F-14A and AGM-45

[riojax]

Looking for a good F-14A wallpaper i did see this photo:

https://nara.getarchive.net/media/bottom-right-side-view-of-an-f-14-tomcat-aircraft-in-flight-the-aircraft-is-a41dd9

 

As i can see this is a F-14A using the AGM-45 and this raises two questions.

 

Was the F-14A (and the F-14B) capable to use it?

Will be it modeled on the HB module?

[Blaze1]

That image has been mislabelled. The weapon in question is an AIM-7.

[Lieuie]

I think that's a sparrow instead of a shrike missile. You can tell from the fins.

[turkeydriver]

Yep the F-14 never carried the Shrike. Those are AIM-7s.

[QuiGon]

Yep the F-14 never carried the Shrike. Those are AIM-7s.

I actually wonder why? The Shrike is pretty much just a Sparrow with a different seeker. it is pre-programmed on the ground and doesn't require anything from the aicraft besides a launch command. So why didn't they implement the Shrike into the Tomcat? Was there really absolutly no need for such a capability, even though it would probably have required very little work to be adopted for the Tomcat?

[AH_Solid_Snake]

That's more of a political than practical question. Both the TFX and VFX programs were developed in a climate where the prior generation of fighters had been for a variety of reasons crippled by multi role thinking - using the technology of the late 1950s it was not possible to make a fighter jet also a capable bomber without seriously infringing on its primary role.

 

In these circumstances both the air force and the navy went for (at the time) an uncomfortably long period without upgrading their front line fighter, both retaining the F4 Phantom for longer than was desirable to the services.

 

As a result both services pushed for a new fighter tailored to their specific requirements, which would emerge as the F-14 and F-15. Both of these jets had a notional strike capability built in from the get-go at least in the form of software support and payload capacity.

 

Politically for the services however there could be no doubt that the fighter capability was being watered down again, as a result neither service qualified their respective aircraft for bomb carriage and any form of advanced targeting was quietly dropped or ignored.

 

For the first 20 years or so of the F-14, and for the entirety of the F-15A/C series the nascent strike capability was ignored as in the words of the services, something would have to have gone seriously wrong for either aircraft to find its only role dropping 10k lbs of dumb bombs on a target.

 

The Air Force only took strike seriously with the F-15 in the very late 1980s and the jets were only just operational with 1 fighter wing for deployment to the 1991 Gulf War, this was also developed and built as a different submodel of aircraft and was considered less an evolution of the F-15C, and more a replacement for the F-111.

 

For the Navy and the F-14 the demise of the A6 intruder combined with budget cuts in the late 1990s and competition for deck space, multi role became critical for the jet to survive. In a similar move as in the 1980s with the demise of the RA5C and its photo recon role, with the F-14 having a podded solution bolted on. With the A6 came the bolt on LANTIRN pod and the finding that with no serious air to air threat to compete with, the F14 was still superlative as a strike aircraft for PGMs.

 

For similar reasons, high risk delivery of Shrike or later HARM ARM missiles would be seen as a poor use of resources while the F-14 was a premier A-A fighter when other less capable (cheaper) platforms could perform the role.

 

By the time the F-14 community were casting around for additional roles the ARM mission was solidly taken by the Hornet, and upgrading / rewiring the F-14 for HARM would have been financially unviable.

[javelina1]

That's more of a political than practical question. Both the TFX and VFX programs were developed in a climate where the prior generation of fighters had been for a variety of reasons crippled by multi role thinking - using the technology of the late 1950s it was not possible to make a fighter jet also a capable bomber without seriously infringing on its primary role.

 

In these circumstances both the air force and the navy went for (at the time) an uncomfortably long period without upgrading their front line fighter, both retaining the F4 Phantom for longer than was desirable to the services.

 

As a result both services pushed for a new fighter tailored to their specific requirements, which would emerge as the F-14 and F-15. Both of these jets had a notional strike capability built in from the get-go at least in the form of software support and payload capacity.

 

Politically for the services however there could be no doubt that the fighter capability was being watered down again, as a result neither service qualified their respective aircraft for bomb carriage and any form of advanced targeting was quietly dropped or ignored.

 

For the first 20 years or so of the F-14, and for the entirety of the F-15A/C series the nascent strike capability was ignored as in the words of the services, something would have to have gone seriously wrong for either aircraft to find its only role dropping 10k lbs of dumb bombs on a target.

 

The Air Force only took strike seriously with the F-15 in the very late 1980s and the jets were only just operational with 1 fighter wing for deployment to the 1991 Gulf War, this was also developed and built as a different submodel of aircraft and was considered less an evolution of the F-15C, and more a replacement for the F-111.

 

For the Navy and the F-14 the demise of the A6 intruder combined with budget cuts in the late 1990s and competition for deck space, multi role became critical for the jet to survive. In a similar move as in the 1980s with the demise of the RA5C and its photo recon role, with the F-14 having a podded solution bolted on. With the A6 came the bolt on LANTIRN pod and the finding that with no serious air to air threat to compete with, the F14 was still superlative as a strike aircraft for PGMs.

 

For similar reasons, high risk delivery of Shrike or later HARM ARM missiles would be seen as a poor use of resources while the F-14 was a premier A-A fighter when other less capable (cheaper) platforms could perform the role.

 

By the time the F-14 community were casting around for additional roles the ARM mission was solidly taken by the Hornet, and upgrading / rewiring the F-14 for HARM would have been financially unviable.

 

 

always interesting to come across these info tidbits and insights. learn a bit. thanks for the post.

[turkeydriver]

I actually wonder why? The Shrike is pretty much just a Sparrow with a different seeker. it is pre-programmed on the ground and doesn't require anything from the aicraft besides a launch command. So why didn't they implement the Shrike into the Tomcat? Was there really absolutly no need for such a capability, even though it would probably have required very little work to be adopted for the Tomcat?

 

Your Shrike had limited range and could not be carried in an AIm-7 recess -it needed a separate adapter. It also required the launch aircraft to be in range of the SAM site. It was an old weapon by he time the F-14 started maturing and AGM-88 was the standard by then. This was tested for fit and carry on the F-14D but never funded for development further.

[Dudikoff]

I actually wonder why? The Shrike is pretty much just a Sparrow with a different seeker. it is pre-programmed on the ground and doesn't require anything from the aicraft besides a launch command. So why didn't they implement the Shrike into the Tomcat? Was there really absolutly no need for such a capability, even though it would probably have required very little work to be adopted for the Tomcat?

 

I guess the question should be why would they? I.e. in which scenario would a Tomcat get to need and use such a weapon back when Shrike was used (with like 2-3 attack squadrons next to them)?

[AH_Solid_Snake]

I guess the question should be why would they? I.e. in which scenario would a Tomcat get to need and use such a weapon back when Shrike was used (with like 2-3 attack squadrons next to them)?

 

Very much this, especially when those other attack squadrons would be A7 or F-18s which are more than capable of the Shrike employment while being cheaper if they suffer losses. At the same time you are wasting an F-14 and its unique FAD / AA capabilities that could be better spent on CAP.