Kalasnkova74

As I understand, the AIM-9E was just an AIM-9B with a different seeker and wider field of view. So for Southeast Asia scenarios, one need only substitute the AIM-9B.

I imagine they’ll post the revised sound files once the bugs are sorted. Hopefully, they’ll also add showing the J-79 engine sound fading when the plane goes beyond Mach 1 and fading back into the background when the jet slows down (as demonstrated when this F-104 decelerated from Mach).

In addition to Zabuzard’s post, I recommend doing some personal scholarship on the AIM-7. The AIM-7 is a rocket powered mini-aircraft designed in the 1950s , and must be treated as such to be launched effectively. Unlike modern missiles which tell you their kill parameters on the HUD and other computer systems, the pilot and WSO must mentally understand the Sparrows hit capability , dynamically apply that in the air, and know when to shoot and not shoot. First, nose/tail settings must be applied so the missile knows it’s engaging a tail-chase vs a head on target. You can still get a hit if you don’t do this, but it’ll be much lower probability. Next, relative size of the target must be considered. If you’re engaging a TU-95 or B-52, you can launch further away than engaging a MiG-21 or MiG-15. The smaller the target, the lower your realistic engagement range and thus the lower probability of a successful Sparrow kill. Consider the time to launch as well. Five miles goes by QUICK at combat speeds. You may not have enough time to set the borseight mode, lock the target , wait four seconds to ensure the missile guidance data is downloaded and the antenna cued, then wait another 1.5 seconds from trigger pull to missile clearance and launch. Note the AIM-7 has to roll when launched from the F-4E before it can maneuver, so it won’t behave like an AIM-120 that maneuvers nearly off the rail. When using the Sparrow, I mentally budget six seconds for the launch cycle. If it looks like I can’t complete a firing cycle within that time, I pinky switch to a different weapon.

In line with the change log entry about the engine sounds being reverted- I noticed in the above video that as the F-104 slows to subsonic (approximately 30 seconds in), the J-79 howl/engine noise fades back into the cockpit. Which makes sense, seeing as the engine’s behind the pilot and thus you’d be outrunning the engine’s noise. Given the F-4Es similar engine placement- as in far behind the pilot/WSO/RIO seats - shouldn’t the J-79 engine sound fade down above the Mach also for the Phantom II? Figured since the sounds were being reviewed anyway I’d point this out. OFC, if the SMEs say it never did this in real life please disregard.

AI bias or not, it is worth pointing out that the MiG-21 in game is very different from the ones the U.S. faced in Southeast Asia. US forces initially faced the MiG-17 and MiG-21F-13, neither of which could fight the F-4 Phantom II in the vertical unless the Soviet fighters engaged with an energy advantage. Thus, the tactical advice to engage using “the egg” & leveraging the F-4s climb performance advantage. Unlike those earlier MiGs, the BiS in game has the T/W to compete with the F-4E in the vertical(as does the MiG-19).

Truth is , the tanker implementation in DCS (boom or probe/drogue) needs an overhaul irrespective of the F-4E & Jester’s vocabulary. Of course the fella’s behind the aircraft - can’t help it when the KC-135s dancing like John Travolta after connection.

USAF pilot Theodore “Gabby” Drake in an interview with 10 Percent True host Steve Davies explained it thus. First, at low airspeeds you’ll still want to roll with rudder (slats notwithstanding)for optimum maneuvering . While you won’t adverse yaw rolling with the stick alone at low airspeeds, using full rudder can help with roll authority. The roll augmentation (aka ‘Roll Aug’ ) logic inhibits this because the control logic counters the rudder movement you’re using to roll the aircraft. Disabling it enables full rudder assisted roll capability, which is useful depending on your maneuvering plans (and necessary if you intend to depart the aircraft in BFM). That said, if you want to fight “conservative” BFM (meaning large , classic vertical turns and no aggressive close -in maneuvering ) , you can pretend this switch doesn’t exist and lose nothing doing so. Incidentally, I personally disable the Roll Aug when landing to enable fine adjustments with the rudder on final approach.

Personal choice, I ignore the tanker lights and let Jester’s guidance keep me on track. Works well enough to tank on, and I don’t have to mess with the seat height.

If I recall my print sources, the APQ-120 MiG-21 detection range is about 21 miles head on without any jamming. Even without ECM, a head on radar lock is a brief event as you’ll be merged very quickly afterwards.

One point to note- I dont consider it prudent to equate the performance of an F-4E with slats locked in to that of a USN / Royal Navy/ USAF F-4C/D. First, the -E differs from those variants in overall configuration, which in turn affects nose authority and other handling traits. The addition of an approximately 1,000lb cannon & accessories in the nose , plus the additional fuel tank in the tail, means the -E handles differently even without taking the wing into account. Next, the drag and lift characteristics of the non-slat wing differ from the slatted one beyond just the obvious adverse yaw aspects. Between the different nose authority and higher drag of the slatted wing- even with the slats stowed- we cannot collectively assume they handle the same. While we probably shouldn’t assume a Naval & land based slatted Phantom II handle the same, we can still conclude using the rudder is a good skill to have. If there’s a slats disagree situation or battle damage inhibiting operation, you might be landing without the benefit of the slats - so you’re right back to flying the F-4E like it’s a big F-100.

While I personally like the previous engine sounds too, the goal should be accuracy of presentation. If the real F-4E sounded “quiet” in the cockpit (remember the J-79s are more than 20ft behind the seats) , then regardless of preference that’s what the sound should reflect.

I’m in the camp who likes Jester as is and looks forward to some of the performance enhancements down the road. The modules only been around four months. If he’s not doing something right, it is probably a sign us nose gunners need to do some homework to fix matters. Further, Jester’s another incentive for me to fly “civilized”, because its his virtual backside on the line too if I screw up.

That’s a rational sentiment, but the fact is given HBs commitments it’ll realistically be years before the Naval F-4 is ready for release. It’s a bad deal for the Navy fans to see us land based Phantom Phans have all the fun, and if a harmless mod/script can enable carrier landing of the F-4E until that variant is released, so much the better. HB probably doesn’t have capacity for that, but modders do.

Good catch. For clarification: the 35 mil setting is used to manually align the reticle with the radar antenna for a boresight lock. For an immediately available online source consult this website, but the 35 mil guidance matches print sources on employing the boresight mode IRL. https://flyandwire.com/2024/05/27/f-4e-boresight-mode-aim-7-and-speedgates/ I suspect that guidance predates the F-4D/E implementation of a RBL caged/ non-manual sight. For our F-4E one need only flip the switch to “caged” to get the sight where it needs to be. Another great example of why we need to do our homework.

My two cents- all of us, myself included, need to really hit the books (digital or otherwise) on employing the AIM-7 before immediately blaming Jester or the aircraft implementation when things go wrong. First, the reticle needs to be set to A/A or the “CAGE” option mils adjusted to 35.(disregard mils setting - this is for previous iterations of the F-4). Otherwise your reticle will not be aligned with the boresight radar beam and Jester will (probably) be locking thin air. Next, the Sparrow’s minimum and maximum range varies based on engagement altitude. At 40k ft a Sparrow’s max range against a 2 square meter target is 20 NM- but if the target is even 5000 ft higher, the engagement range is cut by 1/4th of a mile. Closure rate with the bandit must also be taken into account - because at high fractions of Mach you’ll cover a lot of distance in the five seconds the missile needs to tune, and 20 miles goes by VERY fast at head on closure speeds. Unless your control mapping is next level fast, you’ll be inside minimum engagement range before the missile is ready- and the interlock, if engaged, will not enable AIM-7 launch. Even if you successfully fired at this point because you disabled the interlock , the closure rate will cause the bandit to close inside of arming range of the in flight weapon anyway. So your AIM-7 isn’t going to detonate. Next , you can wave hello at the bandits front quarter IR/radar missile…. Note also that F-4Es pulse radar means aircraft with small frontal RCS like an F-104, F-105 or MiG-21 will have even smaller effective engagement ranges than the missile can kinematically achieve. Which is one reason why APX-80/Combat Tree was a game changer, since an equipped F-4 could track and engage a MiG-21 beyond the APQ-120s ability to capably detect in certain parameters. Ergo, without that system head on shots will be impractical to achieve because the realistic lock-on range is too small to permit full completion of the lock on- telemetry download & missile prep- launch -guidance firing cycle. Larger RCS targets like a MiG-25, Tupolev bomber, etc will be easier to engage. Understand, what I’ve shared so far merely scratches the surface of what one should know about the APQ-120/AIM-7 employment. If a modern radar & AIM-120 combination is a brand new Formula 1 race car, the F-4E is a 1960s Ferrari P-1. A modern F-1 driver can’t just hop in a vintage P-1 and win races immediately. To be effective, much like that F-1 driver we Phantom Flyers must gain a new discipline of education in understanding the Sparrow and radar. Our Phantom’s don’t work remotely the same as calling up a HUD icon and launching a pitbull AMRAAM, and Jester is NOT a magic “lock up the bandit” resource.

Which is why the J makes the most sense, to me personally. The -B isn’t a sitting duck, but the J features the same technology reach as the published -E variants. An F-4B disqualifies Naval fans from using their aircraft competitively in late 70s / early 80s scenarios. A -J can be kitted out for Rolling Thunder by just equipping the early missiles, or loaded up with later all aspect Sidewinders and better Sparrows for post-Vietnam scenarios.

HB hasn’t said, but I earnestly hope they don’t pick the -B and opt for the -J. To understand why, fly the F-4E with AIM-9Bs / AIM-7Es….and then turn off the slats. Most players won’t enjoy paying money for that experience.

Im not surprised. My computer features a mere 16GB RAM & a not-leading edge NViDIA card. Runs the F-4E just fine. As with the airplanes themselves , technology is no guarantee of good results in the field.

Yes. You ditch the HDD for the SSD. There are some optimizations that can be made, but none will overcome the inherent hardware limitations of an HDD vs SSD.

…hello scope creep. This sort of thing is why HB announced they weren’t making one-off Phantom II variants like the Israeli Kurnass, Hellenic AUP, Turkish Terminator and so on. Insofar as campaigns go, remember that HB will release a USN Phantom II down the line. That’ll address many scenarios involving the USN AIM-9D/G etc series.

The AIM-4 is probably one of the most misunderstood weapons systems in American Cold War history. First, a primer. The AIM-4 was built to solve a specific problem, which was NOT shooting down enemy fighters. That was considered an obsolete task in 1948, when the prevailing mindset of USAF leadership was that WWIII against the Soviets was just around the corner. After all, every two decades since 1914 we’d fought a cataclysmic global war, so it stood to reason we’d nuke ourselves into oblivion before 1970. Rather the AIM-4s job was to shoot down high flying Soviet nuclear bombers in head on interceptions. To assist with that, the AIM-4 had a hit to kill fuse. A subject of great lambasting later when it was misused in Vietnam (more on that later), the hit to kill fuse is a mission critical feature if you’re trying to take down a huge 4-engine Tu-95 or similar. A proximity fuse isn’t what you want against a resilient aircraft like that, and remember…WWIII. One damaged bomber making it through equals multiple cities getting nuked. So the missile should hit, bury itself into the Soviet bomber’s fuselage and THEN detonate, maximizing damage. To ensure the missile got there in the first place, Hughes- the builder of the AIM-4- also produced a fairly user friendly (for the time) guidance system to go with it. The Falcon worked like an AIM-54/AWG-9 (which was made by the same firm much later). The missile was part of a symbiotic guidance system, one where the Hughes guidance system (such as the MG-13) would track, lock, and manage firing functions automatically. All the pilot or pilot/weapons officer needed was to maneuver the interceptor to an ideal launch position (speed/altitude/ etc) , lock the target no closer than six miles , and the Hughes fire control computer managed the rest. The pilot gave launch consent for the AIM-4- after that the Hughes system triggered the IR seeker activation, queued the missile coolant, extended the missile from the launch bay and fired the Falcon to ensure highest probability of kill. When employed as designed using a Hughes semi-automated fire control system against high altitude targets , the Falcon was capably accurate. Bruce Gordon cites instances when F-106s would knock down BOMARC target SAMs using the Falcon, and it even acquired high off boresight IR missile capabilities (a first for the USAF before the AIM-9L) when the ADC F-101Bs and F-106s were updated later. So why did the sugar turn to manure? It was a Pentagon dispute over the USAFs next IR missile. After being compelled to buy the capable US Navy F-4B more or less as-is by Robert McNamara, the USAF System Command Generals were forced to accept using the U.S. Navy’s AIM-9B at first. Bad enough they had to adopt a NAVY aircraft, but they weren’t about to keep using the Navy’s missiles. They had some things to say about the next generation of Sidewinder missile. Things the USN didn’t care for, and negotiations for a new Sidewinder variant shared between the branches collapsed . (Incidentally, this is one reason why Cold War era USAF Sidewinders are not compatible with their Navy contemporaries.) So spurned, the USAF System Command generals told the Navy they could take their AIM-9 and shove it. They had a solution in mind- just take the USAF Falcon and lobotomize it onto the F-4D Phantom II. An IR missile is an IR missile, right? There was one problem- the F-4 wasn’t built to accommodate the Hughes guidance systems fitted to the Voodoos, Delta Darts and Delta Daggers. Adding the 50s era mechanical computer to the F-4D would be ruinously expensive , they’d lose AIM-7 capability and would take years to complete - and Vietnam was raging. So all the steps the Hughes computer managed so well in the Air Defense Command aircraft needed to be done manually in the F-4. Switchology was kludged up, the IR seeker had to be manually activated, the coolant manually triggered 90 seconds before anticipated launch (not a problem against a bomber flying a predictable course and heading , but nearly impossible in a dynamic dogfight), and making matters worse the damn thing was carried externally. The AIM-4 was designed in an era when engines didn’t have a lot of thrust and drag was the enemy , so they were built to be carried internally until just before launch. External carriage of the weapon meant the seeker was crazed to uselessness by the environment , and the Southeast Asian humidity didn’t help. The Falcon , designed to be launched with a guidance computer against non maneuvering bombers at high altitude, was deployed to Vietnam attached to a plane it wasn’t designed for, launched in a Rube Goldberg scheme nearly impossible to do manually in combat, at low altitude in an environment it was never tested in, against maneuvering fighter sized targets at low altitude in a regime completely outside its design requirements - and with a hit to kill warhead design meant to knock down Tupolev bombers, not Mikoyan light fighters. The fact five MiGs were shot down at all with a weapon completely unstable for that mission is a remarkable testament to the 8th TFW’s level of skill. Naturally, the USAF System Commands turf war permanently damaged the reputation of the AIM-4 as a tactical dogfighting combat weapon system. A regime it was never built for. The AIM-4- used as directed on the manufacturer label - was nonetheless successful as a high altitude interceptor weapon. One wouldn’t want to use it to shoot down a MiG-17, but then Ferraris are terrible cars to tow with. What should have happened in the 1960s? The USAF System Command people should have swallowed their pride, ordered the Navy’s follow on Sidewinder and had done with it. Put the Navys AIM-9D on USAF Phantoms , Thuds and Huns and we’d have a much better outcome.

According to Shlomo Aloni’s research, the F-4E crews typically jettisoned TERs/ Centerline rails + external tanks via the “panic button” before engaging MiGs. I’m curious to see what the WSOs have to say.

Not if you consider Israeli Air Force doctrine circa 1973. The F-4E Kurnass was tasked mainly with interdiction bombing- unfortunately, many of the Kurnass pilots wanted MiG kills and some left the attack formation to do so in early Yom Kippur operations. That decision scored some MiG kills, but the dogfighting jets threatened the integrity of the flights coming off target -forcing one damaged Phantom II to limp home alone in hostile territory . The squadron commander cracked down and made it clear any pilot who did that again would lose their wings. Since no MiG engagements were expected until the Israeli F-4s came off target, the configuration makes sense.

User HammerUK9 posted this table of refueling speeds:

“I don’t get the impression that these missions are supposed to be quite this difficult!” I mean no e-snark by this, but I think you need more experience with the F-4E before tackling a complex mission like this. It takes months of 8+ hour daily academics and flight training for real-life tactical pilots to learn the basics of aircraft this capable. Even at that rate, someone who practiced this module since Launch Day might be skilled enough to play a tough campaign and manage. Anyone who’s got other responsibilities in their lives -besides playing this game -will simply not be experienced enough to prevail. Few could with just 3 months of experience. Theres a reason real life USAF squadrons almost never send inexperienced LTs to Red Flag. Same goes for wartime deployments- people with years of experience get to go overseas, and folks new to the business got to stay home and miss the war. There’s no rushing the experience tax, and you gotta pay it to git gud enough to win at the more detailed campaigns.