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Community A-4E-C v2.3 (May 2025)


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Posted
47 minutes ago, rfxcasey said:

Can't re-arm re-fuel no matter what I do, what is the problem?

If I remember correctly, you must have the cockpit open to be able to communicate with the ground crew and if you have the engine running you must bring it to idle and you should be able to refuel and rearm, otherwise if it does not allow you to refuel you must turn off the engine and at this point you will be allowed to refuel.

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Posted
10 minutes ago, Calabrone said:

If I remember correctly, you must have the cockpit open to be able to communicate with the ground crew and if you have the engine running you must bring it to idle and you should be able to refuel and rearm, otherwise if it does not allow you to refuel you must turn off the engine and at this point you will be allowed to refuel.

You don't have to turn the engine off for refueling and rearming, only for repairs.

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Posted (edited)
34 minutes ago, Calabrone said:

If I remember correctly, you must have the cockpit open to be able to communicate with the ground crew and if you have the engine running you must bring it to idle and you should be able to refuel and rearm, otherwise if it does not allow you to refuel you must turn off the engine and at this point you will be allowed to refuel.

In all other planes you don't have to have the canopy open and only have to have the engine off to repair. If you need to have the canopy open to talk to the ground crew in the A-4e that's a special case as far as I know, none of the other planes I own require that.

I can't get the any of the radio comms to work in the A-4E after installed to latest version 2.0, I don't know what the problem is. I've tired in the quick missions as well as adding the plane to missions I've made myself and normally fly. What the heck is going on is the plane just bugged or what. My pilot will make the radio call but never any response from ground crew or ATC. I can't salute and launch off the carrier but that's it. Even when the plane is completely shut down it's not working. Worked fine in the old version. I complete uninstalled and reinstalled it but it's still not working.

Edited by rfxcasey
Posted
4 minutes ago, rfxcasey said:

In all other planes you don't have to have the canopy open and only have to have the engine off to repair. If you need to have the canopy open to talk to the ground crew in the A-4e that's a special case as far as I know, none of the other planes I own require that.

Yeah, it's a special case, apparently it didn't have an intercomm to communicate with the ground crew.

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Posted (edited)
10 minutes ago, Gianky said:

Yeah, it's a special case, apparently it didn't have an intercomm to communicate with the ground crew.

Well I'll be dipped, it'd be nice if that was made a bit more apparent. It works, but it still sounds like they are talking on comms so, kind of a miss if realism was what they were going for.

Edited by rfxcasey
Posted
1 hour ago, rfxcasey said:

Why do I need the manual when I've got you?😉

Well . . . I'm 80 and the proability that the manual will out live me is 1.0. Doc says i'll live to 90, but statistics say "Not so fast Charlie!"

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Posted
6 hours ago, photowriters said:

Well . . . I'm 80 and the proability that the manual will out live me is 1.0. Doc says i'll live to 90, but statistics say "Not so fast Charlie!"

Yes, photowriters, I am 69 and liver transplanted and diabetic and even for me the stats don't give me more than ten years or less, but I don't give a damn and think about enjoying life day by day. Someone said " ... tomorrow is another day! "😂

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Posted (edited)

Reading through the second forum thread I came across the two items below. The first is to correct a word choice. The second, while considerably more esoteric. is critical to survival as a tactical combat pilot.

Chocks NOT Chokes

The devices that one puts in front and behind aircraft wheels to keep an aircraft from rolling away are chocks, not chokes.

Real Time Ballistics & Why Level Bombing?

I suspect that no one on this forum has ever heard of real time ballistics, much less knowing what it is or why it is important. Real time ballistics can be defined as the study of, science of, or the solution to aiming a gun so the projectile will hit a moving target like an A-4E trucking along at 7,000 feet AGL and 350KIAS.

What’s important to know as a pilot is the flight time of the projectile to various altitudes. As an attack pilot, the last thing you want to do when flying over enemy territory is to fly in a manner that makes it easier for the anti-aircraft gunners to shoot you down. At its most rudimentary level, the importance of real time ballistics is the immutable truth that the closer you are to the gun the shorter the time of flight is from the muzzle to the aircraft, a situation that reduces to second but equally important immutable truth. The closer you are to the muzzle of the anti-aircraft cannon, the more likely it is that you will be shot down.

Obviously, you want to stay as far away from the muzzle as you can. Equally obvious is that you want to fly in a manner that will complicate the problem of where to aim the guns. The tactic to achieve this is to not fly straight and level, i.e., jink the aircraft. If the time of flight of a projectile is 7.5 seconds then you need to turn and change altitude every 4 to 5 seconds.

When you choose a delivery profile for delivering a stick of bombs you must be mindful of the impact of real time ballistics as well as the inherent accuracy or inaccuracy of the various delivery profiles.

The converse of the enemy gunner’s gun aiming problem is your selection of a delivery profile and a release altitude. In its simplest terms the shorter the slant range to the target when you punch the bomb pickle the better the chances are that you will hit the target. The quasi-standard strike delivery profile for a major strike or a road RECCE in Vietnam was a 45-degree dive releasing your bomb(s) at 5000AGL [above ground level] and 450KTAS. A 30-degree dive releasing at 3000 feet would give you a better chance of hitting the target, but your chances of being shot down would be exponentially higher because you were closer to the ground and closer to the muzzle, real time ballistics at work.

Level bombing using a depressible gunsight to drop Mk 80 series bombs is not a good tactic because that delivery technique is not conducive to either tight CEPs or accuracy. Why? Small pitch errors or deviations result in large impact errors. When you choose a particular delivery tactic or profile there are a host of factors to consider. For example: 

  1. ·        What is the enemy’s anti-air order of battle, i.e., anti-aircraft guns, surface to air missiles, fighter/interceptor aircraft, electronic warfare assets, etc., i.e., what’s the biggest threat to you and your aircraft enroute to the target, in the target area, and egressing from the target?
  2.       What level of damage is required for the target the be considered as destroyed or damaged to the point that additional strikes are not required?
  3. ·       What do the tactical manuals and weaponeering pubs recommend as the preferred delivery profile?
  4. ·       Etc., etc., etc.
Edited by photowriters
spelling and grammar
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Posted

Dear Photowiriter I read very carefully what you write, because there is only to learn from you. I enclose an excerpt of a story of a mission of VA-212 of Bonnie Dick that confirms very well what you wrote. Until your next lesson.

" Our tactics at this point were to
Enter the target area at approximately 3,500 ft. AGL,
and 450 knots so that the C models with J-65 engines
could keep up, climb to about 7,000, make a
30-degree bomb run with a release at 4,000 ft,
and exit at 3,000. These tactics were the result
of a poor assessment of enemy weapons capabilities.
enemy capabilities. The intensity of
ground fire below 3,000 was real. "

Virtual Pilots of DCS A4-E if you are interested in knowing the history of this mission I leave below the link.

https://www.flightjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Scooter-Memories-FJ-413.pdf

 

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Posted
55 minutes ago, Calabrone said:

Dear Photowiriter I read very carefully what you write, because there is only to learn from you. I enclose an excerpt of a story of a mission of VA-212 of Bonnie Dick that confirms very well what you wrote. Until your next lesson.

" Our tactics at this point were to
Enter the target area at approximately 3,500 ft. AGL,
and 450 knots so that the C models with J-65 engines
could keep up, climb to about 7,000, make a
30-degree bomb run with a release at 4,000 ft,
and exit at 3,000. These tactics were the result
of a poor assessment of enemy weapons capabilities.
enemy capabilities. The intensity of
ground fire below 3,000 was real. "

Virtual Pilots of DCS A4-E if you are interested in knowing the history of this mission I leave below the link.

https://www.flightjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Scooter-Memories-FJ-413.pdf

 

If it's VA-212 on the USS Bon Homme Richard (CVA-31) the book must have been Stephen R. Gray's documentary book Rampant Raider which is the story of his path to becoming a naval aviator and his experiences as squadron pilot with the Rampant Raiders of VA-212. I bought the book, but I'll never finish it it because it did not resonate with me. The parts I read matched my own experiences, but the prose was too flat. It lacked both the sparkle of good story telling and the drive that sweep the reader toward a destination.

U.S. Navy carrier based aviation was at the same time well and poorly prepared for extended combat operations when the Gulf of Tonkin Incident occurred on 02 AUG 1964. The attack pilots were highly proficient at day and night carrier operations and delivery of both conventional and special weapons. However, they were ill prepared to fight and survive in the skies of North Vietnam. Their tactics for ingress, egress, and delivery kept them in the center of the most dangerous spot in the North Vietnamese air defenses. The initial loss rates were staggering. As real time ballistics were factored into mission planning and execution, aircraft began to fly at higher altitudes, pilots began to drop bombs at higher altitudes, and the loss rate decreased. 

When I joined my first squadron. we flew 7,000 ft to 11,000 ft ASL, dropped our bombs in a 60° dive releasing the bombs at 7,000 ft. The second cruise we flew between 7,000 ft and 9,000 ft and released our bombs at 5,000 ft. in a 45° dive.

New Subject

Specifics of the case 1, day VFR pattern around the ship has been a topic of intense scrutiny and discussion on every iteration of the A-4E DCS forum. Perhaps it is time to discuss some of the finer points of carrier operations flying an A-4E especially approaches and landings.

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Posted

Dear Photowriters, it's about that book that I found a small excerpt of on the web. The new subject that you have, may I call you by your name, put in the works I hope you get it out soon.

Posted
30 minutes ago, DN308 said:

Is there a chance to find some liveries?

Sure ! But you have to go into User Files and scroll down the drop down menu of "Type" and click on Livery. There you will find various liveries for the A4-E, but you have to search for them because there is no Scooter in the Unit menu.

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Posted
1 hour ago, JFCshloss said:

When i look straight ahead the cockpit goes all black screen  i haved to look left or right or up to see anything

The first thing one can ask you is if you have correctly installed the latest version 2.0, i.e. have you deleted the folder of the previous version and then installed the new one or ? At the end if you have done everything right you can attach a .track where this happens to you in order to try to understand something!

Posted (edited)

Carrier Operation with the A-4E

Most of the topics that follow address the skills, procedures, equipment, etc. that are associated landing on the carrier or operations around the ship. Those that aren’t associated flying around the carrier were included either because of comments, questions, incorrect information, or “Well I’ll be Damneds”  or "Ain't that interesting."

NATOPS CV Landing Pattern Conflict

canned_fire:  06 NOV 2018

In preparation/anticipation I was reading the A-4 NATOPS. My understanding is that it says you should maintain 600 ft through the 90 up until intercepting the glide slope still at 600 ft (carrier landing). I am correct? If so why the difference to the F-18 which (my understanding) you should intercept the glides slope at around 300 ft. Does anybody know why the difference? What explains it? Old technology? no Hud? Back in the 70s that how it was? Any clues?

The simple answer should be “comply with pg 3-25 of the 15 NOV 1968 A-4E/F NATOPS manual the carrier operations section.” However, I believe the diagram on pg 3-25 is flawed because it does not show an altitude check point at the 90.

RELEVANT HISTORICAL INFORMATION:

I went through the process of carrier qualification in four different aircraft, two in the training command before I got my wings, and two in the fleet. While the briefs were tailored to the specific aircraft, all of them described the profile from the 180 until you were wings level on final flying the ball the same way. Basically, each of those briefs described the approach turn as a descending turn at 25 to 30 degrees angle of bank that starts from 600 ft at the 180 in straight and level flight at optimum angle of attack in landing configuration, gear down, flaps down, hook down.

The check point at 90 degrees of turn was a 450 ft altitude ASL [above sea level] at optimum angle of attack. The turn continued from the 90 level at 450 ft at the optimum angle of attack and the angle of bank was adjusted to line up the aircraft on the extended centerline of the angled deck. Descent from 450 feet commenced when the meatball was centered between the horizontal green datum lights.

CONCLUSION:

The difference between the graphic in the A-4E/F NATOPS and the F/A-18 NATOPS graphic should not exist. With the single exception that an F/A-18 would be depicted in one graphic and an A-4 would be depicted in the other, the A-4E/F graphic should be identical to the F/A-18 graphic.

HYPOTHESIS:  

The incongruity of the A-4E/F NATOPS and the F/A-18 NATOPS graphics describing the same thing was due to human error or inattention to detail.

While the passage of time would make proving the hypothesis exceedingly difficult, any interested party could pursue an evidential proof by seeking out input from willing participants in the dwindling population of A-4 pilots who regularly flew the scooter from the decks of aircraft carriers to determine if the approach turn described above was how they flew the aircraft from the 180 to the point they were established on centerline, on glidepath, and on speed, i.e., it was a descending turn from the 180°

Gunsight to Land on Carrier? No! No! No!

ruprecht:  04 JUL 2020

Rudel_chw said:

Ohjust tought that it was only me having difficulty with the carrier recovery 😞 ... maybe it is harder than other aircrafts because of the SFM?

It can be tricky, but if you can get the pattern as accurate as possible, it really helps with the landing. APC helps a lot if you're not using it, and a 75mil sight depression gives you a good aiming reference all the way around - top of the 50mil circle on upwind, dead centre horizon on downwind, put the caret on the crotch in the groove and walk it to the centreline abeam the IFLOLS for a 3 wire.

The way the gunsight is implemented in the A-4E DCS digital aircraft, when it is turned up as it would be for weapons delivery it interferes with the pilot’s view of the meatball and datum lights. For case I operations, there three references for landing on a carrier and nothing else: 

1.     Centerline of angled deck

2.     Fresnel lens glidepath system (meatball and datum lights)

3.     Angle of attack

APC or Autothrottles

The first time I engaged the autothrottles I did so with a little trepidation because I didn’t know what to expect. I was absolutely blown away by how closely the APC system mimicked my impulses to change the throttle position. Almost before I could add or reduce power, the autothrottles made the precise power correction that I knew was needed. A couple of years later when I had a couple hundred arrested carrier landings in the A-7, I did not have the same sympatico relationship with the autothrottles in the A-7, a situation or condition that has always mystified me because landing grade wise, I was as proficient in the A-7 Corsair II as I was in the A-4 Skyhawk.

I guess this is a cautionary tale that an APC or autothrottles is not a panacea. While the power settings and adjustments directed by the A-4F autothrottles were never a surprise or excessive, the A-7s APC system’s reaction to changes in aircraft attitude or pilot inputs to the elevator appeared to be untimely, excessively large, and frequent inappropriate.

Angle of Attack Indexer Display and Function

The October 2016 A-4E DCS Community update by archimaede contains a description of how the angle of attack indexer is used that needs both correction and amplification. The description in archimaede’s update belies both how the angle of attack indexer functions and how it is used in a stabilized approach to an arrested landing on an aircraft carrier.

First, the angle of attack gauge and indexer show nothing about an aircraft’s position on an extended glidepath. The angle of attack equipment shows one thing and one thing only, the instantaneous angle between flow of air and a defined reference to the wing usually something easily measured like the straight chord line of the wing. It should be intuitively obvious that if the aircraft is on glidepath and on centerline it also indicates whether the attitude of the aircraft is either nose high, nose low, or properly aligned for an arrested landing.

If an aircraft is flying a stabilized 4-degree glideslope, i.e., stabilized on the glideslope, and the airspeed is stable, a green nose high or slow indexer chevron tells the pilot that he/she needs to add power and speed up to the point that the aircraft is stabilized on the glidepath at the optimum angle of attack. The converse is true if the red or fast chevron is on. The pilot needs to reduce power and raise the nose and stabilize on the glidepath at the optimum angle of attack which for an A-4E is 17.5 units. Yes, angle of attack is an angular measurement of the relative wind in relation to the wing, but units should not be confused with degrees. 

Landings “Ruled by” G-Forces & Geometry

Aircraft and arresting gear limitations and aircraft performance characteristics and geometry define the envelope for a successful approach and arrestment. If an aircraft is on speed (yellow circle lighted in the AOA indexer), on glidepath (meatball in the center of the green horizontal datum lights), on centerline, and the deck isn’t rolling, pitching, or heaving excessively, the hook will contact the deck between the 2 and 3 wire every time.

If the pilot drops the nose, he also raises the tail of the aircraft, and the hook may hit the deck between the 3 and the 4 wire. You cannot escape either the geometry of the approach or the physics of flight. In the air all roll, yaw, and pitching moments roll, pitch, or yaw the aircraft around its center of gravity whether those moments are from control inputs or wind gusts.

Flying the Meatball

While the information that follows should be obvious, my real world experience tells me it bears repeating. There are only three states that will exist when you first see the ball:  

1.     meatball even with datum lights – aircraft on glidepath – reduce power to stay on glidepath

2.     meatball above datum lights – aircraft above glidepath – reduce power to fly down to glidepath then adjust power to stay on glide path

3.     meatball below datum lights – add power and maintain the optimum angle of attack and continue turn – when ball is in the center, reduce power and fly the glide slope – when the ball is in the center adjust as needed to stay on glidepath.

I don’t have a copy of the F-18 NATOPS, but I cannot imagine why it would say that 300 feet is where you should intercept the glide path. At 300 feet the aircraft is about 20 seconds from touching down on the carrier. From time to time I purposely adjusted my abeam position and approach turn so I only had 10-15 seconds wings level in the grove before I trapped because the ship was running out of sea room or my flight was late in getting back to the ship, but that sort of approach is a dommy-dommy-no-no, though I did get an OK3 grade for one of those wrapped up approach turns. 

While for all intents and purposes the F-18 CV pattern in the NATOPS manual is identical to the A-4E CV pattern on pg 3-25 of the A-4E/F NATOPS manual. The real difficulty here is translating a generic statement like, “maintain 600 feet until you are on the glideslope” to specific altitudes in the track over the sea because where you intercept the glide slope is not a single consistent point in xyz space because the approach pattern is dynamic. The ship is moving through the water and it’s likely that the wind over the deck varies.

The norm on a carrier is for the bridge watch team to maneuver the ship so for recovery operations the wind is straight down the centerline of the angled deck at 30 knots. If the wind down the deck higher, it should be obvious that the aircraft will be further from the ship when the pilot rolls wings level in the groove. Conversely, the aircraft will be closer to the ship if the wind over the deck is less that 30 knots. The pattern around the ship is designed to give the pilot sufficient time to stabilize his aircraft on glideslope, on speed, and on centerline far enough out that he can fly a stabilized approach all the way down to touchdown. The 450 ft to 600 ft altitude at optimum AOA halfway through the approach turn allows this to happen if the pilot starts flying the glide slope as soon as she can during the final part of the approach turn.

Corrections in Sets of 3(+), 1 = at Least 2 More

Flying has been vicariously described as hours and hours of boredom interrupted by moments of stark terror, but while there is an element of truth in that statement (especially in night carrier aviation), a more accurate description is that flying consists of a never ending series of actions to correct deviations from the desired speed, altitude, and heading that begin when you start taxiing out for takeoff and continue until the engines are shut down at the destination. Much like driving a car, those corrections become semi-automatic. That is you do them without giving any serious thought to what you are doing.

An interesting fact that is seldom mentioned even in fight training is that every deviation correction you make typically necessitates at least two additional corrections. I don’t know if any serious human factors studies have been made to determine why this is so, but it’s easy to postulate that it’s because of the imprecision of human movement the error of which is probably exacerbated by the fragility of off-the-cuff human judgement of what’s needed to correct a multi-variant problem. 

The rather obtuse lesson here is if you are not continually making corrections when you are flying digitally, you are more the passenger in an aircraft that’s pointed in a particular direction than you are the pilot of a high speed, delta wing A-4E Skyhawk returning from a critical combat mission.

The Approach

In the typical carrier approach in day VFR operations, i.e., case I, the pilot begins the approach 1.25 miles abeam the port side of the ship and starts her 25 to 30 degree angle of bank turn toward the extended centerline of the landing area when she is slightly past the middle of the carrier or roughly the beginning of the last 1/3rd of the ship.

In the turn, most scooter drivers descended to 450 to 500 feet above the water by 90° turn stabilized at a yellow doughnut on speed indication. When the pilot rolls out of the turn lined up with the extended centerline of the angled deck, she is roughly ¾ of a mile or 25.7 seconds from touchdown at an approach speed of 135 knots with 30 knots of wind over the deck. If the turn was executed correctly, the pilot should see and start flying the ball at some point after the 90° position, and assuming he is on the glidepath, reducing power slightly as she rolls out of the turn, calls the ball with aircraft type and fuel state, and starts down the glideslope if she hasn’t already done so.  When the pilot first picks up the ball at ¾ of a mile, he will see a centered ball from 30 feet below the glidepath to 30 feet above the glidepath. The distance above and below the for a centered ball decreases linearly as the distance to touchdown decreases until over ramp or rear end of the ship the tolerance to see a centered ball is plus or minus six inches. These facts should suggest that one should make smaller and smaller or finer corrections the closer the aircraft gets to touchdown.

One of the subjects of Gospadin’s Community update January 2017 was the autothrottles or APC system. If memory serves, the A-4F was the first model A-4 out of the factory with autothrottles. By the time I first flew the Foxtrot with VX-5 at NAF China Lake, I had roughly 300 carrier landings in the A-4, i.e., I had the muscle memory for the power changes during the approach to stay on speed and on glidepath. It was second nature. I had talked to scooter drivers who refused to use the APC because it was too sensitive or overly responsive to pitch inputs.

The Carrier Approach Chant or Mantra

Another “secret” to a successful and safe approach is to remember the carrier approach mantra or chant that goes like this: 

“Meatball, Lineup, Angle of attack”

“Meatball, Lineup, Angle of attack”

“Meatball, Lineup, Angle of attack”

“Meatball, Lineup, Angle of attack”

“Meatball, Lineup”

“Meatball, Lineup”

“Meatball, Lineup”

“Meatball”

“Meatball”

“Meatball”

 

The scan is “Meatball, Lineup, Angle of attack” from wings level in the groove or final approach until in close, “Meatball, Lineup” until you are at the ramp, and nothing but concentrating on keeping the meatball steady between the datum lights from there until touchdown. If repeating the mantra out loud helps you remember and accomplish it, do it. No one is going to hear you in the aircraft or probably where you have secreted your computer for A-4E DCS sim flights.

Spot not the Deck

The mantra above is designed to ensure that as someone makes an approach to the carrier, he will give equal attention to each of the variables that affect the quality of an approach to the carrier. Look at it again. The last bit of mantra is to keep your eyes on the meatball and that’s one of the most difficult things to do. When you are landing on a carrier, you know full well that if you slip below the glideslope that you increase the possibility that you will hit the round down or ramp with your aircraft, an event the frequently results in the death or permanent disability of the pilot.

At the very time you should be concentrating only on the meatball or glideslope, the rear end of the ship is prominent in your field of view. The ultimate finality of hitting the ramp or flying over the wires for an embarrassing bolter makes it almost impossible to avoid the temptation to look at where you are going to land. Looking at the landing area during the final part of the approach is known as spotting the deck. 

I can personally attest to the fact that the path to developing a habit of spotting the deck is deceptive and insidious. During carrier qualification, the last phase of training to become an attack pilot flying A-4E aircraft. I did not know I was spotting the deck and apparently neither did the LSOs [landing signals officers] who manned the LSO platform during the recovery of fixed wing aircraft. When I got to my squadron, the air wing LSOs didn’t pick up on it, despite the fact there were plenty of warning signs like excessive bolters, frantic power calls by an LSO and the aircraft touching down on flight deck short of the #1 wire, which is a grievous error that is known as taxiing to the #1 wire. 

The process of breaking the habit of spotting the deck began for me with a particularly threatening taxi to the #1 wire one night in the Gulf of Tonkin. I landed so close to the ramp that there was a notable pause before the nose wheel thumped over the #1 wire, a second pause before the main gear thumped over the wire and a final shorter delay until the hook engaged the #1 wire. That landing convinced me that if I didn’t make some changes, I was going to kill myself by hitting the ramp.

That one landing scared me so badly that the next time I flew at night I boltered six times and tanked twice before I finally trapped. It was the last recovery evolution of the night and the captain of the USS Independence had committed to keep the ship into the wind and keep cycling tankers up to refuel me until I trapped. One of the senior officers in VA-72 who had been an LSO asked me if the moment the hook engages a wire comes as a surprise or if I knew when the hook was going to grab a wire. He went on to say if I was not surprised by the arrestment, I wasn’t looking at the meatball, i.e., I was spotting the deck. He took me under his wing, taught me the approach scan mantra, and put me on a course to become a proficient and much safer carrier aviator. 

Breaking the deck spotting habit took considerably longer than I expected it would. It was not until the middle of the next deployment when during the final “Meatball, meatball, meatball” section of the approach mantra I did not spot the deck. I kept my eyes on the ball, and the violence of the arrestment scared the crap out of me. I was still trying to keep the ball centered between the datum lights as I was thrown forward in the shoulder harness as the arresting cable brought the aircraft to a stop on the flight deck. 

The arrestment was such a physical shock that it was almost like one of those moments when someone snaps out of a daze wondering where the hell they are. From that moment on, flying the ball all the way down to arrestment slowly became routine, I seldom boltered, and became routinely one of the top 10 approach and landing graded pilots in whatever air wing with which I was flying.

The 2% Burble

If you are around a bunch of carrier pilots for an extended period of time, eventually one of them will make a remark about “lifties” and “lurkies.” That’s pilot speak for unexpected, unexplained, or expected but momentarily forgotten increases or decreases in the rate of climbs and descents. The lurky that is most well-known by carrier pilots is the 2% burble behind the ship. Everyone who has taken the time to master the art and science of digital aviation or who got passing grades in their junior high school science classes understands the basics of Bernoulli’s principle and how lift is generated and what causes an airfoil to experience a stall. 

What is probably less understood is how the air at the trailing edge of the wing behaves. A fat cambered wing like the one scooter has imparts a slight downward vector at the trailing edge to the air that comes across the top of wing. Despite the fact that an aircraft carrier’s flight deck is not a streamlined airfoil, the air that is displaced over the top of the carrier as it drives through the ocean at 30 to 40 knots has a strong downward vector at the ramp as the air over the deck fills the low pressure area created by the stern of the carrier. This is the burble and the 2% refers to the fact that if your aircraft is stable on the glideslope when you fly into the burble area, it will be below the glideslope as you cross the ramp. Every carrier pilot I know routinely squeezed a little power as he got in close to compensate for the burble. 

How much power was required depended on how much wind was over the deck, what aircraft you were flying, and what the carrier’s speed through the water was. I have yet to take the DCS A-4E to the ship, so I don’t know if the burble is part of the carrier simulation or not. If it is not part of the DCS carrier experience, it needs to be programed in. Without the impact of the burble, carrier landings require far less skill and flying ability than they should. That brings us to a sticky area for discussion, flight simulators or simulated flight.

What is the Function of a Flight Simulator?

The topic header above is in the same class of question as the almost unanswerable parametric question, “How long is a piece of string,” for which the only reasonable answer is, “It depends” or “It’s variable” or “It’s undefined.” For me, as a professional pilot who spent 37 years in the cockpit flying alternatingly for Uncle Sam’s haze gray seagoing canoe club or Continental Airlines, a flight simulator is a multi-million dollar tool to train pilots to fly a specific model aircraft, nothing more and nothing less. As such, a flight simulator is riveted to the physical aircraft it is designed to simulate. That is, it reacts exactly as the real aircraft would to environment factors like crosswinds, turbulence, etc. and pilot initiated inputs via the flight control and engine inputs. Modern flight simulators are marvels of realism that sit on platforms that have six degrees of freedom of motion that gives the crew an almost scary seat of the pants feedback as to what the aircraft is doing.

“Okay,” you say, “but what the hell does that have to do with me ‘flying’ a digital emulation of an A-E Skyhawk?” In a word, PLENTY!!! 

If the digital emulation is properly implemented, learning to land on a digital aircraft carrier should be as hard for you accomplish as it was for every naval aviator that successfully completed the carrier qualification syllabus and went on to fly the scooter in a fleet squadron. Flying a high speed tactical aircraft on and off of an aircraft carrier is hard to learn, damn hard to do well consistently, and it’s inherently dangerous. Every time you bolter after working your butt off on an approach to USS Big Gray Boat, ask yourself where the ball was you touched down. If you can’t answer that question, you weren’t flying the ball so you have no reason to expect you will trap on deck. Same is true if the ball was above the datum lights. The key to success is to keep the ball in the center, stay lined up, and stay on the optimum angle of attack.

Red Yellow Green Brown Blue White & Purple

The above colors are the flight deck and hangar deck rainbow. Each color roughly identifies what the wearer does on the flight or hangar deck.

  • Red – Squadron Ordies (ordnancemen) or Ship’s company fire fighters.

     

  • Yellow – Ship’s Company aircraft taxi directors.

     

  • Green – Squadron maintenance or ship’s catapult and arresting gear operators.

     

  • Brown – Squadron plane captains.

     

  • Blue – “plane pushers.”

     

  • White – medical, safety, or quality assurance.  

     

  • Purple – Ship’s aviation fuel system operators. Everyone called them “grapes.”

     

 

The last colorful comment is a “Well I’ll be damned“ or if you prefer a “Trivia on a stick” comment.

I hope the comments above help reduce the number of collapsed hose gears as well as making the task of landing aboard ship more fun and realistic. It's an old saw amoung carrier pilots that the most fun you can have with your pants on is a toss-up between a max gross cat shot and running the deck on a sunny day. FWIW, running the deck is: 

cat shot --> trap

cat shot --> trap

cat shot --> trap

cat shot --> trap

as fast and as many times as you can.

A max gross cat shot on a small 27C like the Oriskany accelerated the scooter from 0 airspeed to 176KIAS in 211 feet. Relative to the ship that's 146 knots or 168 miles per hour. No matter what you say about that 211-foot trip, it will be an understatement.

May 2022 be a year of fair winds and a following sea for all of you.

Edited by RealA4EPilot
Format Correction
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Posted
16 hours ago, Calabrone said:

The first thing one can ask you is if you have correctly installed the latest version 2.0, i.e. have you deleted the folder of the previous version and then installed the new one or ? At the end if you have done everything right you can attach a .track where this happens to you in order to try to understand something!

screen shot attached shows the limit i can see if i lower my camera any further down  screen goes black 

i also get the same funnily enough if i watch the agm 88 missile from externals if i look at it from directly behind screen goes black 

not sure if the two events are related  but  thgout id mention it anyways 

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