An interesting update to the earlier article on the relative strengths of Australia's present and future fighter options when comared to modern SU-27 derivatives purchased by regional powers.
You may have seen it - I'd read the earlier one linked from here, but hadn't seen this one.
http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-Flanker.html
Regarding the JSF:
What happens when the existing OLS-27/30/31 series IRST is replaced with a newer longwave Focal Plane Array device - such as a single chip QWIP device? The result will be a capability to engage opposing aircraft under clear sky conditions regardless of RCS reduction measures. While the supercruising F/A-22A can defeat such techniques by kinematics alone, fighters in the teen series performance envelope will have to contend with BVR shots using the R-27ET, R-77, R-77T and R-77M cued by the thermal imaging search and track set. Similar issues arise with the deployment of modern ESM receivers on the Su-30MK, analogous to a number of existing Western systems. The Su-30MK series can then launch long range BVR missiles such as the R-27ET, R-77T with infrared seekers, or the R-27EP and R-77P with passive radio-frequency anti-radiation seekers. If cued by such sensors or offboard sources, these weapons will permit the Su-30MK to engage the JSF despite the JSF's good forward sector radar stealth performance (Author).
A clean JSF will have the advantage of a very low X-band radar signature in the forward quarter which will significantly degrade the Sukhoi's otherwise overwhelming radar power-aperture advantage over other types. However, the JSF is not designed to be a hot supersonic performer and like the F/A-18s will need to generously use afterburner to effect an intercept against a rapidly penetrating Sukhoi.
This exposes the JSF to detection and tracking by a newer technology IRST, and engagement by a long burn heatseeking or optically guided AAMs such as the R-27ET, R-77T or likely future variants with imaging seekers analogous to the AIM-9R and ASRAAM seekers. With the latter seekers an R-77/R-77M acquires many of the capabilities of the RAAF's superlative ASRAAM, especially jam resistance, but in a long range missile with datalink midcourse guidance. A new two-colour infrared seeker with 10.8 nautical mile acquisition range has been announced by the Arsenal infrared systems house, ostensibly for use on the R-77 series. Professionals might contemplate that these are not 1980s 36T series seekers.
Russia and the Ukraine have a competent infrared systems industry - e.g. Cyclone JSC recently described their QWIP single chip thermal imagers with 128x128 and 320x256 resolution, competitive against the latest EU technology and suitable for missile seekers and thermal imaging IRST detectors. Therefore an advanced derivative of the OLS-30/31 series with capabilities similar to the Eurofighter PIRATE thermal imaging IRST, but with better detection range, will be implementable with Russian hardware in the latter half of this decade given the current rate of evolution.
In the beam and aft sectors the JSF may be also quite vulnerable to an active or semiactive radar guided missile shot - its beam and aft sector radar signature reduction is much less refined than that in the forward sector. Another factor for the JSF is its radar emission - making it vulnerable to a long range shot with an anti-radiation seeker equipped R-27P, R-27EP, R-77P or when eventually deployed, ramjet R-77MP. While some Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) techniques may reduce vulnerability to anti-radiation missiles, radar modes for closing missile shots typically require high update rates and favour the anti-radiation seeker. Since the R-77/R-77M has a midcourse inertial package - Agat are developing FOG (fibre) gyro technology to avoid dependency on Western Ring Laser Gyro technology - transient loss of the JSF radar emission may not defeat the R-77P/R-77MP - or late model R-27P/EP.
Soviet and more recent Russian BVR doctrine has always emphasised firing pairs of missiles, one with heat-seeking guidance and one with radar guidance, to defeat countermeasures. With the option of active radar, heat-seeking and anti-radiation seekers, and by the end of the decade an imaging seeker, the result is a very lethal cocktail from a defensive countemeasures perspective - a defending fighter may only have datalink transmissions to provide warning and no indication of the seeker mix on the inbound missiles. With three of the four seeker technologies passive defeating such weapons is not trivial.
On publicly available data the JSF is likely to be detected and engaged by an N011M ESA equipped Su-30 inside the 10 to 20 nautical miles head on range envelope, unless the JSF can get the first shot off and successfully kill the Sukhoi. If the Sukhoi can close with the JSF, all bets are off on the JSF's ability to survive the close in engagement.
Another thing I'd never seen mentioned - the R-27P / EP passive anti radar version of r-27 http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/archive/index.php?t-24787.html