Farks

I took the time to translate some of the parts featuring the Viggen in the book Operation Garbo to English. I left the comments open for any suggested improvements or language errors (spelling, grammar, etc). Viggen excerpts from Operation Garbo

Link to pdf It's unfortunately only available in swedish, but it does have plenty of pictures and stuff. I suppose one could take to Google Translate, but making sense of what it comes up with can be a translation job on its own. Or maybe some of us native speakers can help out if we're in the mood and asked nicely or given belly rubs, etc. :music_whistling: For the uninitiated; this book covers Swedens air attack aviation during the cold war, which includes the Viggen. The air attack units were often informally refered to as "ÖB:s Klubba", hence the book title. To quote myself from another thread: A couple of other air force books by the same author is also available for free: "Fienden i Öster" - covers swedish fighter units of the same era. "Flygvapnets Spaningsflyg" - covers swedish aerial recce units of the same era. Enjoy!

The AJS 37 pylons were wired so it could carry up to four BK 90, but it affected the flight performance too much for it to be a realistic option.

Since I'm a loser with no life... I mean a totally awesome dude, I took the time to translate this thing with english subtitles because why not. (remember to turn on the subtitles) This is a mockumentary depicting what Swedens involvement in a "Cold War gone hot" could have looked like. It's made using archive and stock footage, and is similair to the German film "Close To World War III" from 1998. I would love some feedback and notes on grammar, spelling, etc or the translation in general. The video will remain unlisted until potential errors are corrected (update: the video is now live).

The AJ 37 (I presume JA 37 is a typo) could use the Rb 04 from the get go. This picture is slightly misleading: the AJS 37 could carry four BK 90 capsules at the same time, but the weight impacted the flight performance too much for it to be a realistic option. So two capsules became standard.

Road runways are or have been fairly common around the world. What made the swedish system unique is the dispersal doctrine itself. The Bas 90 system called for dispersal both between and within bases, meaning that one wartime base would only house one or half a squadron of aircraft (1 squadron = 8 aircraft, plus some reserves) and that ground operations on a base would be spread out over a large area in and around the base. The aircraft groundcrew on a base were fully mobile, operating out of trucks and trailers, instead of being stationed at permanent flightlines and revetments.

Doesn't the seeker select target(s) diagonally rather than horizontally in group targeting mode (from the seekers POV)? The new manual describes it as selecting targets horizontally. This thread and the diagrams therein describes it that way at least, unless I'm misunderstanding it. Because selecting targets horizontally could already be achieved relatively easily by simply re-aligning the aircraft towards another target after firing the first missile, as I described in this thread (shameless self promotion :music_whistling:). EDIT: Nvm, the manual seems to be correct, I'm the on who can't read.

In the case of the Swedish Air Force during the cold war, no. Tank busting or other tactical missions was not part of the air-to-surface doctrine, the air units didn't train for that type of mission and neither the army or the air force had units that could call in and coordinate such strikes. Risking valuable air strike assets for the gain of maybe taking out a few armored vehicles (of an opponent that counted theirs in the thousands) was simply not economical. The AJ(S) 37 squadrons were to fly either anti-ship or interdiction missions.

According to a forum post on soldf.com the Rb 75T had 135 kg of explosives in its warhead, but I don't know how reliable that info is.

The Rb 75 was based on the A-version of the missile, with some seeker improvements. According to Arboga Missile Musuem, the Rb 75T weighed 295 kg compared to the 210 kg of the regular version. The Rb 05 had a 160 kg warhead.

"Med Invasionen I Sikte" does hint at a possible reason for why the Viggen was only equipped with light bombs. On page 22/23 (my translation): It does also mention on page 39 that the transition to lighter bombs was indeed questioned during the time period. But as the posts above explain, the swedish plans were indeed to target bridges with Rb 05's and Mavericks. The swedish version of the Maverick was modified specifically to work better against ships and bridges. It's also possible they planned to hit bridges with a mixture of ordinance, some aircraft firing missiles and other dropping bombs. But of course it's also possible the air force perhaps misjudged these scenarios.

Well, I do know. The JA 37 was a whole new development in terms of radar, avionics and other on-board systems. It was an almost completely digital aircraft compared to the other Viggen versions. In fact, the leap between the JA 37 and the AJ/SF/SH 37 is greater than the leap between the JA 37 and the JAS 39.

The JA 37 was practically a new aircraft compared to the other Viggen versions, the airframe was more or less the only thing they had in common. So a making a JA 37 for DCS would mean developing it from scratch.

It's been revealed after the fact that Sweden had various "under the table" arrangements with NATO. And the soviets were aware of it to some extent, or at least suspected as much. See the Catalina Affair. It's been suggested by some historians and strategists that Sweden deliberately misbalanced its armed forces, focusing on defending the southern half of the country from a seaborne invasion with aerial and naval assets (where the Viggen would play a key role) at the expense of the army. The implication being that Sweden would focus on defending its lower half and NATO would take over the defense of the upper half in order to defend its positions in northern Norway. Which makes some sense when you look at it. But it's just speculation as far as I know.

Air bases in the northern most part of Sweden during the '70s and '80s, since that's the time period of interest: * 21st Air Wing (F 21) in Luleå. x2 fighter squadrons (J 35D Draken, JA 37 Viggen from 1985) and x1 recce squadron (S 35 Draken, SF/SH 37 Viggen from 1979). * Kiruna. Military and civilian airport. You can still see the military flightline positions at the southern part of the runway. * Jokkmokk. Military air base. This one was built to Bas 90 in the late '80s, adding three short runways just to the south-west of the main runway. * Vidsel. Military air base. Also built to Bas 90 in the late '80s, with two short runways just south and west of the main runway and a third one a bit further west. * Heden. Military air base. Remained Bas 60, i.e not built to Bas 90. * Piteå. Military air base. Also remained Bas 60. * Fällfors. Military air base. Built to Bas 90 in the early '80s with three short runways. * Gunnarn. Military air base. Built to Bas 90 sometime during the '80s, with one short runway just to the west and and another two to the south-east. * Åmsele. Military air base. Built to Bas 90 sometime during the '80s, with three short runways. * And there were a few road runways as well. Jokkmokk (just to the east of the main base), Vidsel (also just to the east of the main base), Långträsk and Finnträsk. The road runways were technically different from the mentioned short runways, in case you're wondering. :music_whistling: * A couple of civilian airports were earmarked for military use as well, namely Gällivare, Arvidsjaur and Skellefteå. A couple of these bases may be located a bit too far south to be included in the suggested map layouts, but I suppose its possible to cheat a little and move them for the sake of fun or something.

https://forums.eagle.ru/showthread.php?t=188663 ;)

For reference, real life AJ(S) 37 tactics revolved around flying in groups (4 aircraft) very low and very fast. Peace time restrictions were 20 m over land and 10 m over sea. Speed would be ~Mach 1. Countermeasure pods would be carried based on the protection needs of the whole group, not individual aircraft. It's likely that AA sites covering the target area would be hit first by a couple of groups flying ahead of the main strike package.

Supporting domestic industry would be my guess as well. The military-industrial complex is one helluva drug! Technically it was SAAB's design, but maybe they were bitten by a British bug or something. :D

Seriously, it's true! For a brief moment in the late '60s the RAF had semi-serious considerations about the Viggen, and SAAB presented a few alternatives to them. The excellent book System 37 Viggen tells the story on page 177 and onwards. But since many of you don't speak the tongue of ära och hjältar I've translated it for you. Feel free to point out errors in the text and potential improvements. I've added question marks where I wasn't sure how to translate.

The SwAF modified their version of the Maverick. From System 37 Viggen, page 93 (my translation): The book also mentions that the SwAF primarily intended to use the Maverick against ships and bridges. Tanks and other smaller targets was not on the agenda.

It's a bit weird though, since other sources show different data and claim that asymetrical loadouts weren't possible. But since it's the actual flight instruction manual used by the air force, and thus can be considered a primary source, it should be accurate. This part of the SFI was published in 1979 after the Rb 75 had been implemented, so maybe they had used that opportunity to re-wire some other stuff to allow for the listed loadouts?

Part 3 of the AJ 37 SFI, page 8 in the pdf, lists all the loadout alternatives for the original AJ 37 (minus the outermost pylons). It does differ a bit from the other available tables though. Regarding carrying the Rb 04E on the central pylon - it was discussed in another thread and the conclusion was that the air force wanted it to be implemented there, but it turned out to be unpractical due to the low ground clearance. And the AJ 37 was very dependent on carrying an X-tank anyway.

Thanks for the pointers MBot. I guess it's all about the "LARPing" til these issues are dealt with then, as you say.

A bit of a disclaimer first; I'm yet to actually get DCS and the Viggen (I'm holding off until I can get a new computer, so please don't hit me!), but in the meantime I've researched some stuff just out of personal curiosity. I'm by no means an expert on matters of aircraft or aerial combat (or military stuff in general), my knowledge is pretty much limited to what I'm presenting here, nor do I have first hand experience with the sim, its engine, mission editing, multiplayer and so on for the reason I mentioned. So take this for what it's worth and forgive me if I'm missing anything that should be common knowledge or obvious among real flight nerds and DCS users. Also, "case study" might not be the proper term for this but it sounds cool and important so I'll go with it because I feel like it and you can't stop me! Anyway, let's move on. As many of you know, the speciality of the attack version of the Viggen was anti-ship operations. Both the design of the aircraft and the doctrine and tactics used by the AJ(S) 37 units revolved heavily around this scenario. So I figured it would be of great interest and relevance with some insight into this scenario and the plans around it. It should hopefully come in handy when designing missions and campaigns or just flying the Viggen in general (or just out of curiosity). And it might be interesting for use in other cases as well. Some of it you might have heard before (especially if you're a Viggen nerd) but hopefully I can bring something new to the table or at least present it in a somewhat gathered format. This will mainly focus on the cold war era ('70s and '80s) and will therefore primarily cover the Viggen in its pre AJS upgrade configuration, the original AJ 37 (the AJS 37 program started around 1991). But I don't think it will cause any major obstacles, except maybe when it comes to weapon loadouts. However you're of course free to ignore all that and just fly the AJS 37 as it is. If you think anything should be added or you see any errors, let it be known. Let's take the whole history from the begining: The AJ(S) 37 Viggen was capable of carrying out a variety of strike missions. But throughout its service during the cold war the "big one" was the anti-ship role. This mission was prioritized above all else and would in reality have been its only mission, since the Swedish Air Force planned to carry it out with such high frequency and aggression that the AJ 37 squadrons were expected to be depleted within the opening stages of the war (!). In the words of air force lieutenant Björn Bjuggren: "E1" refers to "Första Flygeskadern" ("First Air Group") which was the unit all air attack squadrons belonged to, and which Björn Bjuggren commanded between 1952 and 1964. E1 was a special unit since it obeyed directly under the swedish supreme commander ("Överbefälhavaren" or "ÖB" for short), unlike the rest of the armed forces which were commanded by their respective military district commander (including the rest of the air force). Because of this E1 was commonly referred to as "ÖB:s Klubba", which roughly translates into "The SUPCOM's War Hammer". In other words - E1 was a precious and valuable tool only to be disposed of in important matters. Hitting targets of high strategic value was the only option, with the anti-ship mission being on top. In case the expected amphibious invasion didn't happen and the Warsaw Pact instead decided to invade via the north, through Finland, E1's mission would have been interdiction; hitting bridges, supply lines, communications, etc. Another important aspect of E1 was that it was more or less the only major unit within the swedish armed forces that could be available within short notice. Since Sweden relied upon conscription to man its military it would take at least two-three days to fully mobilize it, but the air force pilots were of course full time employes and could thus be ready within just a few hours. So why was the anti-ship role so highly prioritized then? Well, one of the two main conflict scenarios Sweden expected to find itself in in case the cold war went hot was an attack over the Baltic Sea (the other being an attack via Finland, as mentioned above). And this attack was expected to be spearheaded by an amphibious assault carried out by a reinforced WP marine infantry brigade, whos job would be to capture a bridgehead with one or more major ports that the main invasion force could then be shipped over to (motor rifle regiments presumably). So if the initial amphibious assault force could be prevented from reaching swedish territory they wouldn't be able to seize a bridgehead, and without a bridgehead there won't be anywhere to send reinforcements to, and thus there would be no invasion. Even if the amphibious assault force managed to cross and reach their target more or less intact the losses inflicted upon them would hopefully complicate things for them and give the swedish army enough time to mobilize and launch a counter-attack on the bridgehead. The WP's number of transport and cargo ships (both military and civilian) was believed to be high, but their number of specialized landing crafts (such as the Ropucha class) necessary for an amphibious assault was considered to be rather low. Which was yet another reason to focus on wearing down the assault force as much as possible. Other than E1 the assault force would also have to get through the swedish navy and coastal artillery. Organization: As mentioned above, all AJ 37 squadrons were organized under E1. There were three air wings flying the AJ 37 during this period, with a total of 5,5 squadrons. The reason it wasn't a full 6 was because the second group of the 152. squadron was used to train pilots on the Viggen system, and was thus equipped with the two seated Sk 37 instead. The units flying the AJ 37 were: 6th Air Wing (F 6), based in Karlsborg: * 61. air attack squadron, Filip Röd (Foxtrot Red) * 62. air attack squadron, Filip Blå (Foxtrot Blue) 7th Air Wing (F 7), based in Såtenäs: * 71. air attack squadron, Gustav Röd (Golf Red) * 72. air attack squadron, Gustav Blå (Golf Blue) 15th Air Wing (F 15), based in Söderhamn: * 151. air attack squadron, Olle Röd (Oscar Red) * 152. air attack group, Olle Blå (Oscar Blue) One squadron in the air consisted of 8 aircraft, divided into two groups of 4. The remaining available aircraft and pilots would be held in reserve. So an E1 at full force consisted of 44 aircraft. E1's commander was referred to as "C E1" ("Chefen för E1", literally "Commander of E1" in english. Who would have thought?!). C E1 either takes orders from the SUPCOM or the commander of a military district in case the SUPCOM temporarily assigns E1 to him, which was a planned possibility. But I don't think that would have been the case in the anti-ship role, so it's not that relevant here. The Swedish Air Force had a system of dispersed basing of its squadrons during the cold war, called "Bas 60" and later developed into "Bas 90". This meant in case of war the squadrons would disperse over a large number of wartime air bases, which were military airfields with regular runways. There were also road runways as backup bases. The goal was to have each base house one or half squadrons of aircraft (so 4-8 aircrafts, plus reserves presumably). Since there is no scandinavian map or air bases of swedish configuration in DCS at the moment (?) this aspect might be difficult recreate. But E1's bases were mostly concentrated towards the inner parts of the country in order to give some protection, whereas the fighter squadrons tended to have their wartime bases closer to the coast in order to get up and intercept approaching hostiles as early as possible. Weapons: In the anti-ship role the Rb 04 was obviously the weapon of choice during this time period (Rb 15 came with the AJS modification), but most of the AJ 37's weaponry was planned for use in the anti-ship role. Since the Rb 04 could only be used at open sea the other weapons were needed for attacking targets in port, near the coast or in archipelagos. If my knowledge is correct, weapons config was up for the squadron leader to decide. According to a post (down in the comments, here is a screencap of the comment in question) in the Viggen group on Facebook a common anti-ship loadout was alternative "043", which consisted of x5 Rb 04, x2 KB pods and x1 U22 pod per group. I don't know how reliable or accurate that post is, but it sound plausible. But any reasonable mix of Rb 04's + countermeasure pods should do the trick. Not that there are any real alternatives when you exclude the Rb 15... The original AJ 37 could not carry Sidewinders (Rb 24) on its outer pylons, so if you want to stay authentic to the time period they will have to go. It could however carry the AIM-4 Falcon (Rb 28 ) on them, but the case of their usage seems unclear. Some sources claim they were effectively obsolete due to their bad performance, but others claim they were cleared for use in wartime. And of course those missiles aren't even in DCS to begin with. Maybe the Rb 24 could be used as a "surrogate" if desired? The question is if it's worthwhile bringing the extra weight when you're flying an anti-ship mission and already carrying bulky missiles and countermeasure pods. Considering all the heavy AA cover you'll be flying through it seems preferable to just hug the deck and leave the the air-to-air missiles at home. (Or you can just not give a **** and fly with whatever missiles you want) The target: The intended target of an amphibious assault force was estimated to consist of a core of transport and landing crafts carrying a reinforced marine infantry brigade onboard, covered by inner and outer protective screens of combat vessels (including ships with heavy AA, obviously) and minesweepers. Fighter cover was likely as well. The fleet was expected to travel with 1 nautical mile of spacing between ships, at a speed of 10 knots. Crossing the Baltic Sea from the baltic coast to the swedish east coast would take about 10-12 hours. Crossing from East-Germany/Poland to the swedish south coast would take 4-6 hours. There was a lot of debate whether E1 should focus on taking out the escort first or go directly for the transport ships. Taking out the escort and their AA would make it easier to target the transports in subsequent strikes, but at the risk of exhausting the squadrons before they even had a chance to target the transports. Sinking combat vessels would also help even odds for the numerically inferior swedish navy. Going directly for the transports would be the preferable choice, but with the AA cover still intact it would be very risky and increase the number of losses. Here are three examples of how the invasion fleet was expected to look like, based on swedish intelligence: This example was used in an exercise in 1972: From the infograph "Sveriges Ödestimma 1968": This example is shown in the book "Svenskt Flyg Under Kalla Kriget": (this one seems a bit "unstructured" compared to the other two) As you can see there are some differences between the scenarios presented in these examples. And they're all taken from the late '60s and early '70s, before the Viggen was operational. But for the sake of simplicity and lack of other sources we'll assume that some variation of this configuration would have been the case through the duration of the cold war, with the actual ships involved in the operation depending on the exact timeframe (as you can see the ships are mostly unspecified). Someone with more insight into the WP's baltic navy of the '70s and '80s could perhaps elaborate. Not that it matters much anyway since most (none?) of these ships are in DCS at the moment. Looking at real world amphibious exercises the WP held, we got Zapad -81 where about 90 combat vessels and about 70 transport ships and landing crafts participated. Another exercise in 1986 included 7 Aist-class hovercrafts, 1 Ivan Rogov and 2 merchant ships. To what degree these exercises reflected a real operation is uncertain. It's worthwhile pointing out that the general historical consensus is that the the WP's amphibious forces in the baltic were primarily intended for operations against West-Germany and Denmark. And Sweden didn't (necessarily) expect all of the WP's baltic fleet capability to be used against them. Post-cold war research suggests that Sweden, and maybe NATO as well, overestimated the WP's amphibious warfare capabilities. But that's another story. A few things are unclear to me though: regarding taking out the escort first or not, I'm not sure if they mean the outer or the inner most screens. Because all of the available illustrations and examples presumably only include the transports proximity defense and none of the outer screens. Because otherwise the number of ships seems rather low. And considering that the Rb 04 couldn't target discriminate (unless we count the group targeting mode) it seems like a pretty irrelevant discussion anyway. Perhaps someone else can shed some light on this issue? Another question is regarding WP air cover: would it be carried out by their frontal aviation (VVS) or air defense aviation (PVO), or both? Tactics: The primary tactical behaviour was flying in groups (4 aircraft). This was highly emphasized, AJ 37 pilots were never to act individually. This was both for tactical and morale/psychological reasons. This was reflected in how weapon loadouts were configured; a group would carry the appropriate mix of weapons and countermeasures in order to support each other. The AJ 37 squadrons utilized extreme low level flying at high speeds (around Mach 1) to approach their target(s). Peacetime restrictions were 20 m above ground/treetops and 10 m above water. A typical attack run consisted of rapidly climbing a few kilometers before the target area, identifying your target, fire/drop weapons and then get back down on the deck and egress. In the anti-ship scenario we're discussing here the basic plan was to use all of E1 in one single big, coordinated strike on the invasion fleet. And keep on repeating that until E1 was depleted. Hopefully having brought a large chunk of the enemies gross tonnage down with them. Based on exercises and simulations, the expected strike frequency for E1 lied around every two hours or so. A more specific and detailed description of how a AJ 37 squadron would carry out an anti-ship strike isn't available (I don't know of any at least). There is however good documentation of how it was made with the A 32 (the preceding aircraft), and it seems like most of the tactics remained unchanged with the AJ 37. The descriptions vary slightly between sources. I'm presenting them as is here: According to "Svenskt Flyg Under Kalla Kriget": The mission from start to finish: The attack run itself: Here is in illustration for the six steps above, to help make sense of it: According to "Sveriges ödestimma 1968": There are some obvious differences compared to how it would (probably) have been done during the Viggen era. The main one is that every Viggen aircraft had its own radar and navigator (although computerized) and thus weren't as dependant on their lead aircrafts and such. Another is the improved version of the Rb 04, which has both longer range (30 km instead of 20 km) and the ability to be fired in group targeting or home-in-on-jam mode. The method of firing off the second missiles in a different direction as described above could still potentially be useful though (?). Common praxis was to target each ship with two missiles, except for larger or special ships (such as cruisers) which were to be targeted with four missiles. Except for the attacking in 5-10 minute intervals thing, the coordination of the attack is not discussed in any meaningful detail in these examples. Do all squadrons gather up in the air somewhere before the target and attack from the same direction, or do they plan the strike so they make their way to the target on their own but arrive at the same time and attack from different directions? That depends entirely on more exact details of the scenario and situation at hand I assume. The radio silence is another important and interesting thing. It's mentioned both in writing and in interviews with former pilots that the missions were flown in complete radio silence, so having a detailed and agreed upon plan for the whole flight was essential. The radio silence was complemented by radar silence right up until the point of the attack itself. Seeing this done in DCS would be quite interesting. And that's all, for now at least. I hope you enjoyed it and find some good use for it. :) Sources: * ÖB:s Klubba (2010), ISBN: 9789185789740 * Svenskt Flyg Under Kalla Kriget (2016), ISBN: 9789173291347 * Sveriges Ödestimma 1968 (2004) * A few other sources as well, most of them in renhanuxes Viggen documentation thread Insignias and stuff: Första Flygeskadern, E1 (First Air Group): 61. squadron, Filip Röd (Foxtrot Red): 62. squadron, Filip Blå (Foxtrot Blue): 71. squadron, Gustav Röd (Golf Red): 72. squadron, Gustav Blå (Golf Blue): 151. squadron, Olle Röd (Oscar Red): 152. group, Olle Blå (Oscar Blue): Miscellaneous debris: Here is some stuff that may not be directly related to the topic at hand, but still interesting or amusing. * The Viggen was by all accounts incredibly field friendly and easy to maintain. Full turnaround of an aircraft could be performed in 10-20 minutes. During an exercise in 1983, when part of the flight operations were relocated to a civilian airport acting as a backup base after the ordinary base was "destroyed", two men (one flight technician and one conscripted mechanic) were able to perform full turnaround on four AJ 37's in just 40 minutes! The overall availability on the aircrafts that participated in the exercise never fell below 90%. Out of the 460 air strikes carried out during the exercise 360 were deemed to have an effect on target, which was seen as an excellent result. * As mentioned at the beginning, it was expected that E1 would have a very high loss rate and be depleted quickly. In the early '60s it was estimated that 23% of the flying units would be lost per day. The attack frequency for E1 was expected to lie around every two hours, and each flight crew was expected to manage three to five sorties per day for ten days. * The Rb 05 was unpopular among both pilots and in the air force in general. C E1 openly said he didn't want that type of missile for the AJ 37 and pointed towards the poor performance of MCLOS weapons in Vietnam and the Middle East. A TV-guided version of the Rb 05 was in development but was cancelled in favour of the Rb 75 (Maverick). * During the U137 incident (also known as the "Whisky on the rocks" incident) in 1981 two groups of AJ 37's from F 6 were kept on standby at all times throughout the ten days that the incident lasted. This included flying patrol missions. Their job would have been to engage the group of ships lead by a Kashin destroyer that were waiting outside the swedish maritime border, in case they decided sail in and liberate the stranded sub. This was probably the closest the Viggen and the Rb 04 ever came to being used for real. * A number of foreign aircrafts were studied as alternatives to aquiring the Viggen. Including the Buccaner, F-111, F-4 and even the TSR-2. Out of these the F-4 was the most interesting and was an option as late as 1966. The F-4 had superior range and weapons carrying capacity, but the Viggen had more modern and better avionics and operational costs lower by about 30%. And the F-4 could not achieve the desired STOL capability without ground infrastructure. * 48 AJ 37 were modified to AJS 37 standard, out of the ~80 remaining aircraft in inventory. 13 SF 37 (the photo recce version) and 25 SH 37 (the maritime patrol version) were also modified to AJSF 37 and AJSH 37 respectively. The AJS 37 remained in service until the year 2000 and the AJSF/AJSH 37 remained in service until 2005. * E1 was disbanded in 1995, when the Swedish Air Force was restructured into three geographical air commands. * In the 1970's the then in development fighter version of the Viggen (JA 37) was marketed as the "Eurofighter" in an attempt to export the aircraft. Here is an old article reporting on it. * Layout for an AJ 37 flightline position at an air base in 1974: * Remember that part about the Warsaw Pact amphibious warfare capabilities likely being overestimated? Well, here is an excerpt from a french analysis from the early 1980's: (the citation for this simply says "Coutau-Bégarie", who as far as I can tell was a french maritime strategic analyst)

For the geographically impaired, these are (roughly) the areas that you can see on the pilot maps. The area on the left includes Såtenäs which is the 7th Air Wing's (F 7) main base. And the majority of the attack squadrons wartime air bases were concentrated in that region during the cold war as well. The area on the right includes Bråviken Bay, which was believed to be a potential landing site for a Warsaw Pact amphibious invasion during the cold war. The cities of Norrköping and Oxelösund have good ports for shipping in reinforcements, and many roads leading in and out of the area which makes it ideal for an invasion.