zerO_crash

This is not SOP, nor does it make any sense. Even if you flip upon landing, those blades will absorb the initial impact, preventing high-G somersaulting/spinning. Rotorblade-ejection is part og the ejection-sequence, thus no, there is no other way to activate that system.

I call you baby, because your attitude is inadequate, and quite frankly childish! I, am not the one asking for help either! You seem to have a lot to understand about the dynamics of a forum and what doing a favour means. No one is mad here, therefore, you understand very little. No one claimed to be an "expert" either. You have a communication problem, that comes across very clearly. To ban list it is.

Yeah, that is indeed needed. Good to hear that you got it solved!

Actually, stopping the "windows power service" will have a significant effect on your performance in the form of disabling "core parking", which is an underlying function of that service, and one that is known to have caused stuttering for those using Windows 11. That is just an example, but there are other energy saving, "carbon reducing", measures which Microsoft forces on you, even with the general power plan set to "Maximum Performance". Another service which was introduced with Windows 11, was the TPM 2.0 security protocol, which in essence, is a protocol meant to make it more difficult for a potential security breach (i.e. hacker) to access any files that you might have encrypted. On a private consumer basis, this makes absolutely no sense whatsoever to have as a requirement. This is really a protocol meant for corporate-level computing. Still, Microsoft forcing this on you through Windows 11, is eating 3-5% of your CPU just for that "feature" alone. Again, it makes no sense at all, to have it running. Yet another thing to disable on your Windows 11 to free up resources. As to your approach, baby, you are misunderstaning things here. You do not get to make demands as to the quality of advice someone posts here. It is given, that when someone offers free advice, it is your decision to either accept it or not. Still, the provider of that information has spent time and work to help you. It is also understood nowadays, that with the variations and complexity of hardware/software, absolutely no solution ever posted, will grant you anything. Everything is basically at your own discretion. If you are not skilled in computer use, or don´t run a system solely for DCS, then I would not go into the disable-services game. However, if that is the only purpose of your system, then it might be worth checking into. Regardless of your decision, the preferred etiquette in such instance, is a decent "Thank you". Afterall, no one is paid to help here.

KH-66 isn´t realistic on MiG-21Bis, however, if you still want to use it, here´s how: - Put the radar in "STDBY" for 10 minutes. - Take-off. - If you are doing a pure AG-mission, then put the radar into "beam"-mode. That is necessary for getting the ranging as well as guiding the missile towards your reticle. - Weapon selector switch to "S-24 RKT" - "1-2". - Reticle sight to "FIXED" - When you you engage, put the radar to "ON", reticle on target and fire away. Hold the reticle on target for as long as the missile flies. Shouldn´t be any problem, if you have done everything as per description above.

I was going off the OH-58D manual found here: https://www.docdroid.com/ubI02yP/army-bell-oh-58d-operators-manual-pdf#page=383 Section 5-11. pnt. a: Here it states that maximum gross weight is 5500 pounds. Are you referring to a limitation with regards to OH-58D (R) - limited effectivity of the material?

It looks fantastic! If you manage to get the correct synchronization between facial expressions and what the AI will communicate (comments regarding hit/miss, scare if pilot flies too abruptly, proper lip-sync with regards to words used, etc...), you'll set quite a new bar with regards to feeling of not being "alone" in a human-AI scenario (in a module). Specifically, when he talks, it'll be important to have him perfectly synchronized with what's being said. The animations are too superb, to use them for any less! Keep at it!

This is abosultely staggering! The quality of the cockpit is fantastic, and colors are beautiful and vivid! Superb work so far!

Видите ручку справа? Боекомплект заряжен, пилот/техник вводит правильное количество.

Trust me, it´ll work. Have fun!

Not sure if you figured it out. In that picture you are in "Route"-mode (autopilot mode for following a designated flight-plan/heading), albeit without "altitude hold" engaged. The GS is provided by the doppler radar, which is a part of PNK-800 Flight Navigation System (a component of PR-PNK). The specific computational mode, is disabled with weight-on-wheels, and only gets enabled when there is no weight-on-wheels. Thus, turn on K-041 switch, and wait three minutes. Upon lift-off, you'll have the GS-readout in the HUD.

Just to correct that, yes, you won't see the speed indication with weight on wheels. The GS is provided by the doppler radar, which is a part of PNK-800 Flight Navigation System (a component of PR-PNK). The specific computational mode, is disabled with weight-on-wheels, and only gets enabled when there is no weight-on-wheels. Thus, turn on K-041 switch, and wait three minutes. Upon lift-off, you'll have the GS-readout in the HUD.

It seems to me that you do not know the basics of operation within the FAC-role. FAC, is a controller mission, directing aircraft, based on information and demand recieved from an observer. Here is an excerpt: "Forward Air Controllers, or FACs, in the Southeast Asia conflict were rated pilots whose job it was to coordinate air-ground operations. FACs could be ground-based with the troops they were supporting or airborne above the battlefield. The key to success for this air-ground team was and remains today a close relationship between the FAC and the supported unit. For this reason, FACs usually were assigned to support specific units and live with them. This arrangement has been used in every U.S. military operation since World War II when airpower has supported ground forces. Placing the FAC in an aircraft above the battlefield has proven most effective and has been used whenever the tactical situation permitted. In Southeast Asia, Air Force FACs used three main aircraft: the Cessna O-1 Bird Dog, the Cessna O-2 Skymaster, and the North American OV-10 Bronco. These aircraft provided the low-speed maneuverability and long endurance required for locating and maintaining visual contact with targets over the battlefield. They also possessed the short, unimproved airfield operating capability needed to live close to the Army. Each FAC aircraft was equipped with three different radios to coordinate with all the players in the air-ground battle. An FM radio was provided for communications with the ground forces, a UHF radio to talk to the fighter aircraft, and a VHF radio for contact with the Air Force Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) to coordinate approvals and requests for air support. The low performance O-1 and O-2 worked reasonably well during most of the Vietnam War when the threat consisted primarily of small arms and light machine guns. Later in the war the threat increased with the introduction of larger caliber guns and man-portable surface-to-air missiles, and the higher speed OV-10 became the aircraft of choice. In higher threat areas in Laos and southern North Vietnam, jet aircraft (the two-seat F-100F Super Sabres, call sign Misty, and later the F-4 Phantom II, call sign Wolf ) were used as fast FACs to direct air strikes against trucks and other targets of opportunity. The Army used spotters in the O-1 and helicopters, and the Marine Corps employed FACs in the O-1 and OV-10 to control their air assets."1 The observer role, is not a mission for a fast jet. In theory, everything can be done, but let´s not dwell into that. Instead, as per today, there are no fast jets acting as observers. Also, as I already pointed out multiple times before, you need to understand the difference between capable of (you call it "suited" this time around), and used according to established SOP. In a general discussion, we can overlook the odds, and focus on what is common practice or not. Let me tell you this; a SLAM-ER will not get loaded on a jet, unless strategic command have the exact coordinates of a HVT (high-value target). There are no "ifs" here. If you still want to tell me otherwise (which you are), then I will request some sources for a situation where this has ever happened. (You won´t find it). Drones (depending on mission, size and capability) however, are being sent up every day with little to no pre-planning. Purely operationally, that is really a revolution. If you consider that drones are also a framework ready for implementation of AI down the line, reducing the required manpower, or eliminating it entirely, then it is a futuristic product. Its benefits outweigh its shortcomings, and that, by a long shot. Again, I need to school you in the subject. I mentioned before the ability to leverage loans from outside (which indeed is a common practice, and fundamental to sustained economical growth). The reason why I don´t mention Israel with regards to that practice, is that when a country gives another country a loan, they introduce risk into their calulcation. If US is lending Germany money, the risk of defaulting on that load, is realtively low (if we consider geopolitical matters, there are many to consider overall). If US (private investment banks by default) would consider giving Israel a loan, then they have higher concerns with regards to having their loan paid back plus interest rate. That due to the instability in the region. While US has generally always helped Isreal (for reasons concerning many Jewish-members besitting high-end positions in the US system (private/governmental)), this is not something the Israeli government can blindly rely on. Furthermore, with recent socioeconomic development in the world, and crisises like on the US border with Mexico, and even worse, Ukraine, this becomes even more evident. With regards to any other country (other than US), and private investment bank, Israel has a headache trying to guarantee any potential foreign investors. Generally speaking, there are few investors who are willing to risk having investments/assets in what is commonly percieved as the most unstable region in the world. It is apparent to me, that you do not know the economic situation of Israel. This is not something you can research within minutes or hours between responses going back and forth. To be quite honest, I´ll let you in on one more secret. Ukraine, while showing determination, and success early on in the war, had a lot easier job taking foreign loans/support to finanance their war efforts. However (!), with recent developments on the battlefield (Russians pushing the frontline west on a daily basis, and more efficiently so), Ukraine is starting to have problems with securing cash flow. The main reason being the same as Israel - risk was low when Ukraine was performing better than Russia, however the risk of losing it all (including the ability to return the financing), is becoming more evident. This was considered a potential rehearsal before, and sadly, has become the reality now. Simply put, Israel relies on foreign investments in the times of peace (still riskier with lower potential return, than other places around the globe), however when war/conflict emerges, that ideology goes to the trash bin. (Btw. have you heard of any other country finance Israel during the times of war, other than US, being pressured by them?! A country can obviously NOT rest the notion of its survival on that one point alone!). I understood you clearly, but you didn´t understand my reply. You have to put more thought to semantics. I didn´t claim that you said "smaller countries are more efficient at war, then large ones". I stated that from the outset of a situation where a richer country has better financial capabilities compared to its poorer contemporary, with the logic your present, the richer country won´t feel the need to compete on proper terms, thus LEADING to a situation where the richer one will lower its expectation. It´s a psychological aspect; if you are so much better than your peer, then why not take a day off or two. Again, I consider this case closed, as I have demonstrated to you how the military sector looks upon this. Again, there are many more examples. Let me give you one more: Afghanistan had a GDP of just under $14 billion as per 20212. US had at the same time above $23 trillion3. Due to the recent conflicts around the world, you have to estimate a price of around $1000 for an AK-47/AMK and a small amount of ammunition (90rnds - 3 magazines). The price of a Hellfire missile per 2023 was approximately $150.000 per unit. According your idea of caluclating efficiency in warfare, the AK-47 with 3 magazines would amount to approx. 0.0000071% of Afghanistan´s GDP. Equally, a Hellfire missile, would account to 0.00000065%. I´m sure, that if you proposed using a hellfire on each terrorist in Afghanistan, you would get popular in the military circles. Again, I proved to you that this point is dead, we will never agree on your way of calculating it. It is a fallacy. I haven´t even mentioned how the numbers would fluctuate if you were to include the size of each force into the arithmetic. According to your counting, if US would meet a bigger force (Russia or China), they would have to go down to less expensive weapons, because now you are losing out on economy. In real warfare, that is exactly when you want to go opposite, to more expensive weapons, due to the complexity of the theatre and a more capable contemporary. You are simply wrong in your thinking here. If a target is considered HVT (for example Zelensky for Russians), they will use a cruise missile on him. However, anything outside of the aspect of HVT, falls under the "who gets the job done cheaper considering all things equal"-game. For the red marked text, I´ll need a source. We know the price of the interceptor missile, we don´t however know how much the system costs to drive, and what other external support it might need. One can assume that Hamas would never get their hands on a system like this, thus making this notion fantasy to discuss. If you consider this system being on the more expensive side, then for all intents and purposes, this is not a capability which is imminent to them. However, if you state that this would be too expensive for Hamas, tell me: a) How much money does Hamas have? b) How much does the whole system cost including a projected lifetime cost? That is not by a decree, that is a wartime schedule. You also have to set this in context to what is written three paragraphs above. Kurganmashzavod is not meeting the deadlines for production which it already has signed with the government. This is one factory, which for whatever reason, is not meeting the obligation it set on itself. Therefore, they themselves are pushing their workers, albeit not above what the law permits for workers. You cannot read about one production plant, and automatically assume that this a situation concerning the whole Russian state. Obviously, this is "just a story" for the news papers, not something that is common ground. While under war schedule, there will be more pressure on the industry of a given country, it is still more civil than what you initially want it to be. Part of my family is from Russia, Moscow, thus I can tell you that what you pulled out there, is a similar comparison to claiming that just because California has a serious problem with water supply (as in, worse than some 3rd world countries), that means that the whole of US is automatically Africa... In essence, don´t generalise, that tends to bury the truth. I read all of your points, but you seem not to be noticing the semantics. I have not quoted/answered you, in any way that missrepresents any of your points. If you belive so, point it out. "I" am stating that economy and logistics, are a cornerstone of any armed warfare. I never stated that it is the only point to consider, only that it is among the main ones. Consider that economy grants the ability to fund supplies (food, medicine and ammunition), increase the will to fight among the population, etc... When you state that those other aspects are important, it is money that is funding it. As to Afghanistan, I avoid taking the discussion into a new theatre, as that will most likely evolve into one page-long posts. Since you ask about it, well again, you are oversimplifying again. There are many reasons why Afghanistan was lost by US. One major one, was for example the politics of carrying out the war. Rules of engagement, often hindering any possibility of effectively (time-wise) going after the insurgency. Ultimately, you could see upon US pulling out, that politically, a claim was made mentioning one of the main points with War on Terror, which was to neutralize Al Qaeda. Well, what is the point of going in and erasing Al Qaeda, if ISIS and other smaller groups with the same capability, albeit more determination, exist when you pull out?! That proves some of the difficulties with running a military operation, that is constantly used by the politicians to grant them a new cadence in their political career. That´s just one of many points, which you make no mention of, however is just as relevant. By default, guerrilla warfare is a reactionary one, unless you have reliable intel to strike where it hurts. Afghanis were, are and will be poor, however they always found money (collective initative, support from equal-thinking countries/groups in the world) to fund war. When Russians went into Afghanistan (´79-´89), they had the same situation, albeit with some level of corruption in their military. As in any war, some made money by selling arms/supplies to their contemporary. If Afghanis didn´t have money, they wouldn´t have weapons to fight with. That tells you however nothing about their determination/initative/capability/etc... Just know, that with regards to any war that has ever occured, there are none, which you can define the losing condition of, in a paragraph or sentence. 1https://sites.cc.gatech.edu/fac/Thomas.Pilsch/AirOps/facs.html 2https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=AF&start=1960 3https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US

https://yarchive.net/mil/ww2_deice.html Otherwise, you can find free PDFs of books on piloting from around 1917 onwards. There will be sections there with regards to atmospherical considerations. While they give exact military SOPs, they will point you in the direction of what considerations had to be taken by a pilot.

I explained it very clearly before, but I'll repeate myself. You have to understand the difference between what capabilities a weapon offers (software weighs nothing, so why not include a TO (Target of Opportunity) mode?), what army/air force/navy/marines/space forces doctrine allows strategically and tactically, what each squadron promotes as their further refinement of tactics (based on the squadrons speciality), and finally, what a single isolated situation might need. Each service in pretty much any competent army, operates based on the principle of predictability and battlefield control. They do NOT just send pilots with their TGPs in the air to search for their own targets. This is not efficient, and logically so. If you compare how pilots found their targets in WWII for example, they used MK.I eyeball, which has a much broader peripherial than a TGP has (point observation). You are living in a fantasy, if you believe there is any military doctrine claiming that to be a SOP. The one exclusion, again - what is referred to as "single isolated situation", is Operation Desert Storm. It was a pure "out of neccessity"-situation. The same concerns the use of radar in AG operations. Ask a pilot how many missions he's ever done where he even used this functionality. This ability is mostly for intelligence gathering, and an eventuality, but NOT something that a doctrine builds on. In military circles, there is the concept of combat effectiveness and cost of operating a platform (both mentioned before). You do not get any good factor out of a pilot looking for his own targets. That's not how military works. I will further compare here the use of AH-64 (same airframe), in two different squadrons; Air National Guard and Air Cavalry Brigade. They use the same helicopter, in completely different ways, not really utilizing some of the capability used by the other. In the same way, just because it was used to neutralize a EWR-/SAM-site in the opening of Desert Storm, doesn't make it a SEAD-platform. That is why you seem not to understand, by stating what capabilites a SLAM/SLAM-ER has (which I am fully aware of). The pinnacle of the discussion is the prerogative that drones are currently used in a way, which advanced expensive weaponry (e.g. SLAM-ER) "could" be used in, but will never be for the reasons of doctrine/economy/effectiveness/etc... That is what I'm trying to explain to you, and apparently lecture you on. Yes, most users who use DCS are categorically ineffective (looking for targets through TGP/radar due to a currently lacking infastructure of air controllers), not considering the cost of such weapons (flying in low-threat environments with highly advanced weapons not making any sense in the aspect of economy) and with no pre-briefed flight plans. Again, there are far more misunderstandings and private projects about what's what, rather than informed knowledge, even in these forums. I am however questioning why you are mentioning BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction) in this context, when indeed it has been removed from doctrinal manuals after 1990?!1 This doctrine doesn't even exist anymore... and for a good reason. As to what future brings, that depends on how technology matures. Here, we might have opinions, however as I initially stated, no country really has any "effective" means of handling such drones in the capacity that they are operating at in Ukraine. That is a fact. What THOR becomes down the line, or if it even becomes something, time will show. In this discussion, I am not considering anything with regards to a simulated environment (DCS). This is a specific discussion with regards to what is going on right now and in the near term future, with respect to military operation. The last major concept being applied to industry operation (generally), is the concept of modularity, which allows to develop a product (software/hardware), which uniformly conforms to a wide standard of application, and by that, allows to cover a plethora of sectors under one trademark. This is financially, time-wise, manpower-wise and application-wise viable. As such, it is logical to think that a truly capable AI, would be built in this aspect, especially in a industry concerning such a wide range of applications, as military uses (drones, aircraft, vehicles, strategical-/tactical-systems, logistical administration, plus many more). Right now, AI is in pure infancy. We really don't know what AI will look like, and what it'll be down the line, simply because there is no one way of going about it. If anything, we know just how much we don't know about it. An AI can be just about everything, starting from the aspect of whether it should be connected to a unified network (with possibility to administer more than one unit), or whether it should be disconnected completely and administer only one physical unit. Maybe a hybrid of the two. Let me elaborate on what I mean by a modular AI. The learning process and decision making, might be the same across the different variants. However, when implemented in a combat vehicle, it doesn't need to know economy or logistics, neither does it need to know strategy. The modules the "core"-build (if you will) will need, are related to the functionality of the vehicle. When it comes to aircraft, those are then tailored to what specific capabilities the aircraft has (weapons, systems, aircraft performance, other metrics), and not needing the ones from before-mentioned applications. This is just an example. Generally, one can argue that you'd want a unified AI administering a wide range of applications (war efforts, strategy, decision making, etc...) from one mainframe. I however, find many reasons why a purely connected system, has evident shortcomings - what about imparired connectivity in a environment with significant ECM/jamming? What about a potential hacker attack? (one mainframe is easier to target, than a plethora of individual units), plus many more design specific ones. Ultimately, this all gets irrelevant in the event of a EMP. Again, it is essentially a much wider discussion. Still, any sizeable use of EMP, is really created from the use of atomic power, and that is a different domain altogether. This topic is mostly centered on conventional warfare. As to Moore's Law, it's difficult to say. I can bring Intel's CEO with a counter-statement - Intel's CEO says Moore's Law is slowing to a three-year cadence, but it's not dead yet | Tom's Hardware (tomshardware.com). Still, I'd agree that this technology is slowly reaching its limits. If anything, a fundamentally new technology has to be invented, to overcome the different issues that wafers pose. With that said, we do currently have enough computing power for even basic applications of potential AI, depending on the scope and refinement level. Software is further behind than hardware, and that is a issue which requires time and commitment. Actually, it doesn't at all, and again, you fail to understand economy at its core. Budget, is not an isolated situation, it is the cumulative product of a given system. While the interceptor-missiles "seem" cheaper to Israel than S-5s to Hamas, it isn't that at all. Hamas does not have to care for the civilians, and they don't (proven). They will have very few factors affecting their expenditure outside of military means. Israel, on the other hand, has to deal with a whole society, which is very expensive. The downing of one aircraft/vehicle/building will alter what additional costs will arise, and this how the budget for military expenditure will shrink. Handling civilian, government and other expenditures, will ultimately alter the final calculus to the point where Israel is paying much more for its interceptor missiles, than Hamas for their S-5s. This is a fact. That is also, why military doesn't compare it that way, because they themselves, cannot guarantee what budgets they will be granted each year, and how they'll change. Consider how much food prices have risen up, due to the war in Ukraine. Hamas doesn't care for civilians, thus it affects them very little. Imagine however the percentage readjustment in the budget, based on that factor alone. I already showed you an example, thus you are not only arguing against me, but the whole defense sector apparently. Also, a country is nothing more than a huge institution, many of the same rules apply. Of course countries have defaulted financially. "Israel could vote to increase its budget." - Uhm, and the money is supposed to come from where? It can adjust it, but it cannot input what it doesn't have. Again, you have elementary lacks of knowledge in economy and finance. Israel as a country, is especially in a difficult situation, as there are countries in Europe now (Germany and Sweden), who are considering to implement light restrictions for exports to Israel (one that is discussed, is the acquisition of more F-35s by Israel - Germany wants it halted). That is only the hardware side, now consider the implications of trying to push Israel from the outside on exports?! (Israel is a country that doesn't possess a single mineral to extract, their economy builds solely on export of technology and certain locally-made goods/equipment). Again, you are not thinking of it properly. By default, the thought-process you present here, means that a country can essentially compete on the percentage of the cost of a weapon vs. their contender. That would actually bring a bigger country, to less effectivity and level it out with a smaller more effective one. That is the essence of what you preach, and it is simply not correct. I showed you one example, I can show many more. You are at wrong here. I am saying that money (economy), is the main and initial resource, which grants initative to build an arms industry and perform in combat (a well paid soldiers is typically more engaged in what he does, than one that is poorly rewarded). There are other factors as well, but this is the basis of it. Nowadays, rebuilding a factory, does not take very long, if the relevant resources are in place. This is a technical question, but on the strategic level, money matters in more aspects, than you are willing/capable of seeing. Sure, there are examples of where a superpower loses against a small guerilla group (e.g. US - Afghanistan), but this is rather rare, and points to other faults at hand, not logistics. The point is, if you have the backbone of logistics in place, you have all means to potentially succeed in a armed conflict. If you don't, then you've failed other places (poor strategy, use of time, capability, manpower, morales and determination of troops, etc...). With regards to what I marked red, I'll have to ask for a source. While forced convict labor is a thing (cultural), and logically so, "forced labor" is something else, and that is not the case in Russia. Incentives are made for the workers to provide more, but not in the sense that they are given an ultimatum. With regards to unpaid, that is simply not true. There is no decree granting unpaid work/hours with regards to citizens (convicts is a different discussion altogether - no free meal, as they say). There have been delays in payments, and in some cases they have not been regulated yet by the employers yet, since the start of the war. Consider that as you wish, it is a special situation in the country. Still, there is no decree that gives a ultimatum, neither does it grant the employer a chance to not pay their workers (how does it even make sense to threaten with firing, when there are labor shortages...). As to why little was achieved in trying to suppress Russian war initative economically, well, that is a matter that is far wider in aspect, than what we can conceive on a forum, much like the war efforts and analysis of each side. In very basic terms; Russia doesn't depend on the west much at all. There are still below-the-radar trades being done with Russia and European countries, even US. Russian society has a sense of brotherhood, and while some disagree on the current situation, many are willing to sacrifice their own benefits, for the greatness of their country. World more or less dividing itself into two again, where Russia and China are establishing a more self-sustained trade system in Asia. Russia still having a lot money, and what they don't have, they'll mobilize for less. No worries, as we pull in more topics, fewer will be discussed in detail. The notion of the topic is of a global effect, as such, it would be incomplete to try and isolate this topic from whatever is happening around the globe. Indeed the change in US posture (and more countries considering the same), is due to what is happening on the other side of the globe for them - Europe and Asia. 1ADA575998.pdf (dtic.mil)

There are big differences in terms of employment, where a drone can often loiter, and even return, whereas a fired off missile (be it SLAM, SLAM-ER, or anything with a jet/rocket thrust) is already expended. There are differences in application, and while some of the technologies blend in with each other (e.g. a SLAM and AIM-120 are both rockets in physical design, but one is closer to a drone (allows direction control) while the other one is fully autonomous...), therefore they have their uses, depending on the mission. That is also exactly where the difference lies, and pretty obvious one at that, the mission. A scout/combat drone can perform the a whole mission on its own, starting with reconnaissance and ending with final trigger pull on an enemy (suicide attack/direct forces/artillery strike/air strike/etc...). A SLAM-missile, is only a link in the chain, due to price and complexity, plus ranges involved, it is a weapon for purely pre-planned use. It is therefore less dynamic of a weapon (a target of opportunity is a incredibly rare scenario, if viable at all ($$$)), it involves an expensive system to use it (ground or aerial) and finally, it puts a human being in potential harms way (granted, this depends on many factors like launch range, etc... It is a greater topic with more detail to consider). A drone on the other hand, is expendable but with the capability to return back if need be (no target found), the operators are often, albeit not always, out of harms way (depends on drone range and terrain, plus many other factors - e.g. jamming) and finally, the costs are incredibly low, while allowing to take out much more expensive targets. A drone vs. a armored vehicles is effectively 200$-1000$ vs. a vehicle for multiple million $. Additionally, a operator can operate a multitude of drones and targets, while the pilot has to return and rearm/refuel and often rest. On top of that, a drone operator can often operate solo, in addition to directed fire (by forward observers), whereas an aircraft will mostly be bound to CAS-style missions in such contested areas. Strike missions are mostly behind enemy lines, or otherwise in places where no collateral can take place. Finally, onto the main aspect, which indeed separates the two from each other (besides mission) - cost. You can count cost in many ways, however the way you mention, is not a proper one. Here´s why; you cannot judge what averted getting destroyed, because quite honestly, you don´t know what that unit could destroy. For example, while an average tank of the battlefield might destroy on average 8-12 vehicles before it itself gets destroyed statistically, there will be fluctuations where one could destroy nada, while another shot at a nuclear power plant and rendered the whole region uninhabitable. While an extreme comparison, it hits the spot. You would never know what that unit could or would do, thus, it´s not a reliable way of measuring efficiency of a given weapon. Instead, a normal way to calculate cost in the trade, is indeed by comparing the cost of what hits, vs. what is getting hit. Look at this example, where Israel is looking at the opportunity to swap out Iron Dome with Iron Beam, and for what reasons: Specifically "1:43" and onwards, but the whole video is worth watching. That´s a statement by a senior member of JISS (The Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security) US, Russia, China, whoever you wish, compares efficiency of a weapon, in this matter. It is also logical, because when was the last time you saw a multi-million dollar weapon used on a rather small unit, armored or not?! In a few cases, you might notice a combat pilots using for example more expensive Hellfires on 1 - x terrorists, however that is not as expensive of a weapon as some of the other more costly ones (looking at SLAM), and secondly, we don´t know whether they are out of ammunition and/or the Hellfires are close to their expiration date. Maybe it´s a tactical decision to reduce the risk rendered on the crew/aircraft. Again, in such "daily" instances, it a case-by-case basis, and such "artefacts" (detractions from common tactics) will occur. However, when it comes to designing a weapon, and what the mission predicts, then you consider such aspects with very much care, as overall, there is a lot of money to be either saved, or burned. I will add here: Notice how with F-35 and its stealth characteristics, there is still the major project of building and fielding the "Loyal Wingman". What is that, if not a drone, albeit autonomous and most definitely AI?! Multiple countries are developing such systems now, which are to augument combat aircraft (primarily fighter aircraft). If a drone will risk less, and will do the job cheaper (lighter, less fuel burned, less chance of downing the more expensive aircraft, etc...), then it´s a good trade to do. With regards to AI and cheap drones, it depends. If an AI is developed, I imagine that inline with modern standards, it will be a modular build. Essentially, applicable to any machine, albeit with different specification which would dictate what that machine is capable of, and what not. If you develop an AI for a really expensive project, say the Loyal Wingman, then it would really only require stripping it of certain functionality, and possibly some other minor tweaks, to ready it up for a drone. It isn´t really worse than that. Again, it depends on how the software is developed and designed. I am not too worried about processing power either, as chips the size of your phone would be more than enough to run a simple OS and AI with decent capabilities. And if we are to consider Moore´s Law, which isn´t failing us so far, then minaturization will permit exponential growth of power density within chips. Again, I wouldn´t worry about that. Price-wise, with big batches being bought by the military, the prices are still far lower than many current systems operating. Partly answered above, but let me elaborate further. Wars, are ALL about economy. It´s a truth that is seldomly discussed, because few high-standing personalities would want to admit that human life matters (and it does too), but that money is a challenger that cannot be understated. Let me quote you a couple of famous sayings, and you can decide for yourself if you agree or not: Alexander the Great - “My logisticians are a humorless lot… they know if my campaign fails, they are the first ones I will slay.” Napoleon Bonaparte - “An army marches on its stomach.” Sun Tzu - “The line between disorder and order lies in logistics…” Generally attributed to General Foch - “Behind every great leader there was an even greater logistician.” Attributed to General Omar Bradley “Amateurs talk strategy, professionals talk logistics.” Earnst King - “The war has been variously termed a war of production and a war of machines. Whatever else it is, so far as the United States is concerned, it is a war of logistics.” Tom Peters - “Leaders win through logistics. Vision, sure. Strategy, yes. But when you go to war, you need to have both toilet paper and bullets at the right place at the right time. In other words, you must win through superior logistics.” Understand, that logistics, while often only being thought of as the service of timely delivery, is actually far more than that. It is the service of supplying through meeting demand, in other words, industry - economy. Without money, you don´t produce. Have you noticed how the west is trying to supress Russia by implementing financial sanctions? See a pattern? Someone is trying to cut the supply line from the rear, without ever having fired a bullet. The fact that Ukraine still exists on a map, is due to funding from mainly US. Furthermore, there is the concept of war economy, that stresses price-adjustments based on given demand in the region. Example: Ukraine fights a war with many vehicles, Ukraine uses a lot of fuel. Ukraine, needs a lot of fuel. Norway (in the region) produces fuel, Norway sees the opportunity to increase export ($$$). Norway, choses to supply less fuel to itself and regulate consumption by setting market prices, and exports thus more fuel to Ukraine. The same arithmetic works for weapons, ammunition, even who will get the golden ticket to rebuild Ukraine post war, which is being sold to the highest bidder. Trust me, the system is that focused on making money. War, is one of the best places to make money (for some). Therefore, when Ukraine/Russia (or whoever) engages in war, they consider very much their expenditure, as loans do not come cheap. That´s why, for example Israel, is wondering how to shoot down unguided S-5 rockets fired by Hamas/local insurgents, for less than 5o.ooo$ (that´s the cost of the interceptor missile.). How much do you think an old S-5 rocket costs, 3000$? If Israel continues with its Iron Dome, they´ll be poor before they lose the war... I´ll add that with regards to war economy, you wouldn´t believe how crazy it is. Within the same theatre of war, wherever there is a fight going on, the prices actually do move up. With individual budgets to adhere to (the military is too big to have one common budget. They have a unified budget structure, where each service, and even separate parts of the army, have a budget for spending that they themselves have to adhere to. Right now, an AK/M4, is more expensive in Avdiivka, and regions where war is going on, than places where it is relatively little action. Governments generally trade on different terms between each other, however if a private contractor (Lockheed Martin, Colt, Heckler & Koch, etc...) was to make a specific contract with Ukraine, they would be interested in selling according to the prices where demand is the highest, meaning where there is more exchange of fire. In principle, it is no different than for example food being more expensive in places, where it is harder to deliver (mountains, remote regions, etc...), than to deliver it to a metropolis. The rules are different, but the game is the same.

There are a lot of AA-radars/systems which do not have a mast-hoisted radar for low altitude penetration. It's mainly the more elaborate, division-level SAM sites, which possess such an infrastructure. They theatre defense systems, meaning that they are typically relatively far behind the front, compared to many of the more imminent AA/SAM-sites (2K12 Kub, 9K33 Osa, 9K37 Buk, 9K331 Tor, 2K22M Tunguska, etc...). The SAM types you are talking about, are S-125, S-200, S-300, S-400, etc... There are far fewer of those in a theatre (depending on the size), and they again, are mainly meant for medium-high altitude targets. You will have a decent curvature over the range of 100-500km+. Taken into consideration all systems at hand (aerial, space (EKS - really meant for ICBMs), naval, land (immobile)), there will be loopholes around. Russia has one of the most elaborate EWR-systems in the world, and yet, it is far from perfect. Here is where we won't agree in any case. I do economy (business), and semi-professional military analysis (interest). Ukraine, as per fiscal year 2021 (before war started in February 24th, 2022), was the poorest country in Europe! Bulgaria, being the poorest country in EU, had a GDP per capita of approximately 33,845$ in 20221, compare that to Ukraine with its approximately 4827$2! I reckon you compare a "country" to an "insurgency", however that is a flawed comparison at hand. The reason being that a country, has far more financial and logistical burdens, than an insurgency would ever have. A whole country has to consider the civilian population, infastructural prosperity and future perspectives. This topic is worth its own research paper, however know that this a completely invalid argument. Popularity of drones considered - I have access to Russian, Ukrainian and even middle-eastern closed channels on Telegram/Whatsapp, etc... They do tend to post a myraid of material (mostly visual) from around their regions. I can genuinely say that in no modern conflict (since WWII, as per common historical terminology), have drones been used enmasse on a scale anything resembling Ukraine currently. I have not seen anything from Africa, Asia, Middle-east, etc... And mind you, I do not take news outlets too seriously (quite the opposite), I rely mostly on local residents posting what they see and experience. While some of these conflicts have been within the confinements of a single country, e.g. US being in Afghanistan for over 20 years, this does grant time to use drones nevertheless. I will also point out to you, that many of the drones that Ukraine uses (smaller type, not Bayraktar-size), are actually hand-made or from toy stores. Some are of the more advanced Mavic-type (if you can call it that), but a lot are simply made from scrap. This is particularly true for land/sea drones, which are pure Ukrainian products made in provisional workshops. Again, there is very little "standard" here. I don't mind personal points of view, especially if they are well argumented and reasoned for. I am however very specific and strict as to what is a "fact" (confirmed knowledge), vs. "suspicions" (personal POV, with a possible detachment from reality). I will have to ask for a source, or in the very least a solid (!) reasoning for that statement. As to who's "bad", that is an insane oversimplification, and too general, to describe anything as professional as a military initative/campaign. As we all know, militaries often have to adhere to politicians, they are also often a product of the society they serve and the common mean, thus throwing blame on one single institution in such a complex environment, isn't too realistic. Russians are as competent as Americans (US specifically), and so are most other super powers. The difficulties that proved a troublesome beginning in Ukraine (obviously, Russians are retaking Ukrainian soil every day and Avdiivka about to collapse, are a multitude: 1) Corruption in military and society, causing military units to be underprovisioned, most of all in manpower. Further, acts of stealing and trechery, all in the name of private gain. 2) Overconfidence in geopolitical agenda, hoping world would abandon Ukraine in order to solve the conflict quickly. Let's not forget that Russians have been fighting western hardware and intelligence, as well as an incredibly determined enemy (Ukrainians). This has backfired on Russians, resulting in absolutely horrendous losses, and generally poor intial-mid term combat efficiency. 3) Overconfidence in their ability and might, compared to a nation they viewed as "slaves" (for a lack of a better term, sadly...). Russians saw a reprise from Ukraine 2014, in the form of 2.0. Fill the streets with "green men", fly in special forces in a spectacular show of determination, resolve and might, record the capture and resetting of Ukrainian government - show the world how a proper superpower deals with its territorial issues. Again, this never happened, due to Ukrainians, proving through action, lessons learned from that year. Also, their will to stand up and fight. 4) Military system being focused around a small professional (read - fulltime) force, with the sheer might relying on conscription (read - few and seldom trainings, mostly semi-schooled reservists that have been off-duty for a long time). With Russia attempting a swift action in Ukraine, this model of military build has been instrumental in proving that they are a country with strength not in the short term, but prolonged war. By design, a conscription model suggests severe losses in the early stages of an armed conflict, with gradual buildup of experience leading to potentially expotential increase in combat efficiency (more experienced soldiers, teach recruits how to deal with different aspects of local warfare). 5) Insansely poor timing with regards to when the operation (war) was started, considering the weather factor. A common understanding here is that this is due to the Russian military high-command expecting a swift and short opeation (again), taking no precaution for a proglonged one. As you can imagine, from what I mentioned earlier in my posts, Ukraine has a really beautiful and high-quality black soil, which turns butter and mud upon precipitation or contact with water. Well, when spring came (2022-2023), you could see just how the long columns of Russian hardware were stuck, with no way to move, due to the adverse weather conditions and the local flora and fauna. This aspect alone, has cost Russians far more in losses, than they should ever have paid. Consider how history repeats itself, with Germans making the same mistake (over a 5 year period, you cannot avoid it, you can only mitigate it). There are many more aspects, and this is a very general outline, which does indeed point out some of the most severe reasons for why the operation (war) started so poorly for Russians. From the systems you mention; DUKE IED attacks the radio communication of a drone (this only blocks direct control - autonomous functions (TV-Contrast/IR/etc...) mitigate this), and THOR, while being very much experimental, still really works by targetting a single drone at a time and hoping for a burnthrough. Still, let me give you a reference to what this system has to handle, if it indeed ever starts being produced (not being produced as of february 2024): "Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine."3 With 1o.ooo drones lost on average per month, it sounds like a serious problem, that there really is no good solution to right now. Much of the problem posed by such cheap drones, is also the fact that in designing a weapon system countering drones, you need to make sure that it doesn't cost more to take down the drone, than its off-shelf price. If you are using weaponry which costs more to use, than the actual price of its intended target, you are doing a poor trade, and actually working against yourself. Imagine that a couple of 30mm bullets (even if of the "flak" type), will cost more than the actual drone (a 30mm bullet will quickly cost 20$-30$ - only 10 round will typically cost more than what is flying in Ukraine, and thats few rounds to defeat a highly dynamic and unpredictable system). Again, this issue will only get worse with AI being applied to such systems. At that point, jamming a drone will have very little to no effect, on a fully autonomous systems. There are already autonomous drones out there, making use of highly advanced algortythms, with clever programming, as well as initial implementations of basic AI. Putin, in a recent display, has voiced AI as being among the main projects that the Russian industry is working on. US and China are also pumping resources into R&D of AI, as they recognize what impact it will have on the battlefield. With all due respect, you are wrong. Drones come in many shapes and sizes, and to mention one - look at the Poseidon. Officially, little is know about it, other than it being an autonomous system. It is already a system for which no navy in the world has any counter to. You definitely need AI for guidance, as that AI will then be capable of avoiding maneuvers, pretty much the same functionality that current ICBM's have with their MIRVs, and cruise/hypersonic missiles/glide vehicles have as well. Unpredictable flight-tracjectories make them incredibly hard to intercept (read - practically impossible), and that isn't even AI yet, for all we know. Again, superpowers are recognizing the potential, I do so too. I'll disagree on that point entirely. I'll also point out that the reason why the drones used in Ukraine generally don't strike helicopters, aircraft and other high-performance systems enmasse, is exactly because of the limited bandwidth between the operator (human) and the drone. If the drones were more autonomous, particularly AI, the would have all the metrics to perfectly calculate a flight path anticipating an intercept point. The same concept is used in modern AA-missiles, where they are actually drones themselves, albeit still not categorized so, because programming gives no ability to control past weapons release. Still, those weapons are "clever". 1GDP per capita, PPP (current international $) - European Union | Data (worldbank.org) 2GDP per capita (current US$) - Ukraine | Data (worldbank.org) 3Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org)

Drones are far from perfect, but they have their strengths. While drones have existed since thd end of WWI. Based on inadequate technology (albeit maturing), and a certain delay of seeing the advantages, they have really been neglected. They haven't been the main focus of development, until possibly now. Make no mistake, it isn't an accident why drones are so popular in Ukraine, vs. other conflicts. Part of the explanation lies in geology, specifically, the black soil located in these parts of the globe. It is the highest quality of soil on earth, the absolute best when it comes to minerals and for farming. It is however, naturally, very delicate. During spring, and precipitation, it becomes incredibly muddy. As such, Ukraine is a very demanding terrain to operate in with heavy equipment, highly problematic to say the least. Drones, are a good compromise here. You claim that radars can find helicopters and drones, but that is not quite right. Again, there are no absolute terms. A radar positioned on the ground, or low enough, will have a significant level of masking from the terrain. A low flying aircraft (helicopter/drone), can slip by unnoticed. Remember earth's curvature for linger ranges as well. An airborne radar (AWACS) does a better job at finding low level targets. Consider how Israeli EWR never warned (officially) about the paragliders and smaller number of drones from Hamas. Now that is a very level terrain compared to Ukraine (woods, high-rise buildings, etc) and targets are bigger. The point is, there is a significant deadzone thst radars cannot fill (mostly a cost/benefit question, technically, it's possible). Drones are allso capable of hitting moving targets (sucide drones), there is a fair amount of videos showing that online. Have a look: The point is, the ways that these drones are targetted, are very rudimentary. Given frontline schedule, and price/benefit ratio, they are decent, yet do a significant work. Taking out an armored vehicle, is a significant success. Consider now, that this technology will synthesize with AI in the near future, in the aspect of a military product. Consider also that other than dedicated AA platforms, a vehicle/object/helicopter, has really no countermeasures or even a way of systematically countering this threat. That's the danger. Drones are far from the only "new" concept to come out from the war in Ukraine. However, with regards to multiple US military programs and FARA, it is a significant factor driving change. FARA-program stipulated a light gunship as a forward scout aircraft, operating at or behind the enemy lines. For multiple reasons, this has proven to be a high-risk tactic. The same task can be done by a drone, with higher efficiency and far lower risk (no danger to human life). You mention warshios and AA/AG cannons. Well, these are first and foremost the last barrier in the defense architecture of a battleship. A battleship has no other bareiers to effectively attack small drone-boats that stick up 50cm above the surface, and measure the size of a river dinghy. Second, there aren't many of such systems inboard a ship, as it's considered last resort defence (tactics don't build on testing this barrier). Thus, one such system will have a hard time with a coordibated attack from multiple sngles. Once the drone is close enough, the elevation restrictions prohibit further engagement - the unit is done for:

If anyone is trolling, then obviously it's you! You have absolutely no information or metric on what is a minority/majority in this community. You are biased in your views, and obviously incompetent to perform a basic analysis/reasoning. Let me repeat myself one more time, this time, in simpler language: generally speaking, when you search up "flight game", you will not get DCS as a first, or even prominent hit. You find DCS by looking for a simulator (which this software prides itself to be). One joins a simulator, because one wants to simulate (in this case, according to realistic military aviation with all its components). Thus, it's logical to assume that most members of this community, seek realism as their priority number one! Now, that we have established that your arcade views of a simulator belong to the minority, we might infer even more. It would make logical sense to request something in favor of furthering realism, however asking to detract from it because you claim it "would be nice", is beyond recognition. You make a further statement about what admins do and don't. Well, where did you even get that information from? Are you entitled to speak for admins, and on their behalf? Let's be frank, you have no idea about what server admins do or don't, and neither do you know if it is intentional or not. Let me school you a little. The preferred way of going about a situation like this, is submitting your request to the server admin. You only know what you want, but there will be others who want the opposite. A admin will seldomly change a given server setting, to suit a minority. Now, depending on what server you fly at, the mean on the server might or might not want for the same, therefore, contact the admin. As it stands, DCS is a trademark focused on realism (as far as possible), thus it would be against its interest, to suit your idea. You already have the option to customize your perception on realism - I see no problem with it. As to what Hobel mentioned with ground crew realistically preparing the aircraft for the pilot in most cases IRL, sure, true that. However, a proper system needs to be implemented to mitigate this shortcoming (a more advanced ground crew functionality - albeit still a server setting), rather than a quick one, which will prove difficult to work with/incompatible in the future. This is a discussion based on cost, manpower and time, used wrongly, on something that will need to be reworked in the future - i.e. bad business.

I mentioned drones, and for a good reason; they have become a very prominent tool in this war, as compared to before. Drones are used in a whole different role, and on a completely different scale, than what they used to be. I never stated that they are the only lesson to be learned, but they are among the main lessons. This is further confirmed by multiple other projects being cancelled in e.g. US and change in warfare mentality. Check this: Drone Boat Swarm Vision Laid Out By DoD | The War Zone (twz.com) It is mainly drones, which have been able to hold the Black Sea Fleet at bay, attacking targets of opportunity (granted, Moscow was sunk by R-360 Neptune). US Navy has realized the danger of many small targets swarming a ship/unit, built originally to fight other "big" contenders. The fact that a completely new type of use of drones on the battlefield are being pioneered in Ukraine (Ukraine/Russia), is further solidified by the complete lack of effective means to deal with them. US is testing right now a vehicle for dealing with them somewhat effectively, built with parts off the shelf (it uses the M230 gun that AH-64 uses, a very rarely used weapon outside of the Apache): U.S.-Made Counter-Drone Trucks Head for Ukraine (nationaldefensemagazine.org). While many new concepts emerge in Ukraine, few are as eye-opening as drones in the context of their effect on the battlefield. This is also what seems to drive the new changes in US structures, with more countries to follow. China is no different in terms of its focus on drones, with specific offensive systems relying solely on the concept of swarming a target/area with suicide drones. That's my point, and you can clearly see that multiple bigger projects have been doubted in the light of recent events in Ukraine. As to drones denying helicopters, well, nothing is ever definitive (either/or). The truth is that it all depends, but whilst both sides used transport helicopters more daringly in the first phase of the invasion, currently, transport helicopters are pulled further back, with cars/trucks perform the last part of transport. Attack helicopters have also changed their tactics on both sides, in order to grant survivability. This is just a natural evolution of tactics, when you operating in a high-threat environment. As to what systems actually pose the greatest danger to army aviation/air force (helicopters/planes), it is no doubt dedicated AA systems (SAM/MANPAD/AAA). Those are the hard workers. Still, this conflict proves that drones emerge as a new threat to be reckoned with. We are not talking about a single MQ-9, or two, operating roughly in the same area. We are talking about a solid coverage of man-portable observation/combat drones that will more often than not, notice a helicopter coming in. It takes little more than 5-10 minutes for a fire mission to be passed along to the artillery units. If it doesn't get the helicopter, it will get the infantry. That's really the big game changer. This is assuming the drone being a non-combat one. If you have the air saturated with suicide-drones (which in Ukraine is often the case - you can often see low battery status on different types of drones, before they attack. That means that they often stay more than 20-30 minutes in the air, scounting for targets.), then a helicopter coming in for landing, unloading troops/cargo, taking off, will total a minimum of 7 minutes before the helicopter is back up to safe speed (faster than drone). Looking at the videos and information coming from Ukraine, I certainly see a natural shift in tactics with regards to use of different types of units in this environment. To me, it's amazing that there are currently no know ECM jammers strong enough, to block drone operation in a given area (notice - area, not targeting a specific drone). Certainly an interesting discussion though.

Generally, current combat suicide drones are mostly propeller driven (has to be cheap, if it is a "suicide"-weapon), thus they cannot really catch a helicopter flying at speed. About the fastest drones used in Ukraine will do 150km/h in level flight. However, if that helicopter is realitively slow, or near the frontlines (current UAV's have funny long ranges 300km+ - talking about relatively small 25-100kg), then it has a problem. The UH-60 replacement, Bell V-280 VTOL (part of "Future Vertical Lift"-program, not FARA), has longer range and faster travel speed, however it is not a front line aircraft. It presents a bigger target, and is more fragile than a helicopter. The point is however, that suicide drones are effectively nullifying the ability to fly in troops/equipment in a contested area, if that area doesn't have significant AA presence. It's an interesting shift in battlefield dynamics. It seems like US has realized it. Russians/Ukrainians did so too, and this can be seen based on the flight/attack profile of these nations, particularly Russia. Close-in attacks, have become a thing of pure opportunity, while guided munitions are the norm now. Same goes for air force. Now, it's all about keeping 7-8+km of distance, while engaging, depending on situation, mission and weapon. Depending on the strategy and tactics that US Air Force has envisioned for the future, a Raider/Defiant & V-280 composition would allow for much versatility. Raider (being smaller and more nimble) is definitely a helicopter which could disembark troops/supplies at the front. Defiant can carry more, albeit with increased risk of loss and not as practical (physically bigger target, noisier, fewer opportunities for landing, etc.). Still, war studies do show that helicopters in the mid-size 11-14 tons, are the most universal and practical (utility airframes). In either case, those, supplemented by the extended range V-280, would allow to cover the short/medium range tactical operations effectively. With Chinooks/CH-53 being the heavy-lifter, one could make this branch very streamlined, compared to today. Sadly, there are many factors at play which would make such an effectivisation process difficult to pull through. Consider how datalink is only now becoming a unified standard... Until now, neither Army, Air Force or Navy could agree on a common standard, because human factors (everyone wants to be the lead and claim that they had the best system). In the end though, it does signal an interesting shift in perception on what future wars will be like.

May I be corrected! Hah, either released under radar, or I have missed it somehow in patch-notes... Fantastic Exorcet, then the interation seems to be implemented, same with the "after"-effects of wind disturbance. Splendid stuff

It's wrong to read the red bar as "limit never exceed", that is not a term used by the manual, and that, for a very specific reason. Any airframe, depending on the type, will be able to sustain 133% - 150% the limit which is stated in the flight/operating manual. "Limit never exceed", is something that is typically stated in technical documentation from the manufacturer (as opposed flight/operating manual, which is an air force document). This mainly concerns engineers working on the airframe. The reason is simple; pilots are to adhere to limits sets by the air force, not aircraft designers. Of course I am right, I just explained the distinction made in the Su-27SK flight manual (Rus) as to what the different G-limits are. I am partly from there, thus I speak Russian/cyrillic. People generally don't have any understanding for how documents are made, who is to follow what, and which way documentation goes, especially since there isn't any common standard being followed internationally.

I know, but doesn't last as long as it potentially could. Unless someone takes off/flies behind you in that instant, the effect will diminish pretty quick. Also, as mentioned, it doesn't affect helicopters at all.