BlackLion213

Hello, Nice video from Desert Storm featuring VF-32: Not the best quality footage, but a nice period video. Plus, a brief hassle with USAF F-15s starting at 7:14 - includes some HUD footage of the F-14 taking a gun track on it's USAF opponent...and making the reporter puke. :D -Nick

From what I heard, VF-154's jets (final cruise - 2003) required about twice as many maintenance hours as the F/A-18Cs on the same cruise. VF-154 actually managed better airframe availability, but took a lot more man hours. However, rumor has it that the F-14D required about the same maintenance hours per flight hour as the Charlie Hornet. Converting from analog to digital avioncs seemed to make a big difference. Maintenance hours per flight hour also seems pretty dependent on airframe age. When I spoke to an S-3 pilot in 2006, he said that every cat shot caused a failure of something electrical. Things were just worn out. Also, one book I read stated that the VX-5 Phantoms at Pt Mugu required ~350 maintenance hours/flight hour just before they retired in the early 1980s. Part of the need to retire the F-14 a bit earlier was a severe parts shortage by the mid-2000s. That made the maintenance issue seem even worse. -Nick

Badass!! Love the video, beautifully done! :D -Nick

My New Years resolution is to use less hyperbole....:music_whistling: But I agree, that second pass was LOW. :D Looked like less than 30'. Nice! I forgot about that one. :) Thanks! -Nick

Hello, I found a nice video featuring a Tomcat reservist squadron (VF-202) practicing their strafing in the early 90s. It also features some nice low passes (~100', perhaps a bit less?). It's short, but fun to watch. Tomcats have been asked to or have attacked ground targets with their guns on a few occasions. Most famous was VF-102 bird that strafed a ground position during OIF (?). VF-31 also strafed a Taliban compound in October 2002 during OEF. During Operation Praying Mantis in the Strait of Hormuz (1988 ), two A-6E's were struggling to hit a group of Iranian Boghammers attacking an oil rig, so a F-14 were called in to strafe the targets. The A-6s managed to score a hit as the Tomcat headed down - another "almost" for the history books! -Nick

Great post Renhanxue. :) Though I disagree that BVR means you shoot before your opponent can. Certainly, that was the situation for Western/NATO countries initially as Soviet BVR tech was lagging initially, but it's really matter of offering a combat solution for certain ranges and conditions. Not to mention the benefits of carrying a weapon with more than one type of seeker. Many of the AIM-7 shots are not true BVR, but without the concept of BVR there probably would have been less emphasis on that technology. Higby's paper was helpful for exposing the gap between reliability/accuracy during testing/training and true combat. However, digging into just a few examples reveals that his statistics do not give justice to true accuracy or capability by virtue of how he crunched his statistics. A more thorough investigation or more details would have strengthened his argument considerably (at least for me). Also, fog of war can certainly happen with WVR too...a pair of US UH-60s were shot down by US F-15Cs over the Iraqi no-fly zone after 2 or 3 visual confirmations (thought to be Hinds). Sometimes it's best not to trust your eyes as the only source of information. Most equipment cannot deliver on the initial aspiration/dream, but innovation can solve those limitations - which seems to be the case here. Radar guided missiles certainly had early limitations and were definitely not good enough to serve as the only available modality for air combat, but they hardly seem to be a waste. Even with their early reliability and accuracy concerns, they significantly expanded the envelope of available firing solutions - ie, head-on shots and high deflection shots. Perhaps users initially expected too much of it, but that facilitated development. Even with the complaints of less than ideal capability during real combat, it still seems foolhardy to subtract the capability in exchange for some improvement in BFM capability. Even with the F-16, it's capabilities were promptly expanded including the addition of BVR capability. I cannot think of a single instance where an aircraft's weapon suite and sensor capability is reduced to improve A-A performance. In WWII guns were sometimes removed and F3H Demons often flew with fewer cannons, but no one has ever replaced a radar with a smaller/less capable unit, etc. "Natural pressure/evolution" of systems still seems contrary to his perspective. I agree that short range combat is here to stay and will probably account for the majority of air-to-air kills in the future. Even the F-14 managed 4/5 kills with the AIM-9, but doesn't mean that all of that R&D was in vane. In more recent times, AIM-120s have accounted for the majority of US A-A kills. The AIM-120 directly benefited from the AIM-54's existence and operational experience. Plus, having that long-range capability forces the enemy to change behaviors and invest in countering it. The threat may be worse conceptually than in reality (I still argue that the AIM-54 is quite effective, but not a "super missile"), but intimidation can be more effective than real combat. It's better for pilots on both sides if no shots are fired and the enemy retires for fear of the mere possibility. It may not be the best way to spend money, but it is a fringe benefit of the investment. Certainly there are ideas that sound appealing, but do not go anywhere because they are technically challenging and offer few practical benefits - flying cars for example - I'd give up hope on that one. But electric cars are overcoming, even though they were a punch line less than 10 years ago (I still vastly prefer internal combustion for the noise, vibration, and personality - but thats another story :) ). The jet engine was initially pretty inferior operationally to the piston engine - poor acceleration, outrageous fuel consumption, poor endurance, lack of thrust, marginal reliability, etc. On paper, these machines would strike a reader as frankly inferior to their piston alternatives in every parameter, but top speed. But constant development got us there, even though you could have advocated for ending the program since it was "not delivering the promise". Swedish aviation could have given up after the Saab J-21R...so much future potential would have been lost! :thumbup: -Nick

I agree that the "existential war" changes the mindset, but it is also the type of war that both the USN and USAF spent most of the Cold War expecting. The USN was also expecting to operate pretty independently, Desert Storm clearly exposed the USN's limitations when operating as part of a coalition. That may have been the biggest lesson and a large part of the reason why they had so many fewer encounters with enemy aircraft. New doctrines would be adopted and the USN's performance in later coalition conflicts would be much smoother (Allied Force, for example). As for the USN doing something different than the USAF - well maybe... There were so many operational/environmental differences in terms of their operations, hard to know what made the difference. The USAF F-15Cs having priority for all CAPS and intercepts could have been a deciding factor. As in having a classic head-on intercept with great SA vs chasing down an enemy, etc. I think it's really hard to appreciate the issues without the details of these firings. I'm still surprised that there were so many shots given what I have read about USN ops during Desert Storm - most I've what I read was a real lack of enemy contact, especially for F-14s. Lastly, this discussion and the Higby paper raises the issue of what constitutes effective BVR - what are reasonable expectations? To me, BVR seems like a less reliable way to make a kill (longer ranges will affect kill probability alone), but is it reasonable to walk away from the concept when your enemies are prepared to employ it? That's the strangest part of the Higby paper - does he really feel that WVR is the only capability that the US should offer to it's crews? Even "lightweight fighters - aka the F-16 only" have progressively added capability and expanded their BVR capabilities. I have a hard time believing that operational flexibility is a detriment to survival and success. I think the lesson of early BVR was not depend on it, but ignoring it all together makes the same mistake as depending on it. I find it ironic that Higby is really missing the point and advocating for the approach that his paper is supposed to criticize: plan for one type of combat and expect that complete superiority in that one modality will allow to prevail in a wide variety of different circumstances. That was tried...and it failed. The mantra of the 4th gen fighters is maximize your operational flexibility and be prepared to do everything, at least with some degree of proficiency. Follow on designs have not changed their course and no one is currently making a fighter that will only work in WVR or only work in BVR. That probably offers better insight. -Nick

So you agree - best not to make sweeping subjective statements such as "really really bad at A2A" without the specifics. :) It's interesting that half of F-16 launches during Desert Storm were "accidental", wonder if the USN/USMC was similarly afflicted (and why...?). I didn't realize that I had pilots...;) I'm not trying to make this an issue of Nationalism - I would have made these comments if you said such things (pretty rude IMHO) about the French Airforce, RAF, RCAF, Swedish Airforce, SAAF, JASDF, etc, etc. Yes possibly (though a classic situation for humans under duress - no modern pilots have much true combat experience - especially in air-to-air). No doubt pilots were also motivated to make the most of any opportunity (shootdowns can be quite good for a pilots advancement and career). Plus, the cost of the weapon is still quite small compared to the high value of the human operator or the direct cost of the airframe (like the British say: "penny-wise, but pound foolish"). After Lt. Scott Speicher was shot down by a MiG-25, most pilots were taking the enemy threat quite seriously. Still, I haven't read a thing about these other potential "engagements/weapons launches". I'm curious about the circumstances - if anyone else on the forum can shed light - LunaticFringe?? That's an issue and since this thread is Tomcat related, combat use of the Phoenix was subject to much more scrutiny because of the cost. Instead of comparing the Sidewinder and Sparrow to the RB 04, wouldn't the Skyflash be a more relevant comparison? Would pilots receive the same degree of criticism for using the Skyflash if they perceived a threat? -Nick

These new screenshots are simply AMAZING! I love this period and can't wait to experience this complete DCS WWII experience. :D -Nick

I don't think you can make such a strong assertion off just one statistic (or an opinion piece)? Especially in this case where you are simply dividing kills by missile launches. For example, in one of the only real USN engagement of the Desert Storm conflict, a pair of VFA-81 Hornets fired at a pair of intercepting MiG-21s. Lt CMDR Mark Fox initially fired a Sidewinder. He watched the trajectory and feared it would miss so he launched a Sparrow. The Sidewinder still hit and destroyed the MiG-21 while the Sparrow hit the remaining MiG-21 fuselage. Shouldn't both shots count as a hit? Pk for the Sparrow is now 0.5 despite a real Pk of 1.0 (accounting for the wingman's single Sparrow shot which was a kill as well). Also, there were (probably) a lot of shots taken out of parameters with a very low Pk, likely during an intercept of a fleeing aircraft where the pilots "try it", but don't expect success. Should this qualify as "really really bad at A2A" when if they never took the shot the statistics and perception would have been much better? From what I have read (which was a summary by "Hey Joe" Parsons several years ago), the VF-1 F-14A shoot down of a Mi-8 was the only F-14 encounter with enemy aircraft. Everything else was (perhaps) a few radar contacts at long range of aircraft fleeing and no shots were taken. The VF-1 Tomcat launched a lone Sidewinder and scored a hit. Lt. Nick Mongillo fired a single sparrow at a MiG-21 and scored a hit. These don't seem like instances of poor performance. Do you have details on the many other shots that took place? I can't find any mention of these other engagements. -Nick PS - I am also confused, why is the need to fire multiple missiles to destroy an enemy aircraft a sign of "poor performance"? Certainly other weapons generally require multiple shots to be effective. I'd love to see the Pk for a US 0.50" machine gun round during WWII....probably a lot of zeroes in front of it. :)

Really? Where was this established? Certainly the USN tested the AIM-54 against maneuvering targets and it was the first US missile that could hit a target pulling more than 1-2 Gs. It shot down a QF-86 drone pulling 6 Gs in 1973, the above shot is testing for the AIM-54C. Notice this is a close range tail-chase shot. Doesn't seem to be the way one would test an "anti-bomber" missile. For more details from a Tomcat driver, check out this article: http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/this-topgun-instructor-watched-the-f-14-go-from-tomcat-1725012279 The mid-portion of the article has a nice discussion on the intended use of AIM-54 and how that changed in the mid-80s, plus the expected benefits of the AIM-54C vs the AIM-54A. I wouldn't read too much into the Phoenix's retirement as a sign that it couldn't hit a maneuvering target. The AIM-120 offered the capabilities of the AIM-54 (except the range, which was not often that relevant) in a missile that was 1/3rd the weight. Even an F/A-18C can carry 6 AIM-120s without much performance hit, while even the large and every powerful F-14B/D would notice a performance hit from carrying 6 AIM-54s (combined weight of roughly 8,000 lbs!). A missile smaller than the AIM-7 with the capabilities of the AIM-54 was the dream, but it was not feasible in 1972 - hence the Phoenix. By the early 1990s, it was possible and the other 4th gen fighters received the AMRAAM. The range wasn't worth carrying a missile that was 3 times heavier, hence it disappeared when the Tomcat retired. I have yet to see a credible source state the AIM-54 couldn't hit a fighter. Do you have one you could share? -Nick

:D -Nick

The HUD projects a diamond for locked targets and a gun cross for the cannon as seen here: Gun tracking is purely a radar function. I thought the Mirage used INS for A-G delivery, not gun tracking? -Nick

Agreed...as mentioned earlier in my post. :smilewink: However, it is pretty complete, not totally stripped out like the Tomcat in the Midway Museum (or nearly all the other museums here on the West Coast). It would be a better candidate to restore to airworthy status, but the degree of rot that takes place would make any restoration of a 30-40 year old aircraft quite challenging. As you said, with the challenges finding certain parts for the F-22, 4th gen and later fighters are a totally different challenge from a restoration standpoint than WWII warbirds. A local guy restored a P-40 to airworthy status and hand fabricated a lot of parts....could never do that with something like a Tomcat. I was simply explaining that not all on-display Tomcats are stripped out hulks. Some were minimally modified from airworthy status when delivered, though the passage of time can be as harsh as the removal of components. -Nick

I can back up Punk's claim, there are F-14s in museums that are close to airworthy status (at least in terms of completeness, not necessarily condition). The completeness of F-14s in museums varies widely in my experience. In general, F-14s that went to museums earlier tend to be very close to airworthy status. Shortly before the Tomcat's retirement, the USN became very aggressive about "de-mil-ing" and those aircraft look pretty stripped. It's pretty obvious which Tomcats have been "de-miled" when you see them. Museums that have complete/close to airworthy F-14s include: Smithsonian (as close to airworthy as possible is said to be a requirement), Museum of Naval Aviation Pensacola, Valiant Air Command near Orlando, and Seattle Museum of Flight. There are probably more, but I don't know about them. I sat in the Valiant Air Command F-14A about 14 years ago and it was Airshow like. Recent photos seem to suggest that nothing has changed. My 2 cents, -Nick

That makes sense. Familiar with Newtons, just wondering what kN stood for in this context. :) -Nick

Agreed. :) Though the first F110 engines arrived in Oceana with VF-101 in 1986. I think 1984 was when the budget was approved to integrate the F110 into the fleet prior to the F-14D. Actually, I think the final approval to use the F110 for even the F-14D was decided in 1984 (RADM Gilchrist discusses this in his book IIRC). The Navy decided which engine, but Congress was yet to approve the funds for the F110. -Nick PS - :huh: - just not sure what that means, I hit my knowledge barrier.

Great charts LunaticFringe. I love seeing real performance data and it can be difficult to find (for me at least). My understanding of the TF30 was that it received a big boost from speed and low altitude (either one really helped, both was better). At sea level and Mach 0.9, thrust levels from the TF30 and F110 really evened out. Stall margin also really improved at lower altitudes and higher throttle settings. The F110 was a much better engine in every respect, but the TF30 had a few redeeming qualities under certain conditions. I bet that few would feel that the F-14A is underpowered after a zone 5 take-off roll and horsing around between 5K-10K feet (especially in zone 5). But take the F-14A up to 25,000 feet with a combat load and try to accelerate without afterburner...pretty underwhelming. The thrust loss at medium altitude was also a pretty big impediment to ACM (which is where nearly all ACM training took place) since the TF30's deficits were most noticeable at those altitudes. Many a TARPS crew were quite surprised by the TF30s performance down low - Tomcat crews normally spent little time down there. I think it was all about the budget and perspective of the politicians controlling the budget. The F-14 project was way over it's budget cap in the early 70s and they had to cut something. The advanced engine program was the biggest piece and the most logical thing to cut from the layman's perspective. Plus, those making these decisions don't really understand the issues with the TF30. Many saw the F-14A's aero performance (capable of mach 2.4 in testing with untrimmed engines) and figured it was plenty fast - why would you need a better engine? Plus, as you mentioned, the F100 core (with the F401) was having lots of major reliability issues as well - it didn't look like a better option at first. These reliability issues and ACM limitations were hard to articulate to the politicians - meaning its hard to gather resources for the program. I think Secretary of the Navy Lehman was the first to lay it out in easy to understand terms: "The TF30 is a terrible engine, this is the worst airframe-engine mis-match in US Navy history!" I guess that finally got someone's attention and the first F-14A+ arrived a couple years later. -Nick

Thanks! Makes sense that a great deal of the visuals and animations may change by release. -Nick

Perhaps, I'm not sure if those programs were related. Some F-14Bs (maybe all?) did carry the JDAM starting around 2002 - don't know if the Sparrowhawk was a necessary part of that program. -Nick

I'm pretty sure the project started in 1999, but it didn't arrive in the fleet until 2001ish (IIRC). The idea of the Sparrowhawk was integrating the F-14D's HUD software onto a "off-the-shelf" HUD projector and combiner. The issue was convincing the ancient analog avionics of the F-14B (never upgraded from the original F-14A in any meaningful way) to talk to the software for the F-14D HUD (F-14D had a totally new and digital avionics suite). I don't know much about the process, but it did take time from what I read. Most F-14B squadrons that received the HUD only used them for 1-2 deployments (though it was still very appreciated by crews). -Nick PS - 2003 was still 2 years from the last days of the F-14B (VF-11, VF-103, and VF-143 all transitioned in 2005). But it's true that the Sparrowhawk arrived very late in the game. I don't think VF-102 ever received them, they transitioned too early (2002).

Also, one thing I noticed during the Bunyap video is that the nosewheel tow bar dropped when the nosewheel strut compressed on touchdown. At least under normal conditions (as far as I've seen), the nosewheel strut is independent of the tow bar. Here is a nice video of the nose gear in action (head to 7:38 ): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_7kgVlaVFb4 The touchdown in the video may have been special circumstances, but I figure it's worth mentioning. Loved the video BTW! -Nick PS - the above youtube video has lots of great classic USN landing/catapult footage from the late-70s - lots of colorful Tomcats. :)

At least based on the external model, that was the F-14B. The cockpit model is F-14A though they are nearly identical anyway. -Nick

Loved watching! Thank you for the first video update. :D BTW, are those Viggens dancing in the background around 1:56? :) -Nick

That was a fun article! Thank you for posting it. :thumbup: -Nick