MiloMorai

About 10 years ago a guy did a study of accidents with JG26. JG26 was flying both the 109 and 190. The 190 had slightly more accidents.

Kurfurst 42 x 525 l = 22,050 l 284,000/22,050 = 13 sorties Now some words by Butch (Oliver Lefrvre): The problem was not the lack of C3, there were C3 being produced along with B4. Note that they dropped the addition of additives preventing formation of Gum which account for troubles using both B4 and C3 after they have stayed a few weeks in tanks. That was a problem encountered by the team in charge of the captured a/c after the war btw. By 1945 airfields had usualy a few days worth of fuel counting a couple of sorties a day. Problem was that deliveries were erratic, movement of fuel was done by night only and sometimes took a long time. Some deliveries taking weeks to arrive. Fuel production was virtually finished by february 1945 and the strategic stocks were used and they lasted until mid April. C3 use for all units was virtually impossible due to the amount of C3 fuel being delivered first to the 190 units and then to the 109 with ASC/DC engines.

Just to put this 284,000 liters in perspective. 284,000 l = 62,417 gal Consumption of 150 Grade Fuel - Barrels http://www.wwiiaircraftperformance.org/150grade/Consumption_150_Grade_fuel_Barrels.html April 1945 89,000bbl = 3,115,000 gal = 14,173,250 l Using some peoples logic with regard to C3 fuel, then 150PN fuel was in very wide spread use. Yes ~921 Bf109s vs ~1341 Fw190A/Fs 'on hand'. On 27 April 1945 (5 days after Luftwaffenkommando West said there was 284,000 l of C3) when Fw. Arnulf Meyer and ~9 other pilots were picking some new Bf109s, the fuel tanks were only half filled at a Bavarian airfield.:shocking:

But, they are NOT 1.98ata K-4s.

Firing order of the Sabre, http://www.flightglobal.com/FlightPDFArchive/1944/1944%20-%200610.PDF

There was complaints by civilians around Typhoon/Tempest bases that the night time runups were disturbing their sleep.

Now why can't you do that same kind of research for 1.98ata Kurfurst instead of the speculative proofs you provide. As for the very blurry photo, it could be just as easily be a B4 placard.

Fuel has a lot to do with a/c performance.

It most likely that these accidents with 150 fuel was because pilots were not following SOP of revving the engine before beginning their take off run to clear the spark plugs which had been fouled during taxiing to the take off point.

III./JG 27 bases: 18.3.45 - 29.3.45Gütersloh Bf 109K 29.3.45 - 8.4.45 Goslar Bf 109K 8.4.45 - 11.4.45 Halberstadt Bf 109K 11.4.45 - 4.45 Grossenhain Bf 109K 4.45 - 20.4.45 Prague-Gbell Bf 109K 20.4.45 - 2.5.45 Bad Aibling Bf 109K 2.5.45 - 5.45 Salzburg Bf 109K 5.45 - 8.5.45 Saalbach Bf 109K It should be noted that this was a movement from NW Germany, east and then south to the German/Austrian border area. I./JG27 had a similar movement. III. and IV./JG 53 ended up in the same area. ..an extract from Lorant/Goyat "Bataille dans le ciel d'Allemagne" ...(a translation) At Kleinkarolinenfeld, around ten pilots who no longer had aircraft piled into a truck at dawn on 27 April 1945 in order to drive to the airfield at Bad Wörishofen and take delivery of Messerschmitt 109s fresh out of the factories. Fw. Arnulf Meyer (9. Staffel) never forgot the scenes they witnessed that day: Rows of Messerschmitt 109s and Focke-Wulf 190s lined up around the airfield perimeter, others out in the open (!) under the odd camouflage net. Teams of oxen in yokes in the midst of all this enabled the aircraft to be moved around without utilizing any manpower or fuel… At least one hundred fighters from the assembly lines were dispersed around the field. The Officer that met us showed us the latest sub-types to be delivered: Focke-Wulfs with in-line engines and in particular the Messerschmitt Bf 109 K, an improved sub-type of our “Gustav” model. There was bustling activity on the field. Aircraft were landing and taking off constantly. There was no airfield protection Rotte in the air. Our surprise was even greater when we were told that thirty brand new aircraft were due to arrive at the depot that day if the necessary pilots to ferry them in could be found. We were presented to the airfield commander who had set up his office in a comfortably appointed wooden shack: a fatherly Major who gave us a pleasant welcome. Of course we wanted to take the Bf 109 Ks… He asked us for our papers indicating our various type ratings but after scrutinizing them, he handed them back with a shake of the head and simply said: “sorry, I can’t give you any K-4s. You’ve only flown the G-10, so take the G-10s!” We tried to explain to him that whether they were the G or K variant, they were still Messerschmitt 109s and any mods were almost certainly to be of a minor nature, unlikely to impact on the handling qualities of the aircraft. He did not appear particularly convinced by our arguments, but I noted how keenly he eyed us smoking our American cigarettes. These were retrieved from US prisoners and our Spieß always had them in his stocks. As naturally as possible, I offered the Major one of these cigarettes. His face lit up. Just for good measure, I left a barely started packet on his desk. He thanked me and told us that he was going to see what he ‘‘could do”. In the minute that followed, more packets of cigarettes changed hands and in this way we soon had authorization to take the Messerschmitt Bf 109 K-4s! We went to select our Messerschmitts in the company of the line chief, who asked us what our destination airfield was. The fuel crisis had also reached this field. Our aircraft were fueled with enough for thirty minutes flying time, which was largely sufficient to get back to Kleinkarolinenfeld. On the other hand the armament magazines were empty. We were given parachutes and life jackets. Suddenly we saw a car drawing up and out climbed the depot commander. He told us in a voice bereft of emotion that he was not sorry that we were taking the 109 Ks. Then he read the text of a teleprinter message he had just received. The presence of American troops and tanks was reported ten kilometers from Bad Wörishofen and he was ordered to immediately destroy all the aircraft housed on the airfield. The Major explained to us that the 109s were easier to blow up than the 190s, as they carried as standard a delayed-action 3 kg explosive charge in the fuselage housed next to the fuselage fuel tank. We smoked a last cigarette together with the officer. The imminent debacle seemed more of a relief to him than anything else. He had fought during the First World War and had been wounded but was of the opinion that the disaster befalling our country was of a much more serious nature on this occasion. He hoped that we would soon be back among our families and that we would not risk our lives pointlessly. He started up his car and drove off. My first takeoff in the Bf 109 K held no surprises. The aircraft was poorly trimmed and the compass was not functioning, which meant that I had to follow my comrades blindly. A typical product of our war industry in 1945: the instruments were incorrectly calibrated and there was nothing coming through the oxygen mask. Fortunately our flight level did not exceed 1,000 meters. We all landed without incident at Kleinkarolinenfeld. Happily enough the brakes worked… Fw. Arnulf Meyer was with III./JG53 Bad Wörishofen is just W of Munich and SSW of Augsburg Of note is the G-10 comment > III./JG53 was flying G-10s not K-4s

Spit XIVs were also going to SEA.

Revisionist/speculative history can not be ignored SiThSpAwN.

In the 4 Gruppen there was 158 K-4s on hand with 79 serviceable. April 9 1945 I./JG27 - 29/13 (45%) III./JG27 - 35/15 (43%) III./JG53 - 40/24 (60%) IV./JG53 - 54/27 (50%) 158/79 (50%) A dismal serviceable rate.

As the only proof Kurfurst can supply for 1.98ata boost is a copy of an order stating that 1.98ata was cleared for operational use, then this should suffice for 21lb and 25lb boost.:)

The Typhoon &Tempest Story by Thomas/Shores list all the Tempest claims and losses. The Tempest claimed 240 EAs.

http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/jagd/bijg26.html http://www.ww2.dk/oob/bestand/jagd/biijg26.html

Also that I./JG27 lost a G-10 (151885) 14/04/45, so it was not completely equipped with K-4s.

The methanol in the MW50 is there to stop the water from freezing. I would like to know how the water is not converted to steam. All non-intercooled superchargers operate with an intake manifold temperature in the general range of 115° - 200° above ambient (outside air) temperature at 8 psi of boost

Agree Merlin. Someone is confused. The only way to cool the engine is by the radiators (coolant and oil) and that certainly isn't immediate.

There was some post war crashes but none that I could find that required the pilot to bail out. Supposedly this myth started when a German mechanic told an Allied pilot that German pilots had lost their arms when bailing out. Nothing like adding to the apprehension of flying a strange a/c.:)

There was only one Do335 that crashed, WNr 240108, VG+PO, at DoneFeld Dec 24 1944 killing the pilot when the the control wires burned through do to an engine fire.

The He219 had ejection seats. Fw tested ejection seats for the 190.

The fuel pick up in the tank is at the bottom of the tank, so when inverted all that it will be picking up is air.

Top speed was only good for running away as combat took place at a much lower speed that max speed.