US-Russian Helicopter Employment

[Ginsu80]

Hello to all,

 

I was recently reading a post on this forum bemoaning the KA-50's lack of a Radar Warning Receiver and just had to chime with some information on the differences in deployment of attack helicopter between east and west. The idea of using attack helicopters in a deep strike role is really an American invention pioneered in the 1980s and brought to culmination during the first gulf war. In a famous attack Apaches attacked two radar sites and opened up an air corridor for the subsequent air war in Iraq. This is a prime example of how US helicopters are employed, though of course they are not pigeon holed into such a specific method. The fact remains that the US Army views helicopter aviation primarily as giving the commander the ability to affect the battlespace behind the front lines.

 

Russian helicopter aviation however more closely resembles the usage of attack helicopters by the United States Marine Corps in that they perform the role of close air support of troops near the forward edge of battle area and much less on striking units behind enemy lines. This is as much a doctrinal difference as it is natural progression of tactics since the second world war. Russian aviation has always been a product of tactics used in WWII where aircraft were utilized in a support role to troops on the ground, whereas American airpower has been heavily influenced by the strategic bombing campaign. Of course the changing face of combat in the past decade is heavily influencing tactics on both sides, the basic ideas reflect an institutional difference how each side aproaches the same battlefield. Of course, thats just my 2 cents.

[EvilBivol-1]

.

[Ginsu80]

Not sure if that is a good period, or a bad one. Anyone looking for information on tactics, techniques and procedure for attack helicopter employment I highly encourage you to visit the Federation of American Scientists website. You can download FM 1-112 Attack Helicopter Operations. I would post a link but am not sure if it's allowed.

[EvilBivol-1]

That was a good period. I'm in full agreement with your post.

[Ginsu80]

Again I to anyone interested in obtaining the actual pubs used by the Army I recommend FAS. Here is a quote from FM 1-112 to support my point.

 

"Depth. The ATKHB can attack the enemy forces anywhere on the

battlefield. Commanders must see and use the entire battlefield to strike the enemy and

prevent it from concentrating forces at a point of its choice. The speed with which attack

helicopters can mass combat power at chosen points in the battle area allows the force

commander to influence the battle to a depth that would otherwise be beyond his reach."

 

If anyone has access to the Russian Pubs I would love to be able to compare them.

[EvilBivol-1]

From what I've been told, the Soviets did not evaluate RWR equipment as part of the combined arms tactics on their helicopters. There was apparently even a statistic, where the average lifespan of a helicopter crew on the battlefield was estimated as 12 minutes, or 1.5 destroyed tanks.

 

While we're on the subject, there has also been some debate on this forum about the Russians' employment of hover techniques in battle. Two pilots have now told me that weapons employment from a hover is considered one of the standard techniques and was taught and practiced in at least the training centers, but less so in operational squadrons. Further, the technical limitations of Soviet helicopters and weapons systems limited the practical application of hover techniques and largely eliminated use of "pop up" maneuvers. As I understood, this was mainly due to manual guidance and direct helicopter-to-target missile trajectory (as opposed to pop up missile trajectory). Also, because the missile itself spirals, a minimum altitude of 10 meters has to be maintained over the terrain or the missile might strike the ground, which apparently happened quite often.

 

Despite this, there have apparently been some cases of successful hover employment in combat. In one example, an Mi-24 flight used the hover tactic for over a week to engage point targets with ATGMs in Chechnya. They were awarded medals for their performance.

Edited April 2, 2009 by EvilBivol-1

[Giant2111]

I would love, to find and read more about russian chopper tacs. As there is so less konwn for me, I would like to adept it for the BS-module.

[uhoh7]

Hello to all,

 

I was recently reading a post on this forum bemoaning the KA-50's lack of a Radar Warning Receiver and just had to chime with some information on the differences in deployment of attack helicopter between east and west. The idea of using attack helicopters in a deep strike role is really an American invention pioneered in the 1980s and brought to culmination during the first gulf war. In a famous attack Apaches attacked two radar sites and opened up an air corridor for the subsequent air war in Iraq. This is a prime example of how US helicopters are employed, though of course they are not pigeon holed into such a specific method. The fact remains that the US Army views helicopter aviation primarily as giving the commander the ability to affect the battlespace behind the front lines.

 

Russian helicopter aviation however more closely resembles the usage of attack helicopters by the United States Marine Corps in that they perform the role of close air support of troops near the forward edge of battle area and much less on striking units behind enemy lines. This is as much a doctrinal difference as it is natural progression of tactics since the second world war. Russian aviation has always been a product of tactics used in WWII where aircraft were utilized in a support role to troops on the ground, whereas American airpower has been heavily influenced by the strategic bombing campaign. Of course the changing face of combat in the past decade is heavily influencing tactics on both sides, the basic ideas reflect an institutional difference how each side aproaches the same battlefield. Of course, thats just my 2 cents.

 

 

Interesting, since many historians now seem to feel the strategic bombing was largely ineffectual, and the best use of the large bombers came in normandy which might been called CAS. On the other hand, the IL2 was greatly feared by german forces.

 

One thing I'm not sure is settled is how direct attacks on MBTs were considered in helicopter development on the respective sides.

[Ginsu80]

Interesting, since many historians now seem to feel the strategic bombing was largely ineffectual, and the best use of the large bombers came in normandy which might been called CAS. On the other hand, the IL2 was greatly feared by german forces.

 

One thing I'm not sure is settled is how direct attacks on MBTs were considered in helicopter development on the respective sides.

 

It's not so much a direct relationship between helicopters and strategic bombing as it is a much more subtle influence in tactics that have developed since. In fact, if you want to go back further still you can draw a line from modern helicopter tactics to cavalry tactics and infer a relationship from these as well. Where most other nations of the time utilized cavalry formations as a massed shock unit, civil war cavalry generals are known for employing their units in a manner that closely relembles the basic employment of helicopter formations on the modern battlefield. Of course I am in no way attempting to equate the two on an even plane, but rather pointing out an interesting relationship between the two.

 

As for the development of the helicopter by the US into a tank killer, in the US you must really go back to the Vietnam war. Actually, let me take you back first to 1948 and the key west agreement. This agreement attempted to define the respective service roles of the branches. This agreement, among some others, basically relagated the helicopter to the mission of observation and evacuation. Any type of armed air role, including helicopters fell into the purview of the USAF. The Air Force, however, was rather uninterested in the use of the helicopter as an offensive weapon. Which is why the United States waited untill the Vietnam War to begin arming it's helicopters. There are several instances in fact of Army officers advocating the use of the helicopter as a gun platform in the Korean war but there was reluctance to be seen as violating the percieved service roles and perhaps losing the new Army aviation to the Air Force.

 

Now the Vietnam war saw the first major use by the US of the helicopter in an offensive role, and ushered in the United States' first dedicated attack helicopter the AH1. This all dovetails nicely with the advent of precision munitions at the end of the conflict. Shortly thereafter you have helicopter carrying the first guided anti tank weapons such as the TOW for the US and the role of the helicopter as a dedicated tank buster began in earnest.

[theox]

This is an excellent thread! Keep the info coming.

[Ginsu80]

I have been pounding the "tubes" trying to get a line on reliable information concerning the employment of russian attack helicopters. Specifically their tactics and methodology. Sadly no luck. But I did find an interesting note on wikipedia under the attack helicopter entry. Granted wikipedia is not the most learned of sources. It matches nicely with what we have been talking about.

 

"

Lessons learned about limitations of independent attack helicopters

 

On March 24, 2003, US V Corps launched a raid, by 32 Apache helicopters, against Medina Division armor in Karbala, with an attack plan that would fly through the Karbala area. "Army officials now believe that the aviation assembly areas the Army established in the Iraqi desert had been under surveillance by enemy observers, who noticed battle preparations on the night of the 24th." The corps commander told reporters that post-strike analysis revealed that the Iraqi observers had alerted the defense using cellular telephones.[7][3]

As they approached, the power grid in Karbala was shut off, and the night went dark. The Apaches were taken under heavy antiaircraft fire. One was shot down (with the crew captured by Iraqi forces. They were later recovered by US forces), and enough of the others were damaged such that the raid was aborted.

Two days later, the Army again used Apaches to carry out another nighttime deep attack. Tactics used, however, were quite different than those on March 24.[4] The damage done, "The results of the attack were respectable, if not spectacular: seven Iraqi air defense guns destroyed, along with three artillery systems, five radars, and 25 vehicles or other weapons systems. Not one Apache was shot down. Shortly afterward, the 3rd Infantry Division slashed through the Medina on its way toward Baghdad."[7]

On March 26, other systems supported the attack, beginning with a four-minute artillery bombardment to distract the gunners. As the helicopters moved through the Najaf area, the lights again went off, and the intensity of antiaircraft fire increased as they approached the target.

Two different things were done. "The Apaches fired back on the move—rather than using the Army’s typical tactic of hovering over the battlefield. That made them harder to hit from the ground but reduced their accuracy." Also, fixed-wing fighters protected the Apaches' flanks and suppressed more air defense. As the helicopters moved in, they radioed the locations of air defense targets to the fighters.[7]

The March 24 raid is still being analyzed, with Air Force officers suggesting that the AH-64 alone is simply not effective for deep attack without support from conventional aircraft. Other analysts think this mission was poorly planned and the Iraqis had good intelligence on their route of attack. Nevertheless, the Apache mission generally changed from deep attack to direct support of troops.

One of the most important lessons learned about the abortive raid on Iraqi tanks in Karbala, Iraq, was that the AH-64 is resilient enough to function effectively even when damaged. It was also made clear, however, that attack helicopters, without coordinated SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense), cannot penetrate an alerted defense."

[2GvSAP_Dart]

I think part of it is what each side thinks the helicopter replaces in classical warfare.

 

For the US, it's easy - it replaces the light horse. Attack helicopters punch (or slip) through the gaps and exploit the rear areas. It's completely telegraphed and written about in those terms.

 

For the Russians, it's more like grenadiers making the hole and exploiting it - or giving extra punch to the defenders, if I'm reading how they employed the IL-2 in the GPW.

[Chelco]

"The Apaches fired back on the move—rather than using the Army’s typical tactic of hovering over the battlefield. That made them harder to hit from the ground but reduced their accuracy."

 

Great point. Thanks for posting this.

 

During the first day of Operation Anaconda (March 2002), the pilots of "Killer Spades", A Company, 3-101 AVN, learned the hard way that the fire from hover technique they trained for was way too dangerous against the Taliban's ground fire. CW3 Bob Carr conducted the first "running fire" withe his 30 mm cannon.

 

Cheers,

[Chelco]

I have been pounding the "tubes" trying to get a line on reliable information concerning the employment of russian attack helicopters. Specifically their tactics and methodology. Sadly no luck. But I did find an interesting note on wikipedia under the attack helicopter entry. Granted wikipedia is not the most learned of sources. It matches nicely with what we have been talking about ...

 

Ginsu80, the attack you posted about was conducted by the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment and 101st Attack Aviation.

 

A more detailed analysis can be found in "On Point".

 

Take a look here.

 

Cheers,

[Ginsu80]

Just an interesting point I want to note. The two pilots rescued by Marines were rescued by 3rd LAR out of 29 Palms California. There is a mural comemerating the event, or so I am told. This is a very interesting article, I am going to have to take some time to read it. One of the things I am amazed at, and if I can ever find the time to research properly and publish is how fast tactics techniques and procedures are being modified do to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Not to mention the rate at which new equipment is being fielded by US forces. I believe it constitutes a huge shift in both how we fight, and with what we fight with. I must admit my interaction with aviation forces in country is rather limited, but I have noticed and increased focus on smaller elements and working closer with ground troops. However I can not explain this as a consequence of lessons learned, or simply a shift into low intensity operations from the more conventional opening stages of the war. Also, I must admit a personal bias, if you haven't guessed I began my military career in the Marine Corps, and have always believed that the army places too high an emphasis on shaping future engagements with massed formations of helicopters. I have always preferred the Marine Corps' philosophy of close support of ground units with small teams of rotary winged aircraft. But I have to admit that this is as much of a personal bias as a professional belief, and the argument is there for both. Now if I can only find a reliable after action report or summary of helicopter operations from Chechneya or South Ossetia. I want to try and get a feel for the Russian side of things and I find the tactics section of the manual to be rather less that up to the task.

[uhoh7]

Great posts, but the point which interests me is: was the the KA-50 concieved to attack MBTs or not?

 

Obviously the improvement in NATO MBT armor, as seen in the the M1A2 and the Leopard, and the failure of russian forces to improve the Vikhr, mean the in the real world the KA-50 might be relegated to simple counter insurgency operations.

 

But I suspect the KA-50 was oringally designed to counter NATO forces in the Fulda Gap, and had the USSR survived, would have been developed in an anti-tank role---though not precluding other deployments.

 

Had the arms race continued, I postulate that the Vikhr would have been upgraded to deal with the M1A2, and it is my impression that direct attacks on MBTs are within the vision of the original KA-50 design team.

 

This is pure speculation, I'm just wondering how others feel about it.

 

As to RWR, we know that this was tested on at least one KA-50 prototype, and had the Blackshark gone into mass production, we would have to think that RWR would have been included-----if the KA-50 was to be regarded as a potent force in conventional war.

 

Of course in the real world, the effort to restore order in a failed state has superceded the conflict between industrialised land armies. The apache, once a tank killer, is now supporting isolated units deep in hostile terrian. THe optics on the AH64 today, combined with rapid deployment, have brought the machine to the forefront in afghanistan. One need only watch the many videos on liveleak.com to understand the effectiveness of the apache in current operations.

 

The Ka50 is hobbled by a single pilot in similar operations, and this presents the mission designer in DCS with a delema: simulate counter insurgency, or anti-tank frontline combat? In either case the KA-50 needs controling FAC to truly be effective.

 

My own answer to this is based on the Georgian war: The Russians backed away from the state of the art for two reasons, 1) they did not want to reveal their most effective tactics to NATO, and 2) it was not necessary to do so. Hence the conficlts I've tried to model ar more in the order of the Iraq/Iran war, than a hypothectical NATO/Russian confrontation. I simply do not believe the tools are present to model the latter in DCS at present. Which is not to say that you can't have some some very merry, interesting missions.

Edited April 3, 2009 by uhoh7

[Ginsu80]

Your right this topic has swerved slightly askew of what I originally intended. As to the development cycle of the KA-50, from what I can gleam from online sources was basically a development of attack helicopters with the idea of replacing the venerable HIND, much like the MI-28 HAVOK. Unlike the HAVOK however, the Black Shark appears to be a victim of it's only uniqueness and economic circumstances otherwise today it would probably be seen in much greater numbers. Just look at the RAH-66 project on the American side and you can see what may have happened to the Apache if it's development cycle had taken it through the mid 90s instead of the 80s.

 

Now specifically on the subject of a RWR I think it's very likely that it would not have been included on production Black Sharks, despite being tested. I feel that American designs differ due to design philosophy, as untill recently the Apache was viewed as a deep strike option to open up the battle space to higher commands, where as from what I understand of Russian operations, and it is not a great understanding, but as I understand it they operate thier helicopters less as a penetration weapon and more of a direct manuever/fire support option employed in support of ground units. I can speak directly to the lack of emphasis in the US Army of helicopters as a close support option. In 4 years of service with the Marines I participated in 4 seperate training missions involving helicopters in a live fire enviornment. In 5 years of service with the Army, including 2 years on active duty during deployments I have yet to ever have, train with, or at the very least include in planning operations the possiblity of helicopter support. That isn't to say it is not done at all. It just isn't emphasized the same in the two branches.

 

You do pose a very good point on the inclusion of a FAC with the Black Shark. I have been reading that the KA-52 Edrogan, sorry if that is misspelled, is being pitched as a recon element to the KA-50 attack element. Many countries have employed this methodology in thier operations and it is an interesting operational concept but I am not sure if it is one accurate, or two could be modeled successfully with the campaign software. Correct me if I am wrong but only the aircraft in your own flight can data-link information to you correct? I think in reality the data-link system is capable of recieving information from many sources, including those outside of your flight. Much like the American FBCB2 or blue force tracker. If this is true a KA-52 or other recon element with supperior optics and a smaller work load could download data to the Black Shark attack element and this may be what is envisioned for the future.

 

As for the improvements in NATO MBT armor, in the end history always proves out that the weapon beats out armor. It is true that the chobbam armor on NATO tanks is considered by many to be nigh invulnerable to enemy fire, but I can assure however that the insurgents have found ways to defeat even that, and with far less resources than are available to a nation state. Even the humble Vikhr, which I have been told by armor officers could never ever penetrate the front armor on an Abrams, can still score kills by hitting the top, or rear armor. In warfare if 75 percent of your armor becomes a mobility kill on the battlefield you have still lost 75 percent of your mobile firepower and are no longer to affect the battlefield outside of your current position. And I think your are correct, the simple expedient of modifying the Vikhr for top attack, or even applying the lessons learned to a new weapon would probably see the KA-50 with the ability to destroy all Nato armor.

[AlphaOneSix]

It just isn't emphasized the same in the two branches.

 

I don't think it's so much a difference between the two branches, but the difference within different types of units in the Army itself. I served for 6 years in an AH-64A battalion, the first two with the 2nd Armored Division (and attached to the 1st Cavalry Division during Ops. Desert Shield/Storm) and 4 years with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). In the 2AD and 1CD, attack helicopters were generally regarded as a maneuver element on their own, which is incredibly obvious if you read FM 1-112, Attack Helicopter Operations, which blatantly states as the role of the Attack Helicopter Battalion:

 

The ATKHB is an aerial maneuver unit usually employed as a battalion.

It conducts attack, reconnaissance, and security operations that complement other

maneuver forces. The ATKHB enables the supported commander to mass combat power

rapidly at the decisive time and place to affect a battle's outcome. The commander must

integrate the ATKHB into his tactical maneuver plan with other maneuver units. When

employed with other combat assets, the ATKHB can strike the enemy where and when it

is most vulnerable.

 

Nowhere in there does it say that the Attack Helicopter battalion's job is to support other ground forces. This is because the Army viewed attack helicopters as their own maneuver element, just like tanks or even infantry...the main difference being their speed.

 

Fast forward to the 101st. In the 101st, deep operations were still there, but the emphasis was clearly on support of the ground elements. Things like reconnaissance, LZ preparation, armed escort, and close air support were what we trained for almost exclusively, and we worked very closely with our ground counterparts.

 

In the 2AD and 1CD, missions were almost always at the company level or higher. In other words, we would launch all 6 of our Apaches for a mission (Apache companies nowadays have 8 Apaches). In the 101st, we would routinely only launch two aircraft at a time to perform missions.

[Chelco]

+1 Rep to everybody for this interesting discussion.

 

It fascinates me is that we are having this discussion as a spin-off from a simulator. I think it speaks volumes of the quality of DCS Black Shark.

 

Without doubt, attack helicopter doctrines and tactics among the major military superpowers are in a state of constant flux. Studying, revising and ultimately changing military doctrine is supposed to happen through all combat arms, just take a look at the US Cavalry during the last war in Iraq. But when it comes to attack helicopters it is more evident.

 

And then, the even more fertile ground of ideas for helicopter vs helicopter combat ...

 

Take a look at this article:

 

Air Defense with an Attitude: Helicopter vs. Helicopter Combat

(once you get to the link, click into the proxy URL and it will download a pdf document)

 

That article is not new, but yeah has some nice info on the use of the Ka-50 in the anti-air role. Enjoy.

[Chelco]

Just wanted to post a screenshot of the actual article I posted above. The Ka-50 looks so damn beautiful.

 

[EvilBivol-1]

moved the Ka-50/RWR posts here:

http://forums.eagle.ru/showthread.php?p=602399#post602399

[ObvilionLost]

In most wars USSR/Russian adopted their tactics to the battlefield where they are fighting this is why its very hard to find the "official" tactics. Stuff you will find is probably useless, especially the "text book" tactics because they are Soviet style. Get tanks, helicopters, and infantry to advance in big line formation. :music_whistling:

[Chelco]

Good point, but in any case where are these "official" tactics?

 

I wanted to add that Soviet doctrine at both the tactical and operational levels was not and is likely not even today as inflexible and relying only on sheer mass as we have been told so many times.

 

For example, the Soviets have been using the so-called "Forward Detachment" (a regimental/brigade sized formation advancing before the main force with pure combat missions instead of just security or reconnaissance) since the early days of WWII. Commanders of these "Forward Detachments" had to be very skilled and creative when it comes to tactics. A very detailed analysis of Soviet "Forward Detachments" can be found in Col. Glantz's "The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Maneuver".

 

One must not forget that during the 20th century, the first military on the earth to come up with the concept of operational level of war was the Russian.