No more above 12G turns

[JunMcKill]

This is the real configuration/speed allowed for the Su-27Sk in the harpoints, notice the speed allowed in each case, I think the F-15 should have a similar diagram in their manuals.

 

 

1. Restrictions in speed depending on the variant missiles accommodation:

- 1-2 - not more than 1300 km / h;

- 3-7 - no more than 1200 km / h.

2. In any variant asymmetric suspension maximum positive overload is reduced by ΔPu = 2, and the output of the negative overload is prohibited.

3. In the config, the primary suspension (2xR-73E on points 7, 8 and 2xR-27ER1 (2xR-27R1) at points 1, 2) - without speed limits.

4. In all cases the suspension can be applied incomplete Ammunition missiles.

5. Admitted options asymmetric suspension missiles, except for the full-sided and options imbalance takeoff weight of not more than 450 kg.

6. On symmetrical points allowed only the same type of suspension missiles.

7. Built-gun used in all variants with outboard weapon and without it.

8. ???

9. The training flights missile R-73E Only use a 5, 6 or 3, 4 suspension points (to avoid the destruction of the suspension?).

10. Allowed the pairwise symmetric suspension of R-27ER1 and P-27P1 simultaneously on different pairs of points.

 

Sorry for the translation, this is the original in russian:

 

1. Ограничения по скорости в зависимости от варианта размещения ракет:

− 1-2 – не более 1300 км/ч;

− 3-7 – не более 1200 км/ч.

2. При любом варианте несимметричной подвески максимальная положительная перегрузка уменьшается на ΔПу=2, а выход на отрицательную перегрузку запрещается.

3. В варианте основной подвески (2хР-73Э на точках 7, 8 и 2хР-27ЭР1 (2хР-27Р1) на точках 1, 2) – без ограничений по скорости.

4. Во всех вариантах подвески могут применяться неполные боекомплекты ракет.

5. Допускаются варианты несимметричной подвески ракет, за исключением полной односторонней и вариантов с дисбалансом взлетной массы не более 450 кг.

6. На симметричных точках допускается подвеска только однотипных ракет.

7. Встроенная пушка применяется во всех вариантах с подвесным оружием и без него.

8. Для обучения и тренировки летного состава по применению боевых ракет типа Р-27 во всех режимах СУВ. за исключением режима φо для ракет с ТГС, используются учебно-тренировочные ракеты Р-27УТ, укомплектованные различными типами ГСН. Ракеты применяются в режимах: 470-1УТМ с РГC, 470-ЗУТМ с ТГС. Установка режима производится при наземной подготовке путем перестыковки разъема, расположенного в торцевой части ракеты. Готовность ракеты к повторной атаке обеспечивается автоматически через 1-2 минуты с момента сброса цели РЛПК.

9. В учебно-тренировочных полетах ракеты Р-73Э применять только с 5, 6 или 3, 4 точек подвески (для исключения разрушения остекления АНО).

10. Допускается попарная симметричная подвеска ракет Р-27ЭР1 и P-27P1 одновременно на разных парах точек.

[Ktulu2]

I'm guessing those speeds are in IAS? Otherwise the 27 isn't supposed to do more than transonic launches at more than 4 missiles.

[JunMcKill]

Now, this is for the F-15 with 35,000 pounds gross weight

 

[GGTharos]

Wrong engine. The simulated F-15 (and pretty much almost every F-15 after '85) uses the -220.

Also, this chart is a sustained g chart, not a g limit chart :)

 

Anyway, the F-15 payload limits are a maximum of M1.8 with missiles and tanks. It has been flown faster.

 

There are also asymmetric payload limits/warnings for AoA, not G - but in practice unless your wing tanks (or externals, or you're missing one external) aren't balanced, you'll have a hard time getting enough asymmetric weight to care.

[JunMcKill]

Wrong engine. The simulated F-15 (and pretty much almost every F-15 after '85) uses the -220.

Also, this chart is a sustained g chart, not a g limit chart :)

 

And this is the F-15 with 37,000 pounds gross weight. This one have the -220 engine. The problem is not the G limit per se, it's the information that every piloit should now about the limits of the airframe, ok if the F-15 can get higher loads for a limited time (seconds), but will have structural damage with time, and maybe a complete crash. Not like the current simulated in DCS where all are exploiting the limits all time without impact in the fuselage and wings. If you notice in the graph, any high G is limited to 1.05 mach maximum (sea level to 5,000 feets), means about 1.05Mach= 1286.296kph or lower

 

Edited May 19, 2016 by JunMcKill

[GGTharos]

What I am saying is that you are misinterpreting the charts.

 

This is a sustained g chart, it's capability, not g limit. You can reach much higher g's (eg. 9g) with instantaneous turns with no damage whatsoever. You just won't be able to maintain your speed.

 

This chart is all about 'I can maintain this g at this speed'. If you turn harder, your speed will decrease.

 

Again, it is not a structural tolerance chart. :)

[RoflSeal]

And this is the F-15 with 37,000 pounds gross weight. This one have the -220 engine. The problem is not the G limit per se, it's the information that every piloit should now about the limits of the airframe, ok if the F-15 can get higher loads for a limited time (seconds), but will have structural damage with time, and maybe a complete crash. Not like the current simulated in DCS where all are exploiting the limits all time without impact in the fuselage and wings. If you notice in the graph, any high G is limited to 1.05 mach maximum (sea level to 5,000 feets), means about 1.05Mach= 1286.296kph or lower

 

 

Above the line is not structural limit. Limit is 9G as shown on graph. Line represents max sustained G in a turn, in other words above that, aircraft will lose energy in the turn.

[SinusoidDelta]

I stumbled across a detailed account of a tragic mishap. In 1985 a 1st Lieutenant piloting an F-15A literally ripped the wings off his jet carrying a full internal load of fuel, 4x Aim-7's, 4x Aim-9's and 3 drop tanks.

 

It was the result of an abrupt wings level pull up following low altitude high speed pass (over Elmendorf) at 550-600 knots. No official accident investigation report is available.

 

I understand the F-15C had many structural enhancements compared to the A....but it is not indestructible.

 

 

Source: http://forums.jetcareers.com/threads/when-routine-ops-become-not-so-routine.113041/

Time will erase the painful memory of the mistake you just made. So will the next mistake......

 

24 June 1985

Galena Air Force Station (PAGA)

Galena, Alaska

 

McDonnell Douglas F-15A Eagle, 74-0087

43rd Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS)/21st Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW)

Alaskan Air Command, USAF

1 Fatal

 

For this 10th installment of MikeDs accident analyses, I'll analyze how non-routine operations performed in a routine way, as well how the major impacts from a minor oversight, can end up with completely unintended results.

 

One of the unique and fun things about aviation is when pilots get to bring the world of aviation to non-pilots. This can be accomplished from the most benign, such as an airline crew talking to passengers about flying prior to or after a flight, or bringing them into the cockpit; to the more extreme, such as when aerial demonstration teams like the USAF Thunderbirds, US Navy Blue Angels, or the Canadian Snowbirds, among others, wow crowds with their aerial demonstrations; and everything inbetween. These demonstrations are well choreographed, planned and scripted. Such demonstrations are true crowd pleasers especially for people who support and maintain flying operations, the people who make the whole thing possible. Things like incentive rides and mini-airshows or flybys can be a great morale boost to those who work long and hard to make it possible for these aircraft to get into the air. Many of these smaller-scale short demonstrations are generally impromptu and on the fly, with less preplanning. That less preplanning creates a challenge in and of itself and increases the risk factor somewhat, the degree of that risk increase dependant on any number of factors, from the most minor to the major. The key is to be able to mitigate these factors as much as possible, thus not allowing Mr Murphy to make himself the proverbial uninvited guest at the party. Failure to do so will usually end in a situation such was seen on a cool Monday afternoon, 24 June 1985, at Galena AFS Alaska.

 

In 1985, the Cold War was still very much in effect against the Soviet Union and other member nations of the Warsaw Pact. The state of Alaska was seen as a strategic defensive position protecting both Canada and the United States from aggression from the eastern side of the Soviet Union and across the Bering Strait. As such, the US Air Force's Alaskan Air Command had a few squadrons of fighter aircraft, among other types, to help defend the Alaska penninsula from any Soviet air threat, namely bombers which consistently flew along the Alaskan coast in international waters, testing US air defenses. Very often, USAF fighters would scramble from a number of locations to intercept and escort these Soviet bombers, insuring they had no ill intentions. This game of cat and mouse had been going on for a long time, and today, 24 June, was no different.

 

To defend the Alaska pennisula, the Alaskan Air Command (AAC) had a few squadrons of F-15A Eagles based primarily out of Elmendorf AFB (ICAO: PAED) near Anchorage. Generally, 4 x F-15As sat air defense alert at a ready posture. In order to shorten response time to intercept an intruder aircraft coming from the west, AAC had two additional Forward Operating Location (FOL) alert sites at King Salmon Air Force Station (ICAO: PAKN) on the southwestern portion of the Alaskan pennisula, and Galena Air Force Station (ICAO: PAGA) on the west-central half of the state bordering the Yukon River. Each FOL had a detachment of 4 x F-15As and associated maintenance personnel who rotated back and forth from the FOLs and Elmendorf AFB on a regular schedule.

 

On this day, F-15A 74-0087 was sitting home-station air defense alert at Elmendorf AFB. The pilot of 087 was a 24yr old O-2 (1st Lieutenant) first-assignment wingman with approximately 515TT and 315TT in the F-15A aircraft. He was assigned as the wingman of a 2-ship section of Eagles there at the alert hangar. At this time, Elmendorf was undergoing an Operational Readiness Inspection (ORI) whereby the base was being inspected and graded as to how it executes its wartime mission. Late in the morning, the alert klaxon horn sounded in the alert hangar facility, signaling a scramble launch. Not knowing whether this was a practice launch or the real thing against a real target, the Eagle crews treated the sitation as being real like they always do, moved to get mounted-up, engines started, taxied and airborne within minutes. The pilot of 087 did just this, following his lead jet out the alert hangars in minutes and launching with a full live-load of 4 x AIM-7F/M Sparrow medium-range radar-guided air-air missles, 4 x AIM-9L/M Sidewinder short-range air-air IR missiles, a full load of 20mm cannon, and 3 x 600 gallon external drop tanks, one under each wing and one under the centerline station.

 

Following launch and contact with the Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radar station, the flight was informed that this was a practice intercept launch and was vectored to a notional air threat for a simulated intercept. Following completion of this, the flight was cleared to Return to Base (RTB) to Elemendorf. During the RTB, the pilot of 087 got a bleed air leak warning indication in his cockpit. Knowing the potential seriousness of a bleed leak, the flight lead declared an emergency with ATC, gave the navigation lead to the pilot of 087, and assumed a chase position on his wingmans jet. The decision was made to divert to Galena AFS, it being the closest field as well as the most suitable, with both the runway as well as coincidentally the maintenence availability from the alert detachment located there. Appropriate emergency checklists were completed, and descent, approach, and landing were uneventful; the pilot of 087 making a full stop, while the flight lead made a low approach and RTBd to Elmendorf AFB.

 

On the ground at Galena, maintenance began inspection and repairs to 087, and if repairs were completed with sufficient daylight remaining, then 087 could RTB to Elmendorf also. Within a few hours, the appropriate repairs were made to 087, the aircraft was refueled, and the pilot was cleared from home station to return to Elmendorf the same day. As the aircraft forms were being completed, the pilot notified the alert detachment Supervisor of Flying (SOF...an O-3 Captain) of his intention to make a low pass flyby after takeoff and prior to departing back to Elmendorf. These flybys were a regular occurrance and served as a morale boost for the maintainence personnel at the FOLs who were often working in very cold climate conditions to keep the aircraft flying. Forms complete, the pilot of 087 mounted up and engine start and taxi were uneventful. As RW 7 was the active at this time, and the USAF alert ramp and hangar was located at the western half of the airfield on the north side, the pilot of 087 requested a 180 degree turn after takeoff for an opposite direction low-pass down RW 25 prior to departing the Airport Traffic Area (ATA). With the request granted by tower, the pilot of 087 made an uneventful normal takeoff from RW 7. At about a mile from the RW 7 departure end, the pilot made a series of 90 degree turns to reverse course back inbound for the low-pass down RW 25. Completing the course reversal, the pilot descended and crossed the approach end of RW 25 inbound at an estimated 100-200AGL and 550-600 knots in afterburner (AB). Passing down RW 25 and about 1000 feet from the departure end and abeam the USAF alert hangar, the pilot executed an abrupt wings-level pull-up and climb, still in AB. The F-15A instantly and violently broke apart, exploded into flames, and crashed just off the departure end of RW 25 into the Yukon River. There was no ejection and the pilot was fatally injured.

 

 

Probable Cause:

 

*Inflight Planning/Decision Making- Improper- Pilot In Command

*Design Stress Limits of Aircraft- Exceeded- Pilot In Command

*Wings- Overload

 

Secondary Factors:

 

*Improper Aircraft Warning Systems Operation/Configuration- Pilot In Command

*Wings- Failure, Total

*Wings- Separation

 

Tertiary Factors:

 

*Operations Supervision- Improper- Fighter Wing Level

*Operations Supervision- Improper- Local Detachment Level

 

MikeD says:

 

This accident highlights a number couple of areas that tie-into the aforementioned discussion of impromptu and short-planned non-routine operations such as aerial demonstrations, and the hazards associated with them. Two of the primary areas to focus on as it relates to this accident, are:

 

1. The planning of the Flyby itself on this day.

2. The execution of the Flyby by the pilot of 087

 

Planning of the Flyby: As noted in the description of the accident sequence, high-speed low-pass flybys and other mild aerial demonstrations were a fairly common occurrance at the FOL alert sites, and had been for some time. Seen as a morale boost for the support personnel at these FOLs, who often spent weeks away from family and home in these small locations that had not much to do other than work, aerial demonstrations such as flybys really helped provide a sense of camraderie and teamwork. This allowed maintenance and support personnel to take pride of ownership that the hard work they performed daily and under sometimes grueling climate conditions, could be seen in its end-state. These aerial demonstrations were both known about and condoned as the intended morale booster they were by the home-base 21st TFW leadership. The problem was, that these aerial demonstrations violated several USAF-level and AAC-level regulations in-place, as well as the 350 KCAS restriction regulated in then-Air Force Regulation (AFR) 60-16. As there had been no incidents or accidents resulting from these mild demonstrations, it's surmised that the regulatory violations were overlooked by the leadership. On a more local supervisory level, the pilot of 087 advised the alert detachment SOF of his plan for the flyby post-departure. This was done more as a courtesy to the SOF, as the local alert-det SOF really wasn't in charge of the home-station based pilot of 087, and was only responsible for the alert detachment based jets themselves. As there had been no prior problems with flybys such as this one, the more experienced SOF, both rank-wise as well as quaifications-wise, saw no issue with its performance or execution, and joined the maintenance folks and pilots of the alert det on the ramp to witness it.

 

Execution of the flyby: If these high-speed low-pass flybys and other aerial demonstrations had become routine by pilots of the 21st TFW, why had this one suffered the tragic ending it did on this day? Investigation of the wreckage of 74-0087 revealed a very minor preflight oversight, one that during any routine operations wouldn't have likely been noticed, but with a non-routine maneuver such that was being performed today, this one item would make the difference between success and failure. Proper operation of this system, known as the Overload Warning System (OWS), combined with how this system is commonly used by F-15 pilots, is key.

 

OWS System Operation: In the F-15 Eagle, there is a system known as the Overload Warning System (OWS). The OWS is a system that takes inputs from various sources on the aircraft and determines, based off of aircraft weight/configuration, when to set off a warning tone in the pilot's helmet that tells the pilot he's approaching a G-overload condition. One of the places the OWS gets information from is the Armament Control Panel (ACP). In the A-model F-15, the aircraft cannot automatically sense what is physically hanging off of the aircraft or attached to the underwing hardpoints. The only way the aircraft knows what it has onboard is by what the pilot manually sets into the ACP based on each weapons station. It was discovered that post-accident, the pilot of 087 had set his ACP incorrectly. The missiles onboard were properly set into the ACP, but the three 600 gallon external drop tanks, one under each wing, were not. This caused the OWS to have a mismatch, as it was being told by the fuel totalizer that there was far more fuel onboard than what the ACP was showing the aircraft was capable of. More than likely, this would've caused the OWS to shut down, with no warning that it was shut down. It's assumed that this incorrect ACP setting was the same way prior to the first launch at Elmendorf AFB, but there was no maneuvering having been performed during the first sortie where the incorrect setting would've been noticed and corrected. It wasn't until after takeoff on the second sortie, and where the pilot operation of the OWS system comes into play, where there would be the tiny window of opportunity to catch this minor error, it having already been missed on the ground.

 

Pilot use of the OWS: One of the big factors remaining, following the pilot of 087 missing the incorrect setting of the ACP, was how pilots utilize the OWS system. Generally speaking, and with the correct settings, the OWS will provide aural warning tones of an approaching G-overload. While there is also a G-meter in the cockpit, the nature of what air-air aircraft do and their mission, in the times where the pilot will be pulling high Gs, he will likely be heads outside the cockpit, such as in a dogfight. As such, the pilot doesn't have the time or luxury to go inside the cockpit to check the G-meter, even for a second. Consequently, the pilot generally relies on hearing the OWS tones to tell him of impending G-overloads, thus allowing him to manage the aircraft appropriately in order to maintain or reduce Gs, without over-G-ing the aircraft and damaging it. In the case of 087, the pilot was very likely waiting for the OWS tones to sound during his initial abrupt pull-up, and would manage the G-loading from there. With the mismatch in the OWS due to the improper ACP setting and subsequent shutdown of the OWS system, the pilot was listening for warning tones that would never come. At best, he would've had a possible second or so to check the G-meter were he heads-inside the cockpit, but more than likely he was not. With no warning of the rapid G onset and approach to structural overload, the point of no return had been reached, and there was no turning back.

 

MikeDs Final Thoughts: Regulations aside in this accident, when one desires to undertake non-routine operations such that were taken here, or operations that have become routine but aren't often practiced, one has to take great care that they take the time to properly plan and execute. In this accident, a fairly simple endeavor had fatal consequences due to a very minor oversight that had very major implications. In these situations, it's imperitive to insure that the time is taken to use experience, procedures, and your Situational Awareness (SA) bag of tricks to give every chance for a successful outcome. And remember, slower is always faster in these situations, in terms of giving yourself time to catch little problems before they become big ones. If you don't have the time to do that, then reconsider performing the operation at all. When non-routine operations start getting even the smallest degree of overlooked items or even complacency, that's when Mr Murphy begins looking for ways to make himself your uninvited guest to your party. Don't make the job easy for him. Routine Ops shouldn't have to become Not So Routine.

 

 

MikeD

 

 

The above is not intended to be an undue criticism of the person or persons involved in the incident described. Instead, the analysis presented is intended to further the cause of flight safety and help to reduce accidents and incidents by educating pilots through the sacrifices of others in our profession.

 

[JunMcKill]

Above the line is not structural limit. Limit is 9G as shown on graph. Line represents max sustained G in a turn, in other words above that, aircraft will lose energy in the turn.

 

Ok I dont get it? the graph say STRUCTURAL LIMIT, and you say that above the line in not structural limit, come on!

[JunMcKill]

What I am saying is that you are misinterpreting the charts.

 

This is a sustained g chart, it's capability, not g limit. You can reach much higher g's (eg. 9g) with instantaneous turns with no damage whatsoever. You just won't be able to maintain your speed.

 

This chart is all about 'I can maintain this g at this speed'. If you turn harder, your speed will decrease.

 

Again, it is not a structural tolerance chart. :)

 

If I design a simulator usually base the design using the sustained charts (what is given to pilots to learn their aircraft and the technical info of it), not what a pilot told me o whatever, can you post any chart with the data you're talking about? any credible source as I did?. In this case the conversation is over, as usual ED do what they want to keep the F-15 above.

 

As I told you is ok that the airctaft can reach above 9Gs, but the time that you pull above the structural limit should be considered during the flight of this plane until the player change the aircraft or crash, I leave you a part of a interview with Mark Williams in DESERT STORM campaign:

 

 

Source: F-15 Eagle Engaged

Edited May 20, 2016 by JunMcKill

[GGTharos]

I'm confused because I'm not sure what you're getting at. Do you actually understand what the sustained chart is?

 

It describes the aircraft's ability to hold g without losing airspeed. It doesn't describe structural limits - the 9g 'structural limit' line is the safe maneuver limit, much like the limits you see in the flanker manual are the safe maneuver limits which can be exceeded, sometimes safely, sometimes not.

What that manual shows you is that you can reach and exceed the structural limit without losing airspeed under specific conditions.

You can also reach the limit at all other airspeeds and altitudes (as long as the given airspeed allows you to reach that much g), but you will not be able to maintain that airspeed and thus you will not be able to maintain that g.

 

PS: As for your quote, yeah, he flashed 12g and so what? His aircraft was returned to service AFAIK. The 1985 incident was 12.5g for over 5 seconds; that airframe was warped and not returned to service. This was for a ~42000lbs jet flying between 2000' and 10000' (This happened over the sea) and in the transonic area (550-650KIAS) - the most restrictive flight regime by OWS.

 

If I design a simulator usually base the design using the sustained charts (what is given to pilots to learn their aircraft and the technical info of it), not what a pilot told me o whatever, can you post any chart with the data you're talking about? any credible source as I did?. In this case the conversation is over, as usual ED do what they want to keep the F-15 above.

Edited May 20, 2016 by GGTharos

[JunMcKill]

I'm confused because I'm not sure what you're getting at. Do you actually understand what the sustained chart is?

 

It describes the aircraft's ability to hold g without losing airspeed. It doesn't describe structural limits - the 9g 'structural limit' line is the safe maneuver limit, much like the limits you see in the flanker manual are the safe maneuver limits which can be exceeded, sometimes safely, sometimes not.

What that manual shows you is that you can reach and exceed the structural limit without losing airspeed under specific conditions.

You can also reach the limit at all other airspeeds and altitudes (as long as the given airspeed allows you to reach that much g), but you will not be able to maintain that airspeed and thus you will not be able to maintain that g.

 

PS: As for your quote, yeah, he flashed 12g and so what? His aircraft was returned to service AFAIK. The 1985 incident was 12.5g for over 5 seconds; that airframe was warped and not returned to service. This was for a ~42000lbs jet flying between 2000' and 10000' (This happened over the sea) and in the transonic area (550-650KIAS) - the most restrictive flight regime by OWS.

 

Ok I get it, post please the structural limt chart, if you can

[SinusoidDelta]

There is no structural limit chart per say. An aircraft is developed and engineered to be operated within a guaranteed envelope. Once outside of that envelope there is no longer a guarantee.

[Bushmanni]

Here's a page showing the OWS limits.

[SinusoidDelta]

That's from the older -1. Here's the latest and greatest (available to John Q Public at least)

[JunMcKill]

That's from the older -1. Here's the latest and greatest (available to John Q Public at least)

 

 

Thanks, for what I see in your graph, never exceed the 9G limit, it's right? warning than some external config are more restrictive, and in the case of F-15C/D with the use of external tanks, could me more!

 

This graph do not contradict the one posted by me before, only complements and is very easy to read the allowances of load vs Gs and speed at different high levels. But always they place a safe limit of 9Gs.

 

Now what is the aircraft weight 100% fuel with CFT and 6 x AIM-120C and 2 x AIM-9? with that number you should analize in the graph and find the proper load factor.

Edited May 20, 2016 by JunMcKill

[Sierra99]

Cant make out the guide...

 

Enter at Mach number, across to altitude, down to gross weight, left to G limit? It would be nice if someone with access to a Dash 1 limitations section could quote exactly what it says regarding G limits, duration etc. And what G limits require what inspections.

Edited May 20, 2016 by Sierra99

[GGTharos]

The -1 just says (IIRC) that if the system records an over-g you have to do an inspection; the type of inspection depends on component, time, etc.

 

The actual design limits aren't listed, except for the 9g limit, and the 'safe OWS inop' limits. The OWS programming isn't absolute limits either.

[JunMcKill]

This is the second part of the chart (CFT/AIRCRAFT INTERFACE), there are a lot of chart with different configurations, but what usually people do is to dogfight from sea level to 10,000 feet, with full ordnance and center tank, which (looking the charts) is the most restrictive scenario in Gs and speed

 

Edited May 20, 2016 by JunMcKill

[GGTharos]

That won't apply at all though because we don't have CFTs.

 

Anyway, the following basic weights should be useful:

 

F-15C with full payload of missiles and fuel: ~ 45000lbs

F-15C as above plus one bag: ~50000lbs

F-15C with two bags: ~55000lbs

[mvsgas]

Are we still talking about the SU-27?

I'm not sure how the Technical Orders (T.O.) on the F-15 work, but in comparison on the F-16, in order to know all the limitations you need 5 books. 1F-16()-1 Flight manual, 1F-16()-1-1 Supplement to flight manual referring to limitations , 1F-16()-1-2 Supplement to flight manual referring to limitations of the stores/weapons, 1F-16()-34-1-1 Nonnuclear Munitions Delivery and the 1F-16()-34-1-1-1 Supplemental data. The last two basically tell you how to use the systems and their limitations.

 

Cant make out the guide...

 

Enter at Mach number, across to altitude, down to gross weight, left to G limit? It would be nice if someone with access to a Dash 1 limitations section could quote exactly what it says regarding G limits, duration etc. And what G limits require what inspections.

 

Sierra;

I never get this charts neither, but AFAIK, the limitations would be written like this in the aircraft Technical Orders. They would not write any specific numbers, so I don't think there would a a exact number like you mention. Using the guide on the top right, I think you enter the mach; example 1.4 and follow it to the right to the altitude lets go with 20k, you straight down from there to your weight, we can say 55k lbs and looks like we should only do around 5 or 6g.

Edited May 21, 2016 by mvsgas

[Chrinik]

IF I read this chart correctly, I see just over 6 G at Sealevel at 0.9 M at 55.000 lbs...

 

That is IF I even interpret the chart correctly. The Eagle boys will be quick to remind me this is just for a "warning system" and of course you can break the safe limits all the time no Problem.

[Bushmanni]

Does anyone know why you can get less G at 20k vs. at sea level or at 40k? I'm suspecting it has to do with buffeting ie. you need to pull more AoA to get to the limiting G at higher altitudes hence more buffeting but at high altitudes air is so thin that buffeting isn't a problem anymore.

[Ironhand]

Does anyone know why you can get less G at 20k vs. at sea level or at 40k? I'm suspecting it has to do with buffeting ie. you need to pull more AoA to get to the limiting G at higher altitudes hence more buffeting but at high altitudes air is so thin that buffeting isn't a problem anymore.

Perhaps I'm misunderstanding the question but since the higher you go, the lower the true airspeed the Mach number represents, you have to go faster at higher altitudes to have the same available Gs.

[GGTharos]

Does anyone know why you can get less G at 20k vs. at sea level or at 40k? I'm suspecting it has to do with buffeting ie. you need to pull more AoA to get to the limiting G at higher altitudes hence more buffeting but at high altitudes air is so thin that buffeting isn't a problem anymore.

I was told that the OWS programming represents certain types of risks, but there was no other explanation. 9g turns 20000 are almost guaranteed to happen with an eagle AFAIK with respect to what I know of the training.