A bit of brutal honesty from a former EA-6B driver :)

[BlackLion213]

I found this article written by a current EA-18G Pilot who started flying EA-6Bs during the early-90s. The article is a fun read in terms of how the airwing has changed and how interesting things were when the airwing was diverse.

 

http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/confessions-of-a-us-navy-ea-18g-growler-electronic-warf-1694954599

 

It also contains some frank impressions of F-14s operating in the airwing - both good and bad.

 

 

I was stashed with VFA-125 (west coast Hornet training squadron) for six months. Between those two experiences I really was lucky to be exposed to the breath of Naval Air and how each community saw life. Every A-6 guy loved their aircraft and the mission. The Prowler squadrons seemed to have the tightest ready room. The Tomcats were kind of fragmented. They were in love with the aircraft, but pilots and RIO’s seemed to live in separate worlds, or classes. When I was with VFA-125, there were a fair number of transition pilots. The A-7 Corsair II guys were all just happy to be there, but coming to terms with the Hornet’s complicated weapons systems. The A-6 guys all moaned about wanting to be back in Intruders and wanted their Bombardier-Navigator (B/N) back. The Tomcat pilots seemed happy to be in the single seat fighter mafia now, but did miss the extra grunt the Tom had."

 

 

"My first Air Wing had two Tomcat squadrons (B models), two Hornet squadrons, Prowlers, Vikings, Hawkeyes, and SH-3 Sea Kings as helo support. The Tomcats were a sight on deck. Night cat shots were a constant source of envy from the rest of us. Toms would light those big GE (or the old PW) cans, and with their nearly unrestricted climb ability (and huge fuel load), allowed them to climb away from the water effortlessly. Meanwhile, the rest of us clawed for altitude foot by foot after launch… "

 

"Toms really had speed and range in spades, but were maintenance nightmares. If the whole jet wasn't down (broken), the AWG-9 radar usually didn't work, functionally making it a mission kill for the Tomcat. Twice on my first deployment the ENTIRE Tomcat feet was grounded for issues. We joked that you could walk from one end of the hangar bay to the other over the top of Tomcats. It was a regular occurrence to hear during a recovery over the carriers announcing system (1MC), “Aircraft emergency, aircraft emergency, side number 100 (or 200 series, the Tom’s aircraft numbers), returning with _____(pick one) hydraulic failure.” Ugh, hydros were such a mess on that jet along with the fuel transfer systems. Tomcats were fatter on their fuel ladder (schedule of fuel vs. time during a launch to recovery cycle) than any other aircraft (except S-3 Viking). Yet, they would recover first, so that maintenance had time to fix them. Maintainers were real heroes on those jets."

 

"The Hornets at the time were all relatively early lot aircraft, and far more limited capability wise than today’s C/D/E/F Hornets. The pilots were also pretty task saturated. Since Toms were still around, the Hornets were primarily used as attack aircraft to replace the Intruders. They were kind of overshadowed as fighter guys with the Toms still around."

 

Much of the article also discusses the good and bad of the transition to the EA-18G -

Now, if we could just get rid of that wing station cant… (burns me to the core)"

Overall, it's a fun article if you have an interest in late-20th century carrier ops or the transition from EA-6Bs to EA-18Gs.

 

-Nick

[Rudel_chw]

Thanks, seems an excellent reading ... I added it to my reading list bookmark, to read it later :D

[Los]

This is less brutal honesty than the pilot equivalent of old woman gossip.

[OnlyforDCS]

A little offtopic, since it concerns the Tornado, but still a nice anecdote from the article, BTW thanks Blacklion, great read:

 

On a non-CVW (Carrier Air Wing) speed note, I have done several exercises with the Air Force and one in particular at Nellis AFB where were paired up with a British Tornado squadron. Good grief, were those guys fast down on the deck! The Prowler was no slouch down low, and had the gas to maintain it, but man. The lead we had to have on them just to be in position as they made their final run to the target was silly. They were just below subsonic at like 200ft, and I think they were holding back. One of the red air Vipers got through the CAP and tried to bounce one, but the Tornado just ran away"

[turkeydriver]

Though his opinions and experiences are true and valid. I wonder f he served during the Tomcat's heyday and the 1980s and 1990s when the manning and supply systems were stronger. Commenting on 30 year old jets whose sundown date has been established isn't really helpful-it would be like ED asking a LT who just delivered an F/A-18C to the boneyard what he thought of the aircraft. Completely different from what the aircraft was like ~1998.

[BlackLion213]

[

Though his opinions and experiences are true and valid. I wonder if he served during the Tomcat's heyday and the 1980s and 1990s when the manning and supply systems were stronger.

 

I think we can reasonably guess that the EA-6B pilot's first cruise (when he made his Tomcat observations) was ~2000 based on a few bits of info. He described an Airwing with 2 F-14B squadrons, but no A-6E squadron (so after 1995). There was only one Airwing that operated two F-14B squadrons without an A-6E squadron - CVW-7 with VF-11 and VF-143 from 1999-2005.

 

So he probably garnered his impressions at the end of the Tomcat's career.

 

Commenting on 30 year old jets whose sundown date has been established isn't really helpful-it would be like ED asking a LT who just delivered an F/A-18C to the boneyard what he thought of the aircraft. Completely different from what the aircraft was like ~1998.

 

True and certainly the aging F/A-18C fleet has proven that failures are fairly proportional to airframe wear, etc.

 

That said, even when the Tomcat was new, it was known for poor general reliability and frequent failures. It wasn't a total outlier compared to the similarly complex A-6E or even the simpler Phantom, but it was still, arguably, a low point for maintainability among USN aircraft. This makes sense since the F-14A /B were the last aircraft built around analog avionics which simply don't have the durability of digital avionics. The F-14 was perhaps the most mechanically complicated aircraft that the USN ever employed - this distinction comes with real drawbacks.

 

Even in 1980, when most pacific fleet F-14As were only 2-5 years old, RADM Paul Gillcrist referred to the maintainability and reliability of the F-14 as "terrible". And he is a strong advocate for the Tomcat!

 

Plus there are things like this: http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/09/13/Navy-blames-F-14A-crash-on-maintenance-problems/9382621662400/

 

Open loop bleeding of the hydraulic systems every time they are exposed to the air is an ideal standard but one that is not practically attainable in any F-14A squadron ashore or afloat,'

 

'The practical limitation of this standard has been recognized throughout the F-14A community. ... The deficiencies in F-14 hydraulic system servicing procedures throughout the community have been clearly identified and must be corrected,'

 

The hydraulic system was a weak point and per the US Navy, couldn't be adequately serviced under operational conditions. I'm not sure if it was better for the F-14D, but it certainly was a major issue for the F-14A/B.

 

To me, the F-14 is a bit like a Shakespearean character: mighty strengths, but significant faults! It makes the aircraft an excellent topic for a simulation or story telling since life in the F-14 certainly was eventful, even during normal operations. But these faults also tarnished the aircraft's image over time and no doubt added to crew stress. It's easy to see how the F-14 could have so many passionate supporters and still many vocal detractors. :)

 

-Nick

 

PS - All of that said, the F-14A/B/D could be maintained to a high standard with excellent mission availability rates. VF-154 in 2003 (equipped with F-14As), operating the oldest F-14s in the fleet, had a mission readiness and sortie completion rate higher than any of the F/A-18C squadrons in the airwing. F-14A squadrons in the mid-late 1980s averaged deployed full mission capable rates (FMC) and mission capable rates (MC) in the 80s and 90s respectively. So I'm not saying that the F-14 was a total mess, but it demanded much of its maintainers and supply chain than subsequent aircraft.

Edited March 4, 2017 by BlackLion213
Addendum

[turkeydriver]

Agree on most of your points but stress that Paul Gilcrest's book pointed to a poor supply system, a poor engine, and a poorly prepared maintenance standard training. When I talk to maintainers who used superglue to keep AWG-9 R/T CCAs in place it blows my mind that they don't understand how it caused so many more problems. The F-18s initial success is that it was designed simpler in many ways, to circumvent maintenance induced problems. It is a proven metric across worldwide aviation maintenance that the more maintenance an aircraft requires- the more faults will be induced and the system as a whole will suffer. After 20+ years as a Navy maintainer, I'm convinced at least half of the Tomcat's maintenance troubles were induced by the standard of the time period, and the other half by the complexity of the aircraft itself.

To RADM Gilcrest's credit, an entire air wing of F-14's on a carrier with a supply chain and maintenance team dedicated to that one T/M/S would have a much higher readiness rate than a single F-14 squadron with 10 deployed jets on a carrier with 3 Hornet units, a Prowler/Growler unit, E-2C, H-60 etc. Once the Navy killed the F-14 in the early 1990s, the blue water side never wanted to pay another dime to support it when they had the opinion their Destroyers could perform the fleet air defense mission better and use 1.5 hour cycles with sortie generating Hornets (that wore out the launch and arresting gear, wasted overall fuel, and negated the effectiveness of a Nimitz class by half, but don't get me started)

 

[

 

I think we can reasonably guess that the EA-6B pilot's first cruise (when he made his Tomcat observations) was ~2000 based on a few bits of info. He described an Airwing with 2 F-14B squadrons, but no A-6E squadron (so after 1995). There was only one Airwing that operated two F-14B squadrons without an A-6E squadron - CVW-7 with VF-11 and VF-143 from 1999-2005.

 

So he probably garnered his impressions at the end of the Tomcat's career.

 

 

 

True and certainly the aging F/A-18C fleet has proven that failures are fairly proportional to airframe wear, etc.

 

That said, even when the Tomcat was new, it was known for poor general reliability and frequent failures. It wasn't a total outlier compared to the similarly complex A-6E or even the simpler Phantom, but it was still, arguably, a low point for maintainability among USN aircraft. This makes sense since the F-14A /B were the last aircraft built around analog avionics which simply don't have the durability of digital avionics. The F-14 was perhaps the most mechanically complicated aircraft that the USN ever employed - this distinction comes with real drawbacks.

 

Even in 1980, when most pacific fleet F-14As were only 2-5 years old, RADM Paul Gillcrist referred to the maintainability and reliability of the F-14 as "terrible". And he is a strong advocate for the Tomcat!

 

Plus there are things like this: http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/09/13/Navy-blames-F-14A-crash-on-maintenance-problems/9382621662400/

 

 

 

 

 

The hydraulic system was a weak point and per the US Navy, couldn't be adequately serviced under operational conditions. I'm not sure if it was better for the F-14D, but it certainly was a major issue for the F-14A/B.

 

To me, the F-14 is a bit like a Shakespearean character: mighty strengths, but significant faults! It makes the aircraft an excellent topic for a simulation or story telling since life in the F-14 certainly was eventful, even during normal operations. But these faults also tarnished the aircraft's image over time and no doubt added to crew stress. It's easy to see how the F-14 could have so many passionate supporters and still many vocal detractors. :)

 

-Nick

 

PS - All of that said, the F-14A/B/D could be maintained to a high standard with excellent mission availability rates. VF-154 in 2003 (equipped with F-14As), operating the oldest F-14s in the fleet, had a mission readiness and sortie completion rate higher than any of the F/A-18C squadrons in the airwing. F-14A squadrons in the mid-late 1980s averaged deployed full mission capable rates (FMC) and mission capable rates (MC) in the 80s and 90s respectively. So I'm not saying that the F-14 was a total mess, but it demanded much of its maintainers and supply chain than subsequent aircraft.

[FWind]

[

 

I think we can reasonably guess that the EA-6B pilot's first cruise (when he made his Tomcat observations) was ~2000 based on a few bits of info. He described an Airwing with 2 F-14B squadrons, but no A-6E squadron (so after 1995). There was only one Airwing that operated two F-14B squadrons without an A-6E squadron - CVW-7 with VF-11 and VF-143 from 1999-2005.

 

So he probably garnered his impressions at the end of the Tomcat's career.

 

 

 

True and certainly the aging F/A-18C fleet has proven that failures are fairly proportional to airframe wear, etc.

 

That said, even when the Tomcat was new, it was known for poor general reliability and frequent failures. It wasn't a total outlier compared to the similarly complex A-6E or even the simpler Phantom, but it was still, arguably, a low point for maintainability among USN aircraft. This makes sense since the F-14A /B were the last aircraft built around analog avionics which simply don't have the durability of digital avionics. The F-14 was perhaps the most mechanically complicated aircraft that the USN ever employed - this distinction comes with real drawbacks.

 

Even in 1980, when most pacific fleet F-14As were only 2-5 years old, RADM Paul Gillcrist referred to the maintainability and reliability of the F-14 as "terrible". And he is a strong advocate for the Tomcat!

 

Plus there are things like this: http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/09/13/Navy-blames-F-14A-crash-on-maintenance-problems/9382621662400/

 

 

 

 

 

The hydraulic system was a weak point and per the US Navy, couldn't be adequately serviced under operational conditions. I'm not sure if it was better for the F-14D, but it certainly was a major issue for the F-14A/B.

 

To me, the F-14 is a bit like a Shakespearean character: mighty strengths, but significant faults! It makes the aircraft an excellent topic for a simulation or story telling since life in the F-14 certainly was eventful, even during normal operations. But these faults also tarnished the aircraft's image over time and no doubt added to crew stress. It's easy to see how the F-14 could have so many passionate supporters and still many vocal detractors. :)

 

-Nick

 

PS - All of that said, the F-14A/B/D could be maintained to a high standard with excellent mission availability rates. VF-154 in 2003 (equipped with F-14As), operating the oldest F-14s in the fleet, had a mission readiness and sortie completion rate higher than any of the F/A-18C squadrons in the airwing. F-14A squadrons in the mid-late 1980s averaged deployed full mission capable rates (FMC) and mission capable rates (MC) in the 80s and 90s respectively. So I'm not saying that the F-14 was a total mess, but it demanded much of its maintainers and supply chain than subsequent aircraft.

 

some interest thing in 1978

[turkeydriver]

Great Find FWind!

[BlackLion213]

Agree on most of your points but stress that Paul Gilcrest's book pointed to a poor supply system, a poor engine, and a poorly prepared maintenance standard training. When I talk to maintainers who used superglue to keep AWG-9 R/T CCAs in place it blows my mind that they don't understand how it caused so many more problems. The F-18s initial success is that it was designed simpler in many ways, to circumvent maintenance induced problems. It is a proven metric across worldwide aviation maintenance that the more maintenance an aircraft requires- the more faults will be induced and the system as a whole will suffer. After 20+ years as a Navy maintainer, I'm convinced at least half of the Tomcat's maintenance troubles were induced by the standard of the time period, and the other half by the complexity of the aircraft itself.

To RADM Gilcrest's credit, an entire air wing of F-14's on a carrier with a supply chain and maintenance team dedicated to that one T/M/S would have a much higher readiness rate than a single F-14 squadron with 10 deployed jets on a carrier with 3 Hornet units, a Prowler/Growler unit, E-2C, H-60 etc. Once the Navy killed the F-14 in the early 1990s, the blue water side never wanted to pay another dime to support it when they had the opinion their Destroyers could perform the fleet air defense mission better and use 1.5 hour cycles with sortie generating Hornets (that wore out the launch and arresting gear, wasted overall fuel, and negated the effectiveness of a Nimitz class by half, but don't get me started)

 

I don't doubt your expertise on the matter and it seems that many of the F-14's maintenance challenges improved as Navy doctrine changed - at least in terms of mission readiness/availability.

 

I also agree that many may not realize how much changed with the Hornet. As you pointed out, the Hornet actually left performance on the table in exchange for new benchmarks in reliability, a rather unprecedented move compared to prior Navy fighters. But with it, the Navy also accepted a lot of operational challenges and performance concessions. The Navy almost didn't accept the Hornet as it didn't meet minimum specifications for acceleration in the approach configuration. Not to mention the real limitations in combat radius. The Hornet was the airframe that compelled the Navy to adopt a policy of greater inter-service cooperation/dependence - since the Hornet could not meet many of its obligations without USAF refueling assets.

 

It was funny that many Tomcat crews started their careers with the Tomcat being the fuel critical portion of the airwing only for it to have by far the longest legs by the end of its career....says a lot about the operational situation.

 

-Nick

 

PS - Nice bit of info!

 

some interest thing in 1978[ATTACH]158401[/ATTACH][ATTACH]158402[/ATTACH]

[JDarksword]

Nice article. Let me stress that the Prowlers were also 30-40 years old st the time that he was serving so he certainly wouldn't be a stranger to aircraft that were "out of their heyday". Another interesting story, I was talking to a Prowler guy and apparently they could totally jam the AWG-9 from either above or below ( can't remember which). RIP IRIAF Tomcats if we ever get a Prowler module (would love to see that happen)