BlackLion213

I'm still waiting for mine, but with some fellow West Coasters just receiving their now, I figure that I should give it another couple of weeks. -Nick

Awesome as usual, thanks! :thumbup: -Nick

Why is that? -Nick

Excellent, thank you for the clarification. :thumbup: -Nick

That is an awesome book! I just finished recently and it is the best combination of entertainment and solid aviation/tactial information of any book I can remember. I highly recommend it! :thumbup: Honestly, I'm not sure. I suspect that it is a combination of timing (it entered the war towards the end), a much better understanding of how to defeat SAMs, availability of ECM, precision munitions that allowed excellent accuracy at medium altitudes above AAA (Walleyes), widespread use of chaff dispensers, SEAD support, and less political micro-management of the military by the later phases of the war. That is my best guess. :) -Nick

I guess that I'm not quite sure about your question. Are you asking about means of guidance? If so it is either CCIP or laser designation via LANTIRN. The Tomcat had limited functionality since there was little early emphasis on A-G when the original Tomcat software was being developed. The F-14D may have more options, but I don't know if that was the case. I'm not sure how the Tomcat interacted with JDAMs. -Nick

I hope the F-35C performs well for the Navy and I think the F-35C and F/A-18E/F will be very complimentary platforms. The Hornet is very versatile and excellent at ACM while the F-35 brings back the Navy's deep strike capability (at least as advertised). Given the investment put into the Rhino already, continued upgrades and optimization sounds like the best way forward to me. It is pretty straightforward - the Tomcat's belly (Phoenix) pallets can mount bombs from 500 lbs to 2000 lbs. This allows for 4 hardpoints with a max of 2000 lbs per hardpoint. No MERs were developed, though Grumman took some publicity shots with MERs during the early 1970s before the USMC pulled out of the Tomcat program. It can also carry CBUs on the pallets, but I've only seen that during Operation Southern Watch in the late 90s. Operationally, Tomcats typically carried GBUs (GBU-10/12/16) though iron bombs (Mk 82/83/84) were also carried sometimes, though more so before the LANTIRN upgrade. The F-14B/D's were also cleared to drop JDAMs a couple of years before their retirement. -Nick

P-3s did carry Harpoons. Those do pack a wallop! :D Plus there ASW capabilities. -Nick

Better accuracy would mean fewer sorties and fewer losses. The cumulative effect of better equipment, better understanding of the enemy, RHAW gear, Wild Weasels, much better training, and realistic exercises such as Red Flag were hugely important. Flexibility, broad capabilities, and extensive trainings are key. Future wars could have the same political constraints - best to optimize every role and skill that you can. The Tomcat was called indispensable by Senators John McCain and John Glen along with the secretary of the Navy. And of course the Tomcat was still the most powerful and flexible aircraft in the fleet until the day it left. Being indispensable doesn't mean that you won't be dispensed with.... Great, but it still has less range, payload, speed, endurance, sensor capability than the aircraft it replaced. Nice upgrade. Best to depict these events for what they were - the Navy sacrificed capability to adopt an airframe that was supposed to be similar to one of its operational aircraft (but ultimately wasn't so similar - such is life). It was a compromise to try and save money, which might not have happened. A worthy aspiration...perhaps, but it still resulted in duplication of work with duplication of expense. That is the part that is hard for me to reconcile. The most costly portion of the F-14D program was done and the F-14D was operational. To then start over with a totally new program is very expensive. Think about it this way: your older car has less than stellar fuel economy so you decide to buy a new car with better fuel economy, but then you have to fund the cost of the new vehicle and still the cost of fuel. The numbers have to be really extreme before you break even (very inexpensive car with unbelievable fuel economy), let alone save money. It is the duplication of work after funding both projects and completing both that doesn't make sense. If the Navy wanted to retire the Tomcat, what the Navy deserved was a clean sheet design. That would have been a far more logical approach. The F/A-18E/F was sold to Congress as a "modest upgrade" to address known short-comings and as you said, it became a totally new aircraft . It turned out much like the F-84F, too many constraints that compromised the best efforts. Who knows, may be you can't build a Navy aircraft that has decent range and is supersonic below 10,000' without variable geometry...but I bet it is possible. AESA radar is nice, but you can fit that to anything with an A-A radar. The fundamentals have to be good and that is where the Super Hornet is lacking. Outward canted pylons so that bombs don't blow it apart with every strike, subsonic performance with any real ordnance.... It's funny talking about RCS when it flies with 2-3 Hindenburg sized fuel tanks for every sortie. There is no RCS benefit when carrying those behemoths - canted outward no less. I'd like someone to discuss the RCS optimization of the tanks - that would be a real solution. Notice that the F-35 is mission capable on internal fuel (it carries 20,000 lbs), that solves a lot of current performance short-comings for the Rhino. No and that is the point - stop making claims of savings without evidence. Please tell the truth: you don't know. It's OK to think or suppose, but don't state something as though it is a fact. The Super Hornet could easily be a losing proposition cost wise. Unless you have evidence, there is nothing more to say than "I hope or I think". -Nick

From what I've read, the F-14s only carried it on TARPS missions since it was fairly large and heavy, occupying a Phoenix pallet. However, the A-6E did carry it on combat missions as well into higher threat environments. It didn't make the aircraft immune to threats, as seen on this ALQ-167 carrying A-6E after a SAM strike: Luckily, no casualties. But it was a helpful addition. -Nick

Training and operational doctrine do not exist in a vacuum - these issues wee built together by the same misconception and assumption concerning what was needed. For example, F-105D bombing accuracy was less than needed for the Vietnam conflict because crews spent most of their time training for nuclear delivery. Accuracy was perfectly satisfactory for a nuclear weapon, but not a 750 lb bomb. Priority was given to one scenario and it cost the US Military dearly. My point is that a tool that kills people will ultimately fail in addressing this threat. The problem is bigger than the military. That said, the F-14 was indispensible during OEF and OIF in its FAC(A) role and was even forward deployed to land bases at the peak of OIF. It stayed quite relevant. What did it give? You have only stated a series of assumptions. Please show me the real benefit - or at least admit that it is uncertain. The fixed wing version of the F-14 was more expensive, heavier, and performed more poorly during Grumman's internal testing. Can you show me the cost savings of the Super Hornet - I mean in concrete terms like dollars not "it's like the Legacy Hornet so cheaper"? Please make a real argument supported by something reasonably solid - not flatus and moonbeams like the one above. Why is it dated? The F/A-18's first flight was only 6 years later than the F-14A's and the F-14D's avionics suite was designed and implemented at the same time as the F/A-18C's. Would you be mores specific? You seem to be making statements on foregone conclusions here. If you are a human being you are biased. It is an inescapable feature for us. Best to recognize it since that helps one to see past it. :) I didn't say it was necessary to keep the F-14D. Where did you read that? Show me that money. I have simply said there is no proof that the Rhino saved the Navy money. You seem convinced it did - please show me why. -Nick PS - Would you please proof read and limit the spelling and grammatical errors? Sorting them out gets tiresome after a while and it doesn't reflect well.

From what I can tell, the LAU-138 BOL chaff dispenser made its way into the fleet around 1997 or so. A bit later than the planned initial release of the F-14A/A+/B (which appears to be set from from the mid-late 1980s to early 1990s based on Heatblur's descriptions). That said, the ALQ-167 ECM pod and expanded chaff dispenser would be a very welcome addition, as seen here on the Tomcat in the foreground: The ALQ-167 and expanded chaff dispenser would fit the planned Heatblur timeframe and would be a nice augmentation to the TARPS capability. :) -Nick

Ironically, given the remarkable mis-portrayal and inaccuracies of Top Gun, this may be the most realistic scene of the movie! Though the Tomcat was involved in little real combat, it did find itself in many air-to-air "hassles" over the years. It was not too uncommon for foreign air forces (both friendly and very unfriendly) to send fighters to intercept or distract CAP-ing F-14s. In 1981 off Libya, there were many, many engagements per day between Libya and the USN that did not result in air combat (Mirage 5s, MiG-25s, MiG-23s, Su-22s). But fighters would merge while the ROE forced Tomcats to hold fire. The enemy would generally disengage and run for home once the Tomcats entered the "saddle" on the enemies 6. "Snort" Snodgrass has HUD camera footage of his gun pipper centered on the tail of a MiG-25 in full burner off Libya in 1981. He still figures that he should have fired first and asked for forgiveness later given what happened with Kleeman's flight just minutes later. Also, the Libyans would make things difficult by hanging out near CAP stations and waiting till the Tomcats turned to head back to the ship, trying to jump them. Making fuel management and CAP relief timing quite important. These type of events were known to have happened off Libya in 1981, 1986, and 1989. Similar events are also published between Tomcats and Soviet Floggers deployed to Cam Ranh Bay Vietnam in the 1980s (one engagement involved something like a dozen alert launched Tomcats and even more Floggers in 1988!). Also, Pakistani Mirages once hassled with F-14s off Pakistan when they accidentally violated Pakistani waters during an AIC training mission (Pakistani didn't know who they were till they saw them). Also, did you know that two VF-21 F-14As fired on IRIAF F-4Es in the Strait of Hormuz in 1987? There are lots of events that didn't receive much press, but made the life of a USN Tomcat pilot quite interesting - even in "Peacetime". -Nick

Certainly this is true with folding chairs, light bulbs, saltine crackers...but a combat aircraft carrying humans beings into a place where others are trying to kill them....surely there are other criteria? (yes, I am calling you Shirley :)) Cost and logistics are very important - which is why I am still questioning the decision to build the Super Hornet at much greater cost and more complicated logistics than the Legacy Hornet. If cost and simple logistics are the priority, why build the Super Hornet at all? Isn't this the same mentality that lead to the loss of 5000 aircraft over southeast Asia - the assumption that Russia or the Soviet Union is the enemy and that any other enemy is nothing to worry about? Plus, assuming that you know the threat and placing all planning/training emphasis on one type of threat is a rather flawed approach. Remember the F-4C that is lamented for lacking a gun - it was created by the above mindset. One must plan for all possible contingencies. The US (or any other militaries) doesn't actually have a weapon or capability that is genuinely effective for this threat - but that is another discussion/argument. :) You should read what I wrote again. :) My criticism of the Super Hornet is not in the aircraft itself, but the fact that someone cancelled a completed and effective program of a desired aircraft to pursue an entirely new program under the assumption that it would be cheaper. Well intentioned? Perhaps. But the final result is a comparable fly-away cost after funding an entirely new program while wasting the cost of the F-14D program. Plus the cost of keeping those ancient aircraft flight worthy with no available replacement parts or tooling for parts. Meanwhile, they are paying for some expensive custom parts projects and desperately trying to get the most out of these relics knowing that it can do things that the replacement cannot so they better use it while they can (what a dreadful feeling). Hence the aircraft was on the front-line to the very end. This is wasteful and it is reasonable to point out a politicians poor decision making on the issue. I am similarly critical of the A-12 project that spent 4 Billion dollars on an aircraft that never moved past the paper stage. This was a pretty big waste that sapped funds from a lot of other projects. The Super Hornet is a fine aircraft, but the idea of developing it after developing a comparable aircraft doesn't make sense to me with the attendant R&D costs. I haven't seen any evidence that money was saved. Even if maintenance is better, this needs to be amortized over the life of the program as a savings versus the cost of R&D/production. Also, maintenance hours for the F-14D were running around 18-20 during the early 2000s, not ~60-80 hours (that was the F-14A/B with their analog avionics). One of the airframes in VF-154 in 2003 was built in 1974! Comparing the maintenance hours of a 30 year old airframe to a brand new airframe is a bit like comparing the doctors visits of a teenager to a 70 y/o. Plus, the F-14D wouldn't be an "aging airframe" if produced as planned. True and I am not. Though be wary of your observer bias in thinking that just because an aircraft is operational that it was the better of available choices. If we don't reflect upon the past and try to improve then we are doomed to make the same mistakes - this is said often and rarely heeded. True, but there is also no evidence that he was right. Probably easier, with 25% fewer manhours comparing new to new. But it better be! It went into service a decade later - there should be a little progress, right! Faint praise. It went into service a decade later - there should be a little progress, right! :D Lastly, my post never said that retiring the F-14 was a mistake. I said that it doesn't seem to have saved any money. Would you please respond to what I wrote instead of what you think that I wrote? :) -Nick

The standard approach configuration for the Tomcat (A/B/D) involves deployed airbrake and use of DLC (direct lift control - central portion of wing spoilers deployed to modulate lift without pitch or power adjustments). This allowed for several benefits - the TF30 actually has a high residual thrust at low power settings, but long spool up times from low RPMs to mil power. The draggy config allowed the engine to stay at higher RPMs (I think it was ~85-90%) for better response; both for wave-offs/bolters and power adjustment during the approach. Also, the thrust changes with RPM is nonlinear. IIRC, thrust roughly doubles from 90% N1 to mil. So 90% RPM is roughly 50-60% of mil power. Stall resistance is also much better with RPMs above 80%. With the F-14B/D, spool up times are much faster, but the approach still involves the airbrake since the ability to retract the brake (happens automatically at mil power or higher) with power additions really helps wave-off performance. It also better standardizes the approach config between the different models. The F-14's airbrake is also not hugely effective, less so than the Hornets I think. Also, the A-6 and EA-6B also perform all of their approaches with the airbrakes deployed. I'm not sure why the Hornet is the exception. DLC is sort-of a cool feature. It allows for lift modulation without pitch, AOA, or power changes during the approach by adjusting the center wing spoilers with a thumb wheel on the control stick. Another tool for adjusting the ball in the groove. -Nick

They did, at least once. CVW-14 with VF-31 and VFA-115 deployed July 2002-May 2003: http://www.gonavy.jp/CVW-NKf.html Doesn't have to be entirely fictitious. :) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Praying_Mantis https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Nimble_Archer https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Earnest_Will https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Prime_Chance There were no overseers who made the decision to retire the F-14. Instead the Secretary of defense cancelled further F-14D production against the serious objections by the Navy leadership. They wanted at least 200 new build F-14Ds, but were denied. Politics and personal industry preferences of Dick Cheney are potentially an issue too...but we don't need to go that far down the rabbit hole. :) The Navy had reason to object for a couple reasons. The F-14D really did correct all the major deficiencies of the F-14A and was extremely capable. It was also a highly flexible platform with unmatched A-A capabilities, search capabilities, datalink, and would prove to be an outstanding A-G platform with minimal investment. It was expensive, but not really anymore so than the in-production F-14s of the time. But the biggest source of complaint - the Secretary of Defense was cancelling the F-14 in favor of a "paper airplane". Meaning everything was conceptual. The concept sounded great - fix the primary deficiency in the Navy's newest and more reliable fighter to create an aircraft with a high degree of commonality with the existing Hornet, but able to take over the role of the F-14. Sounds great.... But it is a bit like cosmetic surgery, the concept is very desirable "they'll be how big?". But then you find yourself googling "symmastia" and wondering where it all went wrong. In the case of the Super Hornet, the aircraft proved to have a final cost that was quite comparable to the F-14D (never mind the fact that it required another development program with all of that attendant cost while another completed program was disposed of), but it proved to have minimal commonality with the Legacy Hornet, still far less payload and range than the F-14, and a record number of operational deficiencies that took longer than expected to solve (transonic asymmetric wing drop, weapons separation problems, higher than expected transonic drag, poorer performance in the approach configuration, etc). It has proven to be a reliable platform (like the F-14D...) and it has been a good airplane for the Navy (accepting the fact that it is the slowest USN fighter since the F3H and F4D). But was all of this a wise choice...? Who knows... The Navy has become far more dependent on the USAF and left the long-range strike business when the F-14 retired. Maybe it all would have happened anyway. But the F-14 is the only aircraft I am aware of that had a "reverse transition" - it left the reserves first, then the active squadrons and was deployed to combat theaters continuously until they were all gone. The USN was, by its own actions, pretty explicit concerning its opinion of the airplane. :) -Nick PS - This is a squadron transition parade flight, not "sharing deck" per se. Deployments of both the Tomcat and Rhino on the same deck seemed to have been quite rare from what I have seen.

You're right, not much that can be done about that. The F-14A/B did have ancient avionics, even when they were operating in combat as late as 2005. It is a Dinosaur compared to the Hornet and F-15C...of course a Dinosaur could still eat you. :D Even the F-14D wouldn't have the AIM-9X or JMHCS, but it would be a big step up in avionics and RADAR capability. -Nick

Okey dokey...:) Certainly it is "on a spectrum", but I think that most define a glass cockpit as replacing the primary flight instruments with a digital display. Having an analog instrument in the cockpit does not change this in my mind. But to each his own. https://www.pea.com/blog/posts/whats-a-glass-cockpit/ Not sure how this is relevant to the discussion? It was a great opportunity to discuss the conceptual transition between the cockpit of the F-14A/B and F-14D, didn't realize the discussion was harmful. Is it? It wasn't clear that this conceptual transition was something on your mind based on your post. I apologize for explaining, but other people do read things here as well. I don't see the harm in the discussion. -Nick

Well...not quite. The F-14D does have analog gauges in the cockpit, but all are back-up gauges just like in the F/A-18C. In fact, most them are the same back-up gauges as the F/A-18C. I can't find a good online picture of the F-14D cockpit, there are many more photos of F-14As and Bs (more common airframe and a lot of F-14As were flown to museums in the late-90s/early 2000s). This shot is decent: Basically, the analog gauges in the upper left are the back-up ADI, compass/TACAN, then small back-up gauges for the altimeter, airspeed indicator, radar altimeter, and vertical velocity indicator. On the Hornet, there are at knee level, but even when located near the glare shield they are not optimal for reading. The F-14D cockpit was created with the HUD as the primary flight instrument, this was a major transition that brought its ergonomics in-line with the other 4th generation fighters. Here is the F/A-18C in contrast: Also, most of the navigation functions seen in the Hornet cockpit are located in the RIO cockpit with the F-14. The F-14A (and very closely related F-14A+/B) were the last US fighters created where the HUD was NOT a primary flight instrument. It was a supplement to the ADI and used to aid weapons delivery. Here is the F-14B for contrast: Notice the large airspeed indicator, altimeter, compass/TACAN, etc. They are large and placed to facilitate an instrument scan in which the eyes spend most of their time outside the cockpit (as expected when flying a fighter). The HUD in the F-14A/B is very simple and does not display the functions of these primary flight instruments. It really has only a pitch ladder, compass heading, waypoint info, and weapons delivery data. Here is the F-14A HUD (gif) and this one of the more "symbology intensive modes". In cruise mode the pitch ladder is spaced in 30 deg increments and the is no velocity vector. Contrast with the F-14D HUD: Tons of info, because it is the primary flight instrument. This was the major transition that made the F-14D cockpit a comparable environment to other and newer 4th gen fighters. It is true that the Hornet has more MFDs (though not in total when one considers both crewman - there are two more MFDs for the RIO plus the TID/PTID), but the underlying principles of the cockpit design for the F-14D are essentially the same as the Hornet's and quite different from the preceding F-14A/B. Which is to say that the HUD is the primary instrument and there are programmable MFDs for remaining (largely combat) functions with back-up gauges for when things break. -Nick

Yes you can, just flip the TCS on and it will display in place of the ADI. It can also be slewed to the RADAR. -Nick

I don't want to jump to conclusions, but perhaps Razbam posted this video for a reason: https://forums.eagle.ru/showthread.php?t=167068 -Nick

Also, in the last stream the new water was discussed with the new ability to vary sea state based on wind speed. Will the different sea states also effect objects moving through the water (will ships pitch and roll during heavy seas)? -Nick

Not video, but some new pictures. :D https://www.facebook.com/heatblur/ Though this is not a Forrestal class ship (notice the aft port elevator, on Forrestal class there is only a port forward elevator), but the available CVN-77 mod according to the facebook post. -Nick

Can you tell us more about the new lighting system (besides the fact that it looks amazing :))? Also, will DCS 2.1 also apply the new lighting system to NTTR before the great merge/DCS 2.5? -Nick

These are my recent favorites and all of them are really good IMHO. The first on the development of Wild Weasels has many great stories and interesting technical notes concerning RADAR, ECM, and SAMs. It is excellent and I highly recommend it. https://www.amazon.com/Hunter-Killers-Extraordinary-Maverick-Dangerous-ebook/dp/B00NLMC92Q/ref=sr_1_2?ie=UTF8&qid=1491963630&sr=8-2&keywords=Dan+Hampton The same author's first book is also very good, recounting his adventures as a F-16C and CJ pilot (primarily as a wild weasel). It is a bit self ingratiating at times, but within the bell curve for a fighter pilot. :) https://www.amazon.com/Viper-Pilot-Memoir-Air-Combat-ebook/dp/B007HBTAP6/ref=pd_sim_351_1?_encoding=UTF8&psc=1&refRID=WCH9CD4XKCWE7X2BZ7QM For USN and Tomcat enthusiasts, Dave "Bio" Baranek's books are also excellent with great insight into USN operations. Fewer technical details are given, but still a great and quick read. https://www.amazon.com/Topgun-Days-Dogfighting-Cheating-Hollywood-ebook/dp/B00HQLZVYQ/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1491963874&sr=1-1&keywords=Top+GUn+days Before Top Gun Days (the prequel of sorts) is also a quick and fun read that discusses USN NFO training and some stories on the F-14A. https://www.amazon.com/Before-Topgun-Days-Fighter-Instructor-ebook/dp/B01C6D0L20/ref=sr_1_1?s=digital-text&ie=UTF8&qid=1491963943&sr=1-1&keywords=Before+Top+GUn+days Also, I highly, highly recommend Audible to those of you with any kind of daily commute. I otherwise get through books slowly due to a lack of free time, now with audible I am getting through a book like these every 10 days or so! Note, my daily total commute time is around 1:45 min/day (traffic is tough in the SF Bay Area). It really makes the time go quickly and productively. If you have any interest, give it a try. It has been awesome and all of the above books are available on Audible (or were recently). -Nick