Why Was the Fulda Gap the Obvious Invasion Point?

[Rex]

I just moved a buttload of Soviet armor from the East German border, through Fulda, and into Frankfurt, and it was hilly and congested with windy mountain roads.  Not much better than the what I assume the Ardennes would have been like.  There was no "gap" to speak of.

Why was this considered such an easy route, to the point that everyone assumed they were going to use it?

[speed-of-heat]

Fulda Gap - Wikipedia

[sith1144]

It wasn't really. Noone can say for sure what the Warsaw pact plans were but they'd certainly attack everywhere all at once. The Fulda direction I would say has outsized influence because it's where the Americans were at.  If V corps had been on the road to Hamburg I'm sure wed be talking about the A24 charge or something with a snappier title

[theRealTrickFlare]

 

4 hours ago, Rex said:

I just moved a buttload of Soviet armor from the East German border, through Fulda, and into Frankfurt, and it was hilly and congested with windy mountain roads.  Not much better than the what I assume the Ardennes would have been like.  There was no "gap" to speak of.

Why was this considered such an easy route, to the point that everyone assumed they were going to use it?

Because that's where all the guns were pointed. 

[Mr_sukebe]

Maybe it was just upselling the importance of that area?

From a quick look, the northern plains route looks easier for massed armour:

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/North_German_Plain
 

In the above, it suggests that the Fulda route would give easier access to likely Soviet targets, but doesn’t specify what they might be.

When I was setting up my Cold War scenario, the Fulda route appeared to have a number of choke points that would allow the defender to make life much more difficult for the attacker, eg severing the rail links, which would probably have been the obvious method to resupply the assault force.

[Lace]

The main 'gap' was north of Fulda, with a smaller avenue to the south.  Historically it had been of importance (Napoleon retreated through it, and Patton advanced through it), so it was assumed it would be part of a Soviet invasion plan (along with other avenues of advance) and an obvious route to Frankfurt.  The North German Plain would have no doubt seen some action too, but Fulda became more synonymous with WWIII because it was in the American dominated CENTAG.

[OneEyeRoss]

The avenues of approach would have been through the Fulda area, either north or south of the Vogelsberg.  South of the Vogelsberg you are on to Frankfurt aM.  From there, they could hit the prepositioned depots around Mannheim and threaten Rhine Main AFB.  If they went on the north side of the Vogelsberg, towards Giessen, there was a huge Army supply depot.  These were the reasons that the GSFG would attack through there.  Would it have been the main avenue of attack?  No, that would have been the North German Plains, which are pretty much a soccer field...this would have brought the Soviets through to the North Sea ports, which would help isolate Germany from Western supplied arms.

When I was in V Corps, we pretty much knew that we were screwed, but also knew that the Northern Plains were far more important (in the grand scheme of things).

[Northstar98]

It wasn't the only obvious invasion route, the other is the North German Plain, which is not only flatter, but also includes several strategic areas - like control of the coastline and ports (important for Reforger).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seven_Days_to_the_River_Rhine

[MBot]

It is also interesting that sometimes those maps that are being passed around make very little sense. The following map from the German Bundeswehr website is apparently based on the memories of a former NVA staff officer that was involved with the planning by the Soviet commander of the 1st Front (2 Soviet and 1 NVA armies in the southern half of the GDR) in 1983.

By this plan the 8th Guards Army would have attacked with two mechanized rifle and one tank division in the first echelon, with a mechanized rifle division in the second echelon. Look at the path projected for the 79th Guards tank division. It goes right through the Rhön Mountains. This is just the worst terrain possible for a tank division.

[RVT2403]

I too never really understood the hype around Fulda/Hof and think it was more due to US pop culture than other reasons. Frankfurt/Main was important, but the terrain south of Kassel mostly favors the defender and is a pain in the rear for mechanized troops in the advance. Would have been an eastern graveyard if it was pushed as a main objective imo. Think this area would have been more of a pressure point in the first days to support the main advance in Lower Saxony and a slow push south in Bavaria.

A pincer, one north from Hamburg to Bremen heading west and one south along Hannover, Bielefeld route to the Ruhrpott (Dortmund, Essen, Düsseldorf) would have been way more favorable due to terrain and also cutting off the coast - effectively denying resupplies via the West German coast. Amphibious landings in Kiel and Flensburg could have supported this and put pressure on Denmark. Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark are barely 100km wide and, due to the flat terrain, can be used well for long range SAM once taken to cover the baltics and north sea. Pushing further west through Netherlands, Belgium, the supply situation would have been terrible for NATO since everything would have to be landed in France, which is a couple days to a week travel at least under war conditions (considering eastern agents sabotaging railways and bridges).

Fulda/Hof imho would have been a slow advance by WarPac probably to keep the US busy and later act as a staging point for a push on Frankfurt/Main, but not that important in the first chapter. Infantry heavy mechanized elements digging in in these mountainous regions, Lower Saxony should have seen tank heavy elements for aggressive and brutal pushes over the open plains.

My two Pfennige zu dem Thema
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[Nealius]

Amateur strategy hour I guess but the problem I see with the North German plain is its proximity to the North Sea. The Soviets would have to dominate that area with their navy to keep NATO carrier groups out and intercept flights out of the UK. Which doesn't look feasible in that triangle between the UK, Netherlands, and Sweden. Sweden was officially neutral but in reality not, so they surely would have helped with ASW in the North Sea. 

Another issue with the North Germain plain is that, being a plain, it's probably going to be prime killing grounds for Apaches, Kiowas, and Abrams.

The East German border down near Fulda is probably the closest to any major West German strategic areas--I could be wrong as I'm still getting acclimated to the geography. So that's one bonus point, but that assumption is just as flawed as WW2 Germany's assumption that the Allies would launch Overlord between Dover and Calais. 

If they did zerg rush Frankfurt they could have cut off southern Germany, creating a pocket trapped between mountains, East Germany, and Soviet-aligned Czechoslovakia. Switzerland wouldn't do anything. Getting forces across the French border there in Stasbourg or across from Austria would be difficult due to the mountains. Austria's one flat border area is next to Czechoslovakia. To RVT20403's point, the terrain around Fulda favors the defender but that also goes for the Soviets if they managed to take southern Germany. If successful they could  expand their territory to an easily defendable enclave jutting further into NATO territory. Russians are pretty notorious for playing the long game, so I wouldn't think they would try to take the whole of West Germany, instead at first taking chunks of territory, then rebuilding for a decade or so, then taking another chunk.

I'm still curious, though, how much it favors a NATO defender. As modeled in DCS I find the hills and trees to make it nearly impossible to use Apaches and Kiowas as intended, forcing us to go high to see over the terrain and trees to find and engage targets, which exposes us to Soviet ADS and CAP aircraft. Trying to rely on the terrain masking and stalking inevitably ends up with point-blank engagements where we're more likely to be taken out by a TOW missile or Shilka than we are to knock out a tank with a Hellfire.

I really want to see an episode of "History Undone" on this topic.

 

 

Edited April 27 by Nealius

[samba_liten]

Attacking through Fulda made sense, I guess, because it's the closest point to the Rhine. Getting there would have cut the FRG in two. 

As others have pointed out there is much better tank country in the north, so surely an attack would have been launched there too. Plus, probably, another attack through neutral Austria to get at Bavaria.

Jim Storr's book Battlegroup! is very interesting when it comes to what might have been.

[MBot]

I think @Nealius makes a good point as well. It can be argued that the closer engagement distance of the woodlands and rolling hills (but not mountains!) actually favors the Soviet numerical advantage and hurts the NATO long range firepower advantage. I remember from the strategy game Flashpoint Campaigns Red Storm that the main challenge playing NATO was always to find suitable killboxes with long range fields of fire. Defending valleys and woods was always very difficult because the Soviets would still advance very quickly along roads, with defensive positions quickly being overwhelmed at close range by numerical superiority. In this regard the area between Bad Hersfeld and Fulda actually seems quite favorable for the Soviets. Perhaps the term Fulda Gap is a bit unfortunate (though striking) because Fulda is at the southern end of the "gap".

[Mr_sukebe]

Fascinating discussion chaps.  Maybe one to war game in DCS.

[RVT2403]

Good points here. For Fulda, i don't think it would have been impossible, but the price imo would have been to high. True that short engagement ranges negate NATO advantages of thicker armor and longer range to some point, but on the other hand let me throw in FASCAM and (DP)ICM (like the M483) which multiply their effects in confined spaces like you find when advancing along roads nested in between hilly, forested terrain. Put on top the terrain limited range and reaction time of soviet SAM and SHORAD systems in combination with the presence of A-10s. (I btw put the idea of tactical nuclear options aside for all these considerations, since it makes everything a different cup of pudding.) The confined space also makes movement very predictable when you go by vehicle and creation of chokepoints/killzones very easy. I think overall the price for taking Fulda/Hof/Frankfurt would have been immense and way too high "just" (relatively speaking) to have a relatively thin pocket cutting through the center of Germany. Frankfurt was and is an important hot spot for aerial cargo...

Northern Germany though, with Hamburg, Bremen, Wilhelmshaven (only options to get in masses of fuel/crude oil that then gets distributed by pipeline systems south) and the river mouth' of Elbe and Weser (which both are important for inland shipping cargo including fuel down south) as well as the Mittellandkanal, were and are the backbone for resources in West Germany. You can fly in so many armored vehicles via Frankfurt Airport, but with no fuel... so i still think it would have been more favorable for the Soviets to do a major strike along the Lüneburger Heath and along the coast. The terrain favors NATOs longer ranges*, but on the other hand, the numerical advantage of the Soviets was written in their doctrine (of the 80s) in a way which favored wide fronts and using numerical superiority for (out)maneuvering. See FM-100-2-1. You don't do that in the confined hilly terrain down there. With use of pontoons or bridge layers, movement and tactical possibilities would have been way better too - you can pretty much go in a straight line wherever you desire. (*and in fact, the terrain in Lower Saxony was in parts planned and shaped with these engagement ranges in mind, measure the distances between all the little forest patches that break up the open fields of the north. I once had a web resource that went into this but lost the link sadly.) With NATO dominating the North Sea, the open plains of North Germany would not have been taken easily, that is for sure, but i think the risk/reward would have been way, way better than rushing Frankfurt. Once the relevant harbors would have been taken, it would have been hard to get the Soviets out again, and even if: destruction of port and pipeline infrastructure would have crippled the NATO supply situation significantly for a long amount of time. Which in consequence had made a later breaking through in the south way easier.

All this is more relevant for mid-late 80s btw. Early 80s would have given the Soviets a good advantage since NATO usage of thermal imaging was not that wide spread, while around '85 lots of TI were implemented (especially in the Bundeswehr vehicles). Wargaming post-'85 against NATO in bad weather/night becomes a real pain since you are sitting, blind ducks until you are in non-thermal visual range. Huge factor. So a pre-'85 rush through the Fulda gap in bad weather conditions might have looked way different.

If i had to develop a plan, i would have gone all-in in the north with tank heavy pushes. And in the center (Fulda) would have deployed paratroopers (with Mi-8/Mi-26 zipping through the valleys) forward to shield an advance of (even leg)infantry elements to dig in in the hills and fight a slow advance battle to keep the US busy down there and prevent a counter-push towards Thuringia. Once limited resources from the north would have cut NATO mobility, it would have been easier to break through with mobile units through Fulda and the southern regions.

If you want to wargame that stuff, i really recommend FFoT3 - bit more expensive (well, not really since you do not need any supplements. It is an all-in-one book that covers WW2 through 2010s) and complex, but gives really realistic results (as far we can tell) when using the correct real-life tactics.

[TJTAS]

CWG_Historical_Primer.miz

Here is a mission i made on the CW Germany map to outline the tactical importance of this map. You can turn the layers on and off through the draw menu (Draw button lower left icon).

The Blue layer shows the Areas of responsibility of the various nations defending West Germany. This represents the mid 80s time frame of the map. Note they are Corps size (2-3 divisions )

The Neutral layer is another source i found for the National assignments. I believe this is either 60s or 70s.

The Red Layer is the Soviet layer. The main dashed red lines marked with XXXX are the Army group boundaries with the Army group assignments in the rear. The orange arrows denote the low ground and armour friendly crossing points of the border. The light blue dashed lines are the important low ground routes into west Germany. The yellow arrows at the projected development of any attack. This is all based on US estimations in 1979 of the expected 7 Days to the Rhine plan. Now notice that the soviet units are all Army group sized. In the case of the 6th Guards Tank army this would have been 6-7 tank Divisions. This is truly massive. For the TO&E for soviet divisions in this time period please consult FM-100-2-3.

Now these are just the backbone formations for the attack. The soviets didn't trust the DDR, Czech or Polish units to really fight if it came to it. It is likely therefore that these units would have been driven in front of the soviet formations (at gun point) to soak up ammunition. Add to this the lower echelon formations and the disposable units (Chechnya, Ukraine, Cossacks, white Russians) which would have been pushed forward in front of the major formations. In military doctrine you want to mass 3 to 1 to guarantee a victory, In Germany the soviets could have amassed 15 to 1 odds and local ratios of 30 to 1.

So as to the why the low ground routes are important. The North German plain is too good of tank country, Especially for the defender. The rolling terrain would give excellent fields of fire for defending units to hit soviet formations in the open. The soviet doctrine for attack was to flow like water, or to put it another way thigmotaxis. This is the scuttling behaviour of mice, rats, cockroaches etc. Low ground routes give you the ability to scuttle through and if you hit a hard defence pound it with artillery (which the Soviets had a LOT of).

This is a bit of a simplification, there are other factors going on like concentration through time (like ripples coming up a beach) but it covers the basics.

[Mr_sukebe]

Interesting comment about the use of artillery.

I think that there's a tendency in some DCS missions to focus on blowing up tanks.  My guess is that it would be more likely and appropriate for aircraft to attack the logistics train (softer targets) and also groupings like artillery batteries.

[OneEyeRoss]

Hitting the log trains and the follow on forces was for sure a large part of the plan.  The GSFG weren't expected to carry the whole fight, they depended on the follow on forces getting there.  If you get a chance to check out SideKick's "The Balloon Goes Up" series of missions, they use the Caucasus map to simulate a Sov Attack and that is exactly the scenario - hitting the follow on forces while leaving the FEBA to the grunts and Army air. 

As for the artillery - that was the thing I worried about the most during my time with V Corps.  We calculated the amount of ordinance (in tons) that could be hitting our position - it was not a heartening situation.  (This was 1974 - 1980 time frame).  The BM-21 with a double stack of rockets was the one that worried me the most for some reason.  It only had a 12 mile range, but when you are 18-24 years old thinking about a 720 rocket barrage (one battalion of 18 launchers) hitting your grid square, and you are in a M577 thin skinned command post...