I have been studying Cold War attack tactics for a long time and consider my information to be fairly reliable.
First of all, there is a flaw in the question that you have already noticed. The Fulda Gap was never the main target of attack, but only for the southern half of Germany. The south is very hilly and therefore difficult for mechanized forces to access. However, the Fulda Gap was the best route to reach the lowlands “quickly” and with as little distance as possible through valleys along the A5 and A66 Autobahn, which include a junction and large cities (Frankfurt, Mannheim, Mainz, etc.)
Now for the really interesting part. As you already mentioned, the main point of attack was the North German lowlands or the NORTHAG sector. There are several weak points that were identified by the Warsaw Pact (WaPa for short). These are as follows:
- Geography
- Topology
- Combat strength
And particularly interesting is the combination of four corps and four nations! In the Fulda Gap, mainly the USA and West Germany.
The WaPa planned to launch two large-scale attacks almost simultaneously, with the aim of destroying the V and VII US Corps at CENTAG and the German 1st Corps and British 2nd Corps at NORTHAG in encirclement battles. In order to be successful against the forces of NORTHAG, the first wave of Warsaw Pact troops would have to strike through the combat zone of the Dutch 1st Corps on the left flank. This was intended to drive a wedge between the Dutch 1st Corps and the neighboring German 1st Corps and exploit the fact that the Dutch forces first had to be transported hundreds of kilometers from Holland to the inner-German border.
This would allow the 3rd assault group to move across the town of Uelzen from the Wendland Bay (small bay west of the 20th MSD and 19th MSD), roughly as shown on the map. The WaPa's main focus was on the logistical problems of the Dutch. By quickly reaching the Weser River as a natural barrier, the British and German corps would be cut off. With the Harz Mountains directly south of Braunschweig (border between the British and German corps), it is a deliberately chosen bottleneck, limiting the British in terms of troop deployment and evasion.
This is evidenced by the drawing of the “Braunschweig operation plan" (old map), which was essential to prevent early encirclement. Especially with its southern orientation instead of northern orientation. Incidentally, the danger of encirclement was not only known to the WaPa, but also to NATO, which is why the British and Germany set up extra reserve divisions.
Additionally, the map with the attack arrows corresponds 1:1 with the scenarios practiced in the large-scale exercise Certain Strike/Reforger 87 and many other exercises!
Don't worry, the “Braunschweig Operation Plan” has long since been declassified and is publicly available in the German Federal Archives
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