SPO15 feedback

[Dejan]

2 hours ago, MA_VMF said:

Временное РТЭ самолета 9-12 1982г

• Временное РТЭ использовалось в течение короткого периода, а затем заменялось на окончательную версию.
• Информация о временных документах может быть менее доступной.
• I am interested in what is written in the final version, not the trial version.

[AeriaGloria]

If it is a preliminary 1982 manual that is the one with the phrase 

“

	When the radar is switched on for emission, it is not possible to use the
	information from the SPO-15LM indicator due to its erroneous
	nature and, in some cases, chaos/При включении РЛПК на излучение использовать информацию с индикатора СПО-15ЛМ не представляется возможным ввиду ее ошибочности, а в ряде случаев и хаотичности.“ That is incredibly interesting piece of information……..

Edited October 30 by AeriaGloria

[Кош]

22 минуты назад, AeriaGloria сказал:

If it is a preliminary 1982 manual that is the one with the phrase 

“

	When the radar is switched on for emission, it is not possible to use the
	information from the SPO-15LM indicator due to its erroneous
	nature and, in some cases, chaos/При включении РЛПК на излучение использовать информацию с индикатора СПО-15ЛМ не представляется возможным ввиду ее ошибочности, а в ряде случаев и хаотичности.“ That is incredibly interesting piece of information……..

This is from an airforce manual for pilots. It contradicts developer-made manuals and airforces of different states manuals for technicians. We are in the stage of conversation of physically how and why to which these statements don't say anything. Only real answer to how blanking works or doesn't work is a combined graph of signals. To my interpretation of technical manual blanking should cover PRF at least in established modes. Unless not only RWR but many other thing would not have worked.

Edited October 30 by Кош

[AeriaGloria]

2 minutes ago, Кош said:

This is from an airforce manual for pilots. It contradicts developer-made manuals and airforces of different states manuals for technicians. 

Ah thank you 

[Кош]

14 часов назад, Dejan сказал:

Look, I can send you the entire pilot's manual "L-18 aircraft handling" Yugoslav markings for the MiG29. In the entire manual for pilots, the only place where it is mentioned that Beryoza should be turned off, and the pilot should do it manually, is when the command to turn on the radar does not pass during guidance from the ground.
I hope you agree with me that the manual for an airplane contains all the possible instructions for using that airplane and all the restrictions.
I see that you mention Kosovo, better said the War with Yugoslavia because of Kosovo, there are testimonies of pilots who flew MiG29 in those days and who clearly mention that during the radar search they received a signal that they were locked by enemy planes. Pilot Abdul Emeti gives a statement that at the moment when he had a lock on enemy aircraft, he received a signal that the enemy had locked on him and he started an evasive maneuver.

I assume you know that Yugoslavian MiG 29s were hardly maintained in the period from 1991-1999 due to sanctions, so it cannot be said that the SPO on them was improved.
And yes, I would like to see your sources where it is written that during the use of the Mig29 radar, the SPO 15 device does not work in the front observation hemisphere.
And one more thing, after the last patch, when the enemy plane locks the Mig 29 in STT mode, any light stops shining on the SPO.

 

KRU na MiG (1).docx 470.37 \u043a\u0411 · 8 загрузок

I think you are a bit wrong. It has two separate statements. First - if radar doesn't turn on automatically from GCI electronic command, turn it on manually. Second - a reminder to turn off display of long range search radars on RWR when you turn on your radar(but not turn your RWR off totally). There is no explanation or elaboration. Looks like there are bleed-ins from own radar into long range search radar bins.

[MA_VMF]

3 часа назад, Dejan сказал:

• Временное РТЭ использовалось в течение короткого периода, а затем заменялось на окончательную версию.
• Информация о временных документах может быть менее доступной.
• I am interested in what is written in the final version, not the trial version.

Там есть внесение изменений.И оно все равно временное

[Dejan]

10 hours ago, Кош said:

I think you are a bit wrong. It has two separate statements. First - if radar doesn't turn on automatically from GCI electronic command, turn it on manually. Second - a reminder to turn off display of long range search radars on RWR when you turn on your radar(but not turn your RWR off totally). There is no explanation or elaboration. Looks like there are bleed-ins from own radar into long range search radar bins.

You are right, I made a mistake, the SPO is not turned off, but switched from observation mode to capture mode.
In the handbook it is written that Berjoza is an integral part of the navigation system from the ground, so I think that the information - signals are received through that system.

⦁  "  Ugrađena je KRU „Birjuza“ (E502-20) kao deo BReO, namenjena upravo za rad sa NASU/GCI." and translate to eng "⦁ KRU "Birjuza" (E502-20) was installed as part of BReO, intended for work with NASU/GCI."

The point of my writing here is that I believe that for some reason ED modeled the Mig29 that had just come off the strip in the first series. I am quite sure based on the logic and instructions for the Yugoslav Migs that are from the first series and were purchased in 1987 that this problem was quickly solved. 
So, we could get one red plane in DCS that is functional. If you research on the internet, even with AI the only source that mentions the problem with the SPO15LM is ED, and there are tons of technical and aviation manuals on the internet for the Mig29 in many languages.

I have been in this simulation since the beginning of 2007, believe me that after Mig 21 I am overjoyed that we finally have Mig29. I'm aware that it's still an unfinished plane, but it's done very well. Congratulations to ED for a job well done, it's a real pleasure to fly this aircraft. I hope that ED will make an official skin for the Yugoslav Mig29 and the Serbian one that is still flying today.

[AeriaGloria]

We also must not confuse the Beryuza datalink with the Beryoza (Birch) SPO as well. 
 

What we need is more MiG-29 pilots to definitively describe their experience using the SPO with the radar. If one does not make a difference for ED, perhaps we need multiple. 

Edited October 30 by AeriaGloria

[okopanja]

17 minutes ago, Dejan said:

⦁  "  Ugrađena je KRU „Birjuza“ (E502-20) kao deo BReO, namenjena upravo za rad sa NASU/GCI." and translate to eng "⦁ KRU "Birjuza" (E502-20) was installed as part of BReO, intended for work with NASU/GCI."

  

Naša 29-ka je trebalo da dobije zamenu modema sa drugačijom kripto-zaštitom, koji bi omogućio integraciju sa AS-84 komandno informacionim sistemom. Ova integracija je urađena za Mig-21, prvo sredinom 70-ih za AS-74 sistem, pa potom AS-84 sredinom 80-ih. Projekat zbog raspada zemlje nikada nije završen tako da smo rat dočekali sa klasičnim navodjenjem + sovjetskim DL-om, koji je mogao sa opšti samo sa sovjetskim radarima. U tom smo koristili miks sovjetskih, britanskih (Marconi S600 serija) i amerčkih radara (AN/TPS-63 i AN/TPS-70). Prvo veče je uništena Lena kod Pančeva koja je imala dodatnu opremu za DL. 

Velika ironija je bila da su 21-ke mogle da primaju navođenje od AS-84, pri čemu je ispravnost flote koja je bila značajno veća prevazilazila moderniju eksadrilu 29-ki. Prema nekim podacimu su veći deo 1998. godine samo 2-3 aviona bila u stanju da lete. Ostatak flote je do Marta 1999, nekako nakrpljen da leti. Ako ništa drugo sada znamo kako je bilo pilotima (da budem iskren bilo im je gore).

Slazem se konstatacijom da je ove sisteme (SPO i DL) lako pomesati. 

Uzgred nadam se da letiš SARH na Contention-u.  

 

[Dejan]

15 minutes ago, AeriaGloria said:

We also must not confuse the Beryuza datalink with the Beryoza (Birch) SPO as well. 
 

What we need is more MiG-29 pilots to definitively describe their experience using the SPO with the radar. If one does not make a difference for ED, perhaps we need multiple. 

I can try to get in touch with a couple of Serbian pilots who flew in 1999 in the war with NATO.

4 minutes ago, okopanja said:

  

Naša 29-ka je trebalo da dobije zamenu modema sa drugačijom kripto-zaštitom, koji bi omogućio integraciju sa AS-84 komandno informacionim sistemom. Ova integracija je urađena za Mig-21, prvo sredinom 70-ih za AS-74 sistem, pa potom AS-84 sredinom 80-ih. Projekat zbog raspada zemlje nikada nije završen tako da smo rat dočekali sa klasičnim navodjenjem + sovjetskim DL-om, koji je mogao sa opšti samo sa sovjetskim radarima. U tom smo koristili miks sovjetskih, britanskih (Marconi S600 serija) i amerčkih radara (AN/TPS-63 i AN/TPS-70). Prvo veče je uništena Lena kod Pančeva koja je imala dodatnu opremu za DL. 

Velika ironija je bila da su 21-ke mogle da primaju navođenje od AS-84, pri čemu je ispravnost flote koja je bila značajno veća prevazilazila moderniju eksadrilu 29-ki. Prema nekim podacimu su veći deo 1998. godine samo 2-3 aviona bila u stanju da lete. Ostatak flote je do Marta 1999, nekako nakrpljen da leti. Ako ništa drugo sada znamo kako je bilo pilotima (da budem iskren bilo im je gore).

Slazem se konstatacijom da je ove sisteme (SPO i DL) lako pomesati. 

Uzgred nadam se da letiš SARH na Contention-u.  

 

Letim brate, ali mi treba par, tesko je sam protiv mrskog neprijatelja

Moj nick je =4c=Kljun, mozes doci na nas discord. Koji je tvoj nick?

[Кош]

SPO-15 definetely does not receive threats via datalink. But GCI command center has functionality(basically operator assigns that contact has a radar scan volume attached) to calculate threat zones from enemy fighters and then used to build flanking and pincering maneuver trajectories to be sent to fighters in the air. Also just voice like "054 enemy is looking at you, egress course 210".

Edited October 31 by Кош

[BIGNEWY]

Summary of SPO-15LM synchronization systems

The team have prepared some more information to help understand the systems we hope you find it interesting. 

thank you 

[Dejan]

This way, I have absolutely no intention of convincing myself and changing someone's opinion or decision to do something as they think it should be done.
We all know it well and it is a historical fact that every weapon and weapon system can only be proven in war. The Abrams tank was the best tank in the world on paper and in propaganda until its participation in the war showed that it was just a piece of junk like any other tank. I can't say that the Serbian pilots greeted you, I can only convey to you their statements.
"In essence, it doesn't work (SPO 15) as they (ED) say, they partially understood but missed the point. SPO 15 doesn't work from the PPS only at the moment of the radar pulse being emitted, it works between pulses. This means that the performance is degraded, but not that the SPO doesn't work then."
I would like to mention that there are also YT shows dedicated to pilots who flew combat missions in 1999 in which they talked about their flights. I would cite two statements as an example:
"I have them, but they have me too" Commander of the 204th Fighter Aviation Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Pavlović message over the radio, a few minutes before he was shot down, he died then.
"I found a target and locked on it, while I was waiting for the system to give me permission to launch a missile, at that moment the device that shows that I am being irradiated shows a signal that I am locked by the enemy and I am then starting an evasive maneuver." Pilot Boro Zoraja (I do not know his rank). Otherwise, this is a pilot whose combat flight lasted 40 minutes and was shot  several times and he thinks he dodged 4 missiles in total. He successfully landed with minimal fuel, survived the war.
Once again I would like to thank ED for making this wonderful aircraft for us as full fidelity, it is a real pleasure to fly it with all its flaws, and even if this solution for SPO 15 remains like this. There are some irregularities in the modeling of the functioning of the nose wheel, but I need to find a topic where I can write about it.

Edited 23 hours ago by Dejan
typo

[AeriaGloria]

13 minutes ago, Dejan said:

This way, I have absolutely no intention of convincing myself and changing someone's opinion or decision to do something as they think it should be done.
We all know it well and it is a historical fact that every weapon and weapon system can only be proven in war. The Abrams tank was the best tank in the world on paper and in propaganda until its participation in the war showed that it was just a piece of junk like any other tank. I can't say that the Serbian pilots greeted you, I can only convey to you their statements.
"In essence, it doesn't work (SPO 15) as they (ED) say, they partially understood but missed the point. SPO 15 doesn't work from the PPS only at the moment of the radar pulse being emitted, it works between pulses. This means that the performance is degraded, but not that the SPO doesn't work then."
I would like to mention that there are also YT shows dedicated to pilots who flew combat missions in 1999 in which they talked about their flights. I would cite two statements as an example:
"I have them, but they have me too" Commander of the 204th Fighter Aviation Regiment Lieutenant Colonel Milenko Pavlović message over the radio, a few minutes before he was shot down, he died then.
"I found a target and locked on it, while I was waiting for the system to give me permission to launch a missile, at that moment the device that shows that I am being irradiated shows a signal that I am locked by the enemy and I am then starting an evasive maneuver." Pilot Boro Zoraja (I do not know his rank). Otherwise, this is a pilot whose combat flight lasted 40 minutes and was shot  several times and he thinks he dodged 4 missiles in total. He successfully landed with minimal fuel, survived the war.
Once again I would like to thank ED for making this wonderful aircraft for us as full fidelity, it is a real pleasure to fly it with all its flaws, and even if this solution for SPO 15 remains like this. There are some irregularities in the modeling of the functioning of the nose wheel, but I need to find a topic where I can write about it.

This is very convincing info. It seems even if it was unreliable and showed multiple signals, it was still possible to make out the true enemy signal or atleast know that you are locked 

[TotenDead]

Was he locked from the front though? 

[AeriaGloria]

1 hour ago, TotenDead said:

Was he locked from the front though? 

I can only imagine if he says they had a lock on each other 

[Dejan]

3 hours ago, AeriaGloria said:

This is very convincing info. It seems even if it was unreliable and showed multiple signals, it was still possible to make out the true enemy signal or atleast know that you are locked 

We share the same opinion, at the very least you have radiation and the direction it's coming from, although you may not have the right information about what type of radiation it is.

2 hours ago, TotenDead said:

Was he locked from the front though? 

Yes, from the frontal hemisphere.

[DSplayer]

10 hours ago, Dejan said:

Yes, from the frontal hemisphere.

Is there a source for this? The original quote you cited some messages above doesn't say that.

[Muchocracker]

Nothing about these quotes really refutes anything in the analysis made by ED's SPO engineer. 

[Default774]

14 hours ago, AeriaGloria said:

This is very convincing info

I mean, is it? It is just an anecdote and does not really refute anything from ED's analysis

[ASW]

A worthy opponent for the Mig-29A could be the F-4E. but for all the dreams of the red side, not the F-16.

The APX-81 picks up the IFF signals from the Russian SPO module installed on the migs, and then gives a call signal. The automatic return confirms whether the aircraft was friendly or hostile. From there, the APX-81 somehow transmits location data.

 

 

[DSplayer]

18 minutes ago, ASW said:

A worthy opponent for the Mig-29A could be the F-4E. but for all the dreams of the red side, not the F-16.

The APX-81 picks up the IFF signals from the Russian SPO module installed on the migs, and then gives a call signal. The automatic return confirms whether the aircraft was friendly or hostile. From there, the APX-81 somehow transmits location data.

 

 

The Combat Tree interrogates and receives a response from the affected SRO/SRZO IFF transponders, not SPO radar warning receivers.

[ASW]

8 минут назад, DSplayer сказал:

The Combat Tree interrogates and receives a response from the affected SRO/SRZO IFF transponders, not SPO radar warning receivers.

I know that;)

[okopanja]

5 minutes ago, Muchocracker said:

Nothing about these quotes really refutes anything in the analysis made by ED's SPO engineer. 

Yes, but did the SME have access and experience with the actual device? Unlike the first SPO analysis, the second one went much more in depth and even offers several possibilities (a nod to the SME for his effort), yet with present knowledge I would say it's neither definite yes or definite no.

On the other side the testimonials/interviews (I would not call them anecdotes), but I did a fair deal of detailed research into the topic:

E.g. Boro Zoraja flight is described here, and it even contains rough reconstruction of his flight. Sadly the opposing pilots did not give interviews, and if someone is aware or could correlate please let me know. 

Also for the same event pilots gave several interviews, often providing additional information. Collecting them all of them, correlating, verifying against multiple other sources including similar material of opposite side is a matter no simpler than the analysis of circuit boards. 

In addition a number of books, monographs and publications on these flights were published on this matter. I do have access to some of them but not all of them, and some actually sold out rather quickly, since the publishers did not anticipate the interest of the general public. 

In addition there are a number of controversies about commanding officers and decisions they made during the war. In particular it appears that the commander of the Air Force and PVO at that time gen. Spasoje Smiljanić (a person placed into his position to replaced gen Veličković who was not considered as loyal enough Milošević) did not treat the pilots with the respect and integrity. In fact he actively worked after the war to suppress them (including kicking out at least one of them) and justify the failure of the Air Force to shot down enemy aircraft, by forcing the conclusion that the pilots well not trained well enough. When reading the interviews of US pilots who were their opponents, I did not find that their training was faulty, especially given the fact how close the 29s got close to their opponents, despite the numerous electronics failures. If anything these people deserved recognition and respect.

As for late lt. col.(colonel posthumously) Milinko Pavlović, his flight is by far the most difficult to analyze. He was the commander of  127th Fighter Espadrille within 204th Fighter Aviation Regiment. From the first day he faced extreme pressure from gen. Smiljanić to achieve results in face of more numerous, better equipped enemy. Still due to the situation with majority of airfields being severely damaged, and the fact that very few aircraft were left in flying condition, gen Smiljanić did issue order not to scramble the remaining ones. 

On the day of the flight on May 4th 1999, this order was still in effect, until Operational Center ordered Pavlović to prepare and scramble the single fighter from Batajnica airbase. To this date I did not find the information who made this decision which was in strong contrast to standing order of Smiljanić. At the time of the scramble order, the unnamed young Mig-29 pilot was on flight schedule. Pavlović who was at command post ~4 km  away from airport, made a call to the direct post at airport and told them to prepare the aircraft but not to scramble the aircraft until he arrives. He left his deputy at command post and jumped into the private car which he drove directly to the location where Mig-29 was being prepared with younger pilot already strapped in the cockpit. Upon arriving, he ordered the young pilot out and took his place. This on its own was a breach of procedure.

From this point it is rather difficult to establish what actually happened during the flight. We know he flew to defend town of Valjevo (he was born in the nearby village). We also have reports of missiles heading toward him from direction of Bosnia, but also missiles flew from our own PVO positions. Witnesses claimed the enemy missiles hit the aircraft, followed immediately by hits from our own. Milenković did not eject and was likely killed in the cockpit. PVO never confirmed that they shot, but from testimonies of other flights red-on-red did happen several times during the war. 

We do not have direct testimony, but rather of his deputy who provided his last words. I do believe that Air Force and VOJIN did record the conversations. It should be noted that this is the only flight where we do not have a live pilot surviving the flight, likely even the Air Force does not fully know how this event fully unveiled.

Additional sources are more than welcome.

 

[Dejan]

2 hours ago, Muchocracker said:

Nothing about these quotes really refutes anything in the analysis made by ED's SPO engineer. 

If you say so, it must be so.