CheckGear

How does that compare to other U.S. fighters? I ask because maintenance was a big issue in terms of why the F-14 was retired early. It was unique in the sense it wasn't a cheap platform up front and it was also expensive to keep in the air.

Thanks for all the information! This is all very enlightening. One more, somewhat unrelated, question. Anyone know the man hours required to maintain the F-14 and keep them flying?

Wow, so the initial Tomcats didn't even have an IRST either, huh? What was the ALQ-100 used for?

I know the TCS physically replaced the IRST, but did the F-14 retain some sort of infrared-tracking capability after the change? I know the F-14D featured a combination TCS/IRST, so I'm referring to the F-14A and B. And when did the TCS first come into service?

Ha ha, conversations tend to get sidetracked easily when you deal with over-thinkers like us. :megalol: I wouldn't lose any sleep over something I'd hardly notice, but it's good to know that LNS are paying that close attention to detail. It makes me confident that they're going to do as good a job in all areas of the module. From what little I've seen, I'm insanely impressed.

I know people are sticklers for detail here. So am I. I just didn't know they'd make a big deal out of something you'd hardly noticed unless you looked real hard for it or knew about it. I just wish they'd also be sticklers for detail when it comes to things like campaigns, sorties and theaters... :dunno:

LOL I didn't know the refresh rate of the HUD would cause so much controversy!

I noticed that too! That's the most realistic aircraft physics I've ever seen! TOTALLY AUTHENTIC, DUDE!!!

There's a whole lot of distance between "might" and "will." A lot of folks don't appreciate just how different of an aircraft the "Super" Tomcat was from the Tomcat. It's the same amount of difference that exists between the F-15A/B/C/D and the F-15E. If they ever do make an F-14D (which I hope they do), it's going to take a whole lot of work to make it happen.

This was a demonstration of a module that's still very much in development. Give them a break. From what I can gather, they're practically re-creating the physical universe.

Hopefully, this silences the "WHEN IS IT COMING OUT" mob, at least for a little bit. Clearly, the model is under development and actively being worked on. Something we all need to remember is that they're not just going for authenticity - they're going for full-blown fidelity. It's not enough to give us a feel for what flying the Tomcat was like, which is what most sims go for. Instead, they're going to essentially resurrecting the F-14 in an environment that is essentially a copy of the world we live in, physics and all. This requires a level of time and effort well beyond anything we've seen in the development of any simulator in the past and, therefore, will take a whole heck of a lot of time. So I say once again - LNS, please take all the time you need!

You know, because you mentioned it, I can definitely hear Trump saying what I said, awkward hand gestures and all! :crazy:

PEOPLE! The F-14 module will be completed when its completed. And when its completed, its going to blow our minds. It's going to be so good, it'd be worth waiting a lifetime for!

Thanks for posting it. It was an enjoyable and harrowing read. Goes to show, real-life flying is nothing like that of a flight simulator. It takes fitness, skill, and mental toughness, otherwise, it takes you for a ride. Just like a Russian-built plane. :P

For all of you impatient folk, recall the masterpiece that was Falcon 4.0. Or, more to the point, the fact it wasn't when it was first released. The game was probably the buggiest release I've ever witnessed. The fact it was a niche game and had such a specific audience is probably what saved it from a financial perspective. Any other game of any other genre that stumbled out the door like would've seen it's sales suffer. Even after the first major patch of the game was applied, the game still had a number of unresolved errors. The franchise really started to right itself when Graphsim re-released it as Allied Force but at it's core was still the same game as the one released in 1998. I loved Falcon 4.0 as much as anybody else, but I had far too difficult of a time getting it off the ground to fully enjoy it the way we were supposed to. The point is, let things take time. Development hell doesn't seem to be an issue when it comes to the DCS franchise, so it'll be released when it's ready. I'm sure there'll be plenty of bugs that still need to be fixed, but the idea is to have a module that is playable upon release and close enough to what the designers intended to have for us.

Given the complexity of electronic warfare, it's an intensely difficult thing to simulate. What I'd really like to see is a simulation that accurately depicts the disparity in skill and training between First World and Third World militaries.

I'm not sure if Soviet strategy in the Far East differed all that much from that in Europe, but we do know the bastion strategy was preeminent in the Pacific Fleet as it was in the Northern Fleet. As a result, I don't find the "take the fight to enemy" hypothesis all that convincing. Even if a sustained defense of Alaska is logistically unfeasible, a sustained Soviet assault on Alaska is far less feasible. Power projection was simply not the Soviet military's forte. This is not to say they wouldn't have attempted interdiction in the Pacific; they most definitely would've, using bombers and cruise missile submarines. But that would've been the extent of their offensive activities. Like the Northern Fleet, their overall orientation was a defensive one. The potential U.S.-USSR scenario I have in mind taking place in the North Pacific is indeed set in 1986 and involved the Ranger and Carl Vinson. You have two carriers with four of the coolest F-14 squadrons ever - VF-1 and VF-2 on Ranger, VF-51 and VF-111 on Vinson! How would Drakens end up in the Pacific? And Mirage 2000s didn't enter service in Taiwan until the 1990s. Even if a scenario were to take place in the '90s, the Taiwanese have no treaty entanglements that would get them involved in backing up U.S. forces in NORPAC, nor should they - they need to protect themselves against China. Good to see I'm not the only one who recognizes the significance of the North Pacific.

I stand corrected. Disregard.

The Pacific isn't all hot/humid. The North Pacific is just as cold as the North Atlantic can be.

I pick my moments to be absolutely blunt and this is going to be one of them and I say this with no ad hominem intent - you don't know what cherry-picking is. It is using individual pieces of data to support an argument while ignoring or hiding the existence of other data that could refute said argument. I've not done that. I didn't pretend that the rest of the RAND report didn't exist. In fact, I even acknowledge, in the statement of mine you quoted, that RAND's position was that the Soviets would take military action against Norway. I was merely pointing out other areas of the report that provided alternative possibilities on the matter. These are worth taking seriously because they are part of the report, even if they don't form the core of their ultimate position (if they even have one). If anything, I was resisting cherry-picking. Mbot's position seems to be that because the U.S. government or a think-tank thought so, it was guaranteed to happen and here are the reasons why. I was pointing out that in the very sources he consulted, there was still plenty of room for dissension on the matter. I'm not trying to sell anything here. These discussions are a research tool. By bouncing ideas and thoughts off others, I learn new things and adjust my views accordingly, as well as return the favor by sharing my knowledge with others. Getting others to agree with me or "winning" a debate isn't the goal here. It's to share knowledge and learn something in the process. I have no problems with disagreement; what's important is that we get agree on the facts as much as possible. I have my position, others will have theirs and I have no difficulty wrapping my head around the reality people can look at the same thing and come to a different conclusion. So excuse me if I don't exactly present things in a way that conforms to your definition of "academic," because I'm not trying to earn a degree here. What I'm seeing in this discussion is an attempt to justify archaic ways of thinking and a resistance to acknowledge information that challenges the popular narrative. It's incredible that a quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War, people still put so much stock into information that was either wrong, inaccurate, or has been superseded by new information. It's even more mind-boggling how people are allowing works of fiction to define reality. If you think that's something only the uninformed do, think again - much of what we think we know about World War II, the most publicized war in history, is wrong. I'll elaborate more on this if you wish. This is a variant of the "Pics or It Didn't Happen" mentality. Anybody can quote a piece of information. It's what you do with it that counts. What I've seen thus far (MBot, jump in here any time) is to adhere to some official word, take it at face value, and essentially discount all other relevant factors in play. One cannot view these things in isolation. It's not enough for someone to say they'd do something; the means, opportunity and context have to present. And as much as I'd love to list out every last one of my sources down to the page number, I don't, because I consult a number of sources at a time to support even a single point. I'd probably end up writing a whole post listing every specific quotation I utilize to make my arguments. Again, I'm not trying to earn a degree here. But don't take my word for it - check out this passage written by Frank Chadwick, the wargame extraordinaire, in Desert Shield Fact Book This is what's missing with all this "sourcing" - placing the information into context and addressing whether the nuts and bolts are on hand to implement the written intent. "Sourcing" means nothing if you choose to view the data in isolation. It may not be accurate to describe as"cherry-picking," but it's pretty darn close to it. I also need to re-emphasize such "official" assessments and statements were, at best, based on incomplete information or, at worst, exaggerations and overestimations. Take them with a grain of salt, especially in light of the information we have available today. I never said the Soviets wouldn't attack. I just said the Soviets don't have the means to launch a successful invasion of Norway as envisioned by the folks of yesteryear. The low probability of success, among other factors, is why I believe the Soviets wouldn't risk such an undertaking, especially when there are other means of threatening Norway short of invasion. As for my implication the Soviet military is loss-averse, un-creative, or conservative, what sort of picture does a military filled with corrupt officers, persistent brutality, low morale, poorly-trained soldiers, equipment of questionable quality, and tactical inflexibility paint for you? There's too much in the above passage for me to pick apart bit-by-bit, so I'll just broadly address it by saying you're not acknowledging the incredible difficulty any invasion force would have with regards to environment and terrain. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan speaks volumes in this regard. You don't have to run into resistance; the environment often times offers the greatest resistance of all. An effective invasion of Finnmark would be anything but "rapid." They may get there quickly, but they'll have a very difficult time once on the ground. More importantly, your scenario relies almost entirely on the Soviets achieving total surprise, something that would've been next to impossible to occur, unless NATO deliberately slept at the wheel. The lack of surprise would kill any Soviet military effort. If you want to understand why I'm so down on the Soviet military read this essay at http://www.alternatewars.com/WW3/the_war_that_never_was.htm. It's a great starting point and has a list of sources at the end you can consult to learn more. I'm not one to say the Soviet military couldn't exact punishment on it's enemy, but, as a warfighting organization, there wasn't a whole lot to write home about. Their bark was definitely worse than their bite.

It depends. Does a full state of war exist between the U.S. and USSR? What sorts of capabilities do the Soviets have at those bases? Is there a more effective way to deal with those threats? How isolated are the Soviets? These situations are far more complex than you'd imagine. While I find primary sources to be valuable resources that shed light on how a party to a conflict is thinking, this also has to be viewed in context of the big picture and the means available to each side. Just because the U.S. intelligence services expected an attack doesn't mean it would've occurred. Remember that U.S. intelligence services were found to have exaggerated and over-estimated the threat posed by the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact. I can't say whether they did so intentionally, but it gives you every reason to take U.S. intelligence agency assessments with a grain of salt. To see how easily they embellished the Soviet threat, read their annual "Soviet Military Power" publications. It's actually pretty humorous to read, knowing what we know now. Not to overdo the subject, but remember it was the same U.S. intelligence services that feared a Soviet invasion of the Persian Gulf to seize the oil fields. I'm pretty sure they had their reasons for thinking so, but do just a little bit of research and you'll find they never had the capability to pull off such an attack. Note this segment from p. 34: This is where one has to read between the lines. Unless NATO is taken completely by surprise, these Desant units would be outgunned and outnumbered. If you're a Soviet commander, you have to decide whether it's worth sending these units to their certain deaths in an attempt to secure these targets. As elite as Soviet airborne, air assault, naval infantry, and Spetznaz forces are, unless reinforced, they're pretty much sitting ducks against NATO forces. Then there's this bit on p. 37: Even RAND entertains the possibility that the Soviets may be content to take a defensive posture with respect to Norway. Although their ultimate conclusion is that the Soviets would take military action against Norway, they also outline other actions they could take short of invading Norway. These alternate courses of action are actually more consistent with the generally conservative mindset of the Soviet military. I could go on for hours covering all the bases, but there're too many problems associated with a Soviet attack on Norway. There're also issues with NATO launching attacks on the Kola Peninsula, but the only thing I'll say about this is what I've said already - the threat of attack on Kola can be strategically more useful than actually taking the risk of going on the offensive. But, in addition to lacking the means of doing anything we believed the Soviets to be remotely capable of doing, the greatest obstacle may be the war even happening at all. Timing is everything and the ability of the Soviets to attack Norway or even West Germany is contingent upon everything going right for them and everything going wrong for NATO. As we are all aware, such a prospect is so absurd that it's not even worth contemplating. And without questioning how and why a war would even start, we can't even begin to assess the likelihood of anything. Now it's my turn to be a sourcy kind of guy. If you wish to learn more about the Soviet military (which is the all-important missing piece of the puzzle), I suggest the following: - A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact 1955-1991 - The Collapse of the Soviet Military - Inside the Soviet Army - The Threat: Inside the Soviet Military Machine I have plenty more sources that I consult, but these are some of the better ones and provide a good starting point for understanding the Soviet Armed Forces. To put it mildly, the Soviet military nor the Warsaw Pact was what you think it was. In fact, I'd hardly be going out on a limb if I said the Soviet military was pretty useless as a warfighting entity.

This is where one has to get inside the minds of both NATO and Warsaw Pact commanders and think strategically - is the threat posed by NATO forces in Norway in a reinforced state effective in terms of deterrence or in terms of actually degrading the enemy's ability to wage war? For instance, you mentioned nuclear weapons. Nukes are clearly weapons of deterrence, although the Soviets didn't necessarily see it the same way, but that's a whole different issue. At least, from NATO's perspective, nukes are more effective when not used. Once used, they may destroy a lot of targets, but it makes termination of the conflict that much more difficult. This is obviously problematic, because the goal of war is essentially to resolve conflict. But take nukes out of the equation. Without them, what threat do reinforced NATO forces in Norway pose to the Kola Peninsula? You say it's a "significant existential" threat - Murmansk is 80 miles from the Norway-Soviet Union border. Never mind that precision-targeting was still undergoing growing pains in the mid-to-late-'80s. NATO would still have to contend with substantial air defenses and the availability (or lack thereof) of airborne refueling tankers and other resources that could either alleviate or compound operational difficulties. The war in Central Europe, along with the possibility of wars going on in other parts of the world, would severely restrict the amount of reinforcements available to the Arctic front. In other words, NATO forces in Norway actually don't present as substantial of a threat to the USSR as they may seem. Put carrier-based air power into the mix, the calculus changes. But these carriers would first have to contend with the bulk of the Soviet Red Banner Northern Fleet protecting the bastion in the upper reaches of the Norwegian Sea. And that possibility raises plenty of questions of it's own, a) regarding the physical ability of NATO naval forces to destroy the Soviet fleet in their own waters and b) Whether it's best to do so or to use the threat of such an action as leverage towards war termination negotiations. It's difficult to know whether the Soviets saw NATO forces in Norway the same way I just explained. But it's also unreasonable to assume the Soviets were completely ignorant of NATO's capabilities and of their own strengths and weaknesses. In my view, there was little for the Soviets to gain by going on the offensive in Norway. Given much of NATO would be bogged down in Central Europe, there was actually more incentive for them to rely on their air defenses to blunt any NATO offensive from Scandinavia into Soviet territory. Going on the offense as a defensive strategy is certainly a central part of their military thinking, but that doesn't mean they engaged only in offensive activities. Things like terrain and the difficulty in reaching the west coast of Norway would've made any Soviet commander think twice about engaging in such a vast undertaking. War certainly removes many limits, but that doesn't mean people suddenly put all their cards on the table. That sounds true in theory. However, their ability to be successful in such offensive operations is highly contingent on factors such as surprise. As I said above, war removes many limits, but it doesn't necessarily make people do suicidal things. Unless NATO was thoroughly unprepared, NATO defenses in Norway were essentially non-existent, and the Soviets were aware of it, I find it even more difficult to believe the Soviets would commit such a large number of some of their best forces (airborne, naval infantry, etc.) to a battle that would've been extremely difficult to win.

One of the coolest things about Fleet Defender was it allowed you to select which aircraft carrier class you operated from. No other game ever got around to doing that. When this module gets released, I want to fly off the deck of the Independence, Constellation, Enterprise, Carl Vinson, and Abraham Lincoln.

No problems there. Again, I love these sorts of discussions, which is why I'm choosing to engage here. I'm not sure if your referencing any primary sources here, but attacking Norway actually seems counter-productive. For one, any attack, as you imply, would need to be an amphibious one, as the terrain of Norway makes a land invasion difficult. The same applies to NATO if they were ever contemplating a land attack on the Soviet Union. Much of the USSR's ground forces in the north were amphibious units anyway. Second,while land bases in Norway certainly seem like a threat, remember that much of NATO's resources would be committed to fighting the war in Central Europe. There isn't much of an offensive threat posed by either the Norwegian military nor the forces that would be deployed there to reinforce NATO positions. Third, while defeating NATO naval forces was priority #2, not all priorities held equal value. Defense of USSR's strategic nuclear forces were of utmost importance, even at the risk of other priorities. Aside from it's attack submarines and bomber forces, the likelihood of the Soviets devoting that many resources to fighting a naval battle in the Norwegian Sea is very low. You can see this in both the way Soviet warships were designed and the way crews were trained. Simply put, like much of Soviet equipment, they weren't built to last. They were intended for short, intense, individual operations; one big punch only. Soviet ships also trained to operate alone, instead of in groups like NATO vessels. Again, this is the kamikaze mindset on display yet again. Place this within the context of preserving the strategic nuclear deterrent as priority #1. Do you think the Soviets would have sacrificed sacrificed a large their Sunday punchers to defeat NATO's naval forces? The more one uncovers, the more unlikely this "mother of all naval battles" becomes. It's just too far out of character with how the Soviets thought and operated. Even if this "mother of all naval battles" occurred, it would ultimately be a very one-sided affair in NATO's favor. Then the Soviets would have nothing to defend their bastion with, possibly increasing the likelihood of nuclear exchange. Even if one were to suspend disbelief, you run into the issue of logistics, again. The Soviets would've probably taken heavy losses and their resource expenditures would probably be considerable enough to keep them from going any further than Norway. The Soviets didn't have a very logistically sound military; the idea was to have enough resources to sustain one massive effort in hopes of winning the war in the first round. But, as Vampyre so astutely points out, nothing ever goes as planned. Even with their 90-day supply of material, they'd probably run low within a week to a few weeks. Even Tom Clancy, whom I hardly consider a credible source, depicts as much in Red Storm Rising.

DCS using the Caucasus probably has more to do with the recent conflicts in the region, along with the legacy of using the Black Sea as a theater of war going back to the Su-27 Flanker days, which led to the development of DCS. So yeah, the U.S. fighting in the Caucasus isn't plausible, but the ongoing wars in the region make it somewhat more plausible than the GIUK Gap/North Atlantic theater, which hasn't seen a war in over 70 years. Just to be clear, I enjoy these sorts of discussion. My persistence is indicative of my passion in these topics as opposed to an intent to argue. I disagree regarding Iceland and the Norwegian Sea; I agree regarding the Kola Peninsula. The Murmansk/Severomorsk area certainly provides a wide range of targets to attack and numerous enemies to engage. The problem is, and I've made this argument already, we've seen all this before in other simulations. Yes, DCS continues to trot out the Black Sea/Caucasus region and I've called them out on it before, and this is also why I want them to break the cycle and explore other theaters. Gameplay certainly matters and the Kola Peninsula isn't the only place that would work for the F-14. We have a Strait of Hormuz map coming up; that's the best combination of gameplay/plausibility as any. I'd like to also see a North Persian Gulf map, and, as grand an undertaking as this may be, a Sea of Japan map as well. Different places other than the same old Kola Peninsula that offer both gameplay value and plausibility.