horseback

My 2 cents: The Wildcat, like the P-40, is 'not very maneuverable' only in comparison to the Zero and the Oscar (Ki-43); they easily out turned and out rolled most of the rest of their contemporaries, and in the case of the Japanese fighters, out dove them and at higher speeds were much more controllable. In the Wildcat's case, the small community of USN pilots quickly learned to use their better radios to obtain closer teamwork and were frankly better pilots than their Japanese counterparts--by the middle of the Solomons Campaign, USN/USMC F4F pilots were scoring better than one for one against the Zeros flown by best the IJN had (and usually beating the bombers they were escorting into mush). USN pilots were the only ones in WWII besides the Finns who were trained in deflection shooting, and they quickly learned to use those skills against the Japanese who flew beautiful (predictable) aerobatics in combat. And they were doing it in the F4F-4 model, the one 'castrated' to please British combat requirements (six fifties with less total rounds and firing time than the previous 4 X.50 armament of the -3, plus the extra weight of the folding wings useless on a land base). The Dash Seven model, that was built by GM as the FM-2, was a lightened model with a stronger engine, wider Hamilton Standard props instead of the less reliable Curtiss Electric prop and the ability to carry rockets, bombs and drop tanks. Best source for the Wildcat's combat history is Barrett Tillman's excellent The Wildcat in WWII, closely followed by The First Team, Vols I & II, by John Lundstrum. It is almost impossible to simulate the combat between early Japanese fighters and the pre-1944 USN online; virtual fighter pilots in Zeros are not going to give up decent comms or proven superior tactics over the Japanese realities of WWII and sim developers have not gotten around to modeling the relative fragility of the early Japanese fighters--or the effectiveness of the M2 .50 HMG. Also, nobody can simulate the mutual ignorance of the combatants regarding each other's aircraft.

This complaint was common 18 years back on the original Il-2 forums. The Ju-88's defensive guns had a high firing rate, but a small ammo supply contained in, I believe, round magazines. Short bursts were necessary to conserve ammo and keep from burning out the barrels. Also, defensive gunners in WWII bombers on all sides were notoriously inaccurate; the gunner in this case is standing in a crowded cockpit, in an aircraft that is bouncing and wobbling its way through the air from air currents/enemy flak/aircraft fire, and shooting at a teeny-tiny target several hundred meters away (not to mention that most of them were scared out of their skins). The farther off-angle your target is, the more complicated your firing solution, pretty much the opposite of the pilot in an attacking fighter. However, the realism of defensive gunners is apparently not very high on the devs' list right now, and that's why we get what we get. Bear in mind that the squeaky wheel gets the grease, and be a pest until they get around to your wheel.

There was no North American 'east coast' plant; the home plant was in the Los Angeles metro area and the newer satellite plant was in the Dallas/Ft Worth area (which technically, could be east coast if you accept that the east coast of the US begins at the mouth of the Rio Grande). Lockheed, North American and Convair (Liberators, PBYs) had their home offices and manufacturing facilities in Southern California when the war began and expanded from there. Also note that in the case of several of the changes you list, frontline groups in the ETO and Med would receive kits to upgrade their existing aircraft well ahead of the actual new block number's delivery in-theater, which explains the number of photos of razorback B/C Mustangs with that fin fillet added for the D10, and the mid-fuselage fuel tanks on the early examples in England before the 'whole' aircraft with the upgrades could have arrived at Liverpool. cheers horseback

Less efficient cooling system, as I understand it;the Mustang uses One Big Radiator that, if not adding thrust, doesn't subtract as much drag (Meredith Effect or something, they say; I try to avoid people who still know how to operate a slide rule). The Spit Mks VII-VIII-IX-XI & XVI had to split their radiators and share some of the space with another air-sucking Widget; you'll note that MkXIVs and postwar marks had significantly deeper radiators under their wings, probably more than accounting for the difference between the Merlin and Griffon engines' cooling requirements. A little overkill is not an entirely bad thing when you're trying to cool a high performance engine, as anyone who's taken a long (probably too fast) drive through Arizona in the summer can attest. cheers horseback

Echo, I have to disagree with you on many counts; it appears that you have some serious misconceptions about the timing and numbers as regards the P-38 in the 8th and 9th Air Forces. As noted above, the first ETO based P-38 group arrived in October 1943; that would have been about 50 aircraft and pilots who would have to go through a lot of familiarization and theater protocol training before they could begin combat missions. Late fall and winter of 1943/44 was marked by some pretty filthy weather, severely limiting flight operations over Britain and Europe for the 8th AF. The 20th FG got there just a few weeks ahead of the first Mustang group and in real terms, entered combat operations at nearly the same time because of the weather limitations. P-38s were available in dribs and drabs until almost the middle of 1944 because they were in high demand in the Pacific (where they were very successful) and North Africa where they weren't embarrassing themselves once the higher ups started using them properly, so the 20th was all alone in England with little company for a while, and given their high abort rates, rarely if ever put the whole group into the air at the same time over occupied Europe. They certainly didn't get very far east of the P-47's maximum range during that time. The P-38 was never available in the numbers needed before the Mustang and the improved range versions of the P-47 had already taken the field and dominated it. Both of these aircraft were much more easily produced in large numbers and their pilots took less time to master their potentials. Berlin was not hit by the 8th AF's bombers until the first week of March, 1944, and both Mustangs and Lightning formed the escort over Germany, with the veteran 4th FG taking the lead. The Lightning simply wasn't active in useful numbers before the Mustang groups arrived, and the Mustang groups were ready for combat more quickly once they did arrive. Initially, the P-51B/C had similar abort rates as the Lightning, but the Mustang groups solved their problems and became steadily more combat effective, while the Lightning groups continued to have problems. The Lightning over Europe had some severe issues with maintenance, pilot training and leadership. The last issue is key, because an effective leader in the mold of Hubert Zemke or Don Blakeslee would have kicked the necessary rear ends to get the maintenance issues straightened out and gotten their troops ready for combat. From my reading on the 20th FG, it seems as though their Commanding Officers lasted about two or three weeks before getting killed either in combat or in an accident. No continuity at the top meant that the mechanical issues were not addressed with any seriousness for far too long, and the poorly prepared pilots continued to fumble around. Another issue is that the Lightning groups were stationed way out in the northwestern corner of East Anglia (was it Nuthampstead?), well away from most of the other 8th AF fighter groups; they were isolated from the people who were best equipped to give them some tips and encouragement over a few beers in the Officers' Club and challenge them to do better. This sounds trite, but like it says in the Book of Proverbs "as iron sharpens iron, so one man sharpens another." Those young men needed outside competition and fellowship and instead were orphans in the ass-end of nowhere. It appears to have been one long self pity party for many of them. Ultimately, the P-38 was blamed by the Powers That Be in the 8th AF, and the Lightning groups got Mustangs instead by September of 1944 (and they prospered). It seems unfair in retrospect because the L version was arriving and it was all that the airplane should have been a year earlier. Sadly, I would say that the P-38 recon versions probably had more effect on the European war than the fighter versions. Poor availability, both in terms of new aircraft and the ability to get the ones on the field into the air, plus leadership problems, plus the isolation factor, severely limited the P-38's performance as an escort fighter over Europe. It should have been much more successful, sooner than the Mustang or Thunderbolt, but it wasn't. cheers horseback

During my six years in the USN (3 serving on a Garcia class fast frigate out of Pearl), I have heard a great many destroyers of that generation go by, if not the Fletcher class (many of the ensuing classes had essentially the same hull/propulsion as the very successful Fletchers); when you're on a ship at sea, there is a great deal of ambient noise in the form of wind, water or other liquids sloshing about, the sound of your own ship's engines (diesels are loud) and propeller wash. Moonless nights at sea are very dark (and you rarely did shore bombardments when the enemy's gunners could spot your silhouette against the lighter sky and respond effectively), so the Japanese lookouts may not have been entirely delinquent. In short, if your own ship is making way, it would be hard to hear another ship until it was right on top of you. cheers horseback

The firearms locker would normally be locked. The galley wouldn't, and given my personal experiences with the 'small arms' issued to the Navy, many of the pistols and rifles in the firearms locker would be worn-out Marine Corps rejects (and the Gunner's Mates were notorious for separating out the ones that shot straight for themselves). Potatoes would have been vastly more effective for the deck crewmen. cheers horseback

From my reading of various pilot memoirs, squadron histories and so on, it appears that guns' settings in the Army Air Forces were a bit haphazard prior to about early 1944; individual pilots may have gotten their preferences during that period when the USAAF were still trying to figure out what they were doing out there, and how best to do it. In some other units, it looks as though the convergence was standardized at the group or squadron level according to the commanding officer's preference or even at <gasp!> the manufacturer's suggested range. The timelines may be a bit tangled; what the grand poobahs in Washington decreed may have been ignored or taken some months to reach the units at the front lines once the edicts had been written up, signed off and mimeographed (copied) by the thousands. This is very similar to the RAF's experience at the beginning of the war when everything was done according to prewar theory; real life experience soon taught the survivors what worked and what didn't. Official Doctrine was soon ignored and remained so until What Actually Bloody Works became doctrine. Having said all that, the current (late war) "shotgun pattern" would be fine if the DMs were remotely realistic; until they are fixed (really fixed) there will continue to be much weeping, wailing and gnashing of teeth. cheers horseback

Actually, the P-40Ns of the 23rd FG and the 14th AF in the CBI were replaced by Allison Mustangs in early 1944, by both the A-36 and the P-51A versions. Because they had the same flawed sideways gun installation as the B/C models, they underperformed at first. The Japanese fighters were always extremely elusive targets, and attacks on them usually required a wing-flexing turn or roll, so the guns jammed quite frequently, leading to much cursing and discontent (because the Mustang gave the CBI fighters more opportunity to find the enemy with its greater range, it must have been enormously frustrating to get a good target and not have your guns fire). This changed radically when the fix that the 354th FG in England developed in that spring made its way around the world a just few weeks before the D model arrived in September (I think; might have been a bit later). However, the P-40 was still in wide use throughout the Pacific, and the P-51A, provided in large numbers would have been a huge improvement over the P-40, especially in terms of range. I would expect that with wider use, the guns fix would have been made much sooner and spread faster. cheers horseback

Contemporary accounts say that after entering a dive, the Jug reached maximum speed sooner, and that the Mustang in practice would never quite catch up. Of course, in combat, you might be willing to push it to the limits and beyond. However, both were considered significantly better than the (combustion engine powered) opposition and other Allied fighter types in this regard (possibly excepting the Tempest). cheers horseback

I would disagree with you here; the P-322 was a piece of crap, an evolutionary dead end (and thoroughly unnecessary). The Allison Mustang is only forgettable in the sense that it was discontinued so that North American could concentrate on building the Packard Merlin versions--had the Mustang not gotten the Merlin, the Allison Mustangs would have entirely replaced the P-40 everywhere by the beginning of 1944, and the Warhawk would have been 'forgettable'. By all accounts, the Allison Mustang was a joy to fly and had spectacular performance up to about 15,000 ft. It was considered more tractable than the Merlin Mustang not least because the P-51B/C/D/K were basically using an airframe better suited to the lesser power and torque of the Allison (the late D fin fillet was applied to a lot of B & C models--can you guess why?). The Merlin Mustang was not unlike the Spit IX using Mk V frames with the plumbing and prop necessary to attach a 60-series Merlin, but slightly less successful. The Mustang design didn't fully catch up with its engine power from the Allison powered 'A' model until the 'H' model juuust after the war ended. If the British Aircraft Purchasing Commission had asked Dutch Kindelberger to build that fighter with a Merlin from the start (even a 40 series), it would have been vastly more refined and even easier to fly. But I do agree with you about the P-38L. cheers horseback

First; I'm kind of old. Second, I've been a huge --I don't think fan is quite the right word, but I've been fascinated with WWII aviation since I was about seven, when my US Air Force dad was transferred to Anglia Control, a radar station sited just outside the gates of RAF Wattisham in East Anglia. They'd just finished the twentieth anniversary celebration of the Battle of Britain and there was an absolute wealth of material for a lad who'd just learned to read. From that, it sort of snowballed. Models, just as Monogram started releasing more realistic scale replicas instead of toys (including the 1/48 scale P-38L/M of song and legend), and then I found 1000 Destroyed: The Life and Times of the Fourth Fighter Group in my high school library. At this point, it became an addiction, and if I could've passed a flight physical when I was 17, I would have gone to Colorado Springs and gotten my wings and maybe eventually driven Eagles or Falcons (or a smoking hole in the ground somewhere). So now, at 63 I have an extensive collection of books & aviation paraphernalia, including some very authoritative volumes on the Lightning and other WWII fighters, all of which have been read & re-read over the years. I just finished re-reading America's Hundred Thousand by Francis Dean, which is an exhaustive survey of the major US fighter types of the war and a priceless resource when comparing them to each other (including the P-38 series). So, much of my data was refreshed just as this thread started. If DCS does produce a P-38L, it might be much more competitive than you think; the L model fixed most of the flaws in the earlier models and given that much of the festivities online take place below 25K feet, the Lightning in the hands of a dedicated pilot should shine. It has easily the best climb and acceleration of all US fighters, no, repeat, NO torque (ergo a very forgiving stall), unGodly firepower in the nose, and a sustained turn that shocked both the Germans and the less skilled Japanese pilots who didn't take their aircraft to the ragged edge. No performance loss from sea level to 30,000 ft due to the turbosupercharger, and with the boosted ailerons, reasonably good roll at higher speeds. A simulator pilot won't have to contend with the uncomfortable cockpit or poor ergonomics, so all he has to do is figure out what he can do with the Lightning that the opposition can't or shouldn't do. Plus it has that awesome 1930s sci-fi look. cheers horseback

The RAF were the ones who requested that the engines both turn in the same direction for logistical reasons; the French order was based on the numbers achieved by the original XP-38 before the Army wrecked it, but their aircraft weren't going to be delivered before 1942 in any case, unlike the Hawk 75 and 81s that were en route when France fell. AFAIK, the turbosuperchargers were simply not available in the numbers desired to foreign customers at that time, being reserved primarily for the B-17 and B-24 (both of which were supplied to the RAF pre-Pearl Harbor). Given that the AAF castrated the P-39 of its turbosupercharger at about the same time, it can be assumed that there just weren't enough to go around. Had the RAF received Lightnings with 'handed' engines, they might well have been happier with them, but they were probably looking for an excuse to back out of the contract because they felt that Lockheed had been less than ethical concerning a large contract for Hudson bombers and the Lightning Mk I initial testing was a major disappointment (not unlike the Airacobra, which Britain bought more or less sight unseen). As I recall, Lockheed overpromised their production capabilities and then with the US entering the war, things got even more complicated... Lockheed's management and the Army Air Corps' heavy-handed approach with them in the first 18 months of the (US's) war pretty much made a dog's dinner of their production and development over that period, limiting the numbers and improvements of the P-38 at a critical time. The P-322 was very much an unloved stepchild that nobody knew what to do with it, and by all accounts was not well liked by pilots or mechanics. It was an eminently forgettable airplane, so I forgot it. cheers horseback

Entering service is not quite the same thing as getting to the ETO or the Pacific in useful numbers during WWII. The first P-51B left the production lines in May or June of 1943, but the first combat mission for the type was in Nov/Dec of 1943. P-38s were also produced in the LA area (Burbank?) and had to be tested there, then dismantled, packaged and shipped via rail to an east coast port, where they were loaded onto the decks of (large) cargo ships or jeep carriers and a few weeks later would arrive at Liverpool, where after a decent interval, they would be unpacked and assembled, tested and placed in the pipeline to an active 8th or 9th AF unit. It would take between one and a half to three months to get a batch of Lightnings from California to East Anglia, where the Lightning units were mostly based. This is why the loss of the retrofit kits in May of '44 was so critical; had they been delivered on time, P-38s in the ETO would have been far more effective during the Invasion period. cheers horseback

78th FG had by far the coolest unit markings for Mustangs in the ETO. Ironically, I believe that they flew P-51s in combat for the shortest period of all 8th AF fighter units, converting from P-47s in the late fall of 1944. Undoubtedly this was to limit the jealousy of the other Mustang drivers. cheers horseback

And here we have the concept for the next great advance in computer simulation--a massage chair modified to simulate that 'seat of the pants' feel we've all been missing... cheers horseback

Below about 20,000 ft/6100m, compressability was not a factor and the P-38 (like most US built fighters) had a very good acceleration into a dive. In the Pacific, much of the aerial combat took place at lower alts and this trait was taken full advantage of by Lightning pilots. This may be where you heard this. Above that altitude, the P-38 had severe problems entering a dive until the dive brakes were installed outside the nacelles in the J/L models. This would have made it very competitive in the ETO (ignoring other issues the type suffered in that theater). Unfortunately, the conversion kits for the 8th AF Lightnings were (quite avoidably) delayed by a Spitfire pilot who mistook the C-54 delivering the kits for an FW 200 in May of 1944... cheers horseback

I have done a little research, and I have erred. According to the Wikipedia site for the Allison V-1710 engine, "(a)nother key feature of the V-1710 design was its ability to turn the output shaft clockwise or counter-clockwise by assembling the engine with the crankshaft turned end-for-end, by installing an idler gear in the drive train to the supercharger, camshafts, and accessories, installing a starter turning the proper direction, and re-arranging the ignition wiring on the right side to accommodate a changed firing order. No change to the oil pump nor coolant pump circuits was needed." My primary source for all things P-38 (Warren Bodie's masterwork) is in storage, and I was working from memory (which is somewhat flawed on occasion :music_whistling:). Mea culpa; mea maxima culpa. cheers horseback

All versions of the Lightning used counter rotating props, and there were different designations for the 'handed' V-1710 engines (for instance, V-1710-27 and V-1710-29). However, my understanding is that the gearbox was considered part of the engine, and the gearbox was where the direction of the prop spin was determined. Allison was not happy about having to make the specialized engines for the P-38 at first, because it made their overall production numbers appear lower; of course, once the Lightning established itself in the Pacific they were all too happy to take as much credit for it as they could. cheers horseback

Bong considered himself a poor shot; nobody who served with him is known to have agreed with him on that score. Those who served against him rarely had the time to form an opinion. He was just a humble guy (and a perfectionist; he thought he should make every shot). Japanese fighter aircraft designers consciously sacrificed speed and armor for acceleration and agility; they were notoriously 'active' targets, and it was rare to be able to sneak up on one and hit him 'pointblank' (their bombers were another story). To take out a Zero or Oscar before 1944, you most often had to use deflection and hit the front half of the aircraft (where the engine, pilot and fuel was). 'Snap' shooting was the norm in that theater, especially in the first two years of the Pacific war. The P-38 was unusual among American fighters in that all its armament was nose mounted; 1x20mm cannon and 4x.50" machine guns packed close together, so it could hit you very hard in a very short burst at long or short range and convergence was not as critical a factor for aiming. German and Italian pilots in the Med were very wary of entering that cone of fire regardless of what they thought of the P-38's other qualities. The P-38 was a pre-radar design, so it was designed to have excellent acceleration and climb at all altitudes due to its turbosuperchargers; it could be argued that when the United States entered the war, the P-38 was the most advanced fighter in the world--unfortunately, it was still essentially an immature design and Lockheed and the Army Air Force handled its development and manufacture very poorly, resulting in flaws that persisted throughout its wartime career (poor cockpit heating, horrendous control and instrument ergonomics, key electrical and engine components lacking redundancy or protection, among other faults). Good maintenance was unquestionably a factor for units in the ETO, but early units in the Med and the Pacific were veteran Lightning groups with good maintenance support and prewar experienced pilots who got a lot of 'spoon feeding' from Lockheed before they went overseas, unlike the 55th & 20th FGs, who came to Britain in '43 and were given support units already in theater. Compressability was a factor at high altitudes, and there were reports that it could go into compressability in level flight at extreme high alts, but it was not a factor until you were around 24,000 ft and non-existent below 20,000 ft. Finally, it was never available in the desired (or needed) numbers until the Mustang and Thunderbolt had already matched or exceeded its capabilities (and they were always available in greater numbers--and cheaper). Even so, it had tremendous range, great hitting power, excellent vertical maneuverability, a shockingly good sustained turning circle (poor roll though), and in the hands of a good pilot familiar with its quirks was a deadly opponent in any theater of the war. Oh, and that is the other thing--it took two or three times as long to master the P-38 as a Spitfire, Mustang or Thunderbolt. It was easy to fly, but it was hard to get everything out of it without a lot of flying hours in type, according to every authoritative source. Hope this helps clarify the picture. cheers horseback

I think you'll find that the point of reference for WWII American fighter pilots would be the P-40 and P-39, both of which had some serious vices, especially the later model P-40s, whose landing and taxiing qualities were at least as shall we say, 'questionable' as the Messerschmidt 109's was reputed to be. The P-40's trim characteristics were also considered quite demanding (bordering on vicious) for that era, according to most sources. Modern pilots' point of reference is usually something far more aerodynamically advanced, generally benign and most likely includes tricycle landing gear. 70 years' worth of advancement in science, engineering and technology does tend to spoil you a bit. Still, the P-51 was cutting edge for its time, and was a high performance aircraft designed to destroy other high performance aircraft. By definition, it would be assumed to need a lot of attention from its pilot. Just not quite so much as for a Warhawk or a Lightning. cheers horseback

While I applaud the effort, a simulated brew delivers no alcohol to my bloodstream or foam to be wiped from my mustache...ah, hell, I'm going to visit the fridge. cheers horseback

I've read many, many comparisons from American, British and Polish pilots who went from the Spitfire to either the P-47 or the Mustang, and they uniformly stated that 4, 6 or eight .50s were superior to the 2X20mm +4X.303 armament of the Spitfire with a 'c' wing armament: besides the destructive power of the rounds, they always were very happy about the extra firing time. Like most simulators, DCS tends to discount the effect of multiple large-ish projectiles punching holes in the (quite thin) aluminum skin, which tended to tear off in chunks at speeds over 250kph if penetrated and/or torn wider by the air pressure generated at those speeds. You could describe the effect as being much like a slow motion explosion. On most fighters, that skin was critical to the aircraft's structural support and general aerodynamic performance; big pieces torn off or flapping in the slipstream would be very bad for the pilot's morale, among other things. cheers horseback

Full D-Day stripes lasted for a fairly short period; I seem to recall that they were put on the night of June 5th (mostly by hand), and were modified to the lower belly and undersides of the wings in less than a month (probably once long-range escort missions resumed). Most of the fighters kept the underside stripes through the summer of 1944, although new issue aircraft may or may not have had them added as aircraft were lost through attrition. I believe that a general order to remove the stripes from surviving US aircraft came out around early September '44; I don't recall seeing any photos with them dated past that month. The single stripes on the wings and tailplanes were originally used as a 'distemper' marking to help differentiate the Mustang from the Bf 109; originally, the vertical tail sported one too, but it was deemed unnecessary when it seemed to cause the P-51 to look rather more like a Messerschmidt when white stripes were applied on the OD over Neutral Grey aircraft. These markings continued to be used in the ETO until early 1945, by which time distemper markings were pretty much superfluous, given the gaudy paint jobs used by most USAAF fighter groups to identify themselves. Dana Bell published some interesting volumes on USAAF marking in Europe in WWII through Squadron/Signal a few years back; they may be still available for those interested in creating authentic skins. cheers horseback