 10- that includes the AIM-7E-2, AIM-7E-4, and AIM-7F. And that the AIM-7M didn't receive an aerodynamic update- only the course guidance optimization in software. What matters in the intercept is energy, and the gimbal limit differences, as observable by the aforementioned video (because I'm not with my external with further notes on the matter) are immaterial in the comparison.

 

(Also, on the matter of inertia optimization, note figure 8- most sources will tell you the AIM-54 lofts to 70k, when in fact it'll go almost 150% of that, without instruction, if it's guidance calculations require that to make the range.)

 

 

 

The thousands on the carrier are more important than the fighter. Phoenix was the ace in the hole.

 

If presented with three battalions of Soviet Naval Aviation Tu-22s and their supporting spotter and EW packages, the priority are those: spotters, EW, and launchers. The only fighter type threat that Phoenix would be spent on in a 70's-mid 80's OAB situation would be a threat to the E-2s- MiG-25s/MiG-31s, if in fact those had been assigned to assist, which is debatable.

 

One of the most important aspects missing to most regarding the doctrinal choice to limit AIM-54 employment until near the fall of the Soviet Union with the operational availability to PVO and VVS of the MiG-29 and the Su-27, is the understanding of Outer Air Battle and the tactics employed to do so, based on the capabilities of what the Soviets were presenting as a threat.

 

If, for example, your threat bomber is launching a weapon with a 120 mile range, your keep-out range is 120 nm plus downrange flight for your DLI's best time to altitude, with some fudge for time to acquire and get AIM-54 rounds off- say, 160 miles total.

 

Swap that for a Kh-32, or even a Kh-22M, and now your dynamics change, because you're not even trying to kill the shooter- you're trying to kill the targeting group that will feed the coordinates; now you need to beat their signals detection and radar, because a nuclear cruise missile can kill within a radius the carrier can't get out of if they get lucky, meaning your keep-out is two or more times that original number- if they pass the CAPs, and potentially anyone on the chain in relief, the remaining DLI has got to have enough time to get down range, pick them up, and kill the interlopers before they can pin down the boat.

 

And now that 100+ nm range of the AIM-54 is the difference between success and failure, because if the strike spotters see the boat, everybody has to switch responsibilities on the fly in a EMCON/high-jamming environment, and that's a huge risk. Those CAP guys need to now be looking for cruise missiles instead of bombers. Those guys may already be Winchester and heading back, meaning somebody has to come up and take their position- and the situation may entail an inability for them to relay that information back.

 

Kill those searchers, though, and you force the strike group to close and attempt direct acquisition, buying the carrier group time to reload for spent Standard or Sea Sparrow, the boat time to vanish, and the air wing to rearm and restage the grid.

 

Does it seem strange? Maybe. Given you go on cruise with *maybe* a hundred Phoenix rounds, and you need viability to deal with easily fifty to sixty aircraft or cruise missiles in a strike (not accounting for SM capability from the escorts because you require certainty), with any one of those potential bombers or cruise missile targets meaning certain death to the group- every one of those AIM-54s is worth its weight in gold. Navy paid perhaps half a million per once the total bill was done, but every single round was an insurance policy for well over $6 billion, easy, when accounting for the full air wing and the training of every man and woman on the CV.

 

The other pertinent factor to be considered is that the USSR didn't have a fighter-carried stick with the range of the AIM-7F, let alone the Phoenix (barring the Foxbat with the R-33, which was already going to catch a -54 if it was in the airspace); nor, for that matter, did anybody else. Subsequently, you don't have to bother with the heavy rounds to kill Floggers, Fishbeds, etc.

 

Put R-27s out there, even with their worse intercept performance, and you're getting back into the unacceptable rate of exchange area, which then makes Phoenix the solution in hand. Present them with a strike package as escort, though, you'd likely see the old rules apply.

 

Thanks. Lots of material to digest:thumbup:

[captain_dalan]

.....

Does it actually matter if it can do so at 5.5g rather 6g? No, because no turn fights involve an aircraft being at a fixed g 100% of the time, and a defending pilot will still be worrying about a missile launch against them.

 

Same goes for range. Does it matter if it's max for fighter sized targets is 100mn under ideal conditions rather than 80mn? No, as it'll still outrange any other aircraft currently in DCS, and if you're aware of the launch you'll have to go defensive anyway.

 

.....

It actually does matter. As many people do not know the real world capabilities of the missile, they have nothing to base their expectations (and therefore tactics) about it. How to employ it, or how to defend against it. It is these last two that will actually effect the MP, regardless of how the missile is simulated by LN.

 

For me personally, there is no such thing as fair play. This is a military sim. As such it is supposed to simulate real military hardware in such a way that real life doctrine and tactics are more then desired to make that hardware work as promoted. I would expect this to work at the both ends of the stick. As an expected F-14A flyer i want my 54s to act as close as possible to the real thing , but i also extremely prefer for my TF30's to do the same. If i participate in a MP match i don't expect to cry "foul play" when my Cat doesn't act as a Viper or i find myself in a flat spin.

 

How should MP servers act upon it? Unless we talk about major operations with multiple AC and rolls to fulfill, i'd say everything should go. Is it fair that the F-15 has more modern and easier to handle avionics? A more informative HUD? RWR? And yet, we expect that F-15 to go into battle with all those systems operational. It would be a damn shame if someone forced it to go at it without them. Handicaps take away from the victory IMO at least....

 

Cheers and safe flying....

[IASGATG]

I know I'm a bit late to the party, but I feel I need to comment on the perception on the AIM-54's ability to turn.

 

Depending on internal weight, altitude and airspeed, the 54 can pull in the excess of 18g. It has been demonstrated to successfully hit 7g+ targets. Timing a 9g crank against it at the right moment will likely cause the missile to overshoot, however jink defence against missiles hasn't really been a thing since Vietnam.