AIM-54 guidance

[D4n]

Afaik in DCS HOJ does work...

 

And if your guess of 30-50 miles burn through is correct, then there's no chance the Phoenix won't reach the target... :D In fact the Phoenix can probably even be launched as LOAL weapon! :D

[Beamscanner]

Please quote where I said that.

http://forums.eagle.ru/showpost.php?p=2750224&postcount=35

I said that the concept of sending some vague range from the target aircraft to the missile encoded in the TWS illuminating pulses sounds unnecessarily too complex for the time-period as in analogue processing electronics in the missile which has to process and store that range information.

-It's not a "vague" range.. it would be the accurate range relative to where the missile was launched from.

-As stated earlier, this technique wasn't new for that period. And it doesn't take much to plot a couple of points on an X, Y, Z graph..

Well, that assembly is there for tracking the missile's flight parameters (angle, etc.) to control the missile after launch and fly it. That it's also used to keep track of its movement and at high speed in 3D space, store that data and then processes the positional updates received from the F-14 to just determine the range seems very complicated, especially since presumably it already guides towards the target using the SARH pulses.

Yea, it's WAAYY too complex to plot the ISA data, the angle of the SARH reception, plot the target range every few seconds, and fly an intercept path. Better to disregard all of the common radar techniques in use during that period and try guessing range based off the varying intensity of a multi-path signal./S

 

It doesn't guide straight in on the target, it's lofted, flies a lead pursuit and eventually dives down on the target going active around the same time. The SARH guidance gives it the angle to the target via the mono-pulse receiver on the missile, the best you can do if you're only using angle is PN.

 

Good points, but they also work against your range theory. At which range would you switch to active radar as the potential lock depends on the target RCS and would vary for differently sized targets?

How does that change the PPM range theory? The pitbull range is static and determined by engineers long before the missile finishes development. It's a balanced choice between resources and probability of target detection.

 

I'd guess they decided to activate the seeker at the same range it could detect a small fighter sized aircraft (~3sqm RCS). No reason to turn it on way earlier then that, even if the target had a MASSIVE RCS, you don't have that much power to play with and you don't want to let your target know your coming so early on.

 

 

You know the time its radar can run on batteries or this is just a biased assumption? I don't think they used an AA set there. Also, the active radar and the SARH seeker might continue to work in sync after it goes pitbull till the active radar detects the target it guides towards or the missile loses its kinetic energy.

Facts:

-The AIM-54 is expected to have a long flight

-The AIM-54 seeker needs to be as powerful as possible to be effective(i.e. detect small targets at ranges more than a few miles away)

-Size restrictions are pretty serious when it comes to missile designs, so battery sizes and max pitbull ranges are made very conservative.

 

That being said, if your RCS theory was at play, the missile seeker would very likely go pitbull early(due to the points I previously posted) and waste its precious power supply long before detecting/reaching the target in a long range engagement.

 

I'm sure the SARH could/does still provide some support. But if the active seeker goes dry, illuminations once every couple of seconds won't result in a successful engagement.

 

The data needs to be sent to the missile by the FCS prior to launch, that's what I said and also that the old IRST might have also been integrated in the FCS in the same way as TCS later was. You keep implying that some datalink was mentioned here.

Someone implied that a datalink might exist, since the F-14 could use it's TCS and not the AWG-9 to engage a target.

 

I was debunking this idea, because no datalink would be needed when the missile's radar could see the target at the same range as the TCS.

 

 

And finally, here is evidence of AWG-9 "output command signals" referencing the radar's PRF and PW (potentially indicating Pulse Position Modulation). This data relates to the AWM-23 test equipment used to test the AWG-9 transmitter.

http://mil-spec.tpub.com/MIL-T/MIL-T-81785C/MIL-T-81785C00011.htm

 

In any case, we need someone with the -1A weapon employment manual to know more. Hopefully, LN have access to those.

Agreed

Edited April 22, 2016 by Beamscanner

[captain_dalan]

 

"What's TCS?

Television Camera System. That small bulge right under the radome. It was incorporated to provide better visual confirmation on hostile contacts, far beyond normal visual range. For fighter sized targets it was reliable at probably 10 nautical or so, for bombers even further out. Very useful when most of the potential bandits are quite smaller then you (especially in the frontal aspect). Quite ahead of its time, and probably the first useful example of sensor fusion, as it could be slaved to the AWG9. It wasn't incorporated from the get go, though. The mid to late 70's fleet, didn't have it. Not all of them at least. Also, for a time it was preceded by an IRST (an infra red system - think Su-27) that didn't live up to NAVY expectations.

Edited April 22, 2016 by captain_dalan

[D4n]

Wow TCS okay...

[renhanxue]

Given that Iran still has some AGM-54s, I doubt the US will ever release any "hard" technical information to the public. The risk is too high.

What risks are you envisioning, exactly? Early 70's microwave technology that predates solid state electronics is so outdated at this point that it's really only interesting to museums. You can find basically all the technical principles in off-the-shelf textbooks. You never know what can be declassified until you ask, but what you can be almost certain of is that it won't be declassified if nobody asks for it. Try FOIA'ing some user's manual or technical documentation from the first production version from the late 60's/early 70's, it won't cost you anything to ask and it's easy to do, especially if you know the title of the publication you're looking for (try asking some old Tomcat pilot for likely manual titles). It's actually pretty remarkable what you can get declassified these days, I've seen a lot of odd stuff pop up from the archives in recent years.

Edited April 23, 2016 by renhanxue

[Beamscanner]

^agreed.

 

@gospadin

Are you suggesting that the US has something to lose if they release information on Iran's dated F-14A's and AIM-54A's?

 

Why would the US care if Iranian weapon technologies were exposed to the public? What risk is there?

 

No doubt that the Russians sent engineers to dissect every piece of equipment on those jets in Iran.

[Alicatt]

What risks are you envisioning, exactly? Early 70's microwave technology that predates solid state electronics is so outdated at this point that it's really only interesting to museums.

 

In the 1960s my father got a microwave oven for the house, it was 6kW input power (4.5kW output to cook with) and was so heavy that it took 6 men to carry it, a few years later when I went to work at Decca Radar the transmitter assembly of our smallest radar was about the same size as the cavity magnetron from the microwave.

 

Oh and a side point, the frequency the microwave worked on, 932MHz, right plum in the middle of the European 900 GSM band :D

 

There were big changes in electronics around then, I went from valve technology to everything on a chip within a couple of years at the beginning of the 1970s.

[Dudikoff]

http://forums.eagle.ru/showpost.php?p=2750224&postcount=35

 

Proving what? As can be seen in the quoted post, I was referring to the whole concept of transmitting the range from the fighter for processing in the missile, not the encoding part itself.

 

-It's not a "vague" range.. it would be the accurate range relative to where the missile was launched from.

-As stated earlier, this technique wasn't new for that period. And it doesn't take much to plot a couple of points on an X, Y, Z graph..

 

What wasn't new? Show me a missile from that period which handled this kind of processing. All you've shown is command data being sent to the missile encoded in the pulses which are directly translated to flight commands via analogue electronics.

 

There's no point in commenting the rest as we're just treading the same ground.

 

Can anyone from the US file a request for the -1A manual according to the freedom of information act? :)

Edited April 25, 2016 by Dudikoff

[Tirak]

Can anyone from the US file a request for the -1A manual according to the freedom of information act? :)

 

If it's not already available it would be a waste of time. The US government reserves the right to protect military secrets. And while I've seen in a few places people who seem to think that because it's old and obsolete and Iran no longer can gain anything from it, those people seem to forget that the US shredded most of its Tomcat fleet when it retired in the 2000s to prevent any possibility of spare parts making it to the Alleycats. The military is a mite paranoid when it comes to Tomcats and Iran.

[renhanxue]

If it's not already available it would be a waste of time. The US government reserves the right to protect military secrets. And while I've seen in a few places people who seem to think that because it's old and obsolete and Iran no longer can gain anything from it, those people seem to forget that the US shredded most of its Tomcat fleet when it retired in the 2000s to prevent any possibility of spare parts making it to the Alleycats. The military is a mite paranoid when it comes to Tomcats and Iran.

It costs you literally nothing to ask, and without asking you will never find out if your speculation is correct. Even if rejected a declassification request five years ago that doesn't automatically mean they'll reject it now. In fact, it might even be declassified already and all the people who asked for it are just sitting on their copies. I've seen that happen many times in Swedish archives.

 

I also think you overestimate the value of the data. Flight manuals are covered by the lowest classification grade and they have to be read by a lot of people which makes them inherently insecure. Thus, they rarely contain anything spectacular, and the Iranians have had their Tomcats (and a flight manual for them) for like 40 years now.

Edited April 25, 2016 by renhanxue

[Dudikoff]

If it's not already available it would be a waste of time. The US government reserves the right to protect military secrets. And while I've seen in a few places people who seem to think that because it's old and obsolete and Iran no longer can gain anything from it

 

Why would Iran get their F-14's and all the spare parts and weapons without those tactical manuals? :)

Edited April 25, 2016 by Dudikoff

[Tirak]

Why would Iran get their F-14's and all the spare parts and weapons without those tactical manuals? :)

 

I'm not saying that it's logical, quite the opposite in fact. The US has been incredibly irrational concerning the retirement of the Tomcat in how they protect it because of the boogey man of Iran.

[Grundar]

I'm not saying that it's logical, quite the opposite in fact. The US has been incredibly irrational concerning the retirement of the Tomcat in how they protect it because of the boogey man of Iran.

 

 

Yep F-111's using the TF-30's were also destroyed when retired to prevent Iran retrieving parts/tech from them to aid in upkeep of their F-14's (There were also F-111's destroyed as they were part of a the inventory the US told the Soviet Union would be destroyed in their nuclear proliferation agreements - the remaining Australian F-111C's were either placed in museums or buried - cheaper than scrapping them).

[jcdata]

Exactly what I stated in my first post

 

 

 

Yup, this was my conclusion in the post I linked from another topic.. Though its not RF modulation, its Pulse Position Modulation (modulating the pulse timing) for the range information.

 

 

The theory is that the PRF of the AWG-9 is slightly modulated every so often, with the embedded data providing target range to the missile which sees the PRF modulation reflected off the target. This technique is known as Pulse Position Modulation or PPM, and is not considered a "datalink" in the engineering world as it is mechanic of the radar itself and not a dedicated 'datalink'. Just like a flashlight is not considered a 'datalink' even though it can be used to relay information if modulated. Similar to the flashlight, the AWG-9 wouldn't be able to embed that much information into the signal as compared to a traditional "datalink".

 

PPM was a common technique used during this period of history. What engineers typically refer to today as a 'datalink' (be it a cell phone connection or Wifi, etc) is a signal dedicated to transmitting information. Usually via RF shift keying or Phase shift keying from a CW signal, not a pulse one.

 

 

Nope. The F-14a didn't have an IRST, it had TCS. TCS range was about 10 miles. At that range the AIM-54 seeker could lock the target itself, and thus not need a datalink..

First 23 14a had irst

 

Sent from my XT1585 using Tapatalk

[BlackLion213]

First 23 14a had irst

 

True!

 

 

Though the system was removed from all of these aircraft by 1976 (IIRC).

 

 

 

-Nick

[lunaticfringe]

I also think you overestimate the value of the data. Flight manuals are covered by the lowest classification grade and they have to be read by a lot of people which makes them inherently insecure. Thus, they rarely contain anything spectacular, and the Iranians have had their Tomcats (and a flight manual for them) for like 40 years now.

 

The most applicable manuals would be 2-2-16.2, as well as the 2-2-16A sequence.

 

You're not getting them. Especially the A suffixes. It's already been attempted.

 

Hell, I couldn't even get 01-F14AAP-1.1 out of NAVAIR with a FOIA, and that has no conformity with Iranian hardware, period, and had to go a different route to get mine.

 

The United States Navy is very particular about what it permits, and what it will fight for, with regards to the US FOIA. Example: the USAF research we know as Project Red Baron, the second and third volumes, were reviewed post-declassification by an acquaintance of mine in the late 90s for his elective work at the USMC CSC. At one point during the process of work, the copies available for him to review were fully declassified- not one single line of redaction over thousands of pages.

 

Returning perhaps a year later to continue his study, entire sections were redacted. Pages of nothing but blank boxes covering up the text. That was in 99.

 

I FOIA'ed a few sections of the reports in 2013. The redactions were still in place. 1999 was already 25 year mandatory declassification territory, meaning the USN is still playing the technical card. This likely stems from Sparrow, which is still in their inventory in the M variant and has maneuvering profile that remains almost verbatim to the E2, which was detailed in full in said text.

 

And that said- even the classified sections of the Operational Maintenance manuals may not hold the ultimate descriptors of what is going on; most of the hardware is line replacement, rather than repair- it's faster to give the BIT faults to the technician, give him the specifics of what he will see in the failure mode, and tell him to swap X box, rather than to describe the entire nature of what is happening under the hood. The -1A and -1T may give hints, but again, those aren't going anywhere anytime soon.

[Hummingbird]

Great to see you back lunaticfringe, and excellent info as always! :thumbup:

[captain_dalan]

Welcome back lunaticfringe!

[FWind]

The most applicable manuals would be 2-2-16.2, as well as the 2-2-16A sequence.

 

You're not getting them. Especially the A suffixes. It's already been attempted.

 

Hell, I couldn't even get 01-F14AAP-1.1 out of NAVAIR with a FOIA, and that has no conformity with Iranian hardware, period, and had to go a different route to get mine.

 

The United States Navy is very particular about what it permits, and what it will fight for, with regards to the US FOIA. Example: the USAF research we know as Project Red Baron, the second and third volumes, were reviewed post-declassification by an acquaintance of mine in the late 90s for his elective work at the USMC CSC. At one point during the process of work, the copies available for him to review were fully declassified- not one single line of redaction over thousands of pages.

 

Returning perhaps a year later to continue his study, entire sections were redacted. Pages of nothing but blank boxes covering up the text. That was in 99.

 

I FOIA'ed a few sections of the reports in 2013. The redactions were still in place. 1999 was already 25 year mandatory declassification territory, meaning the USN is still playing the technical card. This likely stems from Sparrow, which is still in their inventory in the M variant and has maneuvering profile that remains almost verbatim to the E2, which was detailed in full in said text.

 

And that said- even the classified sections of the Operational Maintenance manuals may not hold the ultimate descriptors of what is going on; most of the hardware is line replacement, rather than repair- it's faster to give the BIT faults to the technician, give him the specifics of what he will see in the failure mode, and tell him to swap X box, rather than to describe the entire nature of what is happening under the hood. The -1A and -1T may give hints, but again, those aren't going anywhere anytime soon.

 

So the -1A and -1T............

 

welcome back lunaticfringe

[r4y30n]

Television Camera System. That small bulge right under the radome. It was incorporated to provide better visual confirmation on hostile contacts, far beyond normal visual range. For fighter sized targets it was reliable at probably 10 nautical or so, for bombers even further out. Very useful when most of the potential bandits are quite smaller then you (especially in the frontal aspect). Quite ahead of its time, and probably the first useful example of sensor fusion, as it could be slaved to the AWG9. It wasn't incorporated from the get go, though. The mid to late 70's fleet, didn't have it. Not all of them at least. Also, for a time it was preceded by an IRST (an infra red system - think Su-27) that didn't live up to NAVY expectations.

 

Interestingly enough you could do the inverse and slave the AWG9 to the TCS. On the page here (http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-EO-Systems.html) they mention a scenario in which the TCS is the device that maintains lock and the AWG9 is blindly illuminating the target for the launched missiles. This would explain the posted log early in the thread that mentions a missile fired solely with TCS lock.

 

"Consider a penetrating Backfire. Detected by the AWG-9, the F-14 slews the TCS onto the Backfire to identify it. Identified, the F-14 then commences illuminating for a Sparrow launch. The Backfire identifies the radar mode and directs most of its jamming power onto the F-14. The AWG-9 cannot match the power and burn through, it therefore loses lock. Will the Backfire get through? No, as the F-14 slaves the AWG-9 to the TCS LOS and engages the video tracker. Though the AWG-9 can't see what it's illuminating, it is illuminating the target tracked by the TCS system. A Sparrow launch may then proceed."

[captain_dalan]

Interestingly enough you could do the inverse and slave the AWG9 to the TCS. On the page here (http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-EO-Systems.html) they mention a scenario in which the TCS is the device that maintains lock and the AWG9 is blindly illuminating the target for the launched missiles. This would explain the posted log early in the thread that mentions a missile fired solely with TCS lock.

 

"Consider a penetrating Backfire. Detected by the AWG-9, the F-14 slews the TCS onto the Backfire to identify it. Identified, the F-14 then commences illuminating for a Sparrow launch. The Backfire identifies the radar mode and directs most of its jamming power onto the F-14. The AWG-9 cannot match the power and burn through, it therefore loses lock. Will the Backfire get through? No, as the F-14 slaves the AWG-9 to the TCS LOS and engages the video tracker. Though the AWG-9 can't see what it's illuminating, it is illuminating the target tracked by the TCS system. A Sparrow launch may then proceed."

 

An interesting feature. I had no idea that had the visual locking and tracking capability back in the analogue days. What i find even more surprising is the ability to slave the radar to the TCS. I wonder if the radar illumination under such circumstances would successfully guide a sparrow even under white noise jamming conditions.

[Reflected]

A lot of interesting info here. Without wanting to hijack the thread - I remember seeing it somewhere, but I'm not sure: will the AIM.54 be modeled by LN, or will they use the stock "ED" version? I'm afraid if ED designs the AIM-54s on the Tomcats with the same "love" as they had for the AMRAAMs, the Tomcat would be about as useful online as the MIG-21.

[Tirak]

A lot of interesting info here. Without wanting to hijack the thread - I remember seeing it somewhere, but I'm not sure: will the AIM.54 be modeled by LN, or will they use the stock "ED" version? I'm afraid if ED designs the AIM-54s on the Tomcats with the same "love" as they had for the AMRAAMs, the Tomcat would be about as useful online as the MIG-21.

 

LN is making their own. It should be the AIM-54C (ECCM)(Sealed) based on the timeframe, but you never know.

[Beamscanner]

Interestingly enough you could do the inverse and slave the AWG9 to the TCS. On the page here (http://www.ausairpower.net/TE-EO-Systems.html) they mention a scenario in which the TCS is the device that maintains lock and the AWG9 is blindly illuminating the target for the launched missiles. This would explain the posted log early in the thread that mentions a missile fired solely with TCS lock.

 

"Consider a penetrating Backfire. Detected by the AWG-9, the F-14 slews the TCS onto the Backfire to identify it. Identified, the F-14 then commences illuminating for a Sparrow launch. The Backfire identifies the radar mode and directs most of its jamming power onto the F-14. The AWG-9 cannot match the power and burn through, it therefore loses lock. Will the Backfire get through? No, as the F-14 slaves the AWG-9 to the TCS LOS and engages the video tracker. Though the AWG-9 can't see what it's illuminating, it is illuminating the target tracked by the TCS system. A Sparrow launch may then proceed."

 

The AWG-9 uses a mono-pulse receiver. If its getting jammed by the target, it can still determine the angular direction of the jamming source. You wouldn't need the TCS LOS, doesn't matter if the AWG-9 losses "lock" (range and velocity lock).

 

If we were talking off axis jamming (being jammed by anyone BUT the target), then I'm sure TCS would be useful.

 

Also, TCS range is roughly 10 miles.. Is the assumption that the TU-22(very large RCS) can prevent burn through at ~10 miles..?

 

Burn through is a factor of Jammer/Skin ratio. The Skin here should be a massive value because the AWG-9s gain and output power and the large RCS of the Backfire. So the Jammer needs to be incredibly powerful and directional to maintain over a 1/1 ratio at 10 miles..

 

I know this isn't a statement of yours, but from AUS Air Power. Normally, everything I've found on that website is really good. In this case, what they are putting out doesn't match up. Perhaps there were more variables at play in their scenario..?

 

edit: perhaps they meant that TCS could be used to help defeat chaff. (technically, a form of off axis jamming)

Edited May 9, 2016 by Beamscanner

[red_coreSix]

Burn through is a factor of Jammer/Skin ratio. The Skin here should be a massive value because the AWG-9s gain and output power and the large RCS of the Backfire. So the Jammer needs to be incredibly powerful and directional to maintain over a 1/1 ratio at 10 miles.

 

From everything that I read they never mentioned target RCS as a significant factor. Jammer/Signal ratio is maybe what you meant. The returns of a Tu-22 aren't "stronger" than the ones from a MiG-29 in that they have the same energy. You may get more returns from a Backfire but that will not effect burn-through range. And as the noise jammer only needs to be 50% the power of the radar he is jamming I'd guess it's very much possible to jam an AWG-9 at 10 miles with the power and cooling allocations you have in a Tu-22.