Tunguskas .. Oh no not that again...

[SwingKid]

Yeah, kinda like the stinger ... which can and does intercept cruise missiles and is used in that role by us AD operators ... did I mention the stinger doesn't have a fuze?

 

And yet...

 

http://forums.frugalsworld.com/vbb/showthread.php?t=95013&highlight=bullet

"As a Sergeant First Class Avenger platoon sergeant for the past ten years, I can shed a little light on this subject... There is no way in hell that an Avneger can engage a Maverick in any tactical situation."

 

He seems to think it's not a size issue, but rather the weakness being the human operator being unable to lock the missile onto an incoming missile. i.e. if the Maverick flew laterally like a cruise missile, then it could be done, but NOT head-on. If I understood correctly.

 

:confused:

-SK

[Yellonet]

Personally I think that Tunguskas can technically hit an incoming Maverick, but as SK mentioned above it will come down to the human factor... which unfortunately isn't modeled in LockOn, so the weapons will always (well not really) be used to maximum effect. So I guess that an Tung on excellent should perhaps go for a shot against an incoming Mav but should perhaps only have a 50% or less chance to shoot it down. Would something like that be fair?

[GGTharos]

And yet...

 

http://forums.frugalsworld.com/vbb/showthread.php?t=95013&highlight=bullet

"As a Sergeant First Class Avenger platoon sergeant for the past ten years, I can shed a little light on this subject... There is no way in hell that an Avneger can engage a Maverick in any tactical situation."

 

He seems to think it's not a size issue, but rather the weakness being the human operator being unable to lock the missile onto an incoming missile. i.e. if the Maverick flew laterally like a cruise missile, then it could be done, but NOT head-on. If I understood correctly.

 

:confused:

-SK

 

I think he meant 'will', not 'can'. I could be wrong! Either way from what he said was that they could engage it if it was targeting something other than the avenger itself and it overflew the avenger, moving onto towards its target.

 

However I don't think he was talking about the FPA equipped avengers, which is what the person I was speaking with was talking about. According to him, cruise missiles would be engaged out to 7-9km depending on tehir flight profile, and if you consider the frontal area difference between a cruise missile and a maverick, I think you could probably engage it with an FPA stinger head on from 3-4km. BUT. He also said that 'pk...I don't know' which to me indicated it was a crap shoot. Then again. No fuze ;)

[MBot]

It appears that contrary to Tunguska, the Tor system DOES have a widely advertised anti-missile capability. It seems to have been designed for this from the start - still apparently uses SACLOS, but with a narrower beamwidth than Tunguska, and the missile has a larger warhead, resembling Pantsyr.

 

I don't quite understand what you mean with beamwidth on the Tunguska. As I understand it, the Tunguskas missile isn't a real beamrider ( or riding rather a imagery beam ). Please correct me if I am wrong, but the way I think the system works is the following.

The optical sight is put on target, the missle is launched. The missle has a IR flare in it's back that is recognised by the computer of the sight. So the FC computer sends steering instructions to the missle to keep the IR flare in the center of the sight, until the missile eventualy hits the target. So beamwidth shouldn't be much of an issue in missle precision, it is theoretical a straight line ( aside there isn't realy a true beam at all ). As far as I see, in the engagement the radar is only used as a antenna to send the command instructions to the missle. Do I miss something here ?

 

Wich brings me back to the question why the optical sight has to be kept manualy on target and why it isn't slaved to a radar lock of the target ( apart from the ECCM reason, wich is quite good ) ?

[GGTharos]

Because helos are low los-rate targets, probably - that means it's 'easy enough' to keep the crosshairs on them manually.

 

Also, in this case you're working in a very high radar clutter environent when attacking low-altitude helos, probably well below the ability of a radar system to engage them. In this case, EOCLOS is very good I think.

[SwingKid]

I don't quite understand what you mean with beamwidth on the Tunguska. As I understand it, the Tunguskas missile isn't a real beamrider ( or riding rather a imagery beam ).

 

True, I've been interchanging "SACLOS" and "beam-rider", sorry.

 

At question was the precision with which the radar can know the target's position - i.e. range and angle resolution. The wider the beam, the less precise the tracking. Both beam-riders and command-guided missiles thus have accuracy that gets worse as you go further in range, or as the radar beamwidth gets wider.

 

The quoted resolution of the tracking system seems to hold one of the keys to calculating exactly what the Pk, unfortunately the quoted figures appear to contradict each other. :confused:

 

-SK

[Alfa]

To add more fuel...

 

It appears that contrary to Tunguska, the Tor system DOES have a widely advertised anti-missile capability. It seems to have been designed for this from the start - still apparently uses SACLOS, but with a narrower beamwidth than Tunguska, and the missile has a larger warhead, resembling Pantsyr.

 

I thought that the anti-missile capability of the Tor was already well established :confused: ....certainly the naval version is deployed with that task as its main reason d´etre.

 

Other modern SAMs like Buk and Tunguska have anti-ARM tactics described in the reference text, but these usually consist of switching frequencies or polarities, having multiple stations work together, blinking or shutting down the radar.

 

Anti-ARM aside - I find it hard to believe that the Buk should not have anti-missile capability.....it is every bit as widely advertised for the naval version(Shtil) as it is for the Tor/Klinok - same goes for the Kashtan.

 

Here are a couple of descriptions of the naval systems - I have highlighted in bold a few pasages of interest in connection with earlier posts on the matter.

 

quote from Rosoboronexport:

 

Shtil

(note "Shtil" - and not the upgraded "Shtil-1" which is the naval version of new Buk-M1-2).

 

The unique SHTIL Shipborne Medium-range Multitarget Surface-to-Air missile Complex:

• ensures all-round collective protection of convoys, naval task forces, and self-defence of the carrier ship against air attacks;
  
• effectively intercepts anti-ship missiles and aircraft by homing missiles in any weather and ECM;
  
• is easy to operate in combat and maintenance;
  
• has a modular structure, compact design and high combat survivability;
  
• can be installed on any warship with displacement of 1,500 tons and more, or on shore;
  
• is under constant progress and can be delivered in customised configurations.

The SHTIL Complex is designed to provide all-round air defence to naval task forces, combatant ships, and other vessels, as well as ship's own protection, against anti-ship missile and aircraft attacks.

 

 

The SHTIL is an all-round shipborne medium-range surface-to-air missile complex, with high level combat performance, which has no analogues in the world.

 

The complex has a circular envelope of fire. It can kill targets in a wide range of target's crossover parameters and altitudes and in considerable killing zone depth.

 

It can be installed on any combatant ship (corvette, frigate, destroyer, cruiser, etc.) with displacement of 1,500 tons or more, or on shore. The modular structure provides high level of combat survivability, simplicity of maintenance, as well as possibility for customers to choose the best suitable option with required channels number, firing rate, and ammunition stock, depending on the ship tonnage and and customer's needs.

The complex ensures stable round the clock operation in all weather conditions and at rough sea up to force five.

 

The complex utilizes the target information supplied by the carrier ship's 3D circular-scan radar. It operates using the current secondary data (digital or analog), or primary radar-supplied data (with data type and configuration designed at customer's choice). It can also be supplemented with a built-in TV-optical sights system with the ordered number of channels at customer's choice.

 

Compact antenna stations are installed in the periphery of the ship's masts and superstructures.

 

A high level of automation ensures rapid reaction and high rate of fire. The missile firing envelopes for guided launchers are expanded relative to missile off-railing sectors.

 

The SHTIL SAM complex employs semi-active homing missile unified with one used in the land-based mobile SAM complex. High firing accuracy in harsh environment together with powerful HE warhead equipped with an adaptive proximity fuse effectively ensure the kill of various targets.

 

The ammunition stock varies from 24 to 96 missiles (depending on the option configuration). Missiles are launched automatically from rapid-fire single-rail launchers. One, two, or three missiles are guided at each target. The missile stock requires no shipboard testing.

 

The complex combat readiness time from the cold state does not exceed three minutes.

 

The complex hardware and software are developed at the most up-to-date level. It has functional and direct redundancy, includes an automatic control system permitting a switch-over of the utilized algorithms in the event of some individual device failure.

 

In action, the complex operates in the autonomous mode or centralised control mode. It can also ensure the fire control of the ship's artillery.

The complex includes a simulator to train and condition operators. The set of shipborne support facilities can be arranged at customer's choice. Base maintenance facilities are also available at customer's choice.

 

The SHTIL SAM complex is the ultimate choice to repel the omnidirectional attacks of the aerial offensive forces. It displays the best cost/efficiency characteristics among the medium-range shipborne air defence missile weapons.

 

From Military Parade September 2002 edition:

 

Kashtan

(note Kashtan - not upgraded Kasthan-M)

 

The Tula Machine-Building Plant (Tulamashzavod) has operated for almost 63 years in cooperation with the KBP Instrument Design Bureau (currently headed by Academician Arkady Shipunov) in developing technologies and organizing production. Tulamashzavod is directly involved in the development of weapons and their modernization.

 

The enterprise produces 23 and 30mm automatic guns for armored vehicles, aircraft, helicopters and air defense systems, highly precise 3UBK10 laser-guided antitank rounds (the latest models of these projectiles can pierce explosive reactive armor of modern tanks), as well as artillery armament for surface ships of all types, from patrol boats to air-capable cruisers.

 

Tulamashzavod produces the Kashtan close-in air defense missile-gun system intended to defend ships and vital stationary facilities (headquarters, communications nodes, oil wells, etc.) from air attack assets (cruise missiles, guided air bombs, aircraft, helicopters, etc.), as well as to engage small sea targets.

 

The Kashtan system comprises:

 

- command module intended to detect targets, distribute them and feed target designation data to firing modules;

 

- firing module (from one to six) which automatically receives target designation data, tracks targets, produces firing data and engages targets with missiles (two-stage solid-propellant missiles with fragmentation rod warheads and proximity fuzes) and gun fire (two 30mm six-barrel automatic guns with a total firing rate of 10,000 rounds per minute);

 

- stowage and reloading subsystem providing storage of 32 missiles in launching containers, their rising to the firing module and lowering to the missile magazine.

 

Using a combined missile and gun armament, the system engages air targets with a high probability (0.96 to 0.99) at a range of up to 8,000 m and altitudes ranging from extremely low ones to 3,500 m.

 

The Kashtan system has a modular design, and is easily installed on various types of ships (from boats with a displacement of 500 t to aircraft carriers). The module’s high combat stability is ensured by the integrated control system (the use of channels for simultaneous tracking of targets in the radar and TV-optical modes).

 

Kashtan’s merits make this air defense missile-gun system a reliable means for close-in defense of combatant ships of all types.

 

Now I realise that these naval versions are different to their landbased "cousins" in varies ways(especially associated radar/optical acquisition means), but I have a hard time understanding how you can flat out dismiss an anti-missile capability of these, when this for years has been a consistantly advertised capability for the naval versions.....especially your arguments concerning the actual missiles involved, considering that these are the same for both landbased and naval versions.

 

P.S. this bit about the Kashtan...

 

" -stowage and reloading subsystem providing storage of 32 missiles in launching containers, their rising to the firing module and lowering to the missile magazine"

 

....would explain your earlier observation in regards to the apparently "missing" 9M311 launch canisters ;) .

 

Sorry about the long quotes :)

 

Cheers,

- JJ.

[S77th-GOYA]

I have a hard time understanding how you can flat out dismiss an anti-missile capability of these, when this for years has been a consistantly advertised capability for the naval versions

 

If the Tung had that capability, wouldn't you think that it would be advertised as well?

[Force_Feedback]

If the Tung had that capability, wouldn't you think that it would be advertised as well?

 

As in that an expensive mobile SAM can only be used to engage missiles? No self respecting customer would buy those. Cruise missile/bomb engagement in not its primary function, and the primary function of the Kashtan is not to engage aircraft but missiles.

[SUBS17]

Yes its quite an odd capability for the ai units as normally in real life the radar operators most likely switch off if operating on the ground if a harm is inbound. Out at sea is different, the protection of the ship is the primary task so everything must be stopped from aircraft to Artillery projectiles from other ships. The other thing is the SAM batterys themselves work together, 1 will switch off and the other will remain active and then they'll switch slowly drawing the SEAD package into range of one of the other batterys. On ground aircraft is primary target not missiles.

[Prophet_169th]

I host a pretty agressive A2G mission on HL. I have had to increase the difficulty thanks to people like Maton and Shepski (My desktop is screenshot of Shepski taking out a KUB site with cluster).

 

There are Tor and Tunguska. Neither provide problems. Most of the time I will even risk a single shot on em.

 

Now that patriot site....whoooh!!! Now that baby consistantly nails every missle I send his way.

 

One thing that woud be awsome to see modelled is what SUB17 speaks of, the SAM radar going on/off.

 

Also modelling of EO and ground command launches for missles that support it, I read article about SAM officer who shot down F-117 with SA-3 did so with EO lock and ground command.

[SwingKid]

Apologies first.

 

(1) It appears that the information posted from the FAS site, referenced in message #58, may be mistaken. From the Russian text, it appears that the optical-tracking method described for Tunguska may actually be just a backup manual over-ride in case of ECM disrupting the normal automatic radar tracking during a radar missile engagement. This would be consistent with the design of other Soviet-era AD systems such as Shilka.

 

(2) I think I've figured out now how to interpret the quoted radar tracking numbers in the Russian text, to produce an estimate of AD effectiveness against Maverick. Let's consider original Tunguska with laser fuze first, then Tunguska-M missile with radio fuze, then Pantsyr, then Tor.

 

Tunguska 9M311 with laser fuze (IOC 1982)

 

9M311 fuze has four laser beams arranged around the missile. Against a typical helicopter target, it has a quoted "certain" detection range of "5 m", "possible" detection range of "15 m".

 

If we treat the AGM-65 Maverick as having a body diameter of about 60 cm, this body will fill a 45-degree field of view at a distance of about (30 / arctan(45/2)) = ~34 cm.

 

That is, the 9M311 missile must pass within 34 cm of a Maverick or similar-diameter target in order to achieve a 50% probability of detection and detonation.

 

The tracking radar has a quoted mean-square angular tracking error of "2 minutes", and the missile has a minimum range of 1.5 km, since it needs to jettison its rocket booster before it can begin receiving command guidance. At the 9M311's minimum engagement range, the tracking radar is measuring the position of the incoming target with an average lateral error of about (1500*tan(2/60)) = ~87 cm.

 

Without describing the math, we can estimate the probability of the missile approaching within 34 cm of the Maverick by using the "erf" function:

http://www.mhtl.uwaterloo.ca/old/courses/me303/calc/func_calc.html

Enter (34/87/sqrt(2)) = ~"0.276" for x and click "Calculate" to get a probability of about 30%.

 

So, at the minimum missile engagement range, 9M311 has a 30% chance of being guided close enough to the target and a 50% chance of detonating. Thus, Pk of 9M311 against Mavericks, Harpoons, and other small targets should not exceed:

 

15% at 1.5 km minimum range

8% at 3 km range

4% at 6 km range

3% at 8 km maximum range

 

 

 

Tunguska-M 9M311M with radio fuze (~1995)

 

In the 9M311M, the laser fuze was replaced with a radio fuze for "improved effectiveness against cruise missiles". We'll assume the radio fuze is not a limiting factor, but it still uses the same expanding-rod warhead which, according to the Russian text, loses its effectiveness beyond 5 m radius. So, 9M311M needs to pass only within 5 m of the target to score a kill.

 

Tunguska-M may also have a newer tracking radar with improved resolution, but since we don't have any data about it, let's assume that we use this missile with existing Tunguska radar parameters. Now that 5 m is larger than 87 cm, we calculate different "x" values according to range

 

At 1.5 km, the "2 minutes" lateral error equals 87 cm, (500/87/sqrt(2)) = 4.06

at 3 km, the "2 minutes" error equals 175 cm, (500/175/sqrt(2)) = 2.02

@ 6 km, 349 cm, (500/349/sqrt(2)) = 1.01

@ 10 km, 582 cm, (500/582/sqrt(2)) = 0.607

 

Enter these values into the calculator linked above to estimate Pk of 9M311M against Mavericks, Harpoons:

 

100% at minimum 1.5 km range

100% at 3 km range

85% at 6 km range

61% at 10 km maximum range

 

Now, these are only estimates - Pk of 9M311M against Maverick is probably not really 100% sue to other sources of error we didn't consider. But, those sources of error will also affect 9M311, and we can already see that the probability of a normal Tunguska that is in service with Russian forces hitting a Maverick should be negligible compared to Tunguska-M, and this is primarily because of its laser fuze, that was designed for a different task.

 

 

 

Pantsyr 9M335 and 57E6 with radio fuze (current development)

 

I won't spend time on these systems because I don't have good enough data, except to point out that the primary means of expanding engagement envelope was to increase the warhead size - from 9 kg to 16 and 20 kg for 9M335 and 57E6 respectively. We can imagine from previous analysis how this will increase the original 5 m kill radius of the 9M311(M) against small targets, and thus affect Pk.

 

 

 

Tor 9M330 with radio fuze (IOC 1986)

 

Monopulse tracking radar has quoted mean angular error of only "0.3 minutes". Missile warhead is about 15 kg, let's estimate 6 m lethal radius.

 

100% at minimum 1.5 km range

100% at 3 km range

100% at 6 km range

100% at maximum 12 km range

 

Tor's main advantage seems to be, advanced monopulse array antenna with ~6x greater accuracy measuring the position of the target in both planes.

 

So, IMHO Tor and Tunguska are not generally comparable.

 

-SK

[GGTharos]

http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/rockets/buzz.pdf

 

Page 13.

 

Can you get more details on the laser fuze?

[SwingKid]

Can you get more details on the laser fuze?

 

As far as Tunguska goes, I already posted all the details that I have, directly quoted from the Russian text:

 

- four lasers,

- cannot assure detection of a helicopter beyond 5 m,

- was replaced by a radio fuze to improve performance against ALCM

 

It doesn't sound as if this Russian-made 1980 laser fuze was using any such scanning technology.

 

-SK

[Yellonet]

Ok, the thing about four 'straw' lasers did it for me... the Tunguskas anti Mav success rate is hugely overmodeled. With such a low chance of success the crew should not even atempt it, they schould shoot flares and smokegrenades and then run away ;)

[GGTharos]

If your read more on that link, originally laser fuze power was 'constrained' to prevent fase positives.

 

The 'scanning technology' is nothing but rotation of the fuze detectors in place aroudn the missile's axis.

 

So, I hope you don't mind too much if I'm fairly insistent on finding out how it worked - not even for this argument, I've already agreed the Pk should be low - just for my own edification.

 

Looking for missile specs on the 9M311 right now, but it's not easy.

[S77th-GOYA]

15% at 1.5 km minimum range

8% at 3 km range

4% at 6 km range

3% at 8 km maximum range

 

 

These figures assume that all other variables are in favor of the Tung? ECM free environment, early detection and concentration on Maverick?

[GGTharos]

ECM isn't that big a deal due to the optical tracking component. The real issue with ECM is detection, and I would assume that detecting a mav at nearly any range would require a radar, EXCEPT in the case where you actually caught the launch happening visually, in which case the aiming error is about 1m and those probabilities theoreically become larger.

 

But the fuze issue is still quite interesting.

[Wags]

ECM isn't that big a deal due to the optical tracking component. The real issue with ECM is detection, and I would assume that detecting a mav at nearly any range would require a radar, EXCEPT in the case where you actually caught the launch happening visually, in which case the aiming error is about 1m and those probabilities theoreically become larger.

 

But the fuze issue is still quite interesting.

 

Particularly if the missile has a rotation.

 

-Matt

[Yellonet]

Hmmm... this source claims that the 9M311 has eight lasers not four.

 

"As compared to the 9M311 air defense missile, the 9M311-1M is noted for:

 

— installation of a radar proximity target sensor in place of the 8-beam laser one;

 

— installation of a pulsed light on the sustainer in place of the flare;

 

— increased operating time of the missile components which has allowed the firing range to be extended from 8 to 10 km. "

 

Source: http://warfare.ru/?catid=264&linkid=1693

[GGTharos]

Yep, I saw the 8-beam thing too, but I'm not convinced that this is a credible source.

 

In addition, correct me if I'm wrong SK, but are you using beam-riding for your calculation, or SACLOS? They're not the same and they have different guidance errors, and I'm quite convinced that beam-riding would be worse ... BUT resolution would HALF the beam

[SwingKid]

One book says 4, the schematic on the diagram seems to show 6, the web site says 8. Ok, I don't know - multiply accordingly. I thought "5 meters guaranteed detection against helicopter" suggested 1/10th guaranteed detection against something 1/10th helicopter size.

 

The analysis was for command-to-line-of-sight (CLOS) guidance.

 

Rotation of the missile might contribute to increased fuze probability, but it would also contribute to increased flight control errors of the missile, so I ignored rotation as if it was roughly self-cancelling. AFAIK unguided rockets and beam-riders are spun at high rate but it's not good for other guided missiles, and this is why AIM-9 was given rolleron stabilizers - to reduce rotation and improve controllability and precision. Taking rotation into account would also chip away at the "if it can shoot down an ASM it can shoot down a Maverick" argument, because then we need to account for closure rate and the target's total length. Note that in the analysis, I assumed all missiles flew a perfect trajectory with no "sidewinding" - only radar tracking error was given so only radar tracking error was taken into account.

 

Then again, Wags often knows things I don't... ;)

 

-SK

[GGTharos]

Nah, I'd monte-carlo the missile's position at the time of intercept. Maybe it's not quit that random, but still. Taking into accoutn some of the TOW video I've seen, I would expect the missile to be flying 'around' the LOS.

 

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/weg2001.pdf

 

Page 272 of the PDF (not the doc) ... 8x mag on the EO. Not bad.

[SwingKid]

ECM free environment, early detection and concentration on Maverick?

 

Assumes an "inertialess" SAM that responds instantaneously and without control error to any deviation of target LOS. Target LOS deviation would depend on the PN homing accuracy of the Maverick itself, i.e. how much it "sidewinds" - should be low anyway because it's locked on a stationary target.

 

Reaction time issue and ECCM are for a separate analysis.

 

-SK

[SwingKid]

Nah, I'd monte-carlo the missile's position at the time of intercept. Maybe it's not quit that random, but still. Taking into accoutn some of the TOW video I've seen, I would expect the missile to be flying 'around' the LOS.

 

Are you trying to say that a TOW can hit a Maverick? :)

 

-SK