=475FG= Dawger

Properly simulating airframe icing is not worth the effort for the sort of aircraft modeled by DCS.

No, it doesn't.

The physical skills involved in pointing an aircraft around the sky are not particularly difficult. However, there are myriad skills and a plethora of knowledge required in the real world that simply have no place or purpose in DCS. And there are human factors that also play no part in DCS. No physical or psychological stress from grueling flying days where the chance of death is real. If you get tired in DCS, just press pause.

Not really.

Ground effect, I expect.

The ability to spike 13g’s “instantly” would be a control deflection modeling error. That is part of the issue with modeling unrealistic catastrophic failures. Combined with inaccurate HSTAB deflection rates at high speed, the result is snapping wings off due to unrealistic G onset rates.

I consider damage modeling and structural failure modeling to be inextricably tied together. Well, I hope they would be inextricably tied together. Damage to the structure should influence its structural failures. They don't seem to work that way right now at the moment. Again, maybe someday. I also recall the warbirds receiving the new and " improved " damage modeling. Disappointing so far, to say the least. I hope the warbirds are still being worked on 'cause they are certainly not finished WRT damage modeling. I would love to fly DCS warbirds again PvP.

I sincerely hope you are right. However, the damage modeling in DCS warbirds is godawful bad. Not the structural failure modeling. I never really encountered any issues along those lines in the warbirds. Other aspects are game-breaking bad. The 475th is, historically, a WWII Fighter Group both in reality and virtually. We gave up on DCS warbirds because of the damage modeling issues. I would love to believe everything about DCS damage modeling is a work in progress and someday soon it will all be corrected to something resembling reality. Ever hopeful.

That is a good question. I use a batch file to kill and restart SSA since this happens fairly regularly. I may be missing a process. A list of what processes might be using this network port associated with SSA and the Sound Module would be appreciated.

That is my point. I don't think everyone here is on the same page WRT degrees versus units. Also, seeing the AOA spike to a number above the Maximum AOA does not indicate something that is impossible. Maximum AOA is where the wing stops flying. It isn't an invisible barrier. It can be exceeded. Controllability beyond Maximum AOA is also something that is very achievable. The airplane is no longer "flying" but it can remain controllable. This accident report indicates an F-15C was maneuvering at 39 degrees AOA when the pilot managed to apply control inputs which caused it to depart from controlled flight. https://www.airforcemag.com/app/uploads/2019/04/06112018_F15C_Kadena.pdf

No, it wasn’t but they did it anyway.

Some of the confusion here seems to stem from what the AoA displayed in the F-15 actually is telling you. AoA is not displayed in degrees. It is displayed in dimensionless units. In the F-15 40 units AoA is equal to 30 degrees. Here is an interesting wing rock thesis. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA256613.pdf If you bother to read it, you will discover that the F-15 in this particular flight test program achieved a maximum of 30 degrees AoA (40 units) in the pullup test and this was slightly lower than what was achieved in the turning and 1 g stall testing. One can safely assume the maximum AoA is slightly more than 30 degrees or 40 units from this publicly available source.

Thank you for helping me demonstrate that your only concern here is “winning”, not actually modeling realistic behavior with regard to aircraft structural integrity. It validates my decision to let this issue go. However, I do have one final request. You demand from me conclusive proof that the wing does not fail at 1.5 times the design limit load. I shall do the same. I demand conclusive proof that the wing DOES fail catastrophically the very first time it is subjected to 1.5 times the design limit load. Video evidence is preferred but official documents will be acceptable. Cheers!

I don't think I can compress the technical information required to completely explain aircraft structural engineering into one post. I suspect that you are in some way responsible, at least in part, for this state of affairs and are attempting to save face. No aircraft manufacturer publishes catastrophic static failure data. There are a lot of reasons for that. One of the biggest reasons is that destructive testing is very expensive and wasteful but even when it is done, the results are not included in easily accessible publications. All you can do is read what is available and make inferences. As an example, the F5 Fatigue Structural Integrity Program report is publicly available It very plainly states that the test subject was static loaded to 1.5 times the limit load with only one failure, a permanent buckling of the trailing edge spar structure. This failure was corrected and retested to ultimate load. Note they define a permanent deformation as the only "failure". One can infer that the F-5 can withstand 1.5 times the limit load a single time without suffering permanent damage to the structure. This very obviously means that the static strength exceeds the 1.5 times the limit load. How much? Who knows but it is somewhere north of that figure. Given the longevity of the F-5 in service and the fact that Northrop F5 program successfully completed 4 lifetimes of testing on the test subject (16,000 hours). Yet, in DCS we have an F-5 that will snap its wings at at 1.5 times the limit load of 7.33. The DCS F-15C also has the same limit load of 7.33 and will snap its wings at 11 G, just like the F-5. We know the F-15 doesn't break its wings at 11 G in the real world. We have living examples of crew who have exceeded that threshold and do not recall losing the wings. Yet your response is, unless I present proof positive to the contrary, catastrophic failure at 1.5 times the limit load is here to stay. Such proof, should it exist, is not going to be something I would waste my time trying to locate. Life is too short and I am almost positive it would not change anything. So with that, I shall bow out. ED will do what they will do with regard to this.

The F-16C Block 50 present in DCS was not introduced during the era Alpenwolf's server is focused on.

I am not looking for "less restriction" as you are implying. Yes, a realistic simulation of structural failure will be much more restrictive than zero effects until catastrophic failure of the wing. However, a realistic structural failure model would mean it would be exceedingly difficult to actually cause catastrophic failure of the wing on a NEW Airplane (Which is what is simulated AFAIK) The current method of taking the limit load , multiplying it by 1.5 and setting the wing to come off at that number is silly on its face and easily shown to be false. Reading through the relevant MILSPECS and reports on the structural integrity testing of tactical aircraft quickly reveals that these aircraft are expected to fairly regularly exceed the limit load and approach the design ultimate limit load (1.5 times the limit load) multiple times during the expected airframe lifetime (4000 hours for tactical aircraft) without compromising structural integrity. There are two types of structural strength to consider. Static Strength and Fatigue Strength, static strength being the ability to withstand a single application of force and fatigue strength being the ability to withstand repeated application of fluctuating load without failure. The force required to reach the static strength limit of metals is MUCH greater than the fatigue strength limit. Fatigue failure requires load cycling to produce structural failure. An aircraft must be designed to withstand a lifetime of load cycling appropriate to the expected mission. The expected mission parameters for modern fighters requires they be capable of withstanding multiple exceedances of the limit load up to and including the ultimate limit load over the life of aircraft. The design ultimate limit load is the FATIGUE strength limit load not the static strength of the structure. Modeling the static failure of the wing at the ultimate limit load is incorrect.

When I have to restart SSA while DCS is running (Usually because I was killed and respawned and SSA no longer works) I get this error message.

Other modules seem to be able to model a more sophisticated and realistic approach to structural failure. Certain modules suffer from permanent deformation of the structure causing the aircraft to handle poorly. Others model component failures due to high G. Which is why this is a big issue. Its all very haphazard and trending towards this arcade version of structural damage. I don’t have any personal investment in the F-15. I fly strictly MP, visual range stuff so the F-15 is never on the menu. However, there are at least three modules suddenly afflicted with this arcade version of structural limits while others retain more sophisticated programming or an apparent absence of limits. What is the end game? Dumb them all down? Depressing to see DCS go that direction but at least it would be consistent across all modules. My hope is ED recognizes this as an error and moves to put more sophisticated and realistic structural failure modeling in place instead of this.

Are you not even curious as to why the strongest aircraft structure fails catastrophically before anything else fails? You point out that " I've never seen it happen to anyone who wasn't running around ham-fisted with full bags." Ever wonder if maybe the pylon, tank or attachment hardware should fail before the wing? Or some other weaker aircraft structure? Doesn't it seem awfully arcade-like that the wing cracks off before anything else? It is a pointless waste of engineering and lots of extra unnecessary weight to build an aircraft where every part and accessory exceeds the catastrophic structural failure point of the wing without even suffering damage. Of course, the F-15C is FC3 so it can be forgiven for being far less than realistic. The problem is that this stuff is being used on other "full-fidelity" DCS modules and seems to be the wave of the future.

As I said earlier, the pilot will GLOC long before the wing will suffer catastrophic failure on a new fighter. We aren’t talking about other parts breaking or getting damaged. We are talking about catastrophic failure of the strongest aircraft structure occurring due to a one time event on a new airplane. Its quite obviously not realistic.

You would be wrong. Real F-15C’s have recorded large G numbers in combat without losing wings and they were not factory fresh. Catastrophic wing failure from a one time event on a new tactical aircraft just doesn’t happen. It is a game-ism ED has introduced for game play purposes.

Red fixed wing pilots have mostly left the server. Dobs and I are flying Red a lot more often just to have someone to shoot at. Occasionally, if we spend a few hours seeding the server some Red Air will show up but it cannot be relied upon. I have no clue what could possibly bring them back.

While I completely agree that the pilot is the G limiter, it is also very unrealistic to be able to create catastrophic wing failure in a brand new F15. The pilot would GLOC long before the wing quit on a new jet. Could he bend a new jet? Sure. Could he pull enough G to make the aircraft un-repairable after landing? Maybe. Snap a wing off? No way.

It is not correct. However, ED has been trending towards unrealistic structural failure modeling in other modules (F/A18) as a method to deter high G maneuver. It is a sad development. There is no logical end to modifying real world characteristics in pursuit of “correct” gameplay.

Ejection is not particularly safe. Getting pulled out of the water alive is also not guaranteed. Sometimes the least risky choice is landing the aircraft. And, if its flying now, you can't really say with any certainty it will never fly again.