Interesting article about a F-15C maintenance tragedy

[ChrisIhao]

Hey guys. Just stumbled across this Time article, which I found to be a very engaging, sad and interesting read:

 

http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,135113,00.html

 

Didnt know quite where to put it, so please move it to the appropriate thread if needed mods.

[strikeeagle]

I remember when that happened.

[SDsc0rch]

goddam

 

geez, military prosecutors.. c'mon!

 

what assh#les

 

 

 

the military is like that - hard rudder orders applied overzealously, blindly and often cruelly after an exhortation from a flag officer

 

i hope those prosecutors sleep oh so well at night......

Edited January 25, 2015 by SDsc0rch

[strikeeagle]

Crossing of the flight control rods at the mixer assembly.

[ChrisIhao]

the military is like that - hard rudder orders applied overzealously, blindly and often cruelly after an exhortation from a flag officer

 

i hope those prosecutors sleep oh so well at night......

 

Yeah, it must be really hard to be "trapped" in this situation. There have been many other cases as well, where the "guys on the floor" get subjected to so much pressure and injustice that they are driven to suicide. Remember, these are their jobs, and if they counter-attack they may very well be thrown out, as well as their family members who are employed by the military (as often is the case in the US military). Knowing that they are likely to not get another job due to recession etc, this must be really hard for some poor guy (or gal) to handle. Its ironic that they are not able to fix a darned half-baked color coded wire system in 10 years, before this event happened, and in my opinion the brass are the ones to blame here, both for the pilots life and Muellers life.

 

The incident in the article is a dark, dark blemish on the reputation of the Airforce.

[Python]

Hadn't heard this before, pretty tragic.

[mvsgas]

People makes mistakes, it happens. The suicide, it happens on the civilian side as well. IIRC, after Japans Airlines 123 accident, there where some suicide from people involve. About the USAF Maintainer, I was one for 15 years and you have to be careful with what you do and how. There will always be people telling you to do things faster and many guys take shortcuts without thinking about the consequences. Sadly the same people telling you to hurry and cut corners will be the first to "throw you under the bus". I did cut some corners when I first started and was young and stupid, but luckily I did not hurt nor damage anyone nor anything and realize I did not gain anything by rushing and cutting corners. Once I became a Supervisor, I tried to take my time and do things by the book. It did not made me very popular around the Production side of the house but I never crash a aircraft nether.

[NRG-Vampire]

...while the rods were color coded (one green, the other white), both attaching points were green, making the rods' color differences useless...

:shocking:

 

:doh: what a senseless waste of human life because of both attaching points were green :cry: shame

 

RIP

[Fjordmonkey]

. It did not made me very popular around the Production side of the house but I never crash a aircraft nether.

 

Better to be unpopular than to loose a jet and X number of people, I say.

 

The same mentality got hammered into my head as a RNoAF groundcrew. One of the senior Crewchiefs had a very good way of saying things: There's two ways to do business around the aircraft. You either do what you're supposed to when you're supposed to and by the book, or you cut corners and will stand together with me and explain to the family of those that died due to your shortcuts or negligence just why they were gathered at the funeral of their loved ones.

 

That really sunk in, and I never cut corners on an aircraft after that. Even to the point of arguing with both the Crewchief and the pilot, both of them captains while I was a mere Corporal.

[Cali]

I don't know how many times we have been told to hurry up and fix something. But, before they said hurry up and fix it, they told us to take our time and do it right. I had 1 shop chief that actually meant and stood by his words. I don't rush my guys because it's not worth what could happen.

[strikeeagle]

For this accident, no one cut any corners. The T.O. sucked, it wasn't a job that was done often, it was a turn over, their was no follow-on MX requirements, the pilot missed that his stabs/ailerons moved in the wrong directions, the crew chief missed the same during the launch, the pilot missed it again at EOR, and that dick general wanted to make an example of those two because they were enlisted and expendable.

 

Too many people missed the problem. The moment QA got the split tail about the possibility of crossing the flight controls at the mixer assembly, before this job took place, the first hole in the cheese fell into place.

[strikeeagle]

As a matter of fact, the first hole in the cheese occurred when MacAir said it was not possible to cross the controls.

[mvsgas]

I have never worked on the F-15, obviously I was not there and I do not know all the details, sure as hell not judging the maintainers. My limited interactions with a F-15 where Launch and recovering them in EAA Air venture 98/99 and some limited stuff at Sheppard during initial training, so I am not sure how the F-15 T.O.s work. I did work the F-16 from 1997 to 2004 and 2008 to 2012. I work the F-117 from 2004 to 2008. The F-117 T.O.s where horrible but the F-16 where perfect, even a illiterate dumb guy like me was able to follow them and understand them. They even had accurate pictures. Now, you mean to tell me there where no IPI on that task, no ops checks, no follow on maintenance to check all the flight controls? The only way I see them missing stuff is if they connected the rods just before crew show and just choose to test it during launch which I have seen many times.

[Python]

I have never worked on any aircraft personally, but out of interest, is it not common practice to test the control surfaces after even basic procedures? Or is that left up the the Pilot? Either way, this was clearly a tragic accident with multiple people missing the mistake.

[mvsgas]

I have only worked on FBW aircraft, but any Flight control maintenance is a big deal and is checked in multiple ways. For example, after the F-117 crash, any worked on the item that caused the previous crash required several people to re-look at the work. In the USAF, there a group of maintainers refer to as Quality Assurance (QA) In some critical items, they will verify the work done. Before QA, the work will normally be done by a technician and check by a supervisor. They both would sign document stating what they have done, how and what technical manual they followed. Some task will additionally require an In Processes Inspection (IPI) where specific steps have to be verified by a supervisor (commonly refer to as a 7 level). I generalize and many more details are involved.

Edited January 27, 2015 by mvsgas

[mvsgas]

Public affairs statement from this PDF

Both individuals were taught in their initial flight control training that the

rods could be crossed at the mixer assembly and an operational check was

required and extremely important. TSgt Campbell also learned of the

possibility of crossed rods during maintenance for the mixer assembly when

all F-15C mechanics were briefed on a similar previous incident in 1991

and the need for extreme care and adherence to the technical orders. In

1991 TSgt Mueller received the message concerning the 1991 incident and

was responsible for disseminating the information to the wing; his

supervisor ordered TSgt Mueller to insure all members of the wing were

aware of the problem; and he was ordered to make sure he developed an

In-Progress Inspection as well as an operational inspection. Additionally,

the technical order contained a conspicuous warning that failure to

correctly install would lead to aircraft destruction and loss of life. An

operational check-out by both TSgt Mueller and Campbell was also

required. Both were specially trained to accomplish this task. An InProgress-Inspection was due prior to closing up the aircraft and before they

did the operational check

 

So far by looking online, many people fail on this incident, like countless others accident before and after this one. But, this guys unfortunately took the brunt of it.

[Fjordmonkey]

I have only worked on FBW aircraft, but any Flight control maintenance is a big deal and is checked in multiple ways.

 

This. Even here in the RNoAF, ANY work on flightcontrols, be they mechanics or, in the case of the F16, electrics/avionics, everything will be tested in the hangar where the work was done, inspected by the QA's, and then re-tested before the aircraft is cleared for operational flight and use.

 

I find it strange that a mishap such as this could happen in the first place. Someone must have gack'ed up bigtime somewhere, be it on the flightline or in the development of the TCTO's for the job.

 

Also, what mvsgas said about the TO's for the Viper is true. When you can teach an 18 year old kid with 2 weeks of bootcamp and 3 weeks of theory on the F16 how to perform a pre-, post- and throughflights, including launch/recovery both normal and RS15, in as little as 3 to 4 weeks, you know you've written something even a half-literate ape could follow. I haven't done much heavy maintnance on the F16's, but the little I HAVE done is pretty simple if you know how to read and understand pictures.

[BitMaster]

This "incident" happened almost in my backyard and a fellow USAF mechanic, who happened to be my flying pal for R/C, told me the story back when it happened, how it happened.

 

The base line was, from a mechanic's point of view, those rods should have been LABELED CLEARLY, just because it is so easy to mix them up.

 

Things always happen but if you invent stuff you have the obligation to pre-think certain scenarios and foresee where bad things are likely to happen and those two rods, as similar as they are and fit alike left and right, that is one of those points where a BIG FAT L & R would have saved more than 1 life.

 

 

Bit

[rrohde]

This "incident" happened almost in my backyard

 

I also had friends from Bitburg AFB who worked on F-15s at the time. Quite a shock for everyone around at the time.

 

Unrelated: As an old "Trierer", I owe a lot to my American buddies from Bitburg AFB and Spangdahlem AFB from back then. Very fond memories.

[ChrisIhao]

Things always happen but if you invent stuff you have the obligation to pre-think certain scenarios and foresee where bad things are likely to happen and those two rods, as similar as they are and fit alike left and right, that is one of those points where a BIG FAT L & R would have saved more than 1 life.

 

Exactly. Murphys law have rarely been so appropriate. Everything that CAN go wrong, WILL go wrong (sooner or later).

[strikeeagle]

@MVSGAS...I think that PA release was a issue. I believe that their defense was that they did NOT know about the crossing possibility. But the way the mixer looks from the top down and the rods are side-by-side, it's easy to cross the rods. As a matter of fact, if you install the rods "straight" on to the mixer, you will cross the controls. But, if you cross the rods, the flight controls would be correct.

 

To others, you're right...a simple control check would have saved the pilot. However, the pilot didn't catch it himself. That's why the CC visually verifies the flight control position w/the pilot during the launch.

 

Anytime I disconnected ANY flight control part or accessory-- no matter the size --I would document the requirement for a FC.

 

 

[ChrisIhao]

@MVSGAS...I think that PA release was a issue. I believe that their defense was that they did NOT know about the crossing possibility. But the way the mixer looks from the top down and the rods are side-by-side, it's easy to cross the rods. As a matter of fact, if you install the rods "straight" on to the mixer, you will cross the controls. But, if you cross the rods, the flight controls would be correct.

 

Thanks for the pics and insight man. Interesting to actually see the parts they were working with.