Kalasnkova74

Hopefully the J is chosen. The B is too technically old to be competitive, plus it would be unfair for Navy Phantom Phans to be stuck flying an iteration older than the USAF -E model.

This. 20nm is plenty for a valid AIM-7 shot - remember the Italians used them as point defense interceptors. So a long range radar isn’t needed for that application.

In summary, it performed like a bigger F-104. The ADC Voodoo used a Hughes MG-13/AIM-4 combination. Minimum range of 3 miles & max range of six, utilizing a computer calculated intercept and launch system. Against non-maneuvering targets like bombers and BOMARC SAMs it worked pretty well, but it performed abysmally against maneuvering targets.That would kill the missiles reputation in Vietnam after it was klidged onto the F-4D. The F-101s Achilles heel was pitch up caused by fuselage drag & unstable airflow over the tail. At high altitude this limited the aircraft to less available G than a B-52. Not a big concern for the interceptor role, but lacking cannons maneuvering against a fighter was off the table. I’d certainly like to see it come to DCS, because many interceptor scenarios are fairly challenging and real life crews pulled off some cool stuff like going from the alert ramp to taking off and intercepting a Tu-95 at altitude in less than five minutes.

There’s a somewhat notorious analysis from the F-110 days showing GE pricing out how much it would cost per aircraft to install higher temp engine combustors to reduce the smoke . Came out to $50k per aircraft in modern money. The USAF declined the bill, making IFF exponentially easier for the VPAF when those Phantoms deployed to SEA.

Harder, significantly. People used to 4th Generation tech and tactics will have to adapt to an iron sight, manually flown jet. Precision will be a factor of pilot skill at dropping bombs, not a setting on the MFD. Air to air will be even tougher. Adapting from “match lift vector and PULL” tactics on 4th Gen aircraft to “manage energy and use the vertical” will be a gulf too large to bridge for some. I expect a small social media backlash after release of people accustomed to Flankers and Hornets declaring the Phantom “useless in a dogfight”. Especially when people depart controlled flight because they’ve spent their flight sim time flying computer controlled aircraft that never let them go out of control.

The F-4E radar also had implementation issues (as is normal with new technology), so many deployed F-4Es didn’t have fully functional /reliable air to air radars anyway. That plus their better air to ground avionics led to them being mud-movers, leading to F-4Ds working USAF MiGCAP duties.

While these points are true, then-Colonel Robin Olds pointed out in an interview that other - and more important factors- explain why the USAF didn’t match the USNs kill ratio. First, the USAF Phantoms had to travel almost 900 miles from Thailand over Laos to North Vietnam. That gave so much warning to the VPAF that the 8th TFW command post may as well have phoned Hanoi for official advance notice. So the VPAF had plenty of time to launch and position MiGs for a high speed pass. Further, this mean USAF Phantoms were fuel critical from combat zone entry, because they had to fight and save enough gas for the 900 mile trip back to base. Get it wrong and you might be heading to the Hanoi Hilton (or a painful death by the Pathet Lao) after flaming out. Even saving enough for a tanker track might not be enough if you’re waiting for four (or more) similarly fuel starved USAF Phantoms or Thuds to tank off. These reasons resulted in many USAF Phantom pilots - Olds included- being forced to bypass sure MiG kills to save fuel. By the time an engaged flight of USAF Phantoms launched AIM-4/AIM-7/AIM-9 the flight typically was bingo, scratching the opportunity for a close range gun kill. Meanwhile, the USN operated out of the Gulf of Tonkin with substantially closer distances. So the VPAF had commensurately less alert of USN Phantom II sorties, especially if they ingressed at low level. That reduced the possibility of an aft attack used so well against USAF flights. The USN pilots also had greater fuel flexibility to engage MiGs , and their Search and Rescue (SAR) situation was somewhat better than the USAF provided they got out to sea. Now layer in the other elements (TOPGUN, better IR missiles for the USN, fluid pair tactics etc) and the better kill stats by the USN are evident.

The topic is about a business case, not general interest. It’s all well and good that 75% of sampled respondents would spend money on a module. But for the poll to answer the question of a business case, you’d have to ask this: ”Would you spend $80 to buy a FF F-15 module if you can buy the FC3 version for $25?” I suspect there won’t be 75% support on that.

The challenge with a FF F-15C module comes down to two words: business case. show of hands- who here is prepared to drop $80 on a FF Su-25 when you can get one for less than 1/5th of that bill? Crickets, right. Because that’s the value proposition of a full fidelity F-15C to non-enthusiasts. The studio would spend years and capital costs developing a more detailed version of a module you can already buy. Yeah, FF > FC3- but is it $55 better? Probably not in the minds of most DCS players. Add in the F-15E which can do A2G + BVR air combat & the business case totally evaporates.

The opening chapter also described what happened to the unfortunate wingman when they did that.

This thread connects the dots on why so many air arms of the Cold War (India, North Vietnam, etc) gave the F-104 a very wide berth. Getting dived on by a Mach 2 death rocket that can counter a defensive break by climbing and killing your subsonic a$$ is not a welcome prospect. A capably flown Starfighter could give an Eagle driver fits , much less some poor schmuck in a MiG-19 or Hawker Hunter.

The U.S. used them briefly during the F-104s Vietnam deployment. The “catamaran” centerline pylons were draggy and limited the F-104s speed and range. The catamarans were ditched accordingly, especially once F-104s were used for close air support alert in Operation Linebacker. Different operators used different configurations of A2A missiles & fuel tanks. The wing stations originally weren’t wired for missiles, but the Pakistanis field modded their Starfighters to use AIM-9s. This was to free up the wingtip stations for lower drag fuel tanks. The modification made its way to the F-104s other operators, if they saw value in it.

None of that changes the fact that the F-4 has fairly advanced aerodynamics for its time. McDonnell solved a series of conflicting design challenges in the Phantom II without resorting to swing wings, computer aided flight stability , or building a low speed deathtrap. An admirable accomplishment for 1960s technology.

I know this is said a lot regarding the Phantom II, even by crew and pilots . But this phrase discredits the truth of what McDonnell accomplished in the early 60s. In an era with slide rules & drafting tables they built a Mach II capable interceptor that could be safely landed aboard a carrier - at 160 knots. That requires fairly advanced aerodynamic qualities. Meanwhile, pilots in Huns and Starfighters were tightening their sphincters on landing approach. The Hun liked to yaw unaware people into the dirt (with explosive and fatal consequences), and the Starfighter had about six or seven different ways to kill a pilot during landing. The F-4s aerodynamics deserve more credit than is often granted.

Yes. Pilots recognized quick that the AIM-7s kill probability (Pk) wasn’t lining up to the brochure and acted appropriately. Multiple AIM-7 shots at one target was not unusual. One flight of four USAF F-4s expended 16 AIM-7s - the entire flights arsenal- at one MiG with no hits.

A US Navy pilot who flew exchange with the RAF stated he preferred the J79s, as being a turbojet design it has faster throttle response than the turbofan Speys. A crucial capability for throttle adjustments around the boat. Overall, short version is the UK fans will say yes, the Americans will say no, and the truth will be summed up by “it depends”

It does have an internal battery, but unless you’re flying a RF-4C/E variant you wouldn’t want to use it often! Replacing the battery on a standard F-4 Phantom II is an aft-ejection seat out procedure.

Not quite. Meet the RF-4EJ: The JASDF operated a batch of F-4EJs modified to carry a French made TACER electronic recce pod, a LOROP (pictured) , and an inline IR camera pod. All were mounted to the belly stations. It’s the only recce Phantom II to have the M61 cannon & AIM-7 capability.

It will be better than that. Two large factors why those missiles worked poorly are training & handling. US pilots back in the 60s were taught to intercept nuclear bombers, not fire their missiles in a maneuvering dogfight. That led to a lot of missed and improper shots. Finally, the missiles themselves were handled like oversized bullets…leading to a lot of vacuum tube parts being damaged before the missiles were even bolted to the jets. Neither factor will be a concern for us in DCS.

Tactical reconnaissance is another role we need to add to DCS. Picture a dynamic campaign needing to dispatch reconnaissance aircraft like RF-4s, RF-101s, RA-5s, etc to track down Scuds.

Small point to note here- originally the USAF Air Staff had no plans to acquire the F-16 after the LWF competition. The combination of NATO Allies lobbying for a replacement of their aging F-104s & the Navy’s financial problems with the F-14 prompted the Secretary of Defense to move forward with the F-16. Since the USAF Air Staff viewed the F-15 as all that was needed for the air superiority role , General Alton Slay convened a committee to transition the F-16 into mainly an air to ground mission. This is why the F-16A never got the AIM-7 despite being tested for it in development: the Air Staff didn’t want a Senator asking for cuts in the F-15 buy because of the F-16 sharing the same BVR capability. Ideally , the force composition would have been a high/low mix of F-15s and F-16s -each having similar capabilities (note also the F-15A used basic CCIP/CCRP bomb capability). The IDF/AF model for these aircraft is a good example of that composition . But the Pentagon had different ideas, because $$$. So instead of the “hi/low” mixture, it was mostly just hi (F-15)with a side of BVR later in the Vipers career. The USN did fulfill this with the F-14/F-18 combo, and does so now with the F-35/ Super Hornet mix.

The high density light fighter vs fewer but “gold plated” question is IMO a false dichotomy. The truth is a capable air force needs both, in concert with quality training & tactics. Missing any one of these four elements = risk. If an air force does not invest in sustainment and development of higher technologies, it will lose to the opponent who does. Science holds no passport, and the only way to find the next generation of workable technology is to sift through the litany of ones that don’t. You can model and project, but ultimately combat is the final test of a plan or technology. We didn’t fully understand the practical shortcomings of AIM-9Bs or AIM-7s until we used them in combat. If we never fielded them in the name of using simple technology, another nation - say, France- would have learned those lessons instead. That means fielding higher technology weapons like the F-4 (in its day), F-14, F-22, NGAD and the like. Keeping your nations military industrial complex up to date is a defensive necessity too. Yes, there’s corruption at work there…but it’s a zero sum game. If your military industry lags behind the rest of the region or world , your military becomes irrelevant (see modern day Iran). The flip side of that requirement is you DO need higher density, simpler aircraft also because at the end of the day, not all the gold plated stuff is going to work. When bugs need to be sorted, a higher density aircraft is needed to carry the missions. This requirement tends to be brushed aside when generals motivated by status and budget allocate money to exclusively finance the gold plated science projects. The balance of which equipment to include will change based on the national budget of the buyer, training requirements, and operational area. Finally we have quality training and tactics. These are another two elements generals like to shortchange in favor of financing the gold plated stuff. Unfortunately for their egos and career ambitions, without these pillars nothing else matters. An air force can operate with ineffective equipment, misallocated resources, embargoed logistics and even mismatched technology IF their tactics and training on what they have is on point. But if a nation sends people to battle with high *or low tech* kit they’re not trained in using , it will end badly for that nations military. Obsolete tactics will also undermine any other advantage brought to the fight. See the USAF’s welded wing formation in Southeast Asia , a formation the Air Staff knew even before Linebacker was obsolete and dangerous during the Cold War. Rigid USAF bureaucracy and dogma (mere wingmen shall not independently shoot in battle!) ignored the findings. Many Air Force officers and families paid the price. The Israeli Air Force in the Cold War was a good example of this balance done right, as they had the then-cutting edge F-4E flying and fighting alongside the less expensive yet still effective Mirage & A-4.

Yet there are still differences to account for. One is the landing gear & wings. The C uses thicker tires, resulting in a thicker wing to accommodate the larger tires used on the land based variant. In turn that affected the wing lift and turn performance vs the Naval -B variant. It’s enough to create a handling difference based on feedback from Naval pilots that flew both USAF (F-4C) and Naval (F-4B) versions. The Sidewinder loadout was also different.l, as the USAF and USN employed different Sidewinder missiles after the AIM-9B.

Welcome to the Party Pal! Air combat discussions are ladders- you never get an answer, just another rung to launch the next question. Literally billions of dollars are spent on these questions and even the think tanks don’t have answers. Jokes aside, where the lightweight fighters “win” over the big hardware is cost-per-effect. Not necessarily slow speed dogfighting , which is a rare flight regime (for good reason). We can see this with Southeast Asia whenever a pair of MiGs forced a USAF strike package to jettison bombs. We have a massive formation of 40 expensive aircraft that cost $10000+ per hour to fly on a 6-8 hour mission , and the sortie is ruined by two MiG-21s ringing up a $10k per hour bill combined. Guerrilla warfare in the air, indeed. This dynamic in the late 1960s pushed General Momeyer to green light Operation BOLO. In DCS -so far- this dynamic doesn’t matter as unlike a certain OTHER air battle game, players don’t have to pay for modules after the initial purchase (thank Zeus). But if other module makers adopt HB’s parts wear function, some of the core logistical challenges of real world air campaigns will be present in the game. If you have to choose between an F-4E and an F-5, a trained pilot will pick the F-4E. But if the F-4E has a bad radar and wonky Sparrow rails for lack of parts vs a fully mission capable F-5, now the question gets interesting.

Let’s look at the combat records. Between the F-4 Phantom II and the MiG-21, the biggest variable is pilot training and tactical skill. At the beginning of Southeast Asia the NVAF had the training edge over US pilots trained in nuclear bomber intercepts. Scary thing is most of us on this forum know more about fighting the F-4 than your average US junior pilot did in 1965. Thus the MiG wrecked the F-4s: at one point the VA-176 prop engined Skyraiders killed more MiGs than their “Air Superiority” F-4Bs embarked in the same Navy air wing! TOPGUN of course changed this dynamic, and the kill statistics bore that out. The USAF kept their obsolete finger four tactics & bomber intercept training. Their kill ratio at the end was the same as 1965. The USN posted a 12-1 ratio by the end of hostilities. We see the same thing in the Middle East. Arab air forces not trained to the same standard as Israeli or Iranian pilots were mauled. While MiG-17s were fighting Phantoms over Southeast Asia & winning, the same jet was cannon fodder to Israeli Phantoms over the Middle East. MiG-21s in Arab & Iraqi service were downed in droves against Western trained opposition. Then we have the 4477th TES, staffed with the cream of the USAF crop. Aggressor pilots, hand recruited, 2000+ hours & many flown combat in Southeast Asia. Flying MiG-21s & Chengdu F-7s they frequently smoked “Blue Air” F-4s ,F-14s & F-15s in the initial fight. Ward Carroll recounted a fight where he lost to a MiG-23 when the pilot extended and shot them in the back. Bottom line; E-M diagrams and data matters, but training tops all. What does that mean for DCS? Excusing the minority of people who’ve studied in advance & may even fly the VSN mod as a basic training aid, most F-4E module buyers will be just like those US pilots from 1965: totally unfamiliar with analog aircraft or the F-4Es kinematic and technological capabilities & limitations. They will make the same mistakes , because they’ll do the same things they did with their Hornets and Fulcrums only to find out the hard way “lift vector on bandit and PULL” ain’t how you win in Phantom land. I anticipate a backlash from the easily frustrated players used to CCRP & AMRAAMs.